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Abstract
Simple vs. Optimal Mechanism Design
Mingfei Zhao
2021
Mechanism design has found various applications in today’s economy, from ad auctions to online
marketplaces. The goal of mechanism design is to design a mechanism or system such that a group
of strategic agents are incentivized to choose actions that also help achieve the designer’s objective.
However, in many of the mechanism design problems, the theoretically optimal mechanisms are
hard to characterize. They are often too complex to implement in practice.
The focus of this thesis is to resolve the discrepancy between theory and practice by studying the
following questions: Are the mechanisms used in practice close to optimal? Can we design simple
mechanisms to approximate the optimal one? In this thesis we focus on two important mechanism
design settings: multi-item auctions and two-sided markets. We show that in both settings, there
are indeed simple and approximately-optimal mechanisms.
Following Myerson’s seminal result [Mye81], which provides a simple and revenue-optimal auction when a seller is selling a single item to multiple buyers, there has been extensive research effort
on maximizing revenue in multi-item auctions. However, the revenue-optimal mechanism is known
to be complex and randomized [HN13, DDT13]. We provide a unified framework to approximate
the optimal revenue in general multi-item multi-bidder auctions. Our result substantially improves
and extends existing results.
Another line of works in this thesis focuses on two-sided markets. The main difference between
two-sided markets and auctions is that mechanism in two-sided markets is designed by a third
party instead of the seller. The mechanism need to incentivize both buyers and sellers to report
their private information truthfully. The impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83]
shows that even in the most basic bilateral trade setting (1 buyer, 1 seller, 1 item), the full efficiency
is not achievable by a truthful mechanism that does not run a deficit. In this thesis we focus on
approximating the efficiency in terms of the objective of gains from trade. We provide simple

mechanisms that approximate the optimal gains from trade, in bilateral trade and many other
two-sided market settings.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Mechanism Design is a fairly classical field that lies in the intersection of Economics, Game Theory
and Optimization. Unlike most of existing directions in Economics and Game Theory, mechanism
design is referred to as “reverse game theory”: The core problem is how to design the right incentive
structure, so that the group of strategic participants of a system are motivated to take actions that
will help to realize the system designer’s goals.
With the growth of online markets and platforms, mechanism design has become increasingly
important and relevant as demonstrated by its abundant applications including auctioning ad slots
to advertisers on websites (e.g. Google), buying and selling goods in online marketplaces (e.g.
Amazon, eBay), routing internet traffic, scheduling tasks in the cloud, and more. In all these
applications, designing a good mechanism in favor of the designer’s goal is crucial, as it might
cause a difference of billions of dollars. Besides its practical importance, the area also has great
theoretical depth. Despite being a relatively young field, we have already witnessed an explosion
of new technical tools that lead to the resolution of many longstanding open problems in the last
15 years.
The major challenge in mechanism design comes from the misalignment of incentive between
the designer and participants. While the designer aims to implement an outcome in favor of her
objective, the participants pick their actions according to their own preferences (e.g. maximize their
utilities). To address this issue and make participants’ actions predictable, the designed mechanism
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is often required to be truthful, which means that the participants are willing to honestly report
her private preferences. As a seminal result of mechanism design, Vickrey [Vic61], Clarke [Cla71]
and Groves [Gro73] proposed a mechanism that is truthful and maximizes the social welfare - the
sum of the buyers’ values for the chosen outcome - in general mechanism design settings.

Simple vs. Optimal
Clearly, the quality of the solution with respect to the designer’s objective is crucial. However,
one should also pay equal attention to another criterion of a mechanism, that is, its simplicity.
Compared to complicated mechanisms, a simple mechanism has advantages for both the designer
and participants. For the designer, the mechanism with a simple format can be implemented by
people that are not only experts in mechanism design; For participants, when facing a complicated
mechanism, they may be confused by the rules and thus unable to optimize their actions and react
in unpredictable ways instead. This may lead to undesirable outcomes and poor performance of
the mechanism.
The mechanism design community has yet to converge to a single definition of simplicity. Mechanisms designed in this thesis will satisfy the following two appealing properties: (i) The mechanisms
are deterministic, i.e. the outcome of the mechanism is completely determined by its input. In a
deterministic mechanism, participants can easily see their utilities without simulating the execution
of the mechanism with random bits, and thus it’s easier for them to optimize their actions. (ii)
The mechanisms are posted price mechanisms and their variations, i.e., there is a separate price
associated with each good on the market, and each participant can choose their favorite bundles
by paying the according price.
In mechanism design, an ideal mechanism would be both optimal and simple. However, in many
settings, the theoretically optimal mechanisms are complex and randomized. To move forward, one
has to compromise – either settle with optimal but somewhat complex mechanisms or turn to simple
but approximately optimal solutions. In this thesis, we focus on the latter approach. We discuss
two well-motivated mechanism design problems whose optimal solutions are complex: revenue (or
profit) maximization in multi-item auctions, and maximizing gains from trade in two-sided markets.
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We design simple and approximately optimal mechanisms for both problems.

1.1

Revenue Maximization

One fundamental question in mechanism design is how to maximize the revenue of the designer.
In particular, maximizing revenue in multi-item auctions, where a seller is selling multiple items to
a set of buyers, has attracted lots of attention from the mechanism design community.
When there is a single item to sale, the seminal result by Myerson [Mye81] shows that there
is a truthful mechanism of a simple format that maximizes the revenue. After Myerson’s result,
maximizing revenue in multi-item auctions has become one of the central problems over the past
decades. However, no general characterization has been found for the revenue-optimal mechanism.
Moreover, even in fairly basic settings, the revenue-optimal mechanism has been proved to be
complex and suffer many undesirable properties including randomization, non-monotonicity, and
others [RC98, Tha04, Pav11, HN13, HR12, BCKW10, DDT13, DDT14]. To facilitate this discussion,
we focus on the case of two items and a single additive buyer and present some examples. A buyer
is additive if her value for a bundle of items is equal to the sum of her value for each item.

Selling Items Separately is not Optimal: There is a single additive buyer whose value for
each item is drawn independently from the uniform distribution on {1, 2}. Since the items are
independent, the mechanism that sells both items separately becomes a natural candidate. The
optimal revenue by doing so is 2. However, consider the mechanism that offers a take-it-or-leave-it
price 3/2 for both items together. The buyer will accept the price with probability 3/4, which
generates expected revenue 9/4 > 2.
Hart and Nisan [HN13] then showed that when selling m independent items to a single additive
buyer, the optimal revenue by selling items separately can only achieve an O( log1m )-fraction of the
revenue by selling them together at a take-it-or-leave-it price. When m → ∞, the mechanism that
sells items separately could be far from the optimal revenue.
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Randomization: [DDT13] Consider a single additive buyer with 2 items. Her value for item 1
is drawn uniformly from {1, 2} and her value for item 2 is drawn independently and uniformly
from {1, 3}. Then the unique optimal mechanism allows the buyer to choose from the following
three options: receive both items with price 4; or receive the first item and a lottery for the
second item, meaning that the second item is given to buyer with probability 1/2, by paying 2.5; or
receive nothing and pay nothing. Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos further provide an example
with a single additive buyer and two items where the unique optimal mechanism offers a menu of
uncountably many lotteries.
For the above examples, the revenue-optimal mechanism becomes significantly more complex
even when there is a single buyer and two items. There is a line of works characterizing the revenueoptimal mechanisms for this special setting [DDT13, DDT14, TW17, GK14a, GK18, HH19]. But in
general, a simple and optimal solution is unlikely to exist.
To move forward, there has been extensive research effort studying the performance of simple
mechanisms in multi-item auctions through the lens of approximation. However, a constant factor
approximation for the optimal revenue was proved only when buyers’ valuations are unit-demand,
i.e. the buyer is interested in purchasing at most one item, due to a line of work initiated by
Chawla et al. [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15, CDW16], or when buyers are additive due to a series
of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [HN12, CH13, LY13, BILW14, Yao15, CDW16]. Chawla and
Miller [CM16] considered a generalization of additive and unit-demand valuation, proving a constant
factor approximation to the optimal revenue via a variation of posted price mechanism.
Nonetheless, all results above only apply to the settings where buyers have linear valuations,
i.e. each buyer’s value for a bundle of items (which may be subject to some constraint) equals to
the sum of her value for each item in the bundle. On the other hand, buyers in real auctions and
markets often have more complex non-linear valuations. For example, a telecom company has a
certain number of target customers in each city, but also has a capacity on how many customers
its service can support. When the number of customers exceeds the capacity, extending service
to a new city will not increase the value for the company. However, when comes to non-linear
valuations, a constant factor approximation is known only for a single buyer [RW15]. It is a major
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open problem to extend this result to multiple buyers.
Question 1. Is there a simple and truthful mechanism that can approximate the optimal revenue
in multi-item auctions, with multiple buyers who have non-linear valuations?
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we give an affirmative answer to this question:
Informal Theorem 1. There exists a simple and truthful mechanism that achieves a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue, even when there are multiple buyers with fractionally-subadditive1
valuation functions. For a more general subadditive2 valuations, our approximation ratio degrades
to O(log m), where m is the number of items in the auction.
We introduce a new class of mechanisms called sequential posted price with entry fee to approximate the optimal revenue. Informally, the procedure of the mechanism is shown as follows:
Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism (informal)
0:

Before the mechanism starts, the seller designs a posted price for every buyer and every item
in the auction.

1:

Buyers will come to the auction and purchase items sequentially.

2:

When a buyer comes, the seller shows her all remaining items as well as their posted price
dedicated to this buyer.

3:

The buyer is asked to pay an entry fee. If she agrees, then she can enter the mechanism and
take any set of remaining items by paying the posted prices. If she refuses, she gets nothing
and pays 0.

Our mechanism is deterministic and truthful. Moreover, it has a simple format by using posted
prices for separate items and entry fees. In fact, mechanisms of this form have already found broad
real-world applications, for example in Costco and Amazon Prime, where the entry fee can be
viewed as a membership fee.
We prove our result via an extension of the duality framework proposed by Cai et al. [CDW16].
Their framework provided a unified treatment for approximating optimal revenue for additive and
1. Informally, it’s the maximum over linear functions. See Chapter 2 for a formal definition.
2. A buyer has subadditive valuations if the sum of her value for two bundles is at least her value for their union.
The result by Rubinstein and Weinberg [RW15] study this valuation but for a single buyer.
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unit-demand valuations. Roughly speaking, the framework generates a useful benchmark of the
optimal revenue and then designs mechanisms to approximate the benchmark. However, the original
approach by Cai et al. [CDW16] is inadequate to provide an analyzable benchmark, when buyers
have non-linear combinatorial valuations. In this paper, we show how to extend their duality
framework to accommodate general subadditive valuations. Another major contribution of our work
is a novel approach to analyze the benchmark. More specifically, we draw a connection between
approximating our benchmark using the sequential posted price with entry fee mechanisms and
approximating optimal welfare with posted price mechanisms.
Our results substantially improve the approximation ratios for many of the settings studied in
the literature, and in the meantime generalize the results to broader cases. See Chapter 3 for a
detailed comparison between the best ratios reported in the literature and the new ratios obtained
in this thesis.

1.2

A General and Practical Model: Profit Maximization

Most results in mechanism design assume that the seller has no cost to produce or own the items.
However, in real markets, the seller often has its own cost for each item. It may be a production
cost, or an opportunity cost, e.g., there is an outside option to sell the item at a certain price if
the item is unsold in this auction. Motivated by this phenomenon, we also study the multi-item
auctions where the seller has costs for obtaining the items in this thesis. As these costs usually
depend on private information that is only available to the seller, we assume that the costs are
private to the seller but are drawn from a distribution also known to the buyers. The goal is to
design a mechanism that maximizes the profit, that is, the total revenue minus the total cost. We
refer to this problem as Profit Maximization. Revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, one of
the most classical and widely studied problem in mechanism design, is clearly a special case of this
problem, where the seller always has cost 0 for each item.
Despite being realistic and widely applicable, the profit maximization problem is not wellunderstood. To the best of our knowledge, the only case with non-zero and randomized costs that
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has been studied is in the context of ad auctions [BMS12, FJM+ 12, DIR14, EFG+ 14, DPT16]. In
ad auctions, the auctioneer is selling an ad displaying slot to an advertiser and aims to maximize
revenue. There are multiple types of viewers of the webpage. The advertiser has a different value
for displaying his ad to a viewer of different type. In an ad auction, only the auctioneer observes the
type of the viewer, and the advertiser only knows a prior distribution from which the viewer-type
is drawn from. In fact the problem can be easily cast as a special case of the profit maximization
problem by mapping each type of viewer to an item. We will give a more detailed comparison
between profit maximization and ad auctions in Chapter 4.
In revenue maximization, the optimal mechanism is known to be randomized and complex
in multi-item settings. As a more general model, it is clear that the profit-optimal mechanism
also requires complex allocation rules and randomization. Thus following the major and successful
research theme in designing simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms, the thesis aims
to design simple and approximately-optimal mechanisms in profit maximization.
Question 2. In profit maximization, is there a simple and truthful mechanism that approximate
the optimal profit?
Before answering this question, it’s worth to discuss a natural but crucial question raised by
this general setting: Is profit maximization substantially harder than revenue maximization? To
facilitate the discussion, we examine two natural but unsuccessful attempts to solve the profit
maximization problem.
Two unsuccessful attempts:

(i) Use a mechanism that (approximately) optimizes the revenue.

This is a terrible solution as some of the items sold by the mechanism may have extremely high
costs, and as a result the mechanism only generates low if any profit. (ii) After the seller sees the
costs, reveal them to the buyer, then use the (approximately) optimal mechanism that is tailored
to those particular costs. To see why this mechanism can be far away from optimal, let us consider
the following example adapted from [HN17].
Example 1.1. A random variable X with support [1, +∞) follows the equal revenue (ER) distribution if and only if Pr [X ≤ x] = 1 − x1 . Consider a profit maximization problem with m
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heterogeneous items and a single additive buyer. The buyer’s value tj for each item j is drawn from
an ER distribution. Define δj to be the m-dimensional vector whose j-th entry is 0 and all the other
entries are ∞. The seller has a private and random cost vector ~c as follows: ~c = (c1 , ..., cm ) = δj
with probability 1/n for each j.
The expected profit of the mechanism in (ii) is 1, since for every j, after revealing cost δj , the
seller can only sell item j to the buyer, which can generate 1 expected profit.3 However, consider an
alternative mechanism which does not reveal the costs, but offers the buyer the following contract:
if the buyer pays log m/2 up front, the buyer can take any item that is available, e.g. has cost 0.
i
h
1 P
· j∈[m] tj ≥ log2m , and due to [HN17],
The chance that the buyer accepts the contract is Pr m
it is at least 1/2. Hence, the mechanism has profit at least

1
4

· log m.

The two failed attempts highlight two major challenges of profit maximization compared to
revenue maximization: (i) how to balance the revenue and cost; (ii) how to capture the informational
rent of the buyer, leveraging the fact that the costs are private information to extract more revenue.
In Chapter 4, we overcome these two challenges and give an affirmative answer for Question 2:
Informal Theorem 2. In the profit maximization problem, there are simple and truthful mechanisms that achieve a constant fraction of the optimal profit. Our result holds for arbitrary distribution of the cost vector.
To prove our result, we propose a novel mechanism called permit-selling. For the single-buyer
case, an informal procedure of the mechanism is shown as follows:
Permit-Selling Mechanism (informal)
0:

For each item, the mechanism creates a separate permit that allows the buyer to purchase the
item at its cost.

1:

The mechanism first sells the permits without revealing any information about the actual costs.

2:

Then the mechanism reveals all the costs. The buyer can buy each item by only paying the
cost, if the buyer has purchased the permit for this item in the first stage.

3. For every j, the profit of selling item j is maxp p · Pr[tj ≥ p] = 1, since the seller has 0 cost for this item.
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The permit-selling mechanisms can in fact help addressing the two challenges of profit maximization as mentioned. Since in the second stage, the price for each item is the same as the seller’s
cost, the profit of the permit-selling mechanisms is exactly the revenue from the first stage. So any
mechanism that achieves high revenue in the first stage also generates high profit. Moreover, the
buyer needs to make a decision on what permits to purchase without learning the costs, therefore,
the seller can extract the informational rent by pricing the permits appropriately. Indeed, we do not
even need to use any complex pricing scheme in the first stage. We sell the permits separately or sell
them as a grand bundle. To accommodate multiple buyers, we then generalize the permit-selling
mechanisms by selling the permits sequentially.
Similar to revenue maximization, in the proof we first come up with a benchmark of the optimal
profit using the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [CDW16], which has become a standard
tool for analyzing the performance of simple mechanisms. In most of the results based on this
duality approach, a particular family of dual variables is used to provide a benchmark for the
objective function. However, this set of dual variables does not provide an appropriate benchmark
due to the existence of costs. We propose a new set of dual variables that is tailored to handle
the costs. Indeed, these dual variables are so informative that they inspired us to introduce the
permit-selling mechanisms.

1.3

Two-sided Markets

As discussed in previous sections, mechanism design for one-sided markets, where a single seller
owns all the items and designs the mechanism, has been extensively studied in Economics and more
recently investigated in Computer Science. In the past few years, there also has been increasing
interest in understanding how to design mechanisms for two-sided markets. In two-sided markets,
there are two distinct groups of selfish agents in a two-sided market – the sellers and buyers.
Sellers own the items and have costs for parting with the items that they own; buyers have values
for acquiring the items that are on the market. Both sides are assumed to act strategically in order
to maximize their own utilities. The goal is to design a mechanism to facilitate trade between the
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two groups and optimize a certain objective, e.g., efficiency.
Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in today’s economy: take for example the New York Stock
Exchange, online ad exchange platforms (e.g., Google’s Doubleclick, Microsoft’s AdECN, etc.),
where advertisers try to purchase ad slots from websites who wish to sell the slots, crowdsourcing platforms, FCC’s spectrum auctions where the telecommunication companies try to purchase
spectrum from television broadcasting companies, online market places (e.g., Amazon, eBay, etc.)
where buyers and sellers trade on the large-scaled trading platforms, or sharing economy platforms
such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb.
Mechanism design for two-sided markets, where both the buyer(s) and seller(s) are strategic, is
known to be substantially harder than for one-sided markets. The additional challenges stem from
the following requirements:
1. The mechanism must be truthful for both sides of the market;
2. The buyer and seller payments must satisfy budget balance, that is, the mechanism must not
run a deficit.
The limitations of these constraints are best illustrated by the seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83]. They show that even in the most basic two-sided market—bilateral
trade, when one seller is selling a single item to a buyer—no truthful and budget balanced mechanism can achieve full efficiency (the trade is made whenever the buyer’s value is higher than
the seller’s cost). In the same paper, Myerson and Satterthwaite also provided the mechanism
that maximizes the efficiency among all truthful and budget balanced mechanisms (known as the
second-best mechanism). Unfortunately, even in bilateral trade, it’s a non-trivial task to explicitly
describe the second-best mechanism as it requires to solve a system of differential equations that
depend on the buyer’s and seller’s distributions. Such a mechanism is difficult to implement in practice. Motivated by the aforementioned results, we aim to design simple and approximately-optimal
mechanisms in two-sided markets in this thesis.
Gains from Trade: A More Challenging Objective
There are two ways to measure the efficiency of a mechanism in two-sided markets. One is the
10

standard notion of social welfare, which is the sum of the agents’ values/costs of the resulting
allocation. An alternative objective is gains from trade (GFT), which is the social welfare of
the final allocation minus the total cost of the sellers. In other words, the GFT captures how
much more social welfare the mechanism generates. Clearly, the two measures are equivalent when
they are maximized exactly. However, approximating the GFT is much more challenging than
approximating the social welfare. For example, if the buyer’s value is 10 and the seller’s cost is 9,
not trading the item is a 9/10-approximation to the optimal social welfare but an 0-approximation
to the optimal GFT. Obviously, any good approximation to the optimal GFT immediately gives a
good approximation to the optimal social welfare, but the opposite direction is rarely true.
Prior to our work, all results approximating the GFT study the bilateral trade setting, and
rely on assumptions that make the value/cost distributions nice [McA08, BM16, CBGdK+ 17]. One
natural question following their results is whether there are approximation results that work for
arbitrary distributions:
Question 3. In two-sided markets, is there a simple, truthful, and budget balanced mechanism that
achieves an unconditional approximation guarantee for the optimal Gains from Trade?
The last part of this thesis is devoted to approximating GFT in two-sided markets. Our result
gives an affirmative answer to Question 3, for bilateral trade and more general two-sided markets
with multiple agents and multiple items.

1.3.1

Result in Bilateral Trade and Its Generalization (Chapter 5)

For the bilateral trade setting, we consider the following two mechanisms and show that the better
of the two achieves

1
2

of the optimal GFT. The first mechanism is called Seller-Offering (SO),

proposed by Blumroson and Mizrahi [BM16]: The seller offers to sell the item at a take-it-or-leaveit price. The buyer receives the item if she pays the offered price to the seller. Otherwise, the
seller keeps the item and no payment is transferred; The second mechanism Buyer-Offering (BO)
is essentially the same mechanism but with the roles of buyer and seller exchanged: Now the buyer
offers to buy the item at a take-it-or-leave-it price and the item is traded if the seller agrees to sell
at this price. The result is achieved by bounding the GFT of any truthful and budget balanced
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mechanism by the buyer’s utility plus the seller’s utility of this mechanism, and then proving that
both terms can be further upper-bounded by the GFT of the SO and BO mechanisms accordingly.
We extend our result to a more general setting with multiple buyers and sellers, which is known
as the double auction in the literature. In a double auction, each seller is endowed with precisely
one item, all items are identical, and each buyer is interested in buying one item. So, there is a
single number associated with each buyer’s value or seller’s cost. We prove a 2-approximation to
the optimal GFT via a generalization of the SO and BO mechanisms. In this thesis we only present
our result for double auctions. But the result can in fact accommodate any two-sided market where
agents’ type can be described as a scalar.
Informal Theorem 3. In bilateral trade and a more general double auction setting, there is a
simple, truthful and budget balanced mechanism that achieves at least half of the optimal GFT.

1.3.2

Approximating Gains from Trade with Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms (Chapter 6)

The mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 achieves (in expectation) a constant approximation to
the optimal GFT. However, one caveat of this mechanism is that its expected GFT does not
asymptotically converge to the optimal GFT as the market grows large. In fact, even when the
values (or costs) of all agents are sampled i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over [0, 1], the
mechanism will at most achieve a constant fraction (strictly smaller than 1) of the optimal GFT
(see Section 6.4). This caveat makes the mechanism less attractive in real-world applications with
large markets.
On the other hand, the famous Trade Reduction mechanism by McAfee [McA92] in double
auctions does not suffer from the above drawback. It is asymptotically efficient, i.e. the mechanism
gets close-to-optimal GFT when the market size goes large. Moreover, its asymptotically efficiency
guarantee holds for any agents’ profile, while our generalized SO and BO mechanisms in Chapter 5
only have GFT guarantee in expectation over agents’ distributions. However, the trade reduction
mechanism, while asymptotically efficient, fails to give any unconditional approximation to the
GFT in expectation.
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To achieve the best of both worlds, in Chapter 6, we aim to design mechanisms that are
asymptotically efficient, and also achieve a constant factor approximation to the optimal GFT in
expectation. We show that there is a truthful and budget balanced mechanism that achieves both
guarantees in double auctions, and a more general matching market setting, where trade between
some buyer-seller pairs are disallowed.
Informal Theorem 4. There is a simple, truthful and budget balanced mechanism that are asymptotically efficient, and also achieves a constant fraction of the optimal GFT, in double auctions and
matching markets.
Our mechanism combines the generalized offering mechanism presented in Chapter 5 with the
trade reduction mechanism. The major challenge here is truthfulness. Without the truthfulness
restriction, one can simply compare the GFT generated by both mechanisms for every agents’ input,
and then choose to run the mechanism with a higher GFT. However, an agent may misreport her
value (or cost) to make the designer choose the mechanism that gives her higher utility. In our
result, we properly adjust the scenario that items are traded in the offering mechanism, as well as
carefully design the payments to guarantee truthfulness.

1.3.3

Two-sided Markets with Heterogeneous Items (Chapter 7)

In the two-sided markets discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, all items are identical. In Chapter 7
we move on to the setting with heterogeneous items. We design a simple, truthful and budget
balanced mechanism and prove that it approximates the optimal GFT, with an approximation
ratio logarithmic in the number of items. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that
achieves a worst-case approximation guarantee in two-sided markets with heterogeneous items.
Informal Theorem 5. In two-sided markets with heterogeneous items, there is a simple, truthful
and budget balanced mechanism that achieves unconditional approximation to the optimal GFT.
More specifically, we focus on a setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned
by a different seller, and there is a constrained-additive4 buyer. Under this setting, we prove an
4. It’s a natural generalization of unit-demand, additive, and matroid-rank valuations. Informally, the buyer is
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O(log2 (n))-approximation using some simple mechanisms.5
To prove the result, we propose a new class of mechanisms called seller adjusted posted price
(SAPP). It is a variation of posted price mechanisms. Informally, the procedure of the mechanism
is shown as follows:
Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism (informal)
1:

Each seller reports her private cost of her item to the mechanism.

2:

The mechanism designs a posted price for each item according to the reported cost profile.

3:

The mechanism shows to the buyer all the items, together with their posted prices.

4:

The buyer is only allowed to purchase at most one item by paying the posted price for this
item.

Comparing to a classic posted price mechanism where the prices are designed before the mechanism starts, the main advantage of using an SAPP mechanism is that it provides the flexibility to
set prices based on the sellers’ cost, which allows an SAPP mechanism to achieve a higher GFT.
An astute reader may have already realized that the amount of money that sellers gain are not yet
defined in the SAPP mechanism. In fact, it is the major technical challenge to carefully design the
adjusted prices as well as the sellers’ gains, to make the mechanism truthful and budget balanced.
We postpone a more detailed discussion in Chapter 7.

1.4

Thesis Organization

In Chapter 2, we introduce all mechanism design concepts, definitions and technical background
that are needed to read this thesis. Then we overview the related work on both lines of work:
multi-item auctions and two-sided markets.
In Chapter 3, we present our result for revenue maximization in multi-item auctions. We
first review the duality framework of [CDW16]. Then we derive an upper bound of the optimal
only interested in a set of items subject to some downward-closed constraint, and is additive over the items. See
Chapter 2 for a formal definition.
5. Our approximation ratio is O(log(n)) for a broad class of constraints (such as matroid, matching, knapsack, or
the intersection of these).
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revenue for subadditive buyers by combining the duality framework with our new techniques. To
familiarize the readers with some basic ideas and techniques used to bound the benchmark, we first
give our proof for the single buyer case. Then we show how to upper bound the optimal revenue
for multiple fractionally-subadditive (or subadditive) buyers with our sequential posted price with
entry fee mechanisms.
In Chapter 4, we present our results for profit maximization. We first introduce a benchmark of
the optimal profit by extending the duality framework of [CDW16] to our profit setting. And then
we show how to bound the benchmark with the permit-selling mechanisms. After that, we design
simple mechanisms to approximate the benchmark for both the single-buyer and multiple-buyer
case.
Starting from Chapter 5, we discuss approximating GFT in two-sided markets. In Chapter 5, we
first prove a 2-approximation in the bilateral trade setting. And then we generalize this result to the
double auction setting with an arbitrary trading constraint. In Chapter 6, we design asymptotically
efficient mechanisms to approximate GFT. We first show by an example that the GFT of the
mechanism we design in Chapter 5 does not converge to the optimal GFT when the market goes
large. Then we design a truthful and budget balanced mechanism that are both approximatelyoptimal and asymptotically efficient in double auctions and a more general setting called matching
market.
In Chapter 7, we present the results for two-sided markets with heterogeneous items. We start
by proving a distribution-parameterized approximation to the optimal GFT. Then we prove an
unconditional O(log2 n)-approximation by using the first result. At the end of this chapter, we
draw a connection between a lower bound to our analysis and one of the major open problems in
a special matching market.
In Chapter 8, we give a conclusion of this thesis and list some open questions following from
our results.
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Chapter 2

Background
In this chapter we introduce some basic definitions and notations, as well as useful tools in the
literature that are needed to read this thesis. Then we overview the related work on both lines of
works that this thesis focuses on: multi-item auctions and two-sided markets.

2.1

Basic Concepts in Mechanism Design

In this section we give the definition of basic concepts in mechanism design.

Agent’s type:

The type of an agent contains all of her private information in order to design

mechanisms. A type profile is a collection of types of all agents.

Single-Dimensional vs. Multi-Dimensional:

A mechanism design problem is called single-

dimensional if the type of every agent can be described as a scalar. An example of the singledimensional setting is single-item auction, where a seller is selling a single item. On the other
hand, the problem is called multi-dimensional if the type is described as a vector of numbers.

Bayesian setting: Throughout this thesis, we consider mechanism design problems in a Bayesian
setting, i.e. the type of each agent is drawn from some distribution that is known to the public.
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(Direct) Mechanism:

A mechanism takes inputs from all agents (called bid or report), decides

an outcome (called allocation rule), and then charges each agent some payment (called payment
rule).

Agent’s value: An agent’s value maps a tuple of her type and an outcome to a non-negative
real number, which represents how much happiness the buyer has for this outcome. The agent is
risk-neutral, meaning that her value for a randomized allocation equals to the expectation of her
value over the randomness of the allocation.

Agent’s utility: An agent’s utility maps a tuple of her type, an outcome and a payment to a
real number. An strategic agent aims to maximize her utility in any mechanism she joins. In this
thesis, we assume that every agent has quasi-linear utility, which means that her utility equals to
her value minus the payment.

Truthfulness/Incentive compatibility:

A mechanism is truthful or incentive compatible (IC)

if for every agent, reporting her type truthfully maximizes her utility. There are two IC concepts
we consider in this thesis:
• Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC): For every agent, reporting her type truthfully maximizes her expected utility if other agents also report truthfully. The expectation is taken over
the distribution of other agents’ types and the randomness of the mechanism.
• Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC): For every agent, reporting her type truthfully maximizes her utility for any reported profile of other agents.

Individual Rationality (IR):

A mechanism is individual rational (also called interim individual

rational or interim IR) if for every agent, reporting her type truthfully gives her non-negative utility
in expectation over other agents’ types. A mechanism is ex-post IR if for every agent, reporting
her type truthfully gives her non-negative utility for any reported profile of other agents.
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Revelation Principle:

A mechanism can have a more complicated format than a direct mech-

anism that simply asks the buyers to submit their types. Myerson introduced the revelation principle [Mye79], which states that every incomplete information game can be simulated by a direct
mechanism. Thus throughout this thesis, we will, without loss of generality, focus on direct and
truthful mechanisms.

2.2

Background of Multi-Item Auctions

In multi-item auctions, there are n buyers and m heterogenous items. For every buyer i, we denote
her type ti as htij im
j=1 , where tij is buyer i’s private information about item j. For each i, j, we
assume tij is drawn independently from the distribution Dij . Let Di = ×m
j=1 Dij be the distribution
of buyer i’s type and D = ×ni=1 Di be the distribution of the type profile. We use Tij (or Ti , T )
and fij (or fi , f ) to denote the support and density function of Dij (or Di , D). For notational
convenience, we let t−i to be the types of all buyers except i and t<i (or t≤i ) to be the types of the
first i − 1 (or i) buyers. Similarly, we define D−i , T−i and f−i for the corresponding distributions,
support sets and density functions.
Throughout this thesis, we use the notation [k] = {1, 2, ..., k} for any positive integer k.

Valuation Function:

The buyer’s valuation is a function that maps each type t and a subset

of items S ∈ [m] to a positive number, which represents how much she values the bundle S when
her type is t. For every buyer i with type ti , her valuation for a subset of items S is denoted by
vi (ti , S).
Independent System and Matroid:

Given a finite ground set I, a set system F ⊆ 2I is a

family of subsets of I. F is called downward-closed if for every S ∈ F, we have S 0 ∈ F, ∀S 0 ⊆ S.
The pair (I, F) is called a matroid if it satisfies all of the following properties:
1. ∅ ∈ F.
2. F is downward-closed.
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3. F has exchange property: For every S, S 0 ∈ F and |S 0 | > |S|, there exists e ∈ S 0 \S such that
S ∪ {e} ∈ F.
In the thesis we say F is a matroid constraint with respect to I if (I, F) forms a matroid.

Hierarchy of the Valuation Functions: Throughout this thesis, every buyer in the auction
has a valuation that is subadditive over independent items:
Definition 2.1. [RW15] For every buyer, whose type t is drawn from a product distribution D
with support T , her valuation function v(t, ·) is subadditive over independent items if:
• v(·, ·) has no externalities, i.e., for each t ∈ T and S ⊆ [m], v(t, S) only depends on htj ij∈S ,
formally, for any t0 ∈ T such that t0j = tj for all j ∈ S, v(t0 , S) = v(t, S).
• v(·, ·) is monotone, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], v(t, U ) ≤ v(t, V ).
• v(·, ·) is subadditive, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U, V ⊆ [m], v(t, U ∪ V ) ≤ v(t, U ) + v(t, V ).
We give a formal definition of different classes of buyer’s valuation covered in this thesis.
Definition 2.2. Let t be the type and v(t, S) be the value for bundle S ∈ [m].
• Additive: v(t, S) =

P

j∈S

v(t, {j}).

• Unit-demand: v(t, S) = maxj∈S v(t, {j}).
• Constrained Additive: v(t, S) = maxR⊆S,R∈I

P

j∈R v(t, {j}),

where I ⊆ 2[m] is a downward-

closed set system over the items specifying the feasible bundles (called feasibility constraint).
The valuation function is called matroid-rank if I is a matroid. An equivalent way to represent
any constrained additive valuations is to view the function as additive but the bidder is only
allowed to receive bundles that are feasible, i.e., bundles in I.
• XOS/Fractionally Subadditive: v(t, S) = maxi∈[K] v (i) (t, S), where K is some finite number
and v (i) (t, ·) is an additive function for any i ∈ [K].

20

• Subadditive: v(t, S1 ∪ S2 ) ≤ v(t, S1 ) + v(t, S2 ) for any S1 , S2 ⊆ [m].
Constrained additive valuation is a generalization of additive and unit-demand valuation by
choosing I = 2[m] and I = {{j} | j ∈ [m]} accordingly. We notice that since the valuation has
no externalities, vi (ti , {j}) only depends on tij for all buyer i. To ease notations, for constrained
additive valuations, we interpret ti as an m-dimensional vector (ti1 , ti2 , · · · , tim ) such that tij =
vi (ti , {j}) is buyer i’s value for item j.
Mechanisms:

A mechanism M in multi-item auctions can be described as a tuple (x, p). For

every type profile t, buyer i and bundle S ⊆ [m], xiS (t) is the probability of buyer i receiving
the exact bundle S at profile t, pi (t) is the payment for buyer i at the same type profile. To ease
notations, for every buyer i and types ti , we use pi (ti ) = Et−i [pi (ti , t−i )] as the interim price paid
by buyer i and σiS (ti ) = Et−i [xiS (ti , t−i )] as the interim probability of receiving the exact bundle
S.
IC and IR constraints:
X

A mechanism M = (x, p) is BIC if:
X

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (ti ) ≥

S⊆[m]

σiS (t0i ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (t0i ), ∀i, ti , t0i ∈ Ti .

S⊆[m]

The mechanism is DSIC if:
X

xiS (ti , t−i )·vi (ti , S)−pi (ti , t−i ) ≥

S⊆[m]

X

xiS (t0i , t−i )·vi (ti , S)−pi (t0i , t−i ), ∀i, ti , t0i ∈ Ti , t−i ∈ T−i .

S⊆[m]

The mechanism is (interim) IR if:
X

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (ti ) ≥ 0, ∀i, ti ∈ Ti .

S⊆[m]

The mechanism is ex-post IR if:
X

xiS (ti , t−i ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (ti , t−i ) ≥ 0, ∀i, ti ∈ Ti , t−i ∈ T−i .

S⊆[m]
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Designer’s Objectives:

Given a BIC and IR mechanism, the social welfare of this mechanism

is the expected sum of buyers’ value over the distributions of buyers. Formally, the social welfare
of a mechanism M = (x, p) is

Et∈T





X X
X
X

xiS (t) =
Eti ∈Ti 
σiS (ti )
i

i

S⊆[m]

S⊆[m]

The revenue of this mechanism is the expected sum of buyers’ payment over the distributions
of buyers. Formally,
Rev(M ) = Et∈T

"
X

#
pi (t) =

X

i

2.3

Eti ∈Ti [pi (ti )]

i

Myerson’s Result

In this section we present the celebrated result by Myerson [Mye81] in single-item auctions. Note
that the result also applies to any single-dimensional settings.

Mechanism in Single-Item Auction: Given any mechanism M = (x, p). For every buyer i,
xi (t) denote the probability that buyer i wins the item under type profile t, and pi (t) denote her
payment. Let xi (ti ) = Et−i [xi (t)] be the interim probability that buyer i wins the item and let
pi (ti ) = pi (t) be her interim payment.
Properties of Allocation Rule: An allocation rule x is implementable if there exists a payment
rule p such that M = (x, p) is DSIC and ex-post IR. An allocation rule x is monotone if for every
buyer i and t−i , xi (ti , t−i ) is non-decreasing on ti .
Myerson’s result [Mye81] gives an exact characterization of implementable allocation rule in
single-item auction.
Lemma 2.1. [Mye81] An allocation rule x is implementable if and only if x is monotone. Moreover, the payment rule p such that M = (x, p) is DSIC and ex-post IR is defined as follows:
Z
pi (ti , t−i ) = ti · xi (ti , t−i ) −

xi (y, t−i )dy − θ
0
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ti

for any θ ≥ 0. We refer to it as Myerson’s payment identity.

Revenue vs. Virtual Welfare:

For any BIC and IR mechanism M = (x, p), the expected

revenue equals to the expected “virtual welfare” for particular virtual value functions. Formally,
X

Eti [pi (ti )] =

i

Myerson’s Virtual Value Function:

X

Eti [xi (ti ) · ϕi (ti )].

i

ϕi (ti ) = ti −

1−Fi (ti )
fi (ti )

is called Myerson’s virtual value

function with respect to distribution Di .
According to Lemma 2.1, the revenue-optimal mechanism in single-item auction (Myerson’s
auction) is defined as follows:
Myerson’s Mechanism in Single-item Auction
1:

Each buyer i reports her value ti to the mechanism.

2:

The mechanism calculates the Myerson’s virtual value ϕi (ti ) for every buyer i.

3:

The mechanism allocates the item to buyer i with the highest ϕi (ti ) (break ties arbitrarily) if
maxj ϕj (tj ) > 0. Otherwise, the mechanism don’t allocate the item.

4:

The payment for each buyer follows from Lemma 2.1.

Given any distribution Di , we say Di is regular if ϕi (ti ) is monotone non-decreasing. When Di
is regular for all i, the allocation rule defined above is indeed monotone. For general distributions,
the allocation may not be monotone, and thus not implementable. Instead, Myerson performed an
“ironing procedure” [Mye81] on the virtual value functions to get a monotone allocation rule.

Ironing:

Consider a distribution D with cdf F and pdf f . Consider the quantile space for distri-

bution D: For any q ∈ [0, 1], let R(q) = q · F −1 (1 − q). By taking derivative, one can easily check
that R0 (q) = ϕ(F −1 (1 − q)) holds for every q. Thus ϕ(·) is non-decreasing if and only if R(·) is
concave. Let R̃(q) = maxq1 ,q2 ∈[0,1] (δ · R(q1 ) + (1 − δ) · R(q2 )), where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique value
such that q = δ · q1 + (1 − δ) · q2 . Now R̃(·) is a concave curve. The Myerson’s ironed virtual value
function is defined as ϕ̃(b) = R̃0 (1 − F (b)).

23

2.4

Background of Two-sided Markets

Two-sided Markets: We use m to denote the number of sellers and n to denote the number of
buyers. For each seller j (or buyer i), her type sj (or type bi ), is drawn independently from her
S
B
n
B
type distribution DjS (or DiB ). Let DS = ×m
j=1 Dj and D = ×i=1 Di be the product distribution
S (or D B ) be
of sellers’ and buyers’ type profile respectively. For notational convenience, let D−j
−i

the distribution of types of all sellers (or buyers) except j (or i). We use TjS (or T S , TiB , T B ,
S , T B ) and f S (or f S , f B , f B , f S , f B ) to denote the support and density function of D S (or
T−j
−i
j
i
−j
−i
j
S , D B ). Let D = (D S , D B ).
DS , DiS , DB , D−j
−i

Double Auction: Double auction is a special case of two-sided markets, where sellers are unitsupply with identical items and buyers are unit-demand. In other words, each seller only owns one
item, and each buyer only wishes to buy one item and treat all the items as the same. This is
a single-dimensional setting as every buyer’s type and each seller’s type can be represented as a
scalar. For each buyer i, bi is the value of buyer i if she gets an item. For each seller j, sj is her
value for the item she owns. To distinguish from buyer’s value, we refer to sj as seller j’s cost.
Let V = {(i, j) | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]} be the set of all possible trading pairs between the sellers and
buyers. We use F ⊆ 2V to denote the trading constraint. More specifically, F is a set system that
contains all of the feasible sets of seller-buyer pairs that can be traded simultaneously. We allow
any F that satisfies the following two properties:
• Every S ∈ F is a matching, in other words, for every buyer i there is at most one seller
j ∈ [m] such that (i, j) ∈ S. Same for the sellers.
• F is downward closed, i.e., if S ∈ F, and S 0 ⊆ S, then S 0 ∈ F.
We refer to this setting as double auction with trading constraint F. In the (classic) double auction,
any matching is in F, indicating that any buyer can trade with any seller.

Bilateral trade:

It’s the simplest setting in two-sided markets, with a single buyer, a single

seller, and a single item. It’s a special case of double auction when n = m = 1.
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Mechanisms in Double Auctions: Any mechanism in double auctions (with trading constraint
F) can be specified as a tuple (A, pB , pS ), where A represents the allocation rule, pB and pS are
the payment rule for buyers and sellers. Given a type profile s and b, A(b, s) ∈ F is a (random)
matching that contains all the pairs of sellers and buyers who trade with each other under this type
profile. In other words, for every pairs (i, j) ∈ A(b, s), buyer i receives the item from seller j and
S
pays pB
i (b, s) to the mechanism. pj (b, s) is the amount of money seller j gains from the mechanism.
B
For notational convenience, we slightly abuse notation to let pB
i (bi ) = Eb−i ,s [pi (bi , b−i , s)] be buyer

i’s expected payment when she reports type bi , over the randomness of mechanism and other agents’
types. Similarly, let pSj (sj ) be seller j’s expected gains when she reports type sj .
In our analysis, we usually use an alternative representation of the allocation rule. For any type
profile b and s, for every i ∈ [n], we use xB
i (b, s) to denote the probability that buyer i gets an item
under this type profile, i.e., the probability that (i, j) ∈ A(b, s) for some j. Similarly, for every
j ∈ [m], we use xSj (b, s) to denote the probability that seller j sells her item. Given a mechanism
(xB , xS , pB , pS ), for every type profile (b, s), buyer i’s utility is her value minus payment, which is
B
S
S
bi · xB
i (b, s) − pi (b, s), and seller j’s utility is her gain minus cost, which is pj (b, s) − sj · xj (b, s).
B
We again slightly abuse notation to let xB
i (bi ) = Eb−i ,s [xi (bi , b−i , s)] be the interim probability

that buyer i gets an item when she reports type bi , over the randomness of mechanism and other
agents’ types. Similarly, let xSj (sj ) be seller j’s interim probability to sell her item when she reports
type sj .
An allocation rule x = (xB , xS ) is monotone if for every buyer i ∈ [n], xB
i (bi , b−i , s) is nondecreasing in bi for any fixed b−i and s, and for every seller j ∈ [m], xSj (b, sj , s−j ) is non-increasing
in sj for any fixed b and s−j .
Budget Balance Constraints:

We give formal definitions of variants of the budget balance

constraints. In Section 5.4, we discuss the connections between these variants.
• Strong Budget Balance (SBB): Under any type profile, the sum of all buyers’ (expected)
payment is equal to the sum of all sellers’ (expected) gains, over the randomness of mechanism.
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Formally,
X

pB
i (b, s) =

i

X

pB
j (b, s), ∀b, s

j

• Weak Budget Balance (WBB): Under any type profile, the sum of all buyers’ (expected)
payment is at least the sum of all sellers’ (expected) gains, over the randomness of mechanism.
Formally,
X

pB
i (b, s) ≥

i

X

pB
j (b, s), ∀b, s

j

• Ex-ante Strong Budget Balance (Ex-ante SBB): The sum of all buyers’ expected payment is equal to the sum of all sellers’ expected gains, over the randomness of mechanism
and the type profile of all agents. Formally,


X
X

Eb∼DB ,s∼DS 
pB
pB
i (b, s) −
j (b, s) = 0
i

j

• Ex-ante Weak Budget Balance (Ex-ante WBB): The sum of all buyers’ expected payment is at least the sum of all sellers’ expected gains, over the randomness of mechanism and
the type profile of all agents. Formally,


X
X

Eb∼DB ,s∼DS 
pB
pB
i (b, s) −
j (b, s) ≥ 0
i

Gains from Trade (GFT):

j

Gains from trade describes the gains of social welfare induced by the

mechanism. Formally, given a mechanism M = (A, pB , pS ), the expected GFT for the mechanism
is defined as


GFT(M ) = Eb∼DB ,s∼T S 


X

(bi − sj )

(2.1)

(i,j)∈A(b,s)

or using the definition of xB , xS ,


n
m
X
X
GFT(M ) = Eb∼DB ,s∼T S 
xB
xSj (b, s) · sj 
i (b, s) · bi −
i=1
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j=1

(2.2)

2.4.1

Impossibility Result by Myerson and Satterthwaite

In this section we overview the impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83] in bilateral trade. We will use b and s to represent the buyer and seller’s type accordingly. In any
mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ) in bilateral trade, for every type profile (b, s), x(b, s) is the probability
that the item is traded. pB (b, s) and pS (b, s) are the payments. For simplicity, for every b let
xB (b) = Es [x(b, s)], pB (b) = Es [pB (b, s)] be the buyer’s interim allocation and payment. Similarly,
let xS (s) = Eb [x(b, s)], pS (s) = Eb [pS (b, s)] for every s.
Given any allocation rule x, we say x is implementable if there exists a payment rule p = pB =
pS , such that M = (x, p) is BIC, IR and SBB.
Theorem 2.1. [MS83] (Impossibility Result) In bilateral trade, consider the allocation rule x such
that x(b, s) = 1[b ≥ s] for all b and s. Then x is not implementable.
First-best vs. Second-best: The impossibility result distinguishes two maximum GFT in twosided markets. The first-best GFT (denoted as FB-GFT) is defined as the maximum expected
GFT without any constraint. In double auctions with trading constraint F, we have




FB-GFT = Eb∼DB ,s∼T S max
A∈F

X

(bi − sj )

(i,j)∈A

On the other hand, the second-best GFT (denoted as SB-GFT) is defined as the maximum expected
GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism.
In the same paper, they also presented an exact characterization of implementable allocation
rules.
Theorem 2.2. [MS83] In bilateral trade, an allocation rule x is implementable if and only if
• xB (b) is non-decreasing on b. xS (s) is non-increasing on sj .
• Eb∼DB ,s∼DS [x(b, s) · (ϕ(b) − τ (s))] ≥ 0.
Here ϕ(·) is the Myerson’s virtual value function for DB , i.e. ϕ(b) = b −
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1−F B (b)
, ∀b.
f B (b)

τ (·) is

an analogous definition for the seller. We will refer to it as the Myerson’s virtual cost function for
DS . For every s, τ (s) = s +

F S (s)
.
f S (s)

Theorem 2.2 can be proved using the following lemma, which is known as the Myerson’s lemma
for two-sided markets.
Lemma 2.2. [MS83] For any BIC, IR mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ) in bilateral trade, we have
1. xB (b) is non-decreasing on b. xS (s) is non-increasing on sj .
2. For every b,
B

B

b

Z

p (b) = b · x (b) −

xB (t)dt − θ,

(2.3)

xS (t)dt + η,

(2.4)

0

where θ is some non-negative constant.
3. For every s,
S

Z

S

p (s) = s · x (s) +

∞

s

where η is some non-negative constant.
Furthermore, if (pB , pS ) satisfies Equation (5.2) and (5.3), then


Eb [pB (b)] = Eb xB (b) · ϕ(b) − θ


Es [pS (s)] = Es xS (s) · τ (s) + η

2.5
2.5.1

(2.5)

Related Work
Revenue Maximization in Multi-item Auctions

In recent years, we have witnessed several breakthroughs in designing (approximately) optimal
mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings.

The black-box reduction by Cai et al. [CDW12a,

CDW12b, CDW13a, CDW13b] shows that we can reduce any Bayesian mechanism design problem to a similar algorithm design problem via convex optimization. Through their reduction, it
is proved that all optimal mechanisms can be characterized as a distribution of virtual welfare
maximizers, where the virtual valuations are computed by an LP. Although this characterization
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provides important insights about the structure of the optimal mechanism, the optimal allocation
rule is unavoidably randomized and might still be complex as the virtual valuations are only a
solution of an LP.
Another line of work considers the “Simple vs. Optimal” auction design problem. For instance, a
sequence of results [CHK07,CHMS10,CMS10,CMS15] show that sequential posted price mechanism
can achieve

1
33.75

of the optimal revenue, whenever the buyers have unit-demand valuations over

independent items. Another series of results [HN12, CH13, LY13, BILW14, Yao15] show that the
better of selling the items separately and running the VCG mechanism with per bidder entry fee
achieves

1
69

of the optimal revenue, whenever the buyers’ valuations are additive over independent

items. Cai et al. [CDW16] unified the two lines of results and improved the approximation ratios
to

1
8

for the additive case and

1
24

for the unit-demand case using their duality framework.

Works in the literature have shown that simple mechanisms can approximate the optimal revenue even when buyers have more sophisticated valuations. For instance, Chawla and Miller [CM16]
showed that the sequential two-part tariff mechanism can approximate the optimal revenue when
buyers have matroid rank valuation functions over independent items. Their mechanism requires
every buyer to pay an entry fee up front, and then run a sequential posted price mechanism on
buyers who have accepted the entry fee. Our sequential posted price with entry fee mechanism
is similar to their mechanism, but with the following major difference: since buyers are asked to
pay the entry fee before the seller visits them, the buyers have to make their decisions based on
the expected utility (assuming every other buyer behaves truthfully) they can receive. Hence, the
mechanism is only guaranteed to be BIC and interim IR. While in our mechanism, the buyers
can see what items are still available before paying the entry fee, therefore the decision making is
straightforward and our mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR. For valuations beyond matroid rank
functions, Rubinstein and Weinberg [RW15] showed that for a single buyer whose valuation is subadditive over independent items, either grand bundling or selling the items separately achieves at
least

1
338

of the optimal revenue.

Our results in Chapter 3 draw a connection between approximating our benchmark using the
sequential posted price with entry fee mechanisms and approximating optimal welfare with posted
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price mechanisms. A great work by Feldman et al. [FGL15] proved an approximation ratio of
2 (or O(log m)) to the optimal welfare via posted price mechanisms, for fractionally-subadditive
(or subadditive) buyers. Their results help us to prove the desired approximation to the optimal
revenue. A recent breakthrough by Dutting et al. [DKL20] improved the approximating ratio for
welfare to O(log log m), when the buyer is subadditive. In the same paper, they also proved an
O(log log m)-approximation to the optimal revenue, following a similar approach to the conference
version of our work [CZ17].
The Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [CDW16] has been applied to other intriguing
Mechanism Design problems. For example, Eden et al. showed that the better of selling separately
and bundling together gets an O(d)-approximation for a single bidder with “complementarity-d
valuations over independent items” [EFF+ 16b]. The same authors also proved a Bulow-Klemperer
result for regular i.i.d. and constrained additive bidders [EFF+ 16a]. Liu and Psomas provided a
Bulow-Klemperer result for dynamic auctions [LP16]. Finally, Brustle et al. [BCWZ17] extended the
duality framework to two-sided markets and used it to design simple mechanisms for approximating
the Gains from Trade.
Strong duality frameworks have recently been developed for one additive buyer [DDT13,DDT15,
Gia14, GK14b, GK15]. These frameworks show that the dual problem of revenue maximization can
be viewed as an optimal transport/bipartite matching problem. Hartline and Haghpanah provided
an alternative duality framework in [HH15]. They showed that if certain paths exist, these paths
provide a witness of the optimality of a certain Myerson-type mechanism, but these paths are not
guaranteed to exist in general. Similar to the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg framework, Carroll [Car15] independently made use of a partial Lagrangian over incentive constraints. These duality frameworks
have been successfully provide conditions under which a certain type of mechanism is optimal when
there is a single unit-demand or additive bidder. However, none of these frameworks succeeds in
yielding any approximately optimal results in multi-buyer settings.
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2.5.2

Profit Maximization

The ad auction problem has been extensively studied in the literature [BMS12, FJM+ 12, DIR14,
EFG+ 14, DPT16]. Signaling mechanisms had been the focus. In a signaling mechanism, the seller
first sends a signal to the buyer based on the type of the viewer and according to a signaling scheme
known to the buyer. The buyer updates her posterior belief of the viewer type after observing the
signal. The seller then uses a mechanism tailored to the buyer’s updated posterior to sell the ad
displaying slot. Many results have been obtained regarding the revenue-optimal signaling scheme.
Overall, the optimal signaling scheme may be highly complex and hard to pin down. Interestingly,
Daskalakis et al. showed that even if we can find the optimal signaling scheme the corresponding
mechanism can still be bounded away from the optimum [DPT16]. They showed that the optimal
mechanism is direct and does not involve any signaling. Motivated by their result, we focus on
simple and direct mechanisms.
In [DPT16], they also showed how to use simple mechanisms to approximate the auctioneer’s
profit in an ad auction. They established the result by reducing the problem to revenue maximization in multi-item auctions with an additive buyer. However, their reduction is ad-hoc and heavily
relies on a specific property of their cost distribution, that is, the cost is always one of the δi s (see
Example 1.1 for the definition). When the cost distribution is general, their reduction no longer
holds, and thus is inapplicable to our problem.
Another result that is related to ours is [MSL15]. They consider the problem of maximizing
profit for the single additive buyer case, when the seller has a fixed production cost for each item.
They propose a mechanism called Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC), where after
buying the bundle, the customer is allowed to return any subset of goods for their production cost.
They prove that such a mechanism is almost optimal for a large number of independent goods,
and the better of a PBDC mechanism and the mechanism that sells items separately is a constant
factor approximation for the optimal profit. For the single buyer and fixed cost case, their PBDC
mechanism is identical to our permit-bundling mechanism. In our paper, we focus on a more general
setting with multiple buyers and non-fixed costs.
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2.5.3

Two-sided Markets

Gains from Trade:

The main related works are on worst-case GFT approximation. Blumrosen

and Mizrahi [BM16] guarantee an e-approximation to the first-best GFT in the setting of bilateral
trade—one buyer, one seller, one item—when the buyer’s distribution satisfies the monotone hazard
rate condition. Colini-Baldeschi et al. [CBGdK+ 17] show that a simple fixed price mechanism
obtains an O( 1r )-approximation to GFT in the bilateral trade and double auction settings, but a
more careful setting of the fixed price gives an O(log 1r )-approximation for bilateral trade. Our
result in Chapter 7 generalizes the O(log 1r )-approximation of [CBGdK+ 17] to multi-dimensional
settings, while providing an unconditional O(log n)-approximation.
Other lines of work provide (1) asymptotic approximation guarantees in the number of items
optimally traded for settings as general as multi-unit buyers and sellers and k types of items
[McA92,SHA18b,SHA18a], (2) dual asymptotic and worst-case guarantees for double auctions and
matching markets [BCGZ18], and (3) Bulow-Klemperer-style guarantees of the number of additional
buyers (or sellers) needed in double auctions in order for the GFT of the new setting running a
simple mechanism to beat the first-best GFT of the original setting [BGG20].

Multi-Dimensional Revenue: In the setting where one seller owns all of the items, has no cost
for the items, and is the mechanism designer, much more is known. However, even when selling
to a single additive bidder (e.g. with no feasibility constraints), posted prices can achieve at best
an O(log n)-approximation [HN12, LY13]. In order to obtain a constant-factor approximation for
an additive buyer, Babaioff et al. [BILW14] use the better of posted prices and posting a price
on the grand bundle, and a variation works for a single subadditive (which includes constrainedadditive) buyer as well [RW15]. However, in a two-sided market where items are owned by separate
sellers, it is not clear how to implement bundling in an incentive-compatible way. The mechanisms
used to obtain constant-approximations for multiple constrained-additive, XOS, or subadditive
buyers [CM16, CZ17] are only more complex.
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Welfare in Two-Sided Markets: Colini-Baldeschi et al. [CdKLT16] consider welfare maximization in the double auction setting with matroid feasibility constraints. They generalize sequential
posted price mechanisms (SPMs) to the two-sided market setting, guaranteeing a constant-factor
approximation to welfare. The mechanism posts prices for each buyer-seller combination (not just
for each item), visits the buyers and sellers simultaneously in the given order, and advances on
either side when the price is rejected. Trade occurs when both sides accept the trade. Follow up
work of Colini-Baldeschi et al. [CBGK+ 20] generalizes the idea to the setting where buyers are
XOS and sellers are additive. Here, there is a posted price for each item, but only “high welfare”
items are considered. The buyers visit and pick out the bundles they want among the high welfare
items. Then sellers are given the opportunity to sell their entire bundle of items demanded by the
buyers (but not any subset), and they are skipped with some probability. Like the previous work,
this mechanism is ex-post IR, DSIC, and strongly BB (buyer payments equal seller payments). As
only “high welfare” items are considered, it is possible for their mechanism to not trade any item
when the minimum trade probability r is a constant.
Blumrosen and Dobzinski [BD16] give an IR, BIC, and strongly BB mechanism for bilateral
trade that obtains in expectation a constant-fraction of the optimal welfare. Dütting et al. [DRT14]
study welfare maximization in the prior-free setting and present DSIC, IR, and weakly BB (buyer
payments exceed seller payments) mechanisms for double auctions with feasibility constraints on
either side.

2.6

Lagrangian Duality

In this section we give a brief introduction of the partial Lagrangian dual of a linear program. We
will use these definitions and properties in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
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We consider the following linear program (primal) with variable x.

max f (x)
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x∈P

Denote x∗ the optimal solution of the primal. We take the partial Lagrangian dual by using
the Lagrangian multiplier λi for each constraint (Ax)i ≤ bi :
Partial Lagrangian Dual:

minλ≥0 maxx∈P L(x, λ), where L(x, λ) = f (x) + λT (b − Ax).

For every feasible dual solution λ ≥ 0, let D(λ) = maxx∈P L(x, λ). Denote λ∗ the optimal dual
solution: λ∗ ∈ minλ≥0 D(λ).
Weak Duality: For any feasible dual solution λ, it holds that f (x∗ ) ≤ D(λ).
Proof.
D(λ) ≥ L(x∗ , λ) = f (x∗ ) + λT (b − Ax∗ ) ≥ f (x∗ )

Strong Duality:

The value of the primal equals to the value of the partial Lagrangian dual. In

other words, f (x∗ ) = D(λ∗ ) = minλ≥0 maxx∈P L(x, λ).

2.7

Online Contention Resolution Scheme

In this section, we introduce a useful technique in mechanism design called online contention
resolution scheme (OCRS). It was first studied by Feldman et al. [FSZ16].
An OCRS is an algorithm defined for the following online selection problem: There is a ground
set I, and the elements are revealed one by one, with item i active with probability xi independent
of the other items. The algorithm is only allowed to accept active elements and has to irrevocably
make a decision whether to accept an element before the next one is revealed. Moreover, the
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algorithm can only accept a set of elements subject to a feasibility constraint F. We use the vector
x to denote active probabilities for the elements and R(x) to denote the random set of active
elements.
Definition 2.3 (relaxation). We say that a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]|I| is a relaxation of PF if it contains
the same {0, 1}-points, i.e., P ∩ {0, 1}|I| = PF ∩ {0, 1}|I| .
Definition 2.4. An Online Contention Resolution Scheme (OCRS) for a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]|I| and
feasibility constraint F is an online algorithm that selects a feasible and active set S ⊆ R(x) and
S ∈ F for any x ∈ P . A greedy OCRS π greedily decides whether or not to select an element
in each iteration: given the vector x ∈ P , it first determines a sub-constraint Fπ,x ⊆ F. When
element i is revealed, it accepts the element if and only if i is active and S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,x , where S
is the set of elements accepted so far. In most cases, we choose P to be PF , the convex hull of all
characteristic vectors of feasible sets in F: PF = conv(1S | S ∈ F).
Definition 2.5 ((δ, η)-selectability [FSZ16]). For any δ, η ∈ (0, 1), a greedy OCRS π for P and F
is (δ, η)-selectable if for every x ∈ δ · P and i ∈ I,

Pr[S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,x , ∀S ⊆ R(x), S ∈ Fπ,x ] ≥ η.

The probability is taken over the randomness of R(x) and the subconstraint Fπ,x . We slightly abuse
notation and say that F is (δ, η)-selectable if there exists a (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS for PF
and F.
Feldman et al. [FSZ16] proved that a broad class of downward-closed feasibility constraints,
such as matroids, matching constraints and knapsack constraints, are all (δ, η)-selectable for some
constant δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, they prove that (δ, η)-selectability has nice composability. In
further chapters, we will see how these results help us to prove that our mechanism achieves a
constant factor approximation.
Definition 2.6 (Matching, Knapsack Constraint). Given an undirected graph G = (V, E). F ⊆ 2E
is a matching constraint with respect to the ground set E if F = {M ⊆ E : M is a matching in G}.
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A knapsack constraint F with respect to the ground set I is defined as: F = {S ⊆ I :

P

i∈S ci

≤ 1}.

Here ci ∈ [0, 1] is the weight of element i.
Lemma 2.3 (Selectability of Natural Constraints). [FSZ16]
• For any matroid constraint F and any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a (δ, 1 − δ)-selectable greedy
OCRS for PF . Moreover, for any  ∈ (0, 1 − δ), there exists a (δ, 1 − δ − )-selectable greedy
OCRS π for PF , and the running time of π is polynomial on the input size and 1/.
• For any matching constraint F and any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an efficient (δ, e−2δ )-selectable
greedy OCRS for PF .
• For any knapsack constraint F and any δ ∈ (0, 21 ), there exists an efficient (δ, 1−2δ
2−2δ )-selectable
greedy OCRS for PF .
Lemma 2.4 (Composability of Selectability). [FSZ16] Given two downward-closed constraints F1
and F2 with respect to the same ground set I. Let F = F1 ∩ F2 . Suppose there exist a (δ, η1 )selectable greedy OCRS π1 for P1 and F1 , and a (δ, η2 )-selectable greedy OCRS π2 for P2 and F2 .
Then there exists a (δ, η1 · η2 )-selectable greedy OCRS π for P1 ∩ P2 and F. When P1 = PF1 and
P2 = PF2 , as PF1 ∩ PF2 ⊆ PF , π is also (δ, η1 · η2 )-selectable for PF and F. Moreover, π is efficient
computable given π1 and π2 .
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Chapter 3

Revenue Maximization in Multi-item
Auctions
In this chapter we study the revenue maximization problem in multi-item auctions. We design simple and truthful mechanisms to approximate the optimal revenue for multiple subadditive buyers.
In Section 3.1 we give an overview of our results and techniques shown in this chapter. In
Section 3.2 we introduce some additional definitions and notations need to read this chapter. In
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, we review the duality framework of [CDW16]. In Section 3.5, we derive
an upper bound of the optimal revenue for subadditive buyers by combining the duality framework
with our new techniques. In Section 3.6, we use the single buyer case to familiarize the readers
with some basic ideas and techniques used to bound the benchmark. In Section 3.7, we show how
to upper bound the optimal revenue for multiple XOS (or subadditive) buyers with our sequential
posted price with entry fee mechanisms. A buyer in the auction can also be called as a bidder. We
use both words interchangeably throughout this chapter.

3.1

Results and Techniques in This Chapter

In this chapter, we unify and strengthen all the results in the literature via an extension of the
duality framework proposed by Cai et al. [CDW16]. Moreover, we show that even when there are

37

Additive or
Constrained
MatroidXOS Subadditive
UnitAdditive
Rank
demand
Previous
6 [BILW14]
31.1*
31.1 [CM16] 338*
338 [RW15]
Single
or
Buyer
4 [CMS15]
This Paper
11*
11
40*
40
8 [CDW16] 133 [CM16]
?
?
?
Multiple Previous
or
Buyer
24 [CDW16]
This Paper
70*
70
268
O(log m)†
* The result is implied by another result for a more general setting.
† The state-of-the-art result is an O(log log m)-approximation by Dutting et al. [DKL20].
Table 3.1: Comparison of approximation ratios between previous and current work.
multiple buyers with XOS valuation functions, there exists a simple, deterministic and Dominant
Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal
Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) revenue. For subadditive valuations, our approximation ratio
degrades to O(log m).
Informal Theorem 6. There exists a simple, deterministic and DSIC mechanism that achieves
a constant fraction of the optimal BIC revenue in multi-item settings, when the buyers’ valuation
distributions are XOS over independent items. When the buyers’ valuation distributions are subadditive over independent items, our mechanism achieves at least Ω( log1m ) of the optimal BIC revenue,
where m is the number of items.
The original paper by Cai et al. [CDW16] provided a unified treatment for additive and unitdemand valuations. However, it is inadequate to provide an analyzable benchmark for even a single
subadditive bidder. In this paper, we show how to extend their duality framework to accommodate general subadditive valuations. Using this extended framework, we substantially improve the
approximation ratios for many of the settings discussed above, and in the meantime generalize the
results to broader cases. See Table 3.1 for the comparison between the best ratios reported in the
literature and the new ratios obtained in this work.
Our mechanism is either a rationed sequential posted price mechanism (RSPM) or an anony-
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mous sequential posted price with entry fee mechanism (ASPE). In an RSPM, there is a price pij
for buyer i if she wants to buy item j, and she is allowed to purchase at most one item. We visit
the buyers in some arbitrary order and the buyer takes her favorite item among the available items
given the item prices for her. Here we allow personalized prices, that is, pij could be different from
pkj if i 6= k. In an ASPE, every buyer faces the same collection of item prices {pj }j∈[m] . Again, we
visit the buyers in some arbitrary order. For each buyer, we show her the available items and the
associated price for each item. Then we ask her to pay the entry fee to enter the mechanism, which
may depend on what items are still available and the identity of the buyer. If the buyer accepts
the entry fee, she can proceed to purchase any item at the given prices; if she rejects the entry fee,
then she will leave the mechanism without receiving anything. Given the entry fee and item prices,
the decision making for the buyer is straightforward, as she only accepts the entry fee when the
surplus for winning her favorite bundle is larger than the entry fee. Therefore, both RSPM and
ASPE are DSIC and ex-post Individually Rational (ex-post IR).

3.1.1

Our Contributions

To obtain the new generalizations, we provide important extensions to the duality framework
in [CDW16], as well as novel analytic techniques and new simple mechanisms.
1.

Accommodating subadditive valuations: the original duality framework in [CDW16]

already unified the additive case and unit-demand case by providing an approximately tight upper
bound for the optimal revenue using a single dual solution. A trivial upper bound for the revenue is
the social welfare, which may be arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The duality based upper bound
in [CDW16] improves this trivial upper bound, the social welfare, by substituting the value of each
buyer’s favorite item with the corresponding Myerson’s virtual value. However, the substitution is
viable only when the following condition holds – the buyer’s marginal gain for adding an item solely
depends on her value for that item (assuming it’s feasible to add that item1 ), but not the set of
items she has already received. This applies to valuations that are additive, unit-demand and more
1. WLOG, we can reduce any constrained additive valuation to an additive valuation with a feasibility constraint
(see Definition 2.2)
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generally constrained additive, but breaks under more general valuation functions, e.g., submodular,
XOS or subadditive valuations. As a consequence, the original dual solution from [CDW16] fails
to provide a nice upper bound for more general valuations. To overcome this difficulty, we take a
different approach. Instead of directly studying the dual of the original problem, we first relax the
valuations and argue that the optimal revenue of the relaxed valuation is comparable to the original
one. Then, since we choose the relaxation in a particular way, by applying a dual solution similar
to the one in [CDW16] to the relaxed valuation, we recover an upper bound of the optimal revenue
for the relaxed valuation resembling the appealing format of the one in [CDW16]. Combining these
two steps, we obtain an upper bound for subadditive valuations that is easy to analyze. Indeed, we
use our new upper bound to improve the approximation ratio for a single subadditive buyer from
338 [RW15] to 40. See Section 3.5.1 for more details.
2. An adaptive dual: our second major change to the framework is that we choose the dual in an
adaptive manner. In [CDW16], a dual solution λ is chosen up front inducing a virtual value function
Φ(·), then the corresponding optimal virtual welfare is used as a benchmark for the optimal revenue.
Finally, it is shown that the revenue of some simple mechanism is within a constant factor of the
optimal virtual welfare. Unfortunately, when the valuations are beyond additive and unit-demand,
the optimal virtual welfare for this particular choice of virtual value function becomes extremely
complex and hard to analyze. Indeed, it is already challenging to bound when the buyers’ valuations
are k-demand. In this paper, we take a more flexible approach. For any particular allocation rule σ,
we tailor a special dual λ(σ) based on σ in a fashion that is inspired by Chawla and Miller’s ex-ante
relaxation [CM16]. Therefore, the induced virtual valuation Φ(σ) also depends on σ. By duality,
we can show that the optimal revenue obtainable by σ is still upper bounded by the virtual welfare
with respect to Φ(σ) under allocation rule σ. Since the virtual valuation is designed specifically for
allocation σ, the induced virtual welfare is much easier to analyze. Indeed, we manage to prove
that for any allocation σ the induced virtual welfare is within a constant factor of the revenue of
some simple mechanism, when bidders have XOS valuations. See Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 for more
details.
3. A novel analysis and new mechanism: with the two contributions above, we manage to
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derive an upper bound of the optimal revenue similar to the one in [CDW16] but for subadditive
bidders. The third major contribution of this paper is a novel approach to analyzing this upper
bound. The analysis in [CDW16] essentially breaks the upper bound into three different terms–
Single, Tail and Core, and bound them separately. All three terms are relatively simple to
bound for additive and unit-demand buyers, but for more general settings the Core becomes much
more challenging to handle. Indeed, the analysis in [CDW16] was insufficient to tackle the Core
even when the buyers have k-demand valuations2 – a very special case of matroid rank valuations,
which itself is a special case of XOS or subadditive valuations. Rubinstein and Weinberg [RW15]
showed how to approximate the Core for a single subadditive bidder using grand bundling, but
their approach does not apply to multiple bidders. Yao [Yao15] showed how to approximate the
Core for multiple additive bidders using a VCG with per bidder entry fee mechanism, but again it is
unclear how his approach can be extended to multiple k-demand bidders. A recent paper by Chawla
and Miller [CM16] finally broke the barrier of analyzing the Core for multiple k-demand buyers.
They showed how to bound the Core for matroid rank valuations using a sequential posted price
mechanism by applying the online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) developed by Feldman
et al. [FSZ16]. The connection with OCRS is an elegant observation, and one might hope the
same technique applies to more general valuations. Unfortunately, OCRS is only known to exist
for special cases of downward closed constraints, and as we show in Section 3.7.2, the approach by
Chawla and Miller cannot yield any constant factor approximation for general constrained additive
valuations.
We take an entirely different approach to bound the Core. Here we provide some intuition
behind our mechanism and analysis. The Core is essentially the optimal social welfare induced by
some truncated valuation v 0 , and our goal is to design a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction
of the welfare as revenue. Let M be any sequential posted price mechanism. A key observation
is that when bidder i’s valuation is subadditive over independent items, her utility in M , which
is the largest surplus she can achieve from the unsold items, is also subadditive over independent
2. The class of k-demand valuations is a generalization of unit-demand valuations, where the buyer’s value is
additive up to k items.
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items. If we can argue that her utility function is a-Lipschitz (Definition 3.4) with some small a,
Talagrand’s concentration inequality [Tal95, Sch03] allows us to set an entry fee for the bidder so
that we can extract a constant fraction of her utility just through the entry fee. If we modify M
by introducing an entry fee for every bidder, according to Talagrand’s concentration inequality, the
new mechanism M 0 should intuitively have revenue that is a constant fraction of the social welfare
obtained by M 3 . Therefore, if there exists a sequential posted price mechanism M that achieves
a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare under the truncated valuation v 0 , the modified
mechanism M 0 can obtain a constant fraction of Core as revenue. Surprisingly, when the bidders
have XOS valuations, Feldman et al. [FGL15] showed that there exists an anonymous sequential
posted price mechanism that always obtains at least half of the optimal social welfare. Hence, an
anonymous sequential posted price with per bidder entry fee mechanism should approximate the
Core well, and this is exactly the intuition behind our ASPE mechanism.
To turn the intuition into a theorem, there are two technical difficulties that we need to address:
(i) the Lipschitz constants of the bidders’ utility functions turn out to be too large (ii) we deliberately neglected the difference in bidders’ behavior under M and M 0 in hope to keep our discussion
in the previous paragraph intuitive. However, due to the entry fee, bidders may end up purchasing
completely different items under M and M 0 , so it is not straightforward to see how one can relate
the revenue of M 0 to the welfare obtained by M . See Section 3.7.2 for a more detailed discussion
on how we overcome these two difficulties.

3.2

Notation in This Chapter

In this chapter, we focus on revenue maximization in the combinatorial auction with n independent
bidders and m heterogenous items. The valuation of each bidder is subadditive over independent
items (see Definition 2.1). We denote bidder i’s type ti as htij im
j=1 , where tij is bidder i’s private
information about item j. For each i, j, we assume tij is drawn independently from the distribution
n
Dij . Let Di = ×m
j=1 Dij be the distribution of bidder i’s type and D = ×i=1 Di be the distribution of

3. M ’s welfare is simply its revenue plus the sum of utilities of the bidders, and M 0 can extract some extra revenue
from the entry fee, which is a constant fraction of the total utility from the bidders.
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the type profile. We use Tij (or Ti , T ) and fij (or fi , f ) to denote the support and density function
of Dij (or Di , D). For notational convenience, we let t−i to be the types of all bidders except i and
t<i (or t≤i ) to be the types of the first i − 1 (or i) bidders. Similarly, we define D−i , T−i and f−i
for the corresponding distributions, support sets and density functions. When bidder i’s type is ti ,
her valuation for a set of items S is denoted by vi (ti , S). For every item j, we use Vi (tij ) to denote
vi (ti , {j}), as it only depends on tij .
Given D and v = {vi (·, ·)}i∈[n] , we use Rev(M, v, D) to denote the expected revenue of a BIC
mechanism M . Throughout this chapter, we use the following notations for the simple mechanisms
we consider.
Single-Bidder Mechanisms:
- SRev(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by any posted price mechanism
that only allows the buyer to purchase at most one item, and we use SRev for short if there is no
confusion4 .
- BRev(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling a grand bundle and we
use BRev for short if there is no confusion.
Multi-Bidder Mechanisms:
- PostRev(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling the items via an
RSPM to the bidders, and we use PostRev for short when there is no confusion.
- APostEnRev(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling the items via an
ASPE to the bidders, and we use APostEnRev for short when there is no confusion.
Single-Dimensional Copies Setting: In the analysis for unit-demand bidders in [CHMS10,
CDW16], the optimal revenue is upper bounded by the optimal revenue in the single-dimensional
copies setting defined in [CHMS10]. We use the same technique. We construct nm agents, where
agent (i, j) has value Vi (tij ) of being served with tij ∼ Dij , and we are only allow to use matchings,
4. The mechanism is slightly different from selling separately, as we only allow the buyer to purchase at most one
item.
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that is, for each i at most one agent (i, k) is served and for each j at most one agent (k, j) is served5 .
Notice that this is a single-dimensional setting, as each agent’s type is specified by a single number.
Let OPTCopies-UD be the optimal BIC revenue in this copies setting.
Continuous vs. Discrete Distributions: We explicitly assume that the input distributions are
discrete. Nevertheless, it is known that every D can be discretized into D+ such that the optimal
revenue for D and D+ are within (1 ± ) of each other [CDW16]. So our results also apply to
continuous distributions.

3.2.1

Our Mechanisms

In this section, we introduce a class of mechanisms called Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee.
For each bidder i, the mechanism first determines a posted price ξij for each item j and an entry
fee function δi (·) : 2[m] → R≥0 for each bidder i that maps the set of available items to a real value
entry fee. The seller visits the bidders sequentially in some arbitrary order. For simplicity, we
assume the bidders are visited in the lexicographical order. When bidder i is visited, let Si (t<i ) be
the set of items that are still available. Clearly, this set only depends on the types of bidders who
are visited before i. The mechanism shows the set Si (t<i ) to bidder i and asks her for an entry fee
δi (Si (t<i )). If she accepts the entry fee, she can enter the mechanism and take her favorite bundle
P
Si∗ by paying j∈S ∗ ξij .
i

If there exist multiple bundles with the same maximum surplus, the bidder can break ties
arbitrarily. Sometimes, there is a feasibility constraint F on what items a buyer can purchase.
In particular, if we say the mechanism is rationed, then F = {∅} ∪ {{j} | j ∈ [m]}, i.e., a buyer
can purchase at most one item. Formally, the favorite bundle Si∗ is defined as follows: Si∗ =
P
argmaxS⊆Si (t<i )∧S∈F vi (ti , S) − j∈S ξij .
See Algorithm 3.1 for the formal specification of the above mechanism. Notice that before the
bidder decides whether to pay the entry fee, she is aware of the set Si (t<i ) which contains all
5. This is exactly the copies setting used in [CHMS10], if every bidder i is unit-demand and has value Vi (tij ) with
type ti . Notice that this unit-demand multi-dimensional setting is equivalent as adding an extra constraint, each
buyer can purchase at most one item, to the original setting with subadditive bidders.
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Mechanism 3.1 Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism
Require: ξij is the price for bidder i to purchase item j and δi (·) is bidder i’s entry fee function.
1: S ← [m]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3:
Show bidder i the set of available items S, and define entry fee as δi (S).
4:
if Bidder i pays the entry fee δi (S) then P
5:
i receives her favorite bundle Si∗ , paying j∈S ∗ ξij .
i
6:
S ← S\Si∗ .
7:
else
8:
i gets nothing and pays 0.
9:
end if
10: end for
available items. Thus, she can compute her favorite bundle Si∗ and the corresponding utility if she
chooses to enter the mechanism. She can then compare that utility with the entry fee and accept
the entry fee if the former is greater than the latter. The mechanism described above is therefore
deterministic and DSIC. Throughout this paper, we focus on the following two special cases of this
class of mechanisms:
-Rationed Sequential Posted Price Mechanism (RSPM): Every buyer can purchase at most
one item and the mechanism always charges 0 entry fee, i.e., F = {∅}∪{{j} | j ∈ [m]} and δi (S) = 0
for all i and S.
-Anonymous Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism (ASPE): The mechanism uses anonymous posted prices, i.e., ξij = ξkj for any item j and bidders i 6= k, but may charge
positive and personalized entry fee. Also, any buyer can purchase any bundle available once she
has paid the entry fee, i.e., F = 2[m] .

3.3

Duality Framework

The focus of [CDW16] was on additive and unit-demand valuations and their respective dual was
derived from an LP that is only meaningful for constrained additive valuations. In order to tackle
general valuations, we need to apply the duality framework to an LP that is meaningful for general
valuations. Instead of using the “implicit forms” LP from [CDW13b, CDW16], we choose a slightly
different and more intuitive LP formulation (see Figure 3.1). For all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti , we
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use pi (ti ) as the interim price paid by bidder i and σiS (ti ) as the interim probability of receiving
the exact bundle S. To ease the notation, we use a special type ∅ to represent the choice of not
participating in the mechanism. More specifically, σiS (∅) = 0 for any S and pi (∅) = 0. Now a
Bayesian IR (BIR) constraint is simply another BIC constraint: for any type ti , bidder i will not
want to lie to type ∅. We let Ti+ = Ti ∪ {∅}.
Following the recipe provided by [CDW16], we take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in
Figure 3.1 by lagrangifying the BIC constraints. Let λi (ti , t0i ) be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the BIC constraint that if bidder i’s true type is ti she will not prefer to lie to type t0i (see
Figure 3.2 and Definition 3.1). As shown in [CDW16], the dual solution has finite value if and only
if the dual variables λi form a valid flow for every bidder i. The reason is that the payments pi (ti )
are unconstrained variables, therefore the corresponding coefficients must be 0 in order for the dual
solution to have finite value. It turns out when all these coefficients are 0, the dual variables λ can
be interpreted as a flow described in Lemma 3.1. We refer the readers to [CDW16] for a complete
proof. From now on, we only consider λ that corresponds to a flow.
Variables:
• pi (ti ), for all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti , denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when
reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders’ types.
• σiS (ti ), for all bidders i, all bundles of items S ⊆ [m], and types ti ∈ Ti , denoting the probability
that bidder i receives exactly the bundle S when reporting type ti over the randomness of the
mechanism and the other bidders’ types.
Constraints:
P
P
0
0
•
S⊆[m] σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (ti ), for all bidders i, and types
S⊆[m] σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) − pi (ti ) ≥
ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , guaranteeing that the reduced form mechanism (σ, p) is BIC and Bayesian IR.
• σ ∈ P (D), guaranteeing σ is feasible.
Objective:
• max

n X
X

fi (ti ) · pi (ti ), the expected revenue.

i=1 ti ∈Ti

Figure 3.1: A Linear Program (LP) for Revenue Optimization.
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Definition 3.1. Let L(λ, σ, p) be the partial Lagrangian defined as follows:

L(λ, σ, p)

n
X
X

=
fi (ti ) · pi (ti ) +
ti ∈Ti

i=1


X

λi (ti , t0i ) · 

ti ∈Ti ,t0i ∈Ti+

X



vi (ti , S) · σiS (ti ) − σiS (t0i ) − (pi (ti ) − pi (t0i ) 


S⊆[m]

(3.1)
=

n
X




X



+

pi (ti ) · fi (ti ) +

n
X



X

λi (t0i , ti ) −

λi (ti , t0i )

t0i ∈Ti+


X X


i=1

X
t0i ∈Ti

ti ∈Ti

i=1



σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) ·

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]


X

λi (ti , t0i ) −

X


vi (t0i , S) · λi (t0i , ti )  (σi (∅) = 0, pi (∅) = 0)

t0i ∈Ti

t0i ∈Ti+

(3.2)

Variables:
• λi (ti , t0i ) for all i, ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , the Lagrangian multipliers for Bayesian IC and IR constraints.
Constraints:
• λi (ti , t0i ) ≥ 0 for all i, ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , guaranteeing that the Lagrangian multipliers are nonnegative.
Objective:
• min max L(λ, σ, p).
λ

σ∈P (D),p

Figure 3.2: Partial Lagrangian of the Revenue Maximization LP.
Lemma 3.1 (Useful Dual Variables [CDW16]). A set of feasible duals λ is useful if maxσ∈P (D),p L(λ, σ, p) <
∞. λ is useful iff for each bidder i, λi forms a valid flow, i.e., iff the following satisfies flow conservation at all nodes except the source and the sink:
1. Nodes: A super source s and a super sink ∅, along with a node ti for every type ti ∈ Ti .
2. An edge from s to ti with flow fi (ti ), for all ti ∈ Ti .
3. An edge from ti to t0i with flow λi (ti , t0i ) for all ti ∈ Ti , and t0i ∈ Ti+ (including the sink).
Definition 3.2 (Virtual Value Function). For each flow λ, we define a corresponding virtual value
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function Φ(·), such that for every bidder i, every type ti ∈ Ti and every set S ⊆ [m],

Φi (ti , S) = vi (ti , S) −


1 X
λi (t0i , ti ) vi (t0i , S) − vi (ti , S) .
fi (ti ) 0
ti ∈Ti

The proof of Theorem 3.1 is essentially the same as in [CDW16]. We include it in Appendix A.1
for completeness.
Theorem 3.1 (Virtual Welfare ≥ Revenue [CDW16]). For any flow λ and any BIC mechanism
M = (σ, p), the revenue of M is ≤ the virtual welfare of σ w.r.t. the virtual valuation Φ(·)
corresponding to λ.
n X
X
i=1 ti ∈Ti

fi (ti ) · pi (ti ) ≤

n X
X
i=1 ti ∈Ti

fi (ti )

X

σiS (ti ) · Φi (ti , S)

S⊆[m]

Let λ∗ be the optimal dual variables and M ∗ = (σ ∗ , p∗ ) be the revenue optimal BIC mechanism,
then the expected virtual welfare with respect to Φ∗ (induced by λ∗ ) under σ ∗ equals to the expected
revenue of M ∗ .

3.4

Recap: Flow for Additive Valuations

In this section, we give a recap of the flow for additive valuations in [CDW16] and the appealing
properties of the corresponding virtual valuation functions. When the valuations are additive, we
simply view tij as bidder i’s value for receiving item j. Although there are many possible ways to
define a flow, we focus on a class of simple ones. Every flow in this class λ(β) is parametrized by a
set of parameters β = {βij }i∈[n],j∈[m] ∈ Rnm . Based on βi = {βij }j∈[m] , we first partition the type
space Ti for each bidder i into m + 1 regions:
(βi )

contains all types ti such that tij < βij for all j ∈ [m].

(βi )

contains all types ti such that tij −βij ≥ 0 and j is the smallest index in argmaxk {tik −βik }.

• R0
• Rj

We use essentially the same flow as in [CDW16]. Here we provide a partial specification and
state some desirable properties of the flow. See Figure 3.4 for an example with 2 items and [CDW16]
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for a complete description of the flow.
Partial Specification of the flow λ(β) :
(β )

1. For every type ti in region R0 i , the flow goes directly to ∅ (the super sink).
(βi )

2. For all j > 0, any flow entering Rj
to ∅.
(βi )

3. For all ti and t0i in Rj

(βi )

is from s (the super source) and any flow leaving Rj

is

(β)

(j > 0), λi (ti , t0i ) > 0 only if ti and t0i only differ in the j-th coordinate.

Figure 3.3: Partial Specification of the flow λ(β) .

(β)

Lemma 3.2 ( [CDW16]6 ). For any β, there exists a flow λi

such that the corresponding virtual

value function Φi (ti , ·) satisfies the following properties:
(β )

• For any ti ∈ R0 i , Φi (ti , S) =
(βi )

• For any j > 0, ti ∈ Rj

P

k∈S tik .

,

Φi (ti , S) ≤

X

tik + ϕ̃ij (tij ) · 1[j ∈ S],

k∈S∧k6=j

where ϕ̃ij (·) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value function for Dij .
The properties above are crucial for showing the approximation results for simple mechanisms
in [CDW16]. One of the key challenges in approximating the optimal revenue is how to provide a
tight upper bound. A trivial upper bound is the social welfare, which may be arbitrarily bad in the
worst case. By plugging the virtual value functions in Lemma 3.2 into the partial Lagrangian, we
obtain a new upper bound that replaces the value of the buyer’s favorite item with the corresponding
Myerson’s ironed virtual value. As demonstrated in [CDW16], this new upper bound is at most
8 times larger than the optimal revenue when the buyers are additive, and its appealing structure
allows the authors to compare the revenue of simple mechanisms to it. In Section 3.5, we identify
some difficulties in directly applying this flow to subadditive valuations. Then we show how to
overcome these difficulties by relaxing the subadditive valuations and obtain a similar upper bound.
6. Note that this Lemma is a special case of Lemma 3 in [CDW16] when the valuations are additive.
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(β)

Figure 3.4: An example of λi

3.5

for additive bidders with two items.

Canonical Flow and Properties of the Virtual Valuations

In this section, we present a canonical way of setting the dual variables/flow that induces our
benchmarks.
Although any flow can provide a finite upper bound of the optimal revenue, we focus on a
particular class of flows, in which every flow λ(β) is parametrized by a set of parameters β =
{βij }i∈[n],j∈[m] ∈ Rnm
≥0 . Based on β, we partition the type set Ti of each buyer i into m + 1 regions:
(βi )

(i) R0

(βi )

contains all types ti such that Vi (tij ) < βij for all j ∈ [m]. (ii) Rj

contains all types ti

such that Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ 0 and j is the smallest index in argmaxk {Vi (tik ) − βik }. Intuitively, if we
(βi )

view βij as the price of item j for bidder i, then R0
(βi )

any item, and any Rj

contains all types in Ti that cannot afford

with j > 0 contains all types in Ti whose “favorite” item is j. We first

provide a Partial Specification of the flow λ(β) :
(β )

1. For every type ti in region R0 i , the flow goes directly to ∅ (the super sink).
(βi )

2. For all j > 0, any flow entering Rj

(βi )

is from s (the super source) and any flow leaving Rj

is

to ∅.
(βi )

3. For all ti and t0i in Rj

(β)

(j > 0), λi (ti , t0i ) > 0 only if ti and t0i only differ in the j-th coordinate.
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(βi )

For additive valuations and any type ti ∈ Rj
(βi )

tion Φ(ti , S) from any type t0i ∈ Rj

, the contribution to the virtual value func(β)

is either 0 if j ∈
/ S, or λi (t0i , ti )(vi (t0i , S) − vi (ti , S)) =

(β)

λi (t0i , ti )(t0ij − tij ) if ti , t0i only differs on the j-th coordinate and j ∈ S. In either case, the contribution does not depend on tik for any k 6= j. This is the key property that allows [CDW16]
to choose a flow such that the value of the favorite item is replaced by the corresponding Myerson’s ironed virtual value in the virtual value function Φi (ti , ·). Unfortunately, this property
(β)

no longer holds for subadditive valuations. When j ∈ S and λi (t0i , ti ) > 0, the contribution
(β)

λi (t0i , ti )(vi (t0i , S) − vi (ti , S)) heavily depends on tik of all the other item k ∈ S. All we can con(β)

(β)

clude is that the contribution lies in the range [−λi (t0i , ti ) · Vi (tij ), λi (t0i , ti ) · Vi (t0ij )]7 , but this is
not sufficient for us to convert the value of item j into the corresponding Myerson’s ironed virtual
value.

3.5.1

Valuation Relaxation

This is the first major barrier for extending the duality framework to accommodate subadditive
valuations. We overcome it by considering a relaxation of the valuation functions. More specifically,
(βi )

for any β, we construct another function vi
(βi )

for any ti , vi

(·, ·) : Ti × 2[m] 7→ R≥0 for every buyer i such that: (i)
(βi )

(ti , ·) is subadditive and monotone, and for every bundle S the new value vi

(ti , S)

is no smaller than the original value vi (ti , S); (ii) for any BIC mechanism M with respect to the
original valuations, there exists another mechanism M (β) that is BIC with respect to the new
valuations and its revenue is comparable to the revenue of M ; (iii) for the new valuations v (β) ,
there exists a flow whose induced virtual value functions have properties similar to those in the
additive case. Property (ii) implies that the optimal revenue with respect to v (β) can serve as a
proxy for the original optimal revenue. Moreover, due to Theorem 3.1, the optimal revenue for
v (β) is upper bounded by the partial Lagrangian dual with respect to v (β) , which has an appealing
format similar to the additive case by property (iii). Thus, we obtain a benchmark for subadditive
bidders that resembles the benchmark for additive bidders in [CDW16].
7. vi (t, ·) is subadditive and monotone for every type t ∈ Ti , therefore vi (ti , S) ∈ [vi (ti , S\{j}), vi (ti , S\{j})+Vi (tij )]
and vi (t0i , S) ∈ [vi (t0i , S\{j}), vi (t0i , S\{j}) + Vi (t0ij )].
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(βi )

Definition 3.3 (Relaxed Valuation). Given β, for any buyer i, define vi
(βi )

Vi (tij ), if the “favorite” item is in S, i.e., ti ∈ Rj

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S\{j}) +
(βi )

and j ∈ S. Otherwise, define vi

(ti , S) =

vi (ti , S).
In the next lemma, we show that for any BIC mechanism M for v, there exists a BIC mechanism
M (β) for v (β) such that its revenue is comparable to the revenue of M (property (ii)). Moreover,
the ex-ante probability for any buyer i to receive any item j in M (β) is no greater than in M
(property (i)). We will see later that this is an important property for our analysis. The proof of
Lemma 3.3 is similar to the -BIC to BIC reduction in [HKM11, BH11, DW12] and can be found in
Appendix A.6.
Lemma 3.3. For any β and any BIC mechanism M for subadditive valuation {vi (ti , ·)}i∈[n] with
(βi )

ti ∼ Di for all i, there exists a BIC mechanism M (β) for valuations {vi

(ti , ·)}i∈[n] with ti ∼ Di

for all i, such that
X

(i)

ti ∈Ti

fi (ti ) ·

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) ≤

X
ti ∈Ti

S:j∈S

fi (ti ) ·

X

σiS (ti ), for all i and j,

S:j∈S

(ii) Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 2·Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D)+2·

XX X
i



(β)
(β )
fi (ti )·σiS (ti )· vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) .

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

Rev(M, v, D) (or Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D)) is the revenue of the mechanism M (or M (β) ) while the
(βi )

buyers’ types are drawn from D and buyer i’s valuation is vi (ti , ·) (or vi

(ti , ·)). σiS (ti ) (or

(β)

σiS (ti )) is the probability of buyer i receiving exactly bundle S when her reported type is ti in
mechanism M (or M (β) ).

3.5.2

Virtual Valuation for the Relaxed Valuation

For any β, based on the same partition of the type sets as in the beginning of Section 3.5, we
construct a flow λ(β) that respects the partial specification, such that the corresponding virtual
valuation function for v (β) has the same appealing properties as in the additive case. For the
(β)

(βi )

relaxed valuation, as λi (ti , t0i ) is only positive for types ti , t0i ∈ Rj

that only differ in the j-th

coordinate, the contribution from item j to the virtual valuation solely depends on tij and t0ij but
not tik for any other item k ∈ S . Notice that this property does not hold for the original valuation,
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and it is the main reason why we choose the relaxed valuation as in Definition 3.3. Moreover, we
(β)

can choose λi

carefully so that the virtual valuation of v (β) has the following format:

Lemma 3.4. Let Fij be the distribution of Vi (tij ) when tij is drawn from Dij . For any β, there
(β)

exists a flow λi

(βi )

such that the corresponding virtual value function Φi

(βi )

(ti , ·) of valuation vi

(ti , ·)

satisfies the following properties:
(β )

(βi )

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S).

(βi )

, Φi

1. For any ti ∈ R0 i , Φi

2. For any j > 0, ti ∈ Rj

(βi )

(ti , S) ≤ vi (ti , S)·1[j ∈
/ S]+(vi (ti , S\{j}) + ϕ̃ij (Vi (tij )))·1[j ∈ S],

where ϕ̃ij (Vi (tij )) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value for Vi (tij ) with respect to Fij .
The proof of Lemma 3.4 is postponed to Appendix A.2. Next, we use the virtual welfare of the
allocation σ (β) to bound the revenue of M (β) .
Lemma 3.5. For any β,
XX

Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) ≤

ti ∈Ti

i

≤

XX
i

h

(βi )

fi (ti ) · 1 ti ∈ R0

ti ∈Ti

i

·

(β)

X

fi (ti )

(βi )

σiS (ti ) · Φi

(ti , S)

S⊆[m]
(β)

X

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S)

S⊆[m]


+

XX

+

XX

i

i

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

h

(βi )

i

(βi )

i

1 ti ∈ Rj

fi (ti ) ·

where πij (ti ) =

X

·


(β)

X

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S\{j}) +

S:j∈S

j∈[m]

ti ∈Ti

(β)

X

h

1 ti ∈ Rj

X

(β)
σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S)

S:j ∈S
/

(β)

· πij (ti ) · ϕ̃ij (tij ),

j∈[m]

P

S:j∈S

(β)

σiS (ti ). Non-Favorite(M, β) denotes the sum of the first two terms.

Single(M, β) denotes the last term.
Proof. The Lemma follows easily from the properties in Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.1.
We obtain Theorem 3.2 by combining Lemma 3.3 and 3.5.
Theorem 3.2. For any mechanism M and any β,

Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 4 · Non-Favorite(M, β) + 2 · Single(M, β).
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(βi )

Proof of Theorem 3.2: First, let’s look at the value of vi
(βi )

some j > 0 and j ∈ S, vi

(βi )

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

XX
i

(ti , S) − vi (ti , S) = 0. Therefore,



(β)
(β )
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S)

XX X

≤

for

(ti , S) − vi (ti , S) = vi (ti , S\{j}) + Vi (tij ) − vi (ti , S) ≤ vi (ti , S\{j}),

because Vi (tij ) ≤ vi (ti , S). For the other cases, vi

i

(βi )

(ti , S) − vi (ti , S). When ti ∈ Rj

ti

fi (ti )

X

(βi )

1[ti ∈ Rj

j

≤Non-Favorite(M, β)

]

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S\{j})

S:j∈S

(Definition of Non-Favorite(M, β))

Our statement follows from combining Lemma 3.3, Lemma 3.5 with the inequality above. 2

3.5.3

Upper Bound for the Revenue of Subadditive Buyers

In Section 3.5.1, we have argued that for any β, there exists a mechanism M (β) such that its
revenue with respect to the relaxed valuation v (β) is comparable to the revenue of M with respect
to the original valuation. In Section 3.5.2, we have shown for any β how to choose a flow to obtain
an upper bound for Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) and also an upper bound for Rev(M, v, D). Now we specify
our choice of β.
In [CDW16], the authors fixed a particular β, and shown that under any allocation rule, the
corresponding benchmark can be bounded by the sum of the revenue of a few simple mechanisms.
However, for valuations beyond additive and unit-demand, the benchmark becomes much more
challenging to analyze8 . We adopt an alternative and more flexible approach to obtain a new
upper bound. Instead of fixing a single β for all mechanisms, we customize a different β for every
different mechanism M . Next, we relax the valuation and design the flow based on the chosen β as
specified in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. Then we upper bound the revenue of M with the benchmark
in Theorem 3.2 and argue that for any mechanism M , the corresponding benchmark can be upper
bounded by the sum of the revenue of a few simple mechanisms. As we allow β, in other words the
8. Indeed, the difficulties already arise for valuations as simple as k-demand. A bidder’s valuation is k-demand if
her valuation is additive subject to a uniform matroid with rank k.
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flow λ(β) , to depend on the mechanism, our new approach may provide a better upper bound. As
it turns out, our new upper bound is indeed easier to analyze.
Lemma 3.6 specifies the two properties of our β that play the most crucial roles in our analysis.
We construct such a β in the proof of Lemma 3.6, however the construction is not necessarily
unique and any β satisfying these two properties suffices. Note that our construction heavily relies
on property (i) of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.6. For any constant b ∈ (0, 1) and any mechanism M , there exists a β such that: for
the mechanism M (β) constructed in Lemma 3.3 according to β, any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
P
(i) k6=i Prtkj [Vk (tkj ) ≥ βkj ] ≤ b;
P
P
(β)
(β)
(β)
(ii) ti ∈Ti fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) ≤ Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij ] /b, where πij (ti ) = S:j∈S σiS (ti ).
Before proving Lemma 3.6, we provide some intuition behind the two required properties.
Property (i) is used to guarantee that if item j’s price for bidder i is higher than βij for all i and j
in an RSPM, for any item j 0 and any bidder i0 , j 0 is still available with probability at least (1 − b)
when i0 is visited. As for any bidder k 6= i0 to purchase item j 0 , Vk (tkj 0 ) must be greater than her
price for item j 0 . By the union bound, the probability that there exists such a bidder is upper
bounded by the LHS of property (i), and therefore is at most b. With this guarantee, we can easily
show that the RSPM achieves good revenue (Lemma 3.19). Property (ii) states that the ex-ante
probability for bidder i to receive an item j in M (β) is not much bigger than the probability that
bidder i’s value is larger than item j. This is crucial for proving our key Lemma 3.26, in which we
argue that two different valuations provide comparable welfare under the same allocation rule σ (β) .
With Lemma 3.26, we can show that the ASPE obtains good revenue.
Proof of Lemma 3.6: When there is only one buyer, we can simply set every βj to be 0 and both
conditions are satisfied. When there are multiple players, we let

βij := inf{x ≥ 0 : Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ x] ≤ b ·
tij

X
ti ∈Ti
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fi (ti ) · πij (ti )},

where πij (ti ) =

P

S:j∈S

σiS (ti ). Clearly, when the distribution of Vi (tij ) is continuous, then

Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij ] = b ·
tij

X

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ),

(3.3)

ti ∈Ti

and therefore for any j,
X
i

Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij ] = b ·

XX

tij

i

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) ≤ b.

ti ∈Ti

So the first condition is satisfied. The second condition holds because by the first property in
P
P
(β)
Lemma 3.3, ti ∈Ti fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) ≤ ti ∈Ti fi (ti ) · πij (ti ).
When the distribution for Vi (tij ) is discrete, it is possible that Equation 3.3 does not hold,
but this is essentially a tie breaking issue and not hard to fix. Let  > 0 be an extremely small
constant that is smaller than Vi (tij ) − Vi (t0ij ) for any tij , t0ij ∈ Tij , any i and any j. Let ζij
be a random variable uniformly distributed on [0, ], and think of it as a random rebate that
the seller gives to bidder i when she purchases item j. Now we modify the definition of βij as
P
βij := inf{x ≥ 0 : Prtij ,ζij [Vi (tij ) + ζij ≥ x] ≤ b · ti ∈Ti fi (ti ) · πij (ti )}.
Both of the two properties in Lemma 3.6 hold if we replace Vi (tij ) with Vi (tij ) + ζij . The only
change we need to make in the mechanism is to actually give the bidders ζij as the corresponding
rebate. Since we can choose  to be arbitrarily small, the sum of the rebate is also arbitrarily
small. For the simplicity of the presentation, we will omit ζij and  in the rest of the paper.
The random rebate indeed makes our mechanism randomized(according to the random variable
ζij ∼ [0, ]). However, the randomized mechanism is a uniform distribution of deterministic DSIC
mechanisms (after determining all ζij ), and the expected revenue of the randomized mechanism
is simply the average revenue of all these deterministic mechanisms. Therefore, there must be
one realization of the rebates such that the corresponding deterministic mechanism has revenue
above the expectation, i.e., the expected revenue of the randomized one. Thus if the randomized
mechanism is proved to achieve some approximation ratio, there must exist a deterministic one
that achieves the same ratio. The deterministic mechanism will use a fixed value zij ∈ [0, ] as the
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rebate.
Similarly, the same issue about discrete distributions arises when we define some other crucial
parameters later, e.g., in the Definition of c, ci and τi . We can resolve all of them together using
the trick (adding a random rebate) described above, and we will not include a detailed proof for
those cases. 2

3.6

Warm Up: Single Buyer

To warm up, we first study the case where there is a single subadditive buyer and show how to
improve the approximation ratio from 338 to 40. Since there is only one buyer, we will drop
the subscript i in the notations. As specified in Section 3.5.3, we use a β that satisfies both
properties in Lemma 3.6. For a single buyer, we can simply set βj to be 0 for all j. We use
Single(M ), Non-Favorite(M ) in the following proof to denote the corresponding terms in The(0)

orem 3.2 for β = 0. Notice R0

= ∅. Theorem 3.3 shows that the optimal revenue is within a

constant factor of the better of selling separately and grand bundling.
Theorem 3.3. For a single buyer whose valuation distribution is subadditive over independent
items,
Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 24 · SRev + 16 · BRev
for any BIC mechanism M .
Recall that the revenue for mechanism M is upper bounded by 4 · Non-Favorite(M ) + 2 ·
(β)

Single(M ) (Theorem 3.2). We first upper bound Single(M ) by OPTCopies-UD . Since σS (t) is
P
(β)
(β)
(β)
(β)
a feasible allocation in the original setting, 1[t ∈ Rj ] · πj (t) with πj (t) = S:j∈S σS (t) is a
feasible allocation in the copies setting, and therefore Single(M ) is the Myerson Virtual Welfare of
a certain allocation in the copies setting, which is upper bounded by OPTCopies-UD . By [CHMS10],
OPTCopies-UD is at most 2 · SRev.
Lemma 3.7. For any BIC mechanism M , Single(M ) ≤ OPTCopies-UD ≤ 2 · SRev.
For Non-Favorite(M ), we will prove the following.
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Lemma 3.8. For any BIC mechanism M , Non-Favorite(M ) ≤ 5 · SRev + 4 · BRev.
We first bound it by the social welfare from all non-favorite items. Then we decompose the
latter into two terms Core(M ) and Tail(M ), and bound them separately. For every t ∈ T , define
C(t) = {j : V (tj ) < c}, T (t) = [m]\C(t). Here the threshold c is chosen as




X
c := inf x ≥ 0 :
Pr [V (tj ) ≥ x] ≤ 2 .
tj



(3.4)

j

Since v(t, ·) is subadditive for all t ∈ T , we have for every S ⊆ [m], v(t, S) ≤ v (t, S ∩ C(t)) +
P
j∈S∩T (t) V (tj ). We decompose Non-Favorite(M ) based on the inequality above. Proof of
Lemma 3.9 can be found in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 3.9.

Non-Favorite(M ) ≤

X
t∈T

j

≤

X

f (t) · v(t, C(t))

+

X

X

j

tj :V (tj )≥c

f (t) ·

X

(β)

1[t ∈ Rj ] · v(t, [m]\{j})
(Core(M ))

t∈T

fj (tj ) · V (tj ) · Pr [∃k 6= j, V (tk ) ≥ V (tj )]
t−j

(Tail(M ))

Using the definition of c and SRev, we can upper bound Tail(M ) with a similar argument as
in [CDW16].
Lemma 3.10. For any BIC mechanism M , Tail(M ) ≤ 2 · SRev.
Proof. Since Tail(M ) =

P P
j

tj :V (tj )≥c fj (tj )

· V (tj ) · Prt−j [∃k 6= j, V (tk ) ≥ V (tj )], for each type

tj ∈ Tj consider the mechanism that posts the same price V (tj ) for each item but only allows
the buyer to purchase at most one. Notice if there exists k 6= j such that V (tk ) ≥ V (tj ), the
mechanism is guaranteed to sell one item obtaining revenue V (tj ). Thus, the revenue obtained by
this mechanism is at least V (tj ) · Prt−j [∃k 6= j, V (tk ) ≥ V (tj )]. By definition, this is no more than
SRev.
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Tail(M ) ≤

X

X

j

tj :V (tj )≥c

fj (tj ) · SRev=2 · SRev

The last equality is because by the definition of c,

P

j

(3.5)

Prtj [V (tj ) ≥ c] = 2.9

The Core(M ) is upper bounded by Et [v 0 (t, [m])] where v 0 (t, S) = v(t, S ∩ C(t)). We argue
that v 0 (t, ·) is drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent items and v 0 (·, ·)
is c-Lipschitz (see Definition 3.4). Using a concentration bound by Schechtman [Sch03], we show
Et [v 0 (t, [m])] is upper bounded by the median of random variable v 0 (t, [m]) and c, which are upper
bounded by BRev and SRev respectively.
Lemma 3.11. For any BIC mechanism M , Core(M ) ≤ 3 · SRev + 4 · BRev.
Recall that
Core(M ) =

X

f (t) · v(t, C(t))

(3.6)

t∈T

We will bound Core(M ) with a concentration inequality from [Sch03]. It requires the following
definition:
Definition 3.4. A function v(·, ·) is a-Lipschitz if for any type t, t0 ∈ T , and set X, Y ⊆ [m],

v(t, X) − v(t0 , Y ) ≤ a · |X∆Y | + {j ∈ X ∩ Y : tj 6= t0j } ,
where X∆Y = (X\Y ) ∪ (Y \X) is the symmetric difference between X and Y .
Define a new valuation function for the bidder as v 0 (t, S) = v(t, S ∩ C(t)), for all t ∈ T and S ⊆
Q
[m]. Then v 0 (·, ·) is c− Lipschitz, and when t is drawn from the product distribution D = j Dj ,
v 0 (t, ·) remains to be a valuation drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent
items. See Appendix A.3 for the proof of Lemma 3.12 and Lemma 3.13.
Lemma 3.12. For all t ∈ T , v 0 (t, ·) satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities
defined in Definition 2.1.
9. This clearly holds if V (tj ) is drawn from a continuous distribution. When V (tj ) is drawn from a discrete
distribution, see the proof of Lemma 3.6 for a simple fix.
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Lemma 3.13. v 0 (·, ·) is c−Lipschitz.
Next, we apply the following concentration inequality to derive Corollary 3.1, which is useful
to analyze the Core(M ).
Lemma 3.14. [Sch03] Let g(t, ·) with t ∼ D =

Q

j

Dj be a function drawn from a distribution

that is subadditive over independent items of ground set I. If g(·, ·) is c-Lipschitz, then for all
a > 0, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I|}, q ∈ N,
Pr[g(t, I) ≥ (q + 1)a + k · c] ≤ Pr[g(t, I) ≤ a]−q q −k .
t

t

Corollary 3.1. Let g(t, ·) with t ∼ D =

Q

j

Dj be a function drawn from a distribution that is

subadditive over independent items of ground set I. If g(·, ·) is c-Lipschitz, then if we let a be the

median of the value of the grand bundle g(t, I), i.e. a = inf x ≥ 0 : Prt [g(t, I) ≤ x] ≥ 12 ,
Et [g(t, I)] ≤ 2a +

5c
.
2

Proof. Let Y be g(t, I). If we apply Lemma 3.14 to the case where a is the median and q = 2, we
have

Z
Pr[Y ≥ 3a] · Et [Y |Y ≥ 3a] = 3a · Pr[Y ≥ 3a] +
t

t

∞

Pr[Y ≥ 3a + y]dy

y=0 t

≤ 3a · Pr[Y ≥ 3a] + c ·
t

|I|
X
k=0

≤ 3a · Pr[Y ≥ 3a] + c ·
t

2
X
k=0

5
≤ 3a · Pr[Y ≥ 3a] + c
t
2
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Pr[Y ≥ 3a + k · c]
t

Pr[Y > a] + c ·
t

|I|
X
k=3

(Y ≤ |I| · c)

4 · 2−k

(Lemma 3.14)

With the inequality above, we can upper bound the expected value of Y .

Et [Y ] ≤ a · Pr[Y ≤ a] + 3a · Pr[Y ∈ (a, 3a)] + Pr[Y ≥ 3a] · Et [Y |Y ≥ 3a]
t

t

t

5
≤ a · Pr[Y ≤ a] + 3a · Pr[Y ∈ (a, 3a)] + 3a · Pr[Y ≥ 3a] + c
t
t
t
2
5
= a + 2a · Pr[Y > a] + c
t
2
5
≤ 2a + c
2

Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 3.11.
Proof of Lemma 3.11: Let δ be the median of v 0 (t, [m]) when t is sampled from distribution D.
Now consider the mechanism that sells the grand bundle with price δ. Notice that the bidder’s
valuation for the grand bundle is v(t, [m]) ≥ v 0 (t, [m]). Thus with probability at least 21 , the bidder
purchases the bundle. Thus, BRev ≥ 12 δ.
According to Corollary 3.1,

Core(M ) = Et∼D [v 0 (t, [m])] ≤ 2δ +

5c
2

(3.7)

It remains to argue that the Lipchitz constant c can be upper bounded using SRev. Notice
that by AM-GM Inequality,

Pr [∃j ∈ [m], V (tj ) ≥ c] = 1 −
t

j

P
≥1 − (

Y

j

Prtj [V (tj ) < c]
m

Pr[V (tj ) < c]
tj

)m = 1 − (1 −

2 m
) ≥ 1 − e−2
m

Consider the mechanism that posts price c for each item but only allow the buyer to purchase
one item. Then with probability at least 1 − e−2 , the mechanism sells one item obtaining expected
revenue (1 − e−2 ) · c. Thus c ≤

1
1−e−2

· SRev. Inequality (3.7) becomes
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Core(M ) ≤ 2δ +

5c
< 4 · BRev + 3 · SRev
2

(3.8)

2
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Since OPTCopies-UD ≤ 2SRev (Lemma 3.7) and Non-Favorite(M ) ≤
5SRev + 4BRev (Lemma 3.10 and 3.11), Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 24 · SRev + 16 · BRev according to
Theorem 3.2. 2

3.7

Multiple Buyers

In this section, we prove our main result – simple mechanisms can approximate the optimal BIC
revenue even when there are multiple XOS/subadditive bidders. First, we need the definition of
supporting prices.
Definition 3.5 (Supporting Prices [DNS05]). For any α ≥ 1, a type t and a subset S ⊆ [m],
P
prices {pj }j∈S are α-supporting prices for v(t, S) if (i) v(t, S 0 ) ≥ j∈S 0 pj for all S 0 ⊆ S and (ii)
P
v(t,S)
j∈S pj ≥
α .
Theorem 3.4. If for any buyer i, any type ti ∈ Ti and any bundle S ∈ [m], vi (ti , S) has a set of
α-supporting prices {θjS (ti )}j∈S , then for any BIC mechanism M and any constant b ∈ (0, 1),

Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 32α · APostEnRev + 12 +

8
+α·
1−b



16
96
+
b(1 − b) 1 − b


· PostRev

If vi (ti , ·) is an XOS valuation for all i and ti ∈ Ti , then α = 1. By setting b to 14 , we have
Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 236 · PostRev + 32 · APostEnRev.

For general subadditive valuations, α = O(log(m)) by [BR11], hence

Rev(M, v, D) ≤ O(log(m)) · max{PostRev, APostEnRev}.

62

Here is a sketch of the proof for Theorem 3.4. We show how to upper bound Single(M, β)
in Lemma 3.15. Then, we decompose Non-Favorite(M, β) into Tail(M, β) and Core(M, β)
in Lemma 3.16. We show how to construct a simple mechanism to approximate Tail(M, β) in
Section 3.7.1 and how to approximate Core(M, β) in Section 3.7.2.
Analysis of Single(M, β):
Lemma 3.15. For any mechanism M ,

Single(M, β) ≤ OPTCopies-UD ≤ 6 · PostRev.
Proof. We construct a new mechanism M 0 in the copies setting based on M (β) . Whenever M (β)
(β)

(β)

allocates item j to buyer i and ti ∈ Rj , M 0 serves the agent (i, j). Since there is at most one Rj

that ti belongs to, M 0 serves at most one agent (i, j) for each of buyer i. Hence, M 0 is feasible in
the copies setting, and Single(M, β) is the expected Myerson’s ironed virtual welfare of M 0 . Since
every agent’s value is drawn independently, the optimal revenue in the copies setting is the same
as the maximum Myerson’s ironed virtual welfare in the same setting. Therefore, OPTCopies-UD is
no less than Single(M, β).
As showed in [CHMS10,KW12], a simple posted-price mechanism with the constraint that every
buyer can only purchase one item, i.e., an RSPM, achieves revenue at least OPTCopies-UD /6 in the
original setting. Hence, OPTCopies-UD ≤ 6 · PostRev.
Core-Tail Decomposition of Non-Favorite(M, β): we decompose Non-Favorite(M, β) into
two terms Tail(M, β) and Core(M, β)10 . First, we need the following definition.

P
Definition 3.6. For every buyer i, let ci := inf x ≥ 0 : j Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + x] ≤

1
2

. For

every ti ∈ Ti , let Ti (ti ) = {j | Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci } and Ci (ti ) = [m]\Ti (ti ).
Since vi (ti , ·) is subadditive for all i and ti ∈ Ti , we have vi (ti , S) ≤ vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti )) +
P

j∈S∩Ti (ti ) Vi (tij ).

The term Non-Favorite(M, β) can be decomposed into Tail(M, β) and

10. In [CDW16], Non-Favorite is decomposed into four different terms Under, Over, Core and Tail. We
essentially merge the first three terms into Core(M, β) in our decomposition.
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Core(M, β) based on the inequality above. The complete proof of Lemma 3.16 can be found
in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3.16.

Non-Favorite(M, β)
XX
X (β)
σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))
≤
fi (ti )
ti

i

+

XX
i

j

3.7.1

(Core(M, β))

S⊆[m]

X

fij (tij ) · Vi (tij ) ·

X
k6=j

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ]
tik

(Tail(M, β))

Analyzing Tail(M, β) in the Multi-Bidder Case

In this section we show how to bound Tail(M, β) with the revenue of an RSPM.
Lemma 3.17. For any BIC mechanism M , Tail(M, β) ≤

2
1−b

· PostRev.

We first fix a few notations. Let

Pij ∈ argmaxx≥ci (x + βij ) · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ x],
tij

rij = (Pij + βij ) · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ Pij ] = max(x + βij ) · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ x],
x≥ci

ri =

P

j rij ,

and r =

P

i ri .

tij

We show in the following Lemma that r is an upper bound of

Tail(M, β).
Lemma 3.18. For any BIC mechanism M , Tail(M, β) ≤ r.
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Proof.
Tail(M, β) ≤

XX
i

+

j

X

j

X

+

j

XX
i

j

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ]
tik

fij (tij ) · (Vi (tij ) − βij ) ·

X

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ]

k6=j

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

1 XX
≤ ·
2
i

X
k6=j

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

XX
i

fij (tij ) · (βij + ci ) ·

X

tik

fij (tij ) · (βij + ci ) (Definition of ci and Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci )

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

X

fij (tij ) ·

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

X

rik (Definition of rik and Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci )

k6=j

X
X
1 XX
≤ ·
Pr[Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci ] · (βij + ci ) +
ri ·
Pr[Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci ]
tij
tij
2
i

j

i

j

1 XX
1 X
≤ ·
rij + ·
ri (Definition of rij and ci )
2
2
i

j

i

=r
In the second inequality, the first term is because Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ ci , so
X
k6=j

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ] ≤
tik

X
k

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ ci ] ≤ 1/2.
tik

The second term is because for any tij such that Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci ,

(Vi (tij ) − βij )·Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ] ≤ (βik + Vi (tij ) − βij )·Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ] ≤ rik .
tik

tik

Next, we argue that r can be approximated by an RSPM. Indeed, we prove a stronger lemma,
which is also useful for analyzing Core(M, β).
Lemma 3.19. Let {xij }i∈[n],j∈[m] be a collection of non-negative numbers, such that for any buyer
i
X
j∈[m]

Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij ] ≤ 1/2,
tij
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then
XX
i

(xij + βij ) · Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij ] ≤
tij

j

2
· PostRev.
1−b

Proof. Consider a RSPM that sells item j to buyer i at price ξij = xij + βij . The mechanism visits
the buyers in some arbitrary order. Notice that when it is buyer i’s turn, she purchases exactly
item j and pays xij + βij if all of the following three conditions hold: (i) j is still available, (ii)
Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij and (iii) ∀k 6= j, Vi (tik ) < xik + βik . The second condition means buyer i can
afford item j. The third condition means she cannot afford any other item k 6= j. Therefore, buyer
i’s purchases exactly item j.
Now let us compute the probability that all three conditions hold. Since every buyer’s valuation
is subadditive over the items, item j is purchased by someone else only if there exists a buyer k 6= i
who has Vk (tkj ) ≥ ξkj . Because xkj ≥ 0 for all k, by the union bound, the event described above
P
happens with probability at most k6=i Prtkj [Vk (tkj ) ≥ βkj ], which is less than b by property (i) of
Lemma 3.6. Therefore, condition (i) holds with probability at least (1 − b). Clearly, condition (ii)
holds with probability Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij ]. Finally, condition (iii) holds with at least probability 1/2, because according to our assumption of the xij s, the probability that there exists any item
k 6= j such that Vi (tik ) ≥ xik + βik is no more than 1/2. Since the three conditions are independent,
· Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij ]. So the
buyer i purchases exactly item j with probability at least (1−b)
2
P P
expected revenue of this mechanism is at least (1−b)
i
j (βij +xij )·Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ xij + βij ].
2 ·
Proof of Lemma 3.17: Since Pij ≥ ci , it satisfies the assumption in Lemma 3.19 due to the choice
of ci . Therefore,

r=

X

(βij + Pij ) · Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ Pij + βij ] ≤
tij

i,j

2
· PostRev.
1−b

(3.9)

Our statement follows from the above inequality and Lemma 3.18.2
We have done the analysis for Tail(M, β). Before starting the analysis for Core(M, β), we
show that ri is within a constant factor of ci . This Lemma is useful for bounding Core(M, β).
Lemma 3.20. For all i ∈ [n], ri ≥

1
2

· ci and

P

i ci /2
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≤

2
1−b

· PostRev.

Proof. By the definition of Pij ,

ri =

X
X
(βij + Pij ) · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ Pij ] ≥
(βij + ci ) · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ ci ]
j

≥

X

j

ci · Pr[Vi (tij ) − βij ≥ ci ] ≥

j

1
· ci
2

P
P
The last inequality is because when ci > 0, j Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci ] is at least 21 . As i ci /2 ≤ r,
P
2
by Inequality (3.9), i ci /2 ≤ 1−b
· PostRev.

3.7.2

Analyzing Core(M, β) in the Multi-Bidder Case

In this section we upper bound Core(M, β). Recall that

Core(M, β) =

XX
i

X

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

(β)

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))

S⊆[m]

We can view it as the welfare of another valuation function v 0 under allocation σ (β) where vi0 (ti , S) =
vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti )). In other words, we “truncate” the function at some threshold, i.e., only evaluate
the items whose value on its own is less than that threshold. The new function still satisfies
monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities.
We first compare existing methods for analyzing the Core with our approach before jumping
into the proofs.

Comparison between the Existing Methods and Our Approach
As all results in the literature [CHMS10, Yao15, CDW16, CM16] only study special cases of constrained additive valuations, we restrict our attention to constrained additive valuations in the
comparison, but our approach also applies to XOS and subadditive valuations.
We compare our approach to the state of the art result by Chawla and Miller [CM16]. They
separate Core(M, β) into two parts: (i) the welfare obtained from values below β, and (ii) the
welfare obtained from values between β and β + c11 . It is not hard to show that the latter can be
11. In particular, if bidder i is awarded a bundle S that is feasible for her, the contribution for the first part is
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upper bounded by the revenue of a sequential posted price with per bidder entry fee mechanism.
Due to their choice of β (similar to the second property of Lemma 3.6), the former is upper bounded
P
by i,j βij · Prtij [tij ≥ βij ]. It turns out when every bidder’s feasibility constraint is a matroid, one
can use the OCRS from [FSZ16] to design a sequential posted price mechanism to approximate this
√ 
P
expression. However, as we show in Example 3.1, i,j βij · Prtij [tij ≥ βij ] could be Ω logmm times
larger than the optimal social welfare when the bidders have general downward closed feasibility
constraints. Hence, such approach cannot yield any constant factor approximation for general
constrained additive valuations.
As explained in the intro, we take an entirely different approach. We first construct the posted
prices {Qj }j∈[m] for our ASPE (Definition 3.7), Feldman et al. [FGL15] showed that the anonymous
posted price mechanism with these prices achieves welfare Ω (Core(M, β)). If all bidders have valuations that are subadditive over independent items, for any bidder i and any set of available items
P
S, i’s surplus for S under valuation vi0 (ti , ·) (maxS 0 ⊆S vi0 (ti , S 0 ) − j∈S 0 Qj ) is also subadditive over
independent items. According to Talagrand’s concentration inequality, the surplus concentrates
and its expectation is upper bounded by its median and its Lipschitz constant a. One can extract
at least half of the median by setting the median of the surplus as the entry fee. How about the
Lipschitz constant a? Unfortunately, a could be as large as

1
2

maxj∈[m] {βij + ci }, which is too large

to be bounded.
Here is how we overcome this difficulty. Instead of considering v 0 , we construct a new valuation
v̂ that is always dominated by the true valuation v. We consider the social welfare induced by
\
\
σ (β) under v̂ and define it as Core(M,
β). In Section 3.7.2, we show that Core(M,
β) is not too
\
far away from Core(M, β), so it suffices to approximate Core(M,
β) (Lemma 3.26). But why
\
is Core(M,
β) easier to approximate? The reason is two-fold. (i) For any bidder i and any set
of available items S, bidder i’s surplus for S under v̂i (ti , ·) (defined as µi (ti , S) in Definition 3.10,
P
which is maxS 0 ⊆S v̂i (ti , S 0 ) − j∈S 0 Qj ), is not only subadditive over independent items, but also
has a small Lipschitz constant τi (Lemma 3.27). Indeed, these Lipschitz constants are so small
P
that i τi and can be upper bounded by PostRev (Lemma 4.24). (ii) If we set the entry fee
P

j∈S

min {βij , tij } · 1 [tij < βij + ci ] and the contribution to the second part is
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P

j∈S

(tij − βij )+ · 1 [tij < βij + ci ]

of our ASPE to be the median of µi (ti , S) when ti is drawn from Di , using a proof inspired by
Feldman et al. [FGL15], we can show that our ASPE’s revenue collected from the posted prices
plus the expected surplus of the bidders (over the randomness of all bidders’ types) approximates
\
Core(M,
β) (implied by Lemma 3.28). Again by Talagrand’s concentration inequality, we can
bound bidder i’s expected surplus by our entry fee and τi (Lemma 3.30). As v̂ is always smaller
than the true valuation v, thus for any type ti of bidder i and any available items S, the surplus
for S under vi (ti , ·) must be larger than µi (ti , S), and the entry fee is accepted with probability
at least 1/2. Putting everything together, we demonstrate that we can approximate Core(M, β)
with an ASPE or an RSPM (Lemma 3.31).
\
Construction of Core(M,
β)
We first show that if for any i and ti ∈ Ti there is a set of α-supporting prices for vi (ti , ·), then
there is a set of α-supporting prices for vi0 (ti , ·).
Lemma 3.21. If for any type ti and any set S, there exists a set of α-supporting prices {θjS (ti )}j∈S
for vi (ti , ·), then for any ti and S there also exists a set of α-supporting prices {γjS (ti )}j∈S for
S∩Ci (ti )

vi0 (ti , ·). In particular, γjS (ti ) = θj

(ti ) if j ∈ S ∩ Ci (ti ) and γjS (ti ) = 0 otherwise. Moreover,

γjS (ti ) ≤ Vi (tij ) · 1[Vi (tij ) < βij + ci ] for all i, ti , j and S.
Proof. It suffices to verify that {γjS (ti )}j∈S satisfies the two properties of α-supporting prices. For
any S 0 ⊆ S, S 0 ∩ Ci (ti ) ⊆ S ∩ Ci (ti ). Therefore,
S∩Ci (ti )

X

vi0 (ti , S 0 ) = vi (ti , S 0 ∩ Ci (ti )) ≥

θj

j∈S 0 ∩Ci (ti )

(ti ) =

X

γjS (ti ) =

j∈S 0 ∩Ci (ti )

X

γjS (ti )

j∈S 0

The last equality is because γjS (ti ) = 0 for j ∈ S\Ci (ti ). Also, we have
X
j∈S

γjS (ti ) =

X

S∩Ci (ti )

θj

(ti ) ≥

j∈S∩Ci (ti )

v 0 (ti , S)
vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))
= i
α
α

Thus, {γjS (ti )}j∈S defined above is a set of α-supporting prices for vi0 (ti , ·). Next, we argue
that γjS (ti ) ≤ Vi (tij ) · 1[Vi (tij ) < βij + ci ] for all i, ti , j ∈ S. If Vi (tij ) ≥ βij + ci , j 6∈ Ci (ti ), by
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definition γjS (ti ) = 0. Otherwise if Vi (tij ) < βij + ci , then {j} ⊆ S ∩ Ci (ti ), by the first property of
α-supporting prices, γjS (ti ) ≤ vi0 (ti , {j}) = Vi (tij ).
Next, we define the prices of our ASPE.
Definition 3.7. We define a price Qj for each item j as follows,

Qj =

X (β)
1 XX
·
fi (ti ) ·
σiS (ti ) · γjS (ti ),
2
ti ∈Ti

i

S:j∈S

where {γjS (ti )}j∈S are the α-supporting prices of vi0 (ti , ·) and set S for any bidder i and type ti ∈ Ti .
Core(M, β) can be upper bounded by

P

j∈[m] Qj .

The proof follows from the definition of

α-supporting prices (Definition 3.5) and the definition of Qj (Definition 3.7).
Lemma 3.22. 2α ·

P

j∈[m] Qj

≥ Core(M, β).

Proof.
Core(M, β) =

XX
i

X

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

S⊆[m]

≤α·

XX

=α·

X XX

i

= 2α ·

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

j∈[m]

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · vi0 (ti , S)

i

(β)

X

σiS (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

γjS (ti )

j∈S

S⊆[m]

fi (ti ) ·

X

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · γjS (ti )

S:j∈S

Qj

j∈[m]

\
In the following definitions, we define Core(M,
β) which is the welfare of another function v̂
under the same allocation σ (β) .
Definition 3.8. Let

τi := inf{x ≥ 0 :

X
j

1
Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + x}] ≤ }.
tij
2

and define Ai to be {j | βij ≤ Qj + τi }.
70

Definition 3.9. For every buyer i and type ti ∈ Ti , let Yi (ti ) = {j | Vi (tij ) < Qj + τi },

v̂i (ti , S) = vi (ti , S ∩ Yi (ti ))

and
γ̂jS (ti ) = γjS (ti ) · 1[Vi (tij ) < Qj + τi ]
for any set S ∈ [m]. Moreover, let

\
Core(M,
β) =

XX
i

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · v̂i (ti , S).

S⊆[m]

In the next two Lemmas, we prove some useful properties of τi . In particular, we argue that
P

i∈[n] τi

can be upper bounded by

4
1−b

· PostRev (Lemma 4.24).

Lemma 3.23.
XX
i

max {βij , Qj + τi } · Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max {βij , Qj + τi }] ≤
tij

j

Proof. According to the definition of τi , for every buyer i,
1
2,

P

2
· PostRev
1−b

Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + τi }] =

j

and max{βij , Qj + τi } ≥ βij . Our statement follows directly from Lemma 3.19.

Lemma 3.24.
X
i∈[n]

τi ≤

4
· PostRev.
1−b

Proof. Since Qj is nonnegative,
XX
i

max {βij , Qj + τi } · Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + τi }] ≥

j

X

τi ·

X

i

According to the definition of τi , when τi > 0,
X
j

1
Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + τi }] = .
2
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j

Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + τi }] .

Therefore,

P

i∈[n] τi

≤

4
1−b

· PostRev due to Lemma 3.23.

\
In the following two Lemmas, we compare Core(M,
β) with Core(M, β).

The proof of

Lemma 3.25 is postponed to Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3.25. For every buyer i, type ti ∈ Ti , v̂i (ti , ·) satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no
P
externalities. Furthermore, for every set S ⊆ [m] and every subset S 0 of S, v̂i (ti , S 0 ) ≥ j∈S 0 γ̂jS (ti ).
Lemma 3.26. Let
Q̂j =

X (β)
1 XX
·
fi (ti ) ·
σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ).
2
i

ti ∈Ti

S:j∈S

Then,
Qj ≥ Q̂j , for all j ∈ [m] and
X

Qj ≤

j∈[m]

X

Q̂j +

j∈[m]

(b + 1)
· PostRev.
b · (1 − b)

Proof. From the definition of Q̂j , it is easy to see that Qj ≥ Q̂j for every j. So we only need to
P
P
(b+1)
argue that j∈[m] Qj ≤ j∈[m] Q̂j + b·(1−b)
· PostRev.
X
j

 1 XX X
X (β)

Qj − Q̂j = ·
fi (ti ) ·
σiS (ti ) · γjS (ti ) − γ̂jS (ti )
2
i

j

ti ∈Ti

S:j∈S

X (β)
1 XX X
≤ ·
fi (ti ) ·
σiS (ti ) · (βij · 1 [Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ] + ci · 1 [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }])
2
i

j

ti ∈Ti

S:j∈S

1 XX X
(β)
= ·
fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) · (βij · 1 [Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ] + ci · 1 [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }])
2
i

j

ti ∈Ti

(3.10)
This first inequality is because γjS (ti ) − γ̂jS (ti ) is non-zero only when Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi , and
the difference is upper bounded by βij when Vi (tij ) ≤ βij and upper bounded by βij + ci when
Vi (tij ) > βij .
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We first bound

i

≤
≤

XX
i

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) · βij · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ]

βij ·

fi (ti ) · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ] +
XX

tij

XX

XX
i

βij · Pr[Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ] +

j∈Ai

i

≤

X
ti ∈Ti

j∈Ai

≤(1/b) ·

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) · βij · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ Qj + τi ].

ti ∈Ti

j

XX
i

ti ∈Ti

j

(β)

XX X
i

(β)

P P P

i

j ∈A
/ i

j ∈A
/ i

βij ·

X

(β)

fi (ti ) · πij (ti )

ti ∈Ti

βij · Pr[Vi (tij ) ≥ βij ]/b
tij

(3.11)

max{βij , Qj + τi } · Pr [Vi (tij ) ≥ max{βij , Qj + τi }]
tij

j

2
· PostRev
b · (1 − b)

The set Ai in the first inequality is defined in Definition 3.8. The second inequality is due to
property (ii) in Lemma 3.6. The third inequality is due to Definition 3.8 and the last inequality is
due to Lemma 3.23.
(β)

P P P

Next, we bound

i

ti ∈Ti

j

XX X
i

j

≤

X

(β)

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) · ci · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }]

ti ∈Ti

ci

XX

i

j

≤

X

ci

X

≤

X

i

fi (ti ) · πij (ti ) · ci · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }].

j

fi (ti ) · 1[Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }]

ti

Pr[Vi (tij ) ≥ max{Qj + τi , βij }]
tij

(3.12)

ci /2

i

≤

2
· PostRev
(1 − b)

The last inequality is due to Lemma 3.20. Combining Inequality (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12), we
have proved our claim.
P

≤ Core(M, β)/2α. Hence, Lemma 3.26 shows that to approximate
P
\
Core(M, β), it suffices to approximate Core(M,
β). Indeed, we will use j∈[m] Q̂j as an proxy
By Lemma 3.22,

j∈[m] Qj

for Core(M, β) in our analysis of the ASPE.
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Design and Analysis of Our ASPE
Consider the sequential post-price mechanism with anonymous posted price Qj for item j. We visit
the buyers in the alphabetical order12 and charge every bidder an entry fee. We define the entry
fee here.
Definition 3.10 (Entry Fee). For any bidder i, any type ti ∈ Ti and any set S, let
µi (ti , S) = max
v̂i (ti , S 0 ) −
0
S ⊆S

X


Qj .

j∈S 0

For any type profile t ∈ T and any bidder i, let the entry fee for bidder i be

δi (Si (t<i )) = Medianti [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))] 13 ,

where S1 (t<1 ) = [m] and Si (t<i ) is the set of items that are not purchased by the first i − 1 buyers
in the ASPE, when buyer `’s valuation is v` (t` , ·) for all ` < i. Notice that even though the seller
does not know t<i , she can compute the entry fee δi (Si (t<i )), as she observes Si (t<i ) after visiting
the first i − 1 bidders.
In Lemma 3.27, we show that τi is the Lipschitz constant for µi (·, ·) and the proof is postponed
P
4
· PostRev due to Lemma 4.24.
to Appendix A.4. Moreover, i τi is upper bounded by 1−b
Lemma 3.27. For any i, the function µi (·, ·) is τi -Lipschitz. Moreover, for any type ti ∈ Ti ,
µi (ti , ·) satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities.
The following Lemma is crucial for our proof. We show that in expectation over all type profiles,
we can lower bound of the sum of µi (ti , Si (t<i )) for all bidders. In particular, this lower bound
\
plus our ASPE’s revenue from the posted prices already approximates Core(M,
β). The proof is
inspired by Feldman et al. [FGL15]. Note that µi (ti , Si (t<i )) is a lower bound of the real surplus
12. We can visit the buyers in an arbitrary order. We use the the alphabetical order here just to ease the notations
in the proof.
13. Here Medianx [h(x)] denotes the median of a non-negative function h(x) on random variable x, i.e.
Medianx [h(x)] = inf{a ≥ 0 : Prx [h(x) ≤ a] ≥ 12 }.
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of buyer i for set Si (t<i ). We choose to analyze the sum of µi (ti , Si (t<i )) because µi (·, ·) has a
small Lipschitz constant, which allows us to approximate µi (ti , Si (t<i )) with buyer i’s entry fee
µi (Si (t<i )) and τi .
Lemma 3.28. For all j, let Qj (Definition 3.7) be the price for item j and every bidder’s entry
fee be described as in Definition 3.10. For every type profile t ∈ T , let SOLD(t) be the set of items
sold in the corresponding ASPE when buyer i’s valuation is vi (ti , ·). Then




Et 

X

µi (ti , Si (t<i )) ≥

X

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · (2Q̂j − Qj )

j

i∈[n]

≥

X
j∈[m]

t

Pr [j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · Qj −
t
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(2b + 2)
· PostRev
b · (1 − b)

Proof.
"
Et

#
X

µi (ti , Si (t<i ))

i

≥

X

h 
i
(β)
Eti ,t−i ,t0−i µi ti , Si (t<i ) ∩ Mi (ti , t0−i )
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t<i
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X

Eti 
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X

j∈[m]

Pr[j ∈ Si (t<i )] ·

t<i

X
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X
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σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ) − Qj
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t


X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ) − Qj

+



S:j∈S

X
XX
X (β)

≥
Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)]
fi (ti ) ·
σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ) − Qj
j

t

i

ti

S:j∈S

t0−i are fresh samples drawn from D−i . The first inequality is because the µi (ti , S) function
 (β) 0
+
Mi (ti ,t−i )
is monotone in set S for any i and type ti ∈ Ti . We use γ̂j
(ti ) − Qj
to denote
 (β) 0

M (ti ,t−i )
(β)
max γ̂j i
(ti ) − Qj , 0 . If we let S be the set of items that are in Si (t<i ) ∩ Mi (ti , t0−i ) and


(β)
P
M (ti ,t0−i )
(β)
satisfy that γ̂j i
(ti ) − Qj ≥ 0, then µi ti , Si (t<i ) ∩ Mi (ti , t0−i ) ≥ v̂i (ti , S) − j∈S Qj ≥
 (β) 0

P
Mi (ti ,t−i )
γ̂
(t
)
−
Q
due to the definition of µi (ti , ·) and Lemma 3.25. This inequality is
i
j
j∈S
j
exactly the second inequality above. The next equality is because Si (t<i ) only depends on the types
of bidders other than i. The second last inequality is because Prt<i [j ∈ Si (t<i )] ≥ Prt [j ∈
/ SOLD(t)]
for all j and i, as the LHS is the probability that the item is not sold after the seller has visited the
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first i − 1 bidders and the RHS is the probability that the item remains unsold till the end of the
P P
P
(β)
mechanism. Now, observe that i ti fi (ti ) · S:j∈S σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ) = 2Q̂j for any j according to
the definition in Lemma 3.26. Therefore,

X
j

≥

X
j

=

X
j

≥

X
j

≥

X
j

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)]

XX

t

i

fi (ti ) ·

ti

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · γ̂jS (ti ) − Qj



S:j∈S

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · (2Q̂j − Qj )
t

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · Qj −
t

X
j

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · Qj −
t

X

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · 2(Qj − Q̂j )
t

2(Qj − Q̂j )

(Due to Lemma 3.26, Qj − Q̂j ≥ 0 for all j)

j

Pr[j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · Qj −
t

(2b + 2)
· PostRev
b · (1 − b)

(Lemma 3.26)

Since entry fee in the ASPE for every bidder as the median of her utility over the available items
under v̂. Clearly, bidders accept the entry fee with probability at least 1/2, as their true utilities
(under v) are always higher than their utilities under v̂. Combining the concentration property
of the utility under v̂ and Lemma 3.28, we can argue that the total revenue from our ASPE is
\
comparable to Core(M,
β), and therefore is comparable to Core(M, β).
Lemma 3.29. For all i and t<i , bidder i accepts δi (t<i ) with probability at least 1/2 when ti is
drawn from Di . Moreover,


5
(b + 1)
1 X
Qj −
+
· PostRev.
APostEnRev ≥ ·
4
2(1 − b) 2b · (1 − b)
j

Proof. For any bidder i, type ti ∈ Ti and any set S, define bidder i’s utility as ui (ti , S) =

P
maxS 0 ⊆S vi (ti , S 0 ) − j∈S 0 Qj . Clearly, ui (ti , S) ≥ µi (ti , S) for any type ti and set S. For any t<i ,
as long as ui (ti , Si (t<i )) ≥ δi (Si (t<i )), buyer i accepts the entry fee. Since δi (Si (t<i )) is the median
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of µi (ti , t<i ), ui (ti , Si (t<i )) ≥ δi (Si (t<i )) with probability at least 1/2 when ti is drawn from Di .
P
So the revenue from entry fee is at least 12 · i Et<i [δi (Si (t<i ))] .
For any i and t<i , by Lemma 3.27 and Corollary 3.1, we are able to derive a lower bound for
δi (Si (t<i )), as shown in Lemma 3.30.
Lemma 3.30. For all i and t<i ,

2δi (Si (t<i )) +

5τi
≥ Eti [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))] .
2

Proof. It directly follows from Lemma 3.27 and Corollary 3.1. For any i and t<i , let Si (t<i )
be the ground set I.

Therefore, µi (ti , ·) with ti ∼ Di is a function drawn from a distribu-

tion that is subadditive over independent items. Since, µi (·, ·) is τi -Lipschitz and δi (Si (t<i )) =
Medianti [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))],

2δi (Si (t<i )) +

5τi
≥ Eti [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))] .
2

Back to the proof of Lemma 3.29. According to Lemma 3.30, the revenue from the entry fee is
P
P
P
P
at least 41 · i Et<i ,ti [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))] − 58 · i τi , which is equal to 14 · i Et [µi (ti , Si (t<i ))] − 85 · i τi .
Combining Lemma 4.24 and Lemma 3.28, we can further show that the revenue from the entry
P
(b+1)
5
fee is at least 14 j Prt [j ∈
/ SOLD(t)] · Qj − ( 2(1−b)
+ 2b(1−b)
)PostRev. Since the revenue from
P
the posted prices is exactly j Prt [j ∈ SOLD(t)] · Qj , the total revenue of the ASPE is at least


(b+1)
1 P
5
·
Q
−
+
j
j
4
2(1−b)
2b·(1−b) · PostRev.
Combining everything together, we have the main result of Section 3.7.2.
Lemma 3.31. For any BIC mechanism M ,

Core(M, β) ≤ 8α · APostEnRev + 4α

Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 3.22 and 3.29.
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6
1
+
1 − b b(1 − b)


PostRev.

Now, we have upper bounded Single(M, β), Tail(M, β) and Core(M, β) using the sum of
the revenue of simple mechanisms (RSPM and ASPE). Combining these bounds, we complete the
proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4: The proof follows from combining Theorem 3.2, Lemma 3.15, 3.16, 3.17
and 3.31. 2

3.7.3

Bad Example for Chawla and Miller’s Approach

Let bidders be constrained additive and Fi be bidder i feasibility constraint. We use PFi =
conv({1S |S ∈ Fi }) to denote the feasibility polytope of bidder i. Let {qij }i∈[n],j∈[m] be a collection
P
of probabilities that satisfy
i qij ≤ 1/2 for all item j and q i = (qi1 , . . . , qim ) ∈ b · PFi . Let
P
βij = Fij−1 (qij ). The analysis by Chawla and Miller [CM16] needs to upper bound i,j βij · qij
using the revenue of some BIC mechanism. When Fi is a matroid for every bidder i, this expression
can be upper bounded by the revenue of a sequential posted price mechanism constructed using
OCRS from [FSZ16]. Here we show that if the bidders have general downward closed feasibility
constraints, this expression is gigantic. More specifically, we prove that even when there is only
√ 
one bidder, the expression could be Ω logmm times larger than the optimal social welfare.
Consider the following example.
Example 3.1. The seller is selling m = k 2 items to a single bidder. The bidder’s value for each
item is drawn i.i.d. from distribution F , which is the equal revenue distribution truncated at k, i.e.,

F (x) =




1 − 1 ,
x

if x < k



1,

if x = k

Items are divided into k disjoint sets A1 , ..., Ak , each with size k. The bidder is additive subject to
feasibility constraint F = {S ⊆ [m]|∃i ∈ [k], S ⊆ Ai }.
Lemma 3.32. Let PF = conv({1S |S ∈ F}) be the feasibility polytope for the bidder in Example 3.1.
Let SW be the optimal social welfare. Then for any constant b > 0, there exists q ∈ b · PF such
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that for sufficiently large k,
X

qj · F −1 (1 − qj ) = Θ(

j∈[m]

k
) · SW
log k

Proof. For any b > 0, consider the following feasible allocation rule: w.p. (1 − b), don’t allocate
anything, and w.p. b, give the buyer one of the sets Ai uniformly at random. The corresponding
ex-ante probability vector q satisfies qj = kb , ∀j ∈ [m]. Thus q ∈ b·PF . Since qj < k1 , F −1 (1−qj ) = k
P
for all j ∈ [m]. We have j∈[m] qj · F −1 (1 − qj ) = k 2 · kb · k = b · k 2 . We use Vi to denote the random
variable of the bidder’s value for set Ai . It is not hard to see that SW = E[maxi∈[k] Vi ].
Lemma 3.33. For any i ∈ [k],
Pr [Vi > 3 · k log(k)] ≤ k −3
Proof. Let X be random variable with cdf F . Notice E[X] = log(k), E[X 2 ] = 2k, and |X| ≤ k.
For every i, by the Bernstein concentration inequality, for any t > 0,

Pr [Vi − k log(k) > t] ≤ exp −

1 2
2t

!

2k 2 + 13 kt

Choose t = 2k log(k), we have
Pr [Vi > 3k log(k)] ≤ exp(−3 log(k)) = k −3

By the union bound, Pr[maxi∈[k] Vi > 3 · k log(k)] ≤ k −2 . Therefore, E[maxi∈[k] Vi ] ≤ 3k log k +
k 2 · k −2 ≤ 4k log k.
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3.8

Improved Analysis for Constrained Additive Valuation

In this section, we show that for constrained additive bidders, we do not need to relax the valuations,
as applying directly the flow in Section 3.5 already gives an upper bound with the right format.
So we can take M (β) to simply be M . In particular, we can derive the following improved upper
bound for Rev(M, v, D) using essentially the same proof as in Section 3.5.
Theorem 3.5. If for any bidder i any type ti ∈ T , vi (ti , ·) is a constrained additive valuation, then
for any mechanism M and any β = {βij }i∈[n],j∈[m] ,

Rev(M, v, D) ≤ Non-Favorite(M, β) + Single(M, β).

Combining the same upper bounds we obtained for Non-Favorite(M, β) and Single(M, β)
and the improved upper bound in Theorem 3.5, we can improve the approximation ratio when the
bidder(s) have constrained additive valuations.
Theorem 3.6. For a single buyer whose valuation is constrained additive,

Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 7 · SRev + 4 · BRev,

for any BIC mechanism M .
Theorem 3.7. For multiple buyers whose valuations are constrained additive,
Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 8 · APostEnRev


4(b + 1)
22
+
· PostRev
+ 6+
1 − b (1 − b)b
for any BIC mechanism M . In particular, if we set b to be 41 , then
Rev(M, v, D) ≤ 8 · APostEnRev + 62 · PostRev.
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(3.13)

Chapter 4

Profit Maximization
In this chapter we study the profit maximization problem in multi-item auctions, where the seller
has private costs associated with her items. We design simple and truthful mechanisms and prove
that they achieve a constant factor approximation to the optimal profit.
In Section 4.1 we give an overview of our results and techniques shown in this chapter. In
Section 4.2 we introduce some additional definitions and notations need to read this chapter. In
Section 4.3, we introduce a benchmark of the optimal profit using the CDW duality framework. We
formulate the maximization problem as an LP, take the Lagrangian dual (Section 4.3.1), and then
define a new set of dual variables (a flow) to derive our benchmark (Section 4.3.2). In Section 4.4,
we prove our result for the single constraint-additive buyer case. In Section 4.5 we study the case
with multiple buyers.

4.1

Results in This Chapter

To state our result, we will first focus on the single buyer case. In our model, there are m items
for sale, and the seller has cost cj for parting with item j. The costs (c1 , . . . , cm ) are drawn from
a distribution C that is known to both the seller and the buyer. We allow the seller’s costs to be
correlated across items. Consider constrained-additive buyers, that is, the buyer has a downwardclosed feasibility constraint F ⊆ 2[m] that specifies what bundles of items are allowed. The buyer
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has value tj for item j, and her value for a bundle S is defined as maxA∈F ,A⊆S

P

i∈A tj .

Similar to

most results in the simple vs. optimal literature, we assume tj to be drawn from Dj independently
across items.
We propose a new class of mechanisms called permit-selling. These mechanisms have two stages.
For each item j, we create a separate permit that allows the buyer to purchase the item at its cost.
In the first stage, we sell the permits without revealing any information about the actual costs. In
the second stage, the seller reveals all the costs, and the buyer can buy item j by only paying the
cost cj if the buyer has purchased the permit for item j in the first stage. How does the buyer
make a decision in such a mechanism? In the first stage, the buyer needs to choose her favorite
bundle of permits to purchase. Since she knows the distribution C, she can compute her utility
for each bundle of permits. In the second stage, the buyer simply picks her favorite set of items
based on the permits she own, the costs of the items, and her valuation function. Why do the
permit-selling mechanisms help addressing the two challenges? Note that the profit of the permitselling mechanisms is exactly the revenue from the first stage, so any mechanism that achieves
high revenue in the first stage also generates high profit. Moreover, the buyer needs to make a
decision on what permits to purchase without learning the costs, therefore, the seller can extract
the informational rent by pricing the permits appropriately.
Indeed, we do not even need to use any complex pricing scheme in the first stage. We sell the
permits separately or sell them as a grand bundle. In our proof we need one more mechanism,
which simply sells the items separately, and the prices change according to the seller’s costs. The
reason why this class of mechanism is required is more subtle and we only sketch the intuition
here. In the permit-selling mechanism, for a fixed buyer type profile t, the buyer purchases a set of
permits P and thus the seller can only extract revenue from items in P , no matter what realized
costs she has. However, for different cost vectors, the seller may have different items from which
she can extract more revenue. By posting item prices that depend on her cost, the seller is able to
target the profitable items based on her realized cost vector. This approach does not capture the
informational rent but may generate high profit in certain cases.
Here are the mechanisms we use.
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• sell-items-separately (IS): for each possible cost vector c = (c1 , · · · , cm ), sell the items
separately, and the price pj (c) for item j depends on c.
• sell-permits-separately (PS): sell the permits separately, and the price pj for the j-th
permit is independent from the seller’s costs.
• permit-bundling (PB): sell all the permits as a grand bundle at a price p that is independent
from the seller’s costs.
Since in all these mechanisms, the seller does not even ask the buyer to report her valuation,
the mechanism is clear incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR). We show that the
best mechanism among these three classes of mechanisms can already achieve a constant fraction
of the optimal profit.
Theorem 4.1. For any valuation distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dm , cost distribution C, and any
downward-closed feasibility constraint F, the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sellpermits-separately, and permit-bundling mechanisms is an 11-approximation to the optimal profit.
When the buyer’s valuation is additive, we can improve the approximation factor to 6.
Theorem 4.2. If the buyer has additive valuation, for any valuation distribution D = D1 ×. . .×Dm
and cost distribution C, the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sell-permits-separately,
and permit-bundling mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.
We then generalize the result to accommodate multiple buyers. With multiple buyers, we sell
the permits with a sequential mechanism: buyers arrive in some arbitrary order. When a buyer
arrives, we first offer the buyer the permits without revealing any information about the seller’s
cost or other buyers’ types. Next, the buyer is given the remaining item set as well as an item price
for each item. For single buyer case the item price is always chosen as the seller’s cost for this item.
Now we allow any prices that may depend on the cost vector.1 Again the buyer can purchase any
item from the remaining item set by paying the corresponding item price, if she has the permit
1. In the proof, the item prices is always chosen to be no less than the seller’s cost.
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for it. The mechanism is BIC and interim IR as the buyer needs to purchase the permit without
knowing the seller’s cost or what items are still available. In the proof, we use Sequential Permit
Posted Price (SPP) mechanisms that sell permits separately and Sequential Permit Bundling (SPB)
mechanisms that sell permits as a whole bundle. Similar to the single buyer case, we need another
mechanism called Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism (CSIP). It resembles the
Sequential Posted Price mechanism from [CHMS10]: the items are sold sequentially with posted
prices that depend on the seller’s cost vector. The mechanism also imposes a constraint on the set
of items a buyer can purchase. See Section 4.2 for more details.
We prove that the best of three classes of mechanisms can already achieve a constant fraction
of the optimal profit, if every buyer has matroid-rank valuation.
Theorem 4.3. For any cost distribution and buyers’ valuation distributions, if every buyer has a
matroid-rank valuation, the best mechanism among all CSIP, restricted SPP2 , and SPB mechanisms
is a 44-approximation to the optimal profit.

4.1.1

Proof Sketch and Techniques

Since the costs are private, it is a priori not clear that it is sufficient to consider only direct
mechanisms. Indeed, signaling mechanisms, a class of indirect mechanisms, are widely studied in the
ad auction setting [BMS12,FJM+ 12,DIR14,EFG+ 14,DPT16]. We first prove a revelation principle
for our problem similar to the one proved in [DPT16] for ad auctions. Our revelation principle states
that w.l.o.g. we can restrict our attention to direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanisms. Moreover,
we can formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. We next apply the Cai-DevanurWeinberg duality framework [CDW16]. The framework has become a standard tool for analyzing
the performance of simple mechanisms. In most of the results based on this duality approach, a
particular family of dual variables, called the “canonical dual” [CDW16, CZ17], is used to provide
a benchmark for the objective function. However, this set of dual variables does not provide an
appropriate benchmark due to the existence of costs. We propose a new set of dual variables that is
2. It’s closed to the Sequential Permit Posted Price mechanism, except that the mechanism may hide some items
randomly, preventing the buyer from buying some item even she has permit. See Section 4.2 for more details.
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tailored to handle the costs. Indeed, these dual variables are so informative that they inspired us to
introduce the permit-selling mechanisms. In the multi-buyer case, the choice of the dual variables
is also inspired by the ex-ante relaxation technique from [CM16]. A similar set of dual variables
are used in [CZ17] to provided a benchmark for the optimal revenue.
The benchmark induced by our dual variables can be easily decomposed into three components
– Single, Prophet and Non-Favorite. Single can be bounded by the profit of the CSIP
mechanism using relatively standard analysis. For Prophet, we bound the term using the same
class of mechanisms, with the help of the Online Contention Resolution Scheme [FSZ16].
For Non-Favorite, in order to establish a connection between profit maximization and revenue maximization, we provide a separate and clean proof for the single buyer case. Instead of
directly analyzing the term, we construct an auxiliary revenue maximization problem for selling
m items to help approximate Non-Favorite. Intuitively, each item in the auxiliary problem corresponds to a permit. We first show that any mechanism in the auxiliary problem can be turned
into a permit-selling mechanism in the original problem, such that the revenue in the auxiliary
problem is the same as the profit of the permit-selling mechanism. Next, we argue that the buyer
has subadditive valuation in the auxiliary problem whenever the buyer has constrained additive
valuation in the original problem. Note that the better of selling the items separately and grand
bundling is a constant factor approximation of the optimal revenue when the buyer has subadditive valuation [RW15, CZ17]. Unfortunately, we cannot use this approximation as a black-box, as
it is not yet clear how the revenue in the auxiliary problem relates to the Non-Favorite term.
Luckily, Cai and Zhao obtain their result via the CDW duality framework, and in their analysis,
they show that a term identical to Non-Favorite can be approximated by the revenue of selling
the items separately or grand bundling. Putting everything together, we prove that the profit of
a sell-permits-separately or permit-bundling mechanism approximates Non-Favorite, and that
completes our proof. For general case, it’s not straightforward build such a connection. We use the
standard Core-Tail Decomposition technique [LY13,CDW16], dividing Non-Favorite further into
two terms Tail and Core. Tail can be approximated using RSPP. For Core, it can be viewed
as all buyers’ truncated welfare with respect to a related fractionally-subadditive valuation and we
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can bound it using SPB and RSPP, by applying the Talagrand’s concentration inequality [Sch03].

4.2

Additional Notations

We consider the auction where a seller is selling m heterogeneous items to n buyers. Each buyer
has a constrained-additive valuation. Following the notations from Chapter 2, we denote buyer
i’s type ti as htij im
j=1 , where tij is buyer i’s value for item j. For every buyer i, denote Fi the
downward-closed feasibility constraint of buyer i’s valuation. On the other hand, the seller has a
private cost cj for producing each item j. Denote c the cost vector and c is drawn from distribution
C. Let T S be the support of C. We allow correlated costs in our problem.
For any direct3 mechanism M and any t, c, denote xij (t, c) the probability that buyer i is receiving item j, when the buyers has type profile t and seller has cost c. Let πij (ti , c) = Et−i [xij (t, c)]
be the interim allocation probability. Similarly, use pi (t, c) to denote the payment for buyer i. For
any t and c, buyer i’s utility ui (t, c) = ti · xi (t, c) − pi (t, c). The seller has profit (revenue minus
P
cost) i (pi (t, c) − c · xi (t, c)).
In our setting where the seller has a cost vector drawn from some distribution, the IC and IR
concepts of the mechanism takes the expectation over the seller’s cost vector. A formal definition
can be found as follows:
• Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC): reporting the true value maximizes the buyer’s expected utility Et−i ,c [ui (ti , t−i , c)].
• Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC): for every c and every t−i , reporting the
true value maximizes the buyer’s utility ui (ti , t−i , c).
• interim Individual Rational (interim IR): reporting the true value induces non-negative expected utility. Et−i ,c [ui (ti , t−i , c)] ≥ 0.
• ex-post Individual Rational (ex-post IR): for every c and t−i , reporting the true value induces
3. By Lemma 4.1, the revelation principle holds in the profit maximization problem. It suffices to consider direct,
BIC, and interim IR mechanisms.
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non-negative utility. ui (ti , t−i , c) ≥ 0.
If the mechanism allocates set S to some buyer, and the buyer is only interested in a feasible
subset of items U ⊂ S, the mechanism can simply allocate set U instead. This does not affect
the truthfulness for all buyers and increases the seller’s profit. In this paper, we will only consider
mechanisms that always allocate a feasible set of items U ∈ Fi to each buyer i. Denote P({Fi }ni=1 )
the region for all feasible allocations x.
For every mechanism M , denote Profit(D, C, {Fi }ni=1 , M ) the seller’s expected profit in M .
We use Profit(M ) for short when (D, C, {Fi }ni=1 ) is clear and fixed.

Profit(M ) =

X

Et,c [pi (t, c) − c · xi (t, c)]

i

As we will explain in Lemma 4.1, it is w.l.o.g. to only consider direct, BIC, and interim IR
mechanisms. Let OPTProfit (D, C, {Fi }ni=1 ) be the optimal profit among all BIC and interim IR
mechanisms (use OPTProfit for short when (D, C, {Fi }ni=1 ) is clear and fixed). Our goal is to use
a simple mechanism to approximate OPTProfit .

4.3

Benchmark for the Maximum Profit

In this section, we construct a benchmark for the optimal profit using the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg
duality framework. Before getting into the framework and benchmark, we first show that the
revelation principle holds in the profit maximization problem. Therefore, it suffices to find a
benchmark for the optimal profit attainable by any direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanisms. The
proof is postponed to Appendix B.2.
Lemma 4.1. Any ex-post implementable mechanism in the profit maximization problem can be
implemented by a direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanism.
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4.3.1

Duality Framework

The framework is first developed in [CDW16] and is widely used in mechanism design. Here we
apply the framework to our profit maximization problem. We obtain an upper bound of the optimal
profit similar to the upper bound of the optimal revenue obtained in [CDW16]. More specifically,
the profit of any BIC, interim IR mechanism is upper bounded by the sum of all buyers’ virtual
welfare minus the seller’s total cost for the same allocation, with respect to some virtual value
function. We will only show a sketch of the framework in the main body and refer the readers to
Appendix B.1 for a complete description.
In the framework, we first formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. Then take the
partial Lagrangian dual of the LP by lagrangifying the BIC and interim IR constraints. Since the
buyer’s payment is unconstrained in the partial Lagrangian, one can argue that to obtain any finite
benchmark, the corresponding dual variables must form a flow. The virtual value function in the
benchmark is then defined according to the choice of the dual variables/flow.
Lemma 4.2. For any dual solution λ that induces a finite benchmark of the optimal profit and any
BIC, interim IR mechanism M = (x, p),

Profit(M ) ≤ Et,c

"
X

#
πi (ti , c) ·

(λ)
(Φi (ti )

− c)

i

where

(λ)

Φi (ti ) = ti −

X
1
·
λi (t0i , ti )(t0i − ti )
fi (ti ) 0
ti ∈Ti

can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function. Here πi (ti , c) = Et−i [xi (ti , t−i , c)] is the interim
allocation. λ(t0i , ti ) is the Lagrangian dual variable for the BIC/IR constraint that says when the
buyer has true type t0i she does not want to misreport ti .

89

4.3.2

Our Flow

Now we choose the dual variables λ carefully to induce a useful benchmark. First, let us use the
single buyer case to provide some intuition behind our flow.

Single Buyer
In [CDW16] and [CZ17], they cleverly choose the canonical flow in the revenue maximization setting.
They divide the type space T into m regions R1 , ..., Rm by finding the largest value tj among all
items (called “favorite” item). It is the item that contributes the most to the buyer’s welfare. Then
they let the flow go between two nodes t, t0 ∈ Rj only if they differs only on the j-th coordinate.
However, the same flow does not give us a useful benchmark in our setting, as the way to divide
the type space does not even depend on the information of the seller’s costs (i.e. the realized cost
c or the cost distribution C). In [CDW16], they also analyze another flow that is considered as
a distribution of several canonical flows. We could define our flow similar to theirs: first for any
fixed cost vector c0 , divide the region by which item has the largest value ti − c0i and use the above
flow. Next, define our flow as a distribution of the flow for c0 , over the randomness of c0 . This
attempt does take the cost distribution into account. Unfortunately, this flow does not work as
the mechanism constructed based on the sampled cost c0 will not represent the seller’s true profit
based on c.
For single buyer, we introduce the following flow. For every j ∈ [m], let v̄j (tj ) = Ec [(tj − cj )+ ].
Define every Rj as follows: Rj contains all types t ∈ T such that j is the smallest index among
argmaxk v̄k (tk ). We route the flow in a similar manner, that is, there is a flow between two nodes
t, t0 ∈ Rj if they only differ on the j-th coordinate (see Definition 4.3). Here is the intuition behind
our division. Inspired by the canonical flow, we again want to identify the favorite item for the
buyer and divide the regions accordingly. However, the favorite item now should be defined as
the one that contributes the most to the buyer’s utility instead of the overall welfare. Note that
v̄j (tj ) = Ec [(tj − cj )+ ] is exactly the expected utility from item j when the item price is cj , which is
the lowest price that the seller is willing to sell the item. That is why we choose v̄j (tj ) to represent
the contribution of item j to the buyer’s utility. Interestingly, the SPS mechanisms are inspired by
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our flow, because when there is only one buyer, v̄j (tj ) can also be viewed as the buyer’s “value”
for the j-th permit when the item price pj (c) = cj . If we can design a mechanism to extract high
revenue from selling the permits, then we have a mechanism that generates high profit. We will
make this intuitive connection more concrete in Section 4.4.3.

Multiple Buyers
Inspired by the single buyer case, we again aim to extract high revenue from selling the permits to
make sure our mechanism generates high profit. When there are multiple buyers in the auction, we
sell items sequentially to the buyers and our mechanism should satisfy the following two properties:
• The item price should be carefully chosen as the item can not be over-allocated. Usually in
the sequential mechanism, the item price should be large enough, to make sure that the item
is available to every buyer when she comes to the auction, with certain probability.
• The item price should be at least the seller’s cost, to make sure the revenue extracted from
selling the items is enough to cover the cost.
Intuitively, how the flow is chosen should also depend on the format of the mechanism we aim
to use. To satisfy both properties, we combine our flow in Section 4.3.2 with the ex-ante relaxation
technique purposed in [CM16]. [CZ17] uses the same technique to construct the flow. They divide
the type space by comparing the difference between value and the quantile induced from ex-ante
allocation probability. Here we involve different quantile thresholds for different cost realization.
Furthermore, in order to satisfy the second property, we choose our threshold as the maximum
between the quantile and seller’s cost.
Definition 4.1. (Ex-ante relaxation) Fix mechanism M (π, p). For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] and
c ∈ T S , define qij (c) =

1
2

· Et [πij (ti , c)], and let

βij (c) = inf {a ≥ 0 : Pr[tij ≥ max{a, cj }] ≤ qij (c)}

βij (c) = 0 if Pr[tij ≥ cj ] ≤ qij (c). If not, for simplicity we assume that there exists βij (c)
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such that Pr[tij ≥ βij (c)] = qij (c). This is true for continuous distribution Dij . For discrete
distributions, our results will hold by dealing with a tie-breaking issue. We refer the readers to
Section 5.3 of [CZ17] for more details. In the further proof we will focus on continuous distributions
and a same fix will apply for discrete distributions.
We denote β the mappings from c to βij (c) for all i, j. Before defining the flow, we need the
following definition.
Definition 4.2. Fix β. For every i, ti and set P ⊆ [m], define




(β)

v̄i (ti , P ) = Ec  max

X

S⊆P,S∈Fi

(tj − max{βij (c), cj })

j∈S

(β)

Remark: v̄i (ti , P ) is equal to ūpi (ti , P ) by choosing pij (c) = max{βij (c), cj }.
(β)

(β)

For notational convenience, let v̄ij (tij ) = v̄i (ti , {j}) = Ec [(tij − max{βij (c), cj })+ ]4 , which
only depends on tij . It coincides with the definition in Section 4.3.2 with β = 0.
Now we are ready to define our flow for multiple buyer case.
(β)

Definition 4.3. (Our flow) Fix β. For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], Rij

contains all types ti ∈ Ti

(β)

such that j is the smallest index among argmaxk v̄ik (tik ). Define the flow as follows: Each node
(β)

ti receives flow of weight fi (ti ) from the source. For every node ti , t0i ∈ Rij , λi (t0i , ti ) > 0 only if
(β)

t0ik = tik for all k 6= j, and t0ij is the predecessor type of tij 5 . For node ti = (tij , ti,−j ) ∈ Rij , if
(β)

there does not exist a successor type t0ij of tij such that (t0ij , ti,−j ) ∈ Rij , all flow entering node ti
goes to the sink ∅. Figure 4.1 shows an example of our flow for some buyer i when m = 2. The
(β)

(β)

curve in the graph contains all (ti1 , ti2 ) such that v̄i1 (ti1 ) = v̄i2 (ti2 ).
(β)

(β)

Since for all β, i, j, v̄ij (·) is non-decreasing, each region Rij is upward-closed: for every ti =
(β)

(β)

(tij , ti,−j ) ∈ Rij and t0ij > tij , (t0ij , ti,−j ) ∈ Rij . With this property, we have the following Lemma
from [CDW16].
4. For any value x, denote x+ = max{x, 0}
5. In other words, t0ij is the smallest value in the support set Tij that is greater than tij .
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Figure 4.1: An example of our flow for two items.
(β)

Lemma 4.3. [CDW16] Fix any β. There exists a flow λ such that for every i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Rij ,

(λ)

Φik (ti ) =




tik ,

if k 6= j



ϕ̃ij (tij ),

if k = j

where ϕ̃ij (·) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function w.r.t. Dij .
With Lemma 4.2 and 4.3, we have obtained a benchmark for any BIC, interim IR mechanism
and divide it into three terms. Note that the benchmark may differ for different mechanisms. The
proof of Theorem 4.4 can be found in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 4.4. For any BIC, interim IR mechanism M , let β be the mapping associated with M
in Definition 4.1, then

Profit(M ) ≤

X

Eti ,c

X

i


(β)
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (ϕ̃ij (tij ) − cj )

j

+2·

XX
i

+

X
i

Eti



Ec qij (c) · (max{βij (c), cj } − cj )

j

X

(β)

(β)

1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v̄i (ti , [m]\{j})

j
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We use Single(β), Prophet(β) and Non-Favorite(β) to denote the three terms accordingly.
Note that all three terms depend on β. For the rest of the paper we show that these three terms can
be bounded by the profit of simple mechanisms for any β induced by a BIC, interim IR mechanism
M . In fact, to prove an approximation of the optimal profit, it is sufficient to consider one specific
β induced by the optimal mechanism. In the proof, we fix β and omit it in the notation.

4.4

Warm-up: Single, Constrained-Additive Buyer

In this section, we bound the benchmark for single, constrained-additive buyer. In this case, all βs
are set to 0 and thus Prophet = 0. We first introduce the class of mechanisms used in our proof.

4.4.1

Our Mechanisms for Single Buyer

We bound the optimal profit by the following three classes of mechanisms. The first mechanism is
sell-items-separately (IS) mechanism. The mechanism is similar to the posted price mechanism in
the revenue maximization problem, except that the seller may decide the posted price according
to her cost vector. Before the auction starts, the seller will decide a posted price pi (c) for each i
based on her cost vector c. Then the posted prices are revealed to the buyer and she will choose her
favorite bundle and pay the posted prices. Clearly the mechanism is ex-post IC and ex-post IR. We
use IS-Profit to denote the optimal seller’s profit among all sell-items-separately mechanisms.
Next, we define the two permit-selling mechanisms that we need. We first need the following
definition.
Definition 4.4. For every t and set P ⊆ [n], define
"
v̄(t, P ) = Ec

#
X
max
(ti − ci )

S⊆P,S∈F

i∈S

This is the expected surplus of the buyer given a set of permits P in the second stage of a
permit-selling mechanism. In the first stage of the permit-selling mechanism, the buyer is required
to find her favorite set of permits by calculating v̄(t, P ) for all P , which is computationally hard.
However, we show that as long as the buyer can make the right decision in scenarios where she
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can only derive positive utility from a single permit, our mechanism is already a constant factor
approximation to the optimal profit. See Footnote 3 for more details.
The second class of mechanism is called sell-permits-separately (PS). There are two stages in
the mechanism. In the first stage, instead of selling the items, the seller sells a permit for each item.
She decides a price pi for permit i independent from the seller’s cost vector c. The buyer is allowed
to purchase any permit i by paying pi . In the second stage, the seller reveals her cost vector c to the
buyer, and the buyer can purchase any item i at a price of ci if the buyer has permit i. The buyer is
not allowed to purchase item i if she does not have the corresponding permit. The buyer chooses her
favorite bundle among the items that she is allowed to purchase. Notice that in the second stage,
P
the buyer with set of permits P ⊆ [n] will choose the bundle S ∗ = argmaxS⊆P,S∈F i∈S (ti − ci ).
Thus, in the first stage, by knowing her valuation t, all the permit prices pj s, as well as the cost
distribution C, the buyer is able to calculate her expected surplus in the second stage v̄(t, P ) (see
Definition 4.4) for any P ⊆ [n]. She will hence choose the best set P ∗ that maximizes her expected
utility in the whole auction and buy all the permits in set P ∗6 . Thus the mechanism is IC and IR.
See Mechanism 4.4 for details.
Mechanism 4.1 Sell-permits-separately
Require: pi , the price for permit i, for all i ∈ [n].
1: Show all the permit prices to the buyer.
P
2: The buyer chooses a set of permits P ∗ = argmaxP ⊆[n] v̄(t, P ) and pays
i∈P ∗ pi .
3: Reveal c to the buyer.
P
P
4: The buyer chooses a set of items S ∗ = argmaxS⊆P ∗ ,S∈F
i∈S (ti − ci ) and pays
i∈S ∗ ci .

Here is a quick remark: the sell-items-separately mechanism may look similar to the sell-permitsseparately mechanism. However, there is a major difference between the two mechanisms. In the
IS mechanism, by posting a item price that depends on her cost vector, the seller is revealing
information about her costs (the private information) to the buyer before the buyer makes any
6. The readers may wonder how can the buyer find the best set P ∗ . To explain this, we consider any type profile
t where there exists i such that v̄(t, {i}) > pi and v̄(t, {k}) < pk , ∀k 6= i. In this scenario buying the permit i only is
the unique way to derive positive utility (v̄ is subadditive by Lemma 4.6) and the buyer will buy permit i for sure.
We point out that only counting the profit from these types suffices to to bound Single. Please see footnote 8 for
more details. Thus, our result holds even if the buyer cannot find the best set in all scenarios. As long as she can
make the right decision in the above scenarios, enough profit is generated by our mechanism.
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decision. That’s why the mechanism is ex-post truthful. While in the PS mechanism, the buyer has
no information about the costs in the first stage, and the mechanism is only truthful in expectation
over the seller’s costs. We use PS-Profit to denote the optimal profit among all PS mechanisms.
The third mechanism is permit-bundling (PB). The seller bundles all permits together and sell
them as a grand bundle in the first stage. The seller decides a price p for the permit bundle
independent from c. The buyer refuses to pay p, then she get no permit and therefore cannot
purchase anything in the second stage. If the buyer buys the permit bundle, the seller reveals
her cost vector c to the buyer and asks for an item price ci for item i. The buyer then chooses
her favorite bundle and pays the item prices. The mechanism is also IC and IR due to a similar
argument as for the PS mechanisms. We use PB-Profit to denote the optimal profit for the PB
mechanisms. See Mechanism 4.5 for details.
Mechanism 4.2 Permit-bundling
Require: p, the price for the grand permit-bundle
1: Show p to the buyer.
2: if The buyer pays p then
3:
Reveal c to the buyer.
P
P
4:
The buyer chooses a set of items S ∗ = argmaxS⊆[n],S∈F i∈S (ti − ci ) and pays i∈S ∗ ci .
5: else
6:
The buyer pays nothing and receives nothing.
7: end if

In the rest of this section, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. When n = 1, for any valuation distribution D, cost distribution C and any downwardclosed feasibility constraint F,

OPTProfit ≤ 2 · IS-Profit + 5 · PS-Profit + 4 · PB-Profit

When the buyer’s valuation is additive,

OPTProfit ≤ IS-Profit + 3 · PS-Profit + 2 · PB-Profit

Theorem 4.5 implies that a simple randomization among the three mechanisms achieves at least
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1
11

the optimal profit for any downward-closed F. And for additive valuations, a randomization

among the three mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.

4.4.2

Bounding Single

To bound Single, we will consider the Copies Setting from [CHMS10], which is a single-dimensional
setting in the revenue maximization problem. Here is a sketch of the proof. For any fixed cost vector
c, we first focus on a related revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and multiple items,
by simply subtracting the fixed cost c from the buyer’s value t. Next, we show that the optimal
revenue in the copies setting of the related revenue maximization problem is an upper bound of
Single. According to [CHMS10], there exists a posted price mechanism in the multi-item setting
whose revenue approximates the optimal revenue in its copies setting. Finally, we show an Item
Posted Pricing mechanism whose expected profit is the same as to the expected revenue of the
posted price mechanism.
For any fixed c, we will first focus on the following revenue maximization problem with a single
buyer and m items. Buyer has value tj − cj for each item j, where tj is drawn independently
from Dj . Since c is a fixed vector, the buyer’s values are independent across items. The buyer is
constraint-additive with respect to the feasibility constraint F.
The Copies Setting of the above problem is as follows: there are m buyers in the auction and m
copies to sell. Buyer j only interests in the j-th copy and has value tj − cj for it, where tj is drawn
independently from Dj . Since c is a fixed vector, all buyers’ values are also independent. The seller
has no cost for the copies but has a downward-closed constraint F that specifies which copies can
simultaneously be sold. Denote OPTCopies-UD (c) the optimal revenue for the copies setting. Since
it is a single dimensional setting, Myerson’s auction achieves the optimal revenue, which equals to
the maximum ironed virtual welfare

OPTCopies-UD (c) = Et [max
S∈F

X
(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ ].7
j∈S

7. Notice that the ironed Myerson’s virtual value for buyer j is ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj .
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Moreover, let OPT-RevCopies-UD (c) be the optimal revenue if we further restrict the seller to
sell at most one copy. Similarly OPT-RevCopies-UD (c) = Et [maxj (ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ ]. We have the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Single ≤ Evc [OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)] ≤ 2 · IS-Profit. When the buyer is additive,
we further have Single ≤ IS-Profit. Moreover, there exists an IP mechanism M where pj (c)
only depends on cj for every j ∈ [m], such that Single ≤ Profit(M ).
Proof. We first prove the result for arbitrary downward-closed constraint F. Notice that for every
t, the indicator 1[t ∈ Rj ] is 1 for only one j. Since πj (t, c) ∈ [0, 1], we have

Single = Et,c

X


1[t ∈ Rj ] · πj (t, c) · (ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )

j




≤ Et,c max(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ = Ec OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)


j

By [CHMS10], there exists a posted price mechanism M (c) in the revenue maximization problem
whose revenue is at least 21 OPT-RevCopies-UD (c). Let p̂j (c) be the posted price for item j.
Now we move back to our profit maximization setting and define the IP mechanism M 0 as
follows: For every cost vector c, define the posted price for item j as p̂j (c) + cj . Notice that for
every t and c, the buyer in M 0 will purchase the same bundle B ∗ (t, c) as the one in M (c). Here
P
B ∗ (t, c) = argmaxS∈F j∈S (tj − cj − p̂j (c)). Thus the seller’s profit of M 0 is

Et,c



X

X



(p̂j (c) + cj − cj ) = Et,c

j∈B ∗ (t,c)

p̂j (c)



j∈B ∗ (t,c)

 1
1 
≥ Ec OPT-RevCopies-UD (c) ≥ · Single
2
2
When the buyer is additive, for any fixed c, it is not hard to realize that OPTCopies-UD (c)
equals to the revenue of selling each item separately using the monopoly reserve in the revenue
maximization problem. Let p̂j (c) be the monopoly reserve for item j in the revenue maximization
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problem. Following the same proof as above, the IP mechanism M 0 with price p̂j (c) + cj achieves
expected profit at least

Ec [OPTCopies-UD (c)] = Et,c

X

(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+
j

≥ Et,c

X


1[t ∈ Rj ] · πj (t, c) · (ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj ) = Single

j

4.4.3

Bounding Non-Favorite

Before bounding Non-Favorite, we will first prove a crucial lemma of this section. Consider the
revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and m items. The buyer’s type t ∼ D. She has
valuation function v̄(t, ·) when her type is t. For simplicity, we will call this revenue maximization
problem the revenue setting, and the original profit maximization problem the profit setting. Recall
that in the single buyer case,

v̄(t, P ) = Ec



max

S⊆P,S∈F

X

(tj − cj )



j∈S

The following lemma converts any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting into a BIC and
interim IR mechanism in the profit setting, without changing the value of the objective (revenue
and profit accordingly). The intuition behind the lemma is as follows. For any mechanism in
the profit setting that sells the permit before revealing her true cost, the buyer with type t has
expected “value” v̄(t, P ), that is, how much the buyer can make from the second stage if given a
set of permits P , for all set of permits P . Thus, the mechanism can be viewed as a corresponding
mechanism in the revenue setting where the permits are being sold and the buyer has valuation v̄
over the permits.
Lemma 4.5. For any truthful mechanism M in the revenue setting, there exists an IC and IR
mechanism M 0 in the profit setting such that, the revenue of M equals to the seller’s profit of M 0 .
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Proof. For any t, let X(t) be the (possibly random) set of items that the buyer is allocated in
mechanism M , when the buyer reports t. Let p(t) be the payment for the buyer in M . Define M 0
as follows: in the first stage, the buyer reports her type t and the seller gives the set of permits
X(t) to the buyer and charge p(t). In the second stage, the seller reveals the cost vector c and
the buyer can buy any item that she has a permit by paying item price cj . To prove M 0 is an IC
and IR mechanism, it suffices to show that the buyer has no incentive to lie in the first stage. If
the buyer with type t reports t0 in M 0 , she will receive the set of permits X(t0 ) and purchase her
favorite bundle of items under item prices c. Her expected utility is

Ec,X(t0 )



max

S∈F ,S⊆X(t0 )

X

(tj − cj ) − p(t0 ) = EX(t0 ) [v̄(t, X(t0 ))] − p(t0 )
j∈S

Here the expectation is taken over the randomness of X(t0 ). Since M is truthful, for any
t ∈ T, t0 ∈ T + 8 , EX(t) [v̄(t, X(t))] − p(t) ≥ EX(t0 ) [v̄(t, X(t0 ))] − p(t0 ). It states that when the buyer
has type t, reporting t in the first stage maximizes her expected utility. Thus M 0 is IC and IR.
Notice that in the second stage of M 0 , the total item prices paid by the buyer is equal to the seller’s
total cost. Thus the seller’s profit is exactly the payment in the first stage. Since M 0 use p(t) as
the payment rule, the seller’s profit of M 0 equals to the revenue of M .

Now we are ready to bound the term Non-Favorite. Recall that

Non-Favorite = Et

X


1[t ∈ Rj ] · v̄(t, [n]\{j}) .

j

Consider the revenue setting where the buyer has valuation function v̄ and let OPTRev (v̄) be
the optimal revenue among all truthful mechanisms. Here we omit D and C in the notation as
they are fixed. Given Lemma 4.5, it is tempting to find a simple mechanism that approximates
OPTRev (v̄) and convert it into a permit-selling mechanism. However, since we do not know what
class of valuation v̄ belongs to, it not a priori clear any simple vs. optimal result applies here.
8. Recall that T + = T ∪ {∅} contains the choice of not attending the auction.
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As the original valuation in the profit setting is constrained additive, it is natural to think that v̄
is also constrained additive. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove such a claim as there is no
clear feasibility that is associated with v̄. The good news is that we are able to relax the class of
valuations and show that v̄ is indeed a subadditive function, which allows us to leverage the result
in Chapter 3 (also in [RW15]).
To remind the readers, let us first review the results. In Chapter 3 we bound OPTRev (v̄)
when v̄ is subadditive over independent items (see Definition 2.1). In the proof, we separate the
benchmark of the optimal revenue into two terms (called “single” and “non-favorite”). We then
bound the two terms by the optimal revenue of the Selling Separately mechanism (SRev(v̄)) and
Bundling mechanism (BRev(v̄)) respectively. The second term “non-favorite” is defined as the
expected welfare from all non-favorite items. Here for any fixed t, the favorite item is defined as
the j that maximizes v̄(t, {j}). Interestingly, this is how we divide the region into Rj s and the
term “non-favorite” is exactly the same as Non-Favorite. We will use Non-FavRev (v̄) to denote
“non-favorite” here to emphasize that it is from the revenue setting.
In order to apply the result in the revenue setting, we first show that the function v̄(·, ·) in
Definition 4.2 is indeed subadditive over independent items (Definition 2.1). The proof of Lemma 4.6
is postponed to Appendix B.3.
Lemma 4.6. v̄(·, ·) is monotone, subadditive and has no externalities.
Lemma 4.7. (Restatement of Lemma 3.8) Suppose v̄ is subadditive over independent items, then

Non-FavRev (v̄) = Et

X


1[t ∈ Rj ] · v̄(t, [n]\{j}) ≤ 5 · SRev(v̄) + 4 · BRev(v̄)

j

When the buyer is additive, [CDW16] has an improved bound for Non-FavRev (v̄) using SRev(v̄)
and BRev(v̄).
Lemma 4.8. [CDW16] If v̄ is an additive function, then

Non-FavRev (v̄) ≤ 2 · SRev(v̄) + 3 · BRev(v̄)
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By Lemma 4.5, the Selling Separately mechanism in the revenue setting can be converted to
the PP mechanism in the profit setting and has profit equals to SRev(v̄). Also the Bundling
mechanism can be converted to PB and obtains profit BRev(v̄). Furthermore, when the buyer is
additive, there is no constraint F and for every t ∈ T, P ⊆ [m],

X


X
 X
v̄(t, P ) = Ec max
(tj − cj ) = Ec
(tj − cj )+ =
v̄(t, {j}).
S⊆P

j∈S

j∈P

j∈P

Thus, v̄ is an additive function. We have the following Corollary:
Corollary 4.1. Non-Favorite ≤ 5 · PS-Profit + 4 · PB-Profit. When the buyer is additive,
Non-Favorite ≤ 2 · PS-Profit + 3 · PB-Profit.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: It follows from Theorem 4.4, Lemma 4.4 and Corollary 4.1. 2
When the buyer is additive, according to [HN17], BRev(v̄), the revenue of the optimal bundling
mechanism, is bounded by O(log(m))·SRev(v̄). Thus Corollary 4.1 implies an O(log(m))-approximation
to the optimal profit with only IP and PP mechanisms. Both mechanisms sell the items separately.
Thus the optimal profit for m items is bounded by O(log(m)) times the sum of the optimal profit
for every single item.
Theorem 4.6. When the buyer is additive,

OPTProfit ≤ IS-Profit + O(log(m)) · PS-Profit

Moreover,

OPTProfit ≤ O(log(m)) ·

X

OPTProfit ({j}) = log(m) ·

j∈[m]

X

Etj ,cj [(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ ]

j∈[m]

where ϕ̃j (·) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function for Dj .
Proof. According to [HN17], BRev(v̄) ≤ O(log(m))·SRev(v̄). Combining this result with Lemma 4.4
and Corollary 4.1, we have the following: there exists an IP mechanism M where the posted price
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pj (cj ) only depends on cj for every j ∈ [m], such that

OPTProfit ≤ Profit(M ) + O(log(m)) · PS-Profit

Since the buyer is additive, Profit(M ) is equivalent to the sum (over all j) of the profit that
sells a single item j with price pj (cj ). Note that for any PP mechanism with permit prices {`j }j∈[m] ,
the profit is equivalent to the sum (over all j) of the profit that sells a single item j with permit
price `j . Thus

OPTProfit ≤ Profit(M ) + O(log(m)) · PS-Profit ≤ O(log(m)) ·

X

OPTProfit ({j})

j∈[m]

It remains to prove that for every j, the optimal profit when selling a single item j, is at most
Etj ,cj [(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ ]. In the auction with a single item j, by Lemma 4.2, we have following for any
dual variable λ:

h
i
OPTProfit ({j}) ≤ max Etj ,cj π(tj , cj ) · (Φ(λ) (tj ) − cj )
π

1
·
where Φ(λ) (tj ) = tj − fj (t
j)

P

t0j ∈Tj

λ(t0j , tj )(t0j − tj ). Note that in the auction for selling a single

item j, both the buyer’s value and seller’s cost are scalar. By Corollary 18 of [CDW19], when the
optimal dual variable λ is chosen, Φ(λ) (tj ) = ϕ̃j (tj ). Thus

OPTProfit ({j}) = max Etj ,cj [π(tj , cj ) · (ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )] = Etj ,cj [(ϕ̃j (tj ) − cj )+ ],
π

where the last equality follows from π(tj , cj ) ∈ [0, 1], ∀tj , cj .
At the last of this section, we will prove the following lemma that connects the profit maximization problem to the revenue maximization problem. We show that any truthful mechanism in the
revenue setting that is an α-approximation to the optimal revenue can be converted to a BIC and
interim IR mechanism in the profit setting that is a (9α + 2)-approximation to the optimal profit.
Lemma 4.9. Recall that the revenue setting is the revenue maximization problem where the buyer
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has valuation v̄. Then any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting that is an α-approximation to
the optimal revenue OPTRev (v̄) can be converted to an IC and IR mechanism in the profit setting
that is a (9α + 2)-approximation to the optimal profit OPTProfit .
Proof. By Lemma 3.8,

Non-FavRev (v̄) ≤ 5 · SRev(v̄) + 4 · BRev(v̄) ≤ 9 · OPTRev (v̄)
Let M be the α-approximation mechanism in the revenue setting. Then the revenue of M
satisfies:

Rev(M ) ≥

1
1
· OPTRev (v̄) ≥
· Non-FavRev (v̄)
α
9α

By Lemma 4.5, there exists a BIC and interim IR mechanism M 0 in the profit setting such that
Profit(M 0 ) = Rev(M ). Notice that Non-Favorite = Non-FavRev (v̄). By Theorem 4.4,

OPTProfit ≤ Single + Non-Favorite ≤ 2 · IS-Profit + 9α · Profit(M 0 )
Thus a randomization between M 0 and the optimal Item Posted Pricing mechanism is a (9α+2)approximation.

4.5

Multiple, Matroid-Rank Buyers

In this section, we will bound the benchmark in Theorem 4.4 for multiple, matroid-rank buyers. We
remark that although in this thesis we only consider the setting where each buyer has a matroidrank valuation, our result applies to any constrained additive buyer, where the feasibility constraint
Fi is an intersection of constant number of matroid, polytope and knapsack constraints, by using
the online contention resolution scheme (Section 2.7).
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4.5.1

Our Mechanisms

We bound the optimal profit by the following three classes of mechanisms. The first mechanism is a
variant of the Sequential Item Posted Price (SIP) mechanism, which is first purposed by [CHMS10]
in the revenue maximization problem. Here we allow the seller to decide posted prices according
to her cost vector. Before the auction starts, the seller decides a posted price pij (c) for each
buyer i and item j, based on her cost vector c. Then buyers come one by one in an arbitrary
order. Each buyer can choose her favorite bundle among all remaining items by paying the posted
prices. The mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR. We call the mechanism Constrained Sequential
Item Posted Price (CSIP) if it further adds a sub-constraint on the set of items the buyer can
purchase. The mechanism first decides a constraint J 0 (c) on the ground set of all buyer-item pairs
J = {(i, j) | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}, based on her true cost c. A (possibly random) set A ⊆ J represents
a way of allocating the items. It’s feasible if
• Each item is allocated to at most one buyer: ∀j, Oj = {i : (i, j) ∈ A}, |Oj | ≤ 1.
• Each buyer is allocated a feasible set of items: ∀i, Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A}, Pi ∈ Fi .
Let J be the family of all feasible sets. J 0 (c) must satisfy J 0 (c) ⊆ J . When each buyer comes,
she is only allowed to take the item that doesn’t ruin the constraint J 0 (c). See Mechanism 4.3 for
details.
Mechanism 4.3 Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price Mechanism
Require: pij (c), the item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]; the constraint J 0 ⊆ J .
1: A ← ∅.
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3:
Reveal item prices {pij (c)}m
j=1 to the buyer.
4:
i can choose a bundle Si such that A ∪ {(i,
j)}j∈Si ∈ J 0 .
P
5:
i receives her favorite bundle Si∗ , paying j∈S ∗ pij (c).
i
6:
A ← A ∪ {(i, j)}j∈Si∗ .
7: end for
For the CSIP used in our proof, the corresponding sub-constraint J 0 (c) can be computed
efficiently. See Section 4.5.3 for more details. We use CSIP-Profit to denote the optimal seller’s
profit among all CSIP mechanisms.
105

Next, we define the two Sequential Permit Selling mechanisms used in the proof. The second
class of mechanism is called Sequential Permit Posted Price(SPP). Before the auction starts, the
seller decides a posted price pij (c) for each buyer i and item j, based on her cost vector c. Then
buyers come one by one in an arbitrary order. For each buyer i there are two stages: the permitpurchasing stage and item-purchasing stage. In the permit-purchasing stage, instead of selling the
items, the seller sells a permit for each item. She decides a price lij for permit j independent
from the seller’s cost vector c and buyer type profile t. The buyer is allowed to purchase any
permit j ∈ [m] by paying lij . The decision must be made before she sees the remaining item
set Si (t<i , c). In the item-purchasing stage, the seller reveals Si (t<i , c) and her cost vector c to
the buyer, and the buyer can purchase any remaining item j at a price of pij (c) if the buyer has
permit j. The buyer is not allowed to purchase item j if she does not have the corresponding
permit. The buyer chooses her favorite bundle among the items that she is allowed to purchase.
Notice that in the second stage, the buyer with set of permits P ⊆ [m] will choose the bundle
P
S ∗ = argmaxS⊆P ∩Si (t<i ,c),S∈Fi j∈S (tij − pij (c)). Thus, in the first stage, by knowing her type
ti , all the permit prices lij s, as well as the cost distribution C, the buyer is able to calculate her
expected surplus in the second stage for any P ⊆ Si (t<i ). She will hence choose the best set
P ∗ that maximizes her expected utility in the whole auction and buy all the permits in set P ∗ .
The mechanism is only BIC and Interim IR as buyers have to make decisions before getting any
information about other buyers’ types and the seller’s costs. See Mechanism 4.4 for details.
Mechanism 4.4 Sequential Permit Posted Price
Require: lij , pij (c), the permit and item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
1: S ← [m]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3:
Show buyer i the permit price lij for every j. P
4:
i chooses a set of permits P ∗ ⊆ [m] and pays j∈P ∗ lij .
5:
Reveal S and item prices {pij }m
j=1 to the buyer.
P
6:
i receives her favorite bundle Si∗ ⊆ S, paying j∈S ∗ pij (c).
i
7:
S ← S\Si∗ .
8: end for
In our proof we will use restricted Sequential Permit Posted Price mechanisms (RSPP) by
adding the following two changes to the mechanism: Firstly, the buyer is only allowed to purchase
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at most one permit on the permit-purchasing stage. Secondly, we will further allow the mechanism
to hide some items from the buyer on the item-purchasing stage. Formally, the mechanism will
choose a (possibly random) set Si0 (t<i , c) ⊆ Si (t<i , c) and the buyer is only allowed to purchase
item in Si0 (t<i , c). We will now briefly explain how our mechanism used in the proof chooses this
set. Fix some parameter b ∈ (0, 1) which is determined later. In the proof, the item price pij (c) are
chosen such that for every i, j, c, Prt<i [j ∈ Si (t<i , c)] ≥ 1 − b. We define the random set Si0 (t<i , c)
as follows: for any j ∈ Si (t<i , c), put j in Si0 (t<i , c) with probability (1 − b)/ Prt<i [j ∈ Si (t<i , c)],
independently. Now we have Prt<i [j ∈ Si0 (t<i , c)] = 1 − b. For every buyer i, she has to make the
choice whether to purchase each permit j before knowing if the corresponding item is still available
or not. The above equation guarantees that for every cost profile c, in expectation over the type
profile of buyers coming before her, each item j is available with probability exactly 1 − b. That
probability is independent of c. Thus the expected value for purchasing every permit j is exactly
(1 − b) times the utility she could get from this item. This is a crucial property in our proof. See
Lemma 4.17) for more details. In the rest of the paper, when we mention RSPP, we refer to the
mechanism that hides the item as above. We denote RSPP-Profit the optimal profit of these
mechanisms.
The third mechanism is Sequential Permit Bundling(SPB). When every buyer i comes, the
seller bundles the permit of all items together and sell them as a grand bundle at some price δi in
the first stage. δi is independent from c. If the buyer refuses to pay the price, then she gets no
permit and therefore cannot purchase anything in the second stage. If the buyer buys the permit
bundle, the seller then reveals the remaining item set Si (t<i , c) and the item prices {pij (c)}m
j=1 to
the buyer. The buyer then chooses her favorite bundle and pays the item prices. The mechanism
is also BIC and interim IR due to a similar argument as for SPP. We use SPB-Profit to denote
the optimal profit for all SPB mechanisms. See Mechanism 4.5 for details.

In the rest of this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. For any valuation distribution D, cost distribution C and any matroid feasibility
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Mechanism 4.5 Sequential Permit Bundling
Require: pij (c), item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]; δi , the price for the permit bundle.
1: S ← [m]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3:
Show buyer i the permit bundle price δi .
4:
if buyer i pays price δi then
5:
Reveal S and item prices {pij }m
j=1 to the buyer.
P
6:
i receives her favorite bundle Si∗ ⊆ S, paying j∈S ∗ pij (c).
i
7:
S ← S\Si∗ .
8:
else
9:
The buyer pays nothing and receives nothing.
10:
end if
11: end for
constraints {Fi }m
i=1 ,
OPTProfit ≤ 14 · CSIP-Profit + 22 · RSPP-Profit + 8 · SPB-Profit

Again a simple randomization among the three mechanisms achieves at least

1
44

the optimal

profit.

4.5.2

Bounding Single

Similar to the single buyer case, for every fixed vector c, we consider the related revenue maximization problem where every buyer i has value tij − cj for item j. The corresponding Copies Setting is
a revenue maximization problem with mn buyers and m items. Every buyer (i, j) only interests in
item j and has value tij −cj on it. For every i, at most one (i, j) can be served in the mechanism. We
denote OPT-RevCopies-UD (c) the optimal revenue of this setting. In Lemma 4.10 we first bound
Single by Ec [OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)]. Then according to [CHMS10], OPT-RevCopies-UD (c) can
be approximated by the revenue of the optimal sequential posted price mechanism in the related
revenue maximization setting. Assume the posted price for buyer i and item j is p̂ij (c). We show
that in our setting, an SIP mechanism with pij (c) = p̂ij (c) + cj has profit the same as the expected
(over the randomness of c) revenue of the above sequential posted price mechanism.
Lemma 4.10. Single ≤ Ec [OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)] ≤ 6 · CSIP-Profit.
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Proof. Recall that

Single =

X
i

Eti ,c

X


(β)
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (ϕ̃ij (tij ) − cj )

j

For every BIC, interim IR mechanism M = (π, p) and every c, consider the following mechanism
M 0 in the Copies Setting: M 0 serves agent (i, j) if and only if M allocates item j to buyer i and
(β)

ti ∈ Rij . Since M is feasible, for every j there exist at most one i such that (i, j) is served
in M 0 . Also since every ti stays in one region, for every i there exists at most one j such that
P
P
(i, j) is served in M 0 . Thus M 0 is feasible and the expected revenue equals to i Eti
j 1[ti ∈

(β)
Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (ϕ̃ij (tij ) − cj ) . Thus we have
Single ≤ Ec [OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)]

By [CHMS10], for every c there exists a sequential posted price mechanism M (c) in the related
revenue maximization setting9 , where every buyer can purchase at most one item, such that its
revenue is at least OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)/6. Suppose the posted price for buyer i and item j is
p̂ij (c). Now let’s consider the Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism with pij (c) =
p̂ij (c) + cj in our profit maximization setting, where every buyer is only allowed to purchase at
most one item. For every t, c, let Ai (t<i , c) be the remaining item sets when buyer i comes to
the auction. Then she will choose her favorite item argmaxj∈Ai (t<i ,c) (tij − cj − p̂ij (c)) (or choose
not to purchase anything). Notice that this is also buyer i’s favorite item in M (c) under the same
scenario. Thus the allocation rule for CSIP under c is the same as the one for M (c). Then profit
of the constructed CSIP is equal to the expected revenue of M (c) over the randomness of c, as
the extra item prices just cover the seller’s costs. According to [CHMS10], the profit is at least
Ec [OPT-RevCopies-UD (c)]/6. The proof is done.
9. Recall that in this setting every buyer i has value tij − cj for item j.
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4.5.3

Bounding Prophet

In this section we will bound Prophet with a Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism.
The proof uses the Online Contention Resolution Scheme (OCRS) developed by Feldman et al.
[FSZ16]. See Section 2.7 for details.
Lemma 4.11. ( [FSZ16]) Consider the online selection setting. If there exists a (b, c)-selectable
greedy OCRS Π for PJ , then for every y ∈ b·PJ , consider the strategy that the agent takes elements
greedily subject to the sub-constraint JΠ,y . Then the agent will select each element e with probability
at least c · ye . The result applies for any almighty adversary10 .
Before getting to the proof, let’s first discuss the connection between OCRS and bounding
Prophet. Recall that

Prophet = 2 ·

XX
i



Ec qij (c) · (max{βij (c), cj } − cj )

j

Fix c. For every (i, j) ∈ J, let y(i,j) = qij (c). Since qij (c) is half the ex-ante probability that a
feasible mechanism M serves the pair (i, j) when the true cost is c, thus y = (y(i,j) )(i,j)∈J ∈

1
2

·J.

Now consider the CSIP with item prices max{βij (c), cj }. Then by Definition 4.1, each buyer i
can afford item j with probability qij (c)11 , i.e. the element (i, j) is active with probability qij (c).
In Lemma 4.12 we show that for one specific almighty adversary, the set of element (i, j) chosen
by the agent following the greedy OCRS is exactly same as the set of buyer-item pair served in
the mechanism, for every type profile. Then (b, c)-selectability guarantees that every buyer i will
purchase every item j in the mechanism with probability at least c given the fact that she can
afford this item. This gives a lower bound of CSIP-Profit.
Lemma 4.12. Fix seller’s cost vector c. Suppose there exists a (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS Π
for polytope P (J ), for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). For every lij s such that l ∈ b · P (J ), consider the
10. The adversary can determine the order of elements shown to the agent. An almighty adversary has all the
information it needs to decide the order, including the agent’s type and strategies, and the realization of all possible
randomness. In other words, the adversary will choose the worst order for the agent.
11. It’s true when βij (c) ≥ cj . For those (i, j) such that βij (c) < cj , the corresponding term in Prophet is 0. We
could simply never serve those pairs.
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CSIP under the specific cost profile c, with posted price pij (c) = Fij−1 (1 − lij ) and sub-constraint
JΠ,l . Then the mechanism will gain profit at least

c·

X

lij · (pij (c) − cj )

i,j

under cost c.
Proof. Under cost c, consider the CSIP with posted price pij (c), associated with the constraint
JΠ,y . When every buyer i comes, let Ai be the set of buyer-item pairs that have already been
served. And let Bi∗ be her favorite bundle among the remaining items, such that after taking those
items, the sub-constraint JΠ,y is not violated. Now consider the online selection setting with the
following almighty adversary: Ground set is J. The agent has value tij for each element (i, j). Each
element (i, j) is active if ti ≥ pij (c), i.e. is active with probability lij . The adversary divides the
whole item-revealing process into n stages. For each stage i, let Bi be the set of elements that have
been selected in the past. The adversary first reveals all (i, j)s where j ∈ Bi∗ , one after another.
Then it reveals the remaining (i, j)s.
Notice that by following the greedy OCRS Π, the agent will follow the constraint JΠ,l and
choose all the element (i, j) where j ∈ Bi∗ on each stage, as taking those elements won’t violate
the constraint by the definition of Bi∗ . It’s equivalent to the buyer-item pair selection process in
the CSIP. Thus under the above adversary, the set of element (i, j) chosen by the agent is exactly
same as the set of buyer-item pair served in the mechanism. Since each element (i, j) is active
with probability lij and l ∈ b · P (J ), by Lemma 4.11, each element is chosen by the agent with
probability at least c · lij . In other words, in CSIP, each buyer i purchases item j with probability
at least c · lij , under cost c. Thus the obtained profit is at least

c·

X

lij · (pij − cj )

i,j

Now it’s sufficient to show that there exists a ( 12 , c)-selectable greedy OCRS Π for PJ . Recall
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that every A ∈ J satisfies:
• Each item is allocated to at most one buyer: ∀j, Oj = {i : (i, j) ∈ A}, |Oj | ≤ 1.
• Each buyer is allocated a feasible set of items: ∀i, Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A}, Pi ∈ Fi .
Let J1 (or J2 ) be the subfamily that contains all set A that satisfies the first(or second) bullet
point. It’s straightforward to see that J1 forms a partition matroid. We will show that J2 is also
a matroid, given the fact that every Fi is a matroid.
Lemma 4.13. J2 is a matroid.
Proof. Consider any A, A0 ∈ J2 such that |A| > |A0 |. For every i, let Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A} and
P
P
Pi0 = {j : (i, j) ∈ A0 }. We have Pi ∈ Pi0 ∈ Fi . Notice that |A| = i |Pi | > |A0 | = i |Pi0 |, there
must exist i0 such that |Pi0 | > |Pi00 |. Since Fi0 is a matroid, there exists some j0 ∈ Pi0 \Pi00 such
that Pi00 ∪ {j0 } ∈ Fi0 . By definition of J2 , we also have (i0 , j0 ) ∈ A\A0 and A0 ∪ (i0 , j0 ) ∈ J2 . Thus
J2 is a matroid.
Note that J = J1 ∩ J2 . J is an intersection of two matroids. We can show that there exists a
( 12 , 14 )-selectable greedy OCRS for P (J ) by Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4.
Put everything together, we are able to bound Prophet using CSIP-Profit.
Lemma 4.14. Prophet ≤ 8 · CSIP-Profit.
Proof. First for those (i, j) such that βij (c) < cj , the corresponding term in Prophet is 0. We
could simply never serve those pairs. Thus without loss of generality, we assume that βij (c) ≥ cj
for every (i, j). For every c, since qij (c) is half the ex-ante probability that a feasible mechanism
M serves the pair (i, j) when the true cost is c, thus q(c) = (qij (c))(i,j)∈J ∈

1
2

· J . By Lemma 2.3

and 2.4, there exists a ( 12 , 41 )-selectable greedy OCRS Π for P (J ). We thus consider the CSIP with
posted price pij (c) = max{βij (c), cj }, associated with the constraint JΠ,q(c) . By Lemma 4.12, the
profit of the mechanism is at least

1 XX 
·
Ec qij (c) · (max{βij (c), cj } − cj )
4
i

j
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4.5.4

Bounding Non-Favorite

In this section we will bound Non-Favorite. As discussed in Section 4.3, we will fix β and omit
it in the notation. We first give an informal proof by reducing the multiple buyer problem to single
buyer problems with a new valuation v̄i in Definition 4.2. This shows a connection to the single
buyer setting as well as the ex-ante relaxation by Chawla and Miller [CM16]. In their paper they
solve the revenue maximization problem for multiple matroid-rank buyers, bounding the benchmark
by the sum of optimal revenue for the single buyer problem under an ex-ante constraint.
Recall that
Non-Favorite =

X

Eti

X

i

1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v̄i (ti , [m]\{j})



j

This is the sum of all buyer’s welfare contributed by those non-favorite “items”12 , under a
new valuation v̄i . Consider the Sequential Permit Selling mechanism with posted price pij (c) =
max{βij (c), cj }. Since pij (c) ≥ cj for every c, the profit of the mechanism will be at least the
revenue extracted from the permit copies.
Notice that for every i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with probability qij (c).
Thus by union bound, each item j is still available when buyer i comes with probability at least
P
1 − j qij (c) ≥ 12 . By Lemma 4.21, buyer i’s expected utility in the second stage after purchasing
a set of permit copies P , is at least

1
2

· v̄i (ti , P ). Now we have reduced the multiple buyer problem

to n single buyer problems where buyer i has valuation v̄i (·, ·) for the set of permit copies. Thus

P
from Section 4.4, the term Eti
j 1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v̄i (ti , [m]\{j}) can be extracted from selling the
permit copies separately and as a whole bundle.
The above argument doesn’t give a formal proof because the buyer’s expected utility on the
copies does not exactly equal to

1
2

· v̄i (ti , P ) and thus a reduction like Lemma 4.5 cannot be di-

rectly obtained. Now we provide a formal and separate proof, bounding Non-Favorite with
RSPP and SPB mechanisms. First we decompose the term using a standard Core-Tail decomposition technique [LY13, CDW16], according to v̄ij (tij ). For every i ∈ [n], define τi = inf{a ≥ 0 :
12. Here we use quotations on the word ‘item’ as in the corresponding single buyer problem, the goods sold to the
buyers are permits, not real items.
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P

j

Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ a] ≤ 12 }. For every ti , let Ci (ti ) = {j ∈ [m] : v̄ij (tij ) ≤ τi }.

Lemma 4.15.

Non-Favorite ≤

XX
i

j

+

X

Etij :v̄ij (tij )>τi [v̄ij (tij ) · Pr [∃k 6= j s.t. v̄ik (tik ) ≥ v̄ij (tij )]]
ti,−j

Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))]

(Tail)

(Core)

i

Proof.

Non-Favorite =

X

≤

X

≤

X

=

X

Eti

X

i


1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v̄i (ti , [m]\{j})

j

Eti

X

i


1[ti ∈ Rij ] · (v̄i (ti , Ci (ti )\{j}) + v̄i (ti , [m]\{j}\Ci (ti )))

j

Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))] +

X

Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))] +

XX

i

Eti

X

i

i

i

j

k

1[ti ∈ Rij ] ·

X


v̄ik (tik )

k∈[m]\{j}\Ci (ti )

Etik :v̄ik (tik )>τi [v̄ik (tik ) · Pr [(tik , ti,−k ) 6∈ Rij ]]
ti,−k

= Core + Tail

Bounding Tail
We will bound Tail using RSPP mechanisms. For every i, j, let rij = maxa≥τi a · Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ a],
P P
which is the optimal revenue from selling permit j to buyer i. Let r = i j rij . We first show
that Tail ≤

1
2

· r and then bound r using a RSPP.

Lemma 4.16. Tail ≤

1
2

· r.
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Proof.

Tail =

XX
i

≤

XX
i

ti,−j

X


Etij :v̄ij (tij )>τi v̄ij (tij ) ·
Pr[v̄ik (tik ) ≥ v̄ij (tij )]

j

≤

XX

≤

XX

i

k6=j

Etij :v̄ij (tij )>τi

j

i

=

Etij :v̄ij (tij )>τi [v̄ij (tij ) · Pr [∃k 6= j s.t. v̄ik (tik ) ≥ v̄ij (tij )]]

j

j

X

rik

tik



k6=j

Pr[v̄ij (tij ) > τi ] · ri
tij

1
·r
2

The following lemma bounds r using the RSPP.
Lemma 4.17. For any positive {ξij }i,j such that
XX
i

j

P

j

Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 21 , we have

ξij · Pr[v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 4 · RSPP-Profit
tij

Proof. Consider the RSPP mechanism with permit price 21 ξij and item price max{βij (c), cj }. Notice
that for every buyer i, her expected utility for purchasing each permit j is

1
2

· v̄ij (tij ). She will

purchase every permit j for sure if both of the events happen:
1. She is willing to purchase permit j, i.e., v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij .
2. She is not willing to purchase other permits, i.e., v̄ik (tik ) < ξik , ∀k 6= j.
(1) happens with probability Pr[v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij ]; By union bound, (2) happens with probability at
P
least 21 as j Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 12 . Furthermore, both events are independent and thus buyer i
will purchase permit j and pay the permit price with probability at least

1
2

· Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ ξij ].

We point out that in the above lemma, it’s necessary to make every buyer i’s expected utility
for purchasing each permit j to be exactly

1
2

· v̄ij (tij ). This is the reason the RSPP mechanism
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needs to hide each item randomly to make each item available with probability exactly

1
2

(See

Section 4.5.1). If the mechanism doesn’t hide the item, we only know that her expected utility for
each permit is at least that much. We are not able to lower bound the probability that (2) happens
using union bound.
Lemma 4.18. Tail ≤ 2 · RSPP-Profit.
Proof. It directly follows from Lemma 4.16 and 4.17 by applying argmaxa≥τi a · Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ a]
as ξij (Notice that it satisfies the constraint in Lemma 4.17 by the definition of τi ).
Bounding Core
Now we bound Core using RSPP and SPB.
Theorem 4.8. Core ≤ 8 · SPB-Profit + 20 · RSPP-Profit.
Recall that Core =

P

i Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))].

In the proof we will consider the SPB mechanism

with item prices max{βij (c), cj } and permit bundle price δi =

1
2

· medianti (v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))). In order

to show that each buyer will accept this bundle price with at least half probability, we will prove
the expected utility for the item-purchasing stage is at least

1
2

· v̄i (ti , [m]). We need the following

definition.
Definition 4.5. Consider the above SPB mechanism. For every i, ti , c and P ⊆ [m], let

ui (ti , c, P ) =

max

S⊆P,S∈Fi

X

(tij − max{βij (c), cj })

j∈S

By Definition 4.5, buyer i’s expected utility for the item purchasing stage is Et<i ,c [ui (ti , c, Si (t<i , c))].
Recall that Si (t<i , c) is the set of available items in the above SPB mechanism. We notice that for
every i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with probability qij (c). Thus by union bound,
P
each item j is still available when buyer i comes with probability at least 1 − j qij (c) ≥ 21 , i.e.
Prt<i [j ∈ Si (t<i , c)] ≥ 12 . Then by showing that all ui s are XOS valuations, we prove that every
buyer has expected utility at least

1
2

· v̄i (ti , [m]) to enter the auction.
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Lemma 4.19. ( [DNS05]) A function v(·) is XOS if and only if for every S ⊆ [m], there exist
prices {pj }j∈S (called supporting prices) such that
• v(S 0 ) ≥
•

P

j∈S

P

j∈S 0

pj for all S 0 ⊆ S.

pj ≥ v(S).

Lemma 4.20. For every i, ti , c, ui (ti , c, ·) is an XOS function.
Proof. Fix i, ti , c. For every P ⊆ [m], let S ∗ = argmaxS⊆P,S∈Fi

P

j∈S (tij − max{βij (c), cj }).

Define

supporting prices for set P as follows: pPj = (tij − max{βij (c), cj }) · 1[j ∈ S ∗ ]. It’s easy to check
that pPj s satisfy both constraints in Lemma 4.19. Thus ui (ti , c, ·) is an XOS function.
Lemma 4.21. Consider the above SPB mechanism. For every i, buyer i will accept the bundle
price δi with at least

1
2

probability.

Proof. As stated above, for every buyer i with type ti , her expected utility on the item-purchasing
stage is Et<i ,c [ui (ti , c, Si (t<i , c))]. For every i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with
P
probability qij (c). Thus by union bound, Prt<i [j ∈ Si (t<i , c)] ≥ 1 − j qij (c) ≥ 21 .
By Lemma 4.19 and 4.20, let pPj (ti , c) be the supporting price for ui (ti , c, ·) and set P . We have



X

Et<i ,c [ui (ti , c, Si (t<i , c))] ≥ Et<i ,c


[m]
pj (ti , c)

j∈Si (t<i ,c)

= Ec

 X


[m]
pj (ti , c) · Pr[j ∈ Si (t<i , c)]
t<i

j∈[m]

≥

Thus buyer i will pay δi =

1
2

1
1
1
· Ec [ui (ti , c, [m])] = v̄i (ti , [m]) ≥ · v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))
2
2
2

· medianti (v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))) with probability at least 12 .

Now it’s sufficient to show that Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))] is comparable to δi for every i. This is obtained
by applying the Talagrand’s concentration inequality on v̄i (ti , Ci (ti )). Let µi (ti , S) = v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ) ∩
S). We show that µi is subadditive and has small Lipschitz constant (Definition 3.4). The proof is
Lemma 4.22 is postponed to Appendix B.4.
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Lemma 4.22. µi (ti , ·) is monotone, subadditive, no exteralities and has Lipschitz constant τi .
The following lemma is a restatement of Corollary 3.1. It shows that for every i, Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))]
is bounded by δi and the Lipschitz constant τi .
Lemma 4.23. (Restatement of Corollary 3.1)

Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))] = Eti [µi (ti , [m]) ≤ 4 · δi +

For the last step,
Lemma 4.24.

P

i τi

Proof. By definition,

P

i τi

5
· τi
2

can be bounded using the RSPP.

≤ 8 · RSPP-Profit.
P

j

Prtij [v̄ij (tij ) ≥ τi ] =

RSPP-Profit ≥

1
2

for every i. By Lemma 4.17,

X
1X
1 X
τi ·
τi
Pr[v̄ij (tij ) ≥ τi ] = ·
tij
4
8
i

j

i

Proof of Theorem 4.8: Consider the SPB mechanism with item prices max{βij (c), cj } and per1
2

mit bundle price δi =

· medianti (v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))). According to Lemma 4.21, Lemma 4.24 and

Lemma 4.23,

SPB-Profit ≥

1 X
1 X
5
1
·
δi ≥ (
Eti [v̄i (ti , Ci (ti ))] − τi ) ≥ · (Core − 20 · RSPP-Profit)
2
8
2
8
i

i

2
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Chapter 5

Single-Dimensional Two-sided
Markets
Starting from this chapter, we consider the problem of approximating gains from trade (GFT) in
two-sided markets. In this chapter, we will focus on single-dimensional settings, or more specifically,
bilateral trade and double auctions associated with any downward-closed trading constraints F (see
Section 2.4). We will design a simple, truthful and budget balanced mechanism and prove that the
GFT of this mechanism is at least half of the second-best GFT.
In Section 5.1, we characterize the set of allocation rules that are implementable by an IR,
BIC, SBB mechanism in double auctions. In Section 5.2, we study the bilateral trade setting,
proving a 2-approximation to the second-best GFT using some simple, IR, BIC, SBB mechanisms.
In Section 5.3, we generalize the 2-approximation result to any double auction with arbitrary
downward-closed feasibility constraint. In Section 5.4, we discuss the relationship of mechanisms
with different budget balanced constraints.
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5.1

Characterizing the Implementable Allocation Rules in Double
Auctions

In this section, we characterize the set of allocation rules that are implementable by an IR, BIC,
SBB mechanism in Theorem 5.1. It generalizes Myerson and Satterthwaite’s result [Mye81] (see
Section 2.4) to double auctions. In particular, their result is a special case of ours when n = m = 1.
For simplicity, in the proof of Theorem 5.1 we assume all agents have continuous distributions.
In other words, for every buyer i (or seller j), fiB (·) (of fjS (·)) is a continuous function and positive
in its domain [bi , bi ] (or [sj , sj ]). Both bi and sj can be ∞. For discrete distributions, the theorem
follows from a similar argument.
Theorem 5.1. Given an allocation rule x = (xB , xS ), there exists payment rule (pB , pS ) such that
the mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC and SBB if and only if
S
• For every i, xB
i (bi ) is non-decreasing on bi . For every j, xj (sj ) is non-increasing on sj .

•



n
m
X
X
Eb,s 
xB
xSj (b, s) · τj (sj ) ≥ 0
i (b, s) · ϕi (bi ) −
i=1

(5.1)

j=1

The following lemma characterizes the payments in an IR, BIC mechanism. The proof is similar
to the analysis for bilateral trade in [MS83].
Lemma 5.1. Suppose a mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR and BIC, then
S
• For every i, xB
i (bi ) is non-decreasing on bi . For every j, xj (sj ) is non-increasing on sj .

• For every buyer i and any of her type bi ,
pB
i (bi )

= bi ·

xB
i (bi )

Z

bi

−
bi

θi is some non-negative constant.
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xB
i (t)dt − θi ,

(5.2)

• For every seller j and any of her type sj ,
pSj (sj )

= sj ·

xSj (sj )

Z

sj

+

xSj (t)dt + ηj ,

(5.3)

sj

ηj is some non-negative constant.
Furthermore, if (pB , pS ) satisfies Equation (5.2) and (5.3), then
n
X
i=1

m
X

"
Ebi [pB
i (bi )] = Eb,s

n
X

#
xB
i (b, s) · ϕi (bi ) −

i=1

n
X

θi



m
m
X
X
S
S


Esj [pj (sj )] = Eb,s
xj (b, s) · τj (sj ) −
ηj

j=1

(5.4)

i=1

j=1

(5.5)

j=1

Proof. For every i and bi , let UiB (bi ) be buyer i’s expected utility when she reports her true type
bi . Since M is BIC, for every buyer i, and two types bi , b0i ∈ [bi , bi ],
B
B 0
B 0
UiB (bi ) = bi · xB
i (bi ) − pi (bi ) ≥ bi · xi (bi ) − pi (bi )

0
B 0
0
B
B
UiB (b0i ) = b0i · xB
i (bi ) − pi (bi ) ≥ bi · xi (bi ) − pi (bi )

The two inequalities imply
B 0
B
0
B 0
(b0i − bi ) · xB
i (bi ) ≤ Ui (bi ) − Ui (bi ) ≤ (bi − bi ) · xi (bi )

0
B
B
when b0i > bi , xB
i (bi ) ≥ xi (bi ). xi (bi ) is non-decreasing on bi and thus Riemann integrable. Let

b0i = bi + ,
B
B
B
 · xB
i (bi ) ≤ Ui (bi + ) − Ui (bi ) ≤  · xi (bi + )

(5.6)

For any value z, taking integral of bi on [bi , z] and let  → 0, we have
UiB (z) = UiB (bi ) +

Z

z

bi
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xB
i (bi )dbi

(5.7)

B
pB
i (z) = z · xi (z) −

Z

z
B
xB
i (bi )dbi − Ui (bi )

(5.8)

bi

Clearly, UiB (bi ) ≥ 0, as M is interim IR. Equation (5.2) follows from setting θi = UiB (bi ).
Similarly, we can show that Equation (5.3) holds for every j.
Furthermore, for every i, by Equation (5.2),

Ebi [pB
i (bi )]

bi

Z
=

B
bi xB
i (bi )fi (bi )dbi

Z

bi

=

Z

bi

=
bi

=

Z

xB
i (t)

bi

Z

B
bi xB
i (bi )fi (bi )dbi −

bi

Z

bi

−

bi

Z

B
xB
i (t)fi (bi )dtdbi − θi

bi

bi
B
bi xB
i (bi )fi (bi )dbi

bi

Z

−

bi

Z

bi

bi

fiB (bi )dbi dt − θi

t

bi

(5.9)


B
xB
i (bi ) 1 − Fi (bi ) dbi − θi

bi
B
ϕi (bi )xB
i (bi )fi (bi )dbi − θi

bi

Similarly, for every seller j, by Equation (5.3),
Esj [pSj (sj )] =

Z

sj

sj xSj (sj )fjS (sj )dsj +

Z

sj

Z

sj

=
sj

=

sj xSj (sj )fjS (sj )dsj

sj

=

Z

sj

sj xSj (sj )fjS (sj )dsj

Z

sj

sj

xSj (t)fjS (sj )dtdsj + ηj

sj

xSj (t)

sj

sj

Z

Z

sj

sj

Z

sj

Z

t

fjS (sj )dsj dt + ηj

sj

xSj (sj )FjS (sj )dsj

(5.10)
+ ηj

sj

τj (sj )xSj (sj )fjS (sj )dsj + θj

sj

Equations (5.4) and (5.5) directly follows from the two equations above.

Proof of Theorem 5.1: If there exists a payment rule (pB , pS ) such that the mechanism M =
(xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC and SBB, by Lemma 5.1, x is monotone and there exists non-negative
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θi ’s and ηj ’s such that Equations (5.4) and (5.5) hold. Since M is SBB,


n
m
n
m
X
X
X
X
S

Eb,s 
xB
(b,
s)
·
ϕ
(b
)
−
x
(b,
s)
·
τ
(s
)
=
θ
+
ηj ≥ 0
i i
j j
i
i
j
i=1

j=1

i=1

(5.11)

j=1

If the given allocation rule x is monotone, and satisfies Inequality (5.1), define payment rule
p = (pB , pS ) as follows:

pB
i (b, s)

= bi ·

xB
i (b, s)

Z

bi

−

xB
i (t, b−i , s)dt

(5.12)

xSj (b, t, s−j )dt

(5.13)

bi

pSj (b, s)

= sj ·

xSj (b, s)

Z

sj

+
sj

This is a threshold payment and thus M = (x, p) is DSIC and IR. According to Equations (5.4),
(5.5) and Inequality (5.1), M is ex-ante WBB. By Lemma 5.11 and Theorem 5.12, there exists
0

0

0

0

payment rule (pB , pS ) such that M 0 = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC, and SBB. 2

5.2

Bilateral Trade

To warm up, we first study the classic bilateral trade setting, when there is only one buyer, one
seller and a single item. Throughout this section, we will use b and s to represent the buyer and
seller’s type accordingly. In any mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ), for every type profile (b, s), x(b, s) is
the probability that the item is traded. pB (b, s) and pS (b, s) are the payments. For simplicity, for
every b let xB (b) = Es [x(b, s)], pB (b) = Es [pB (b, s)] be the buyer’s interim allocation and payment.
Similarly, let xS (s) = Eb [x(b, s)], pS (s) = Eb [pS (b, s)] for every s.
We will present two simple IR, BIC, SBB mechanisms and prove that the better one obtains at
least half of the optimal GFT.
1. Seller-Offering Mechanism (SO): The seller posts a take-it or leave-it price qB (s) for
the item to the buyer. The item price depends on her true type s and the buyer’s value
distribution. The buyer has to pay qB (s) to the seller if she chooses to take the item.
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2. Buyer-Offering Mechanism (BO): The buyer posts a take-it or leave-it price qS (b) for
the item to the seller. The item price depends on her true type b and the seller’s value
distribution. The seller can get qS (b) from the buyer if she chooses to sell the item.
Since the item is sold through a posted price, both mechanisms are clearly SBB. For SO, the
seller has the information of her true type s and the buyer’s type distribution DB . She will choose
qB (s) to maximize her expected utility and thus the mechanism is BIC and IR for the seller. The
buyer sees the posted price and will buy if and only if her value b is greater than qB (s), no matter
what s is. Hence the mechanism is DSIC and IR for the buyer. Similarly, BO is BIC for the buyer,
DSIC for the seller, and IR for both agents.
Let GFTSO and GFTBO be the expected GFT for SO and BO. We will prove that the secondbest GFT (SB-GFT) is bounded by GFTSO plus GFTBO . Hence a simple randomization between
the two mechanisms achieves a 2-approximation.
Theorem 5.2. SB-GFT ≤ GFTSO + GFTBO
To prove Theorem 5.2, we first focus on the left hand side of the inequality - the optimal GFT.
In [MS83], the authors give an exact characterization of the optimal mechanism, yet its GFT is
not easy to analyze. Thus it’s necessary to provide an upper bound of the optimal GFT that has
a simple form.

5.2.1

Upper Bound for OPT

Notice that the GFT of any two-sided market mechanism equals to the buyer’s expected utility of
this mechanism, plus the seller’s expected utility, plus the difference between buyer’s and seller’s
expected payment. Denote OPTBU (or OPTSU ) the optimal buyer’s (or seller’s) utility attainable
by any IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism. Note that in any ex-ante WBB mechanism, the
buyer’s expected payment is at least the seller’s expected gains. Thus OPT is upper bounded by
OPTBU plus OPTSU .
Now it remains to bound OPTSU and OPTBU . By Lemma 5.1, for any BIC and IR mechanism
M = (x, p), x(b, s) is non-decreasing on b and non-increasing on s. The seller’s expected utility for
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the mechanism is Eb,s [pB (b, s)−x(b, s)·s] = Eb,s [x(b, s)·(ϕ(b)−s)]. When DB is regular, it is at most
Eb,s [(ϕ(b) − s)+ ] when x(b, s) = 1[ϕ(b) ≥ s].1 For irregular DB , ϕ(b) might not be non-decreasing
and thus 1[ϕ(b) ≥ s] might not be a monotone allocation rule. To get an achievable bound, we
will follow the ironing procedure on the virtual value function [Mye81] and bound OPTSU by
Eb,s [(ϕ̃(b) − s)+ ], where ϕ̃(·) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function.
Lemma 5.2. [Har13] For any non-decreasing function xB (·) : T B → [0, 1],

Eb [xB (b) · ϕ(b)] ≤ Eb [xB (b) · ϕ̃(b)].
The inequality holds with equality if xB (b) = xB (b0 ) for every two values b, b0 in the same ironed
interval (or formally, ϕ̃(b) = ϕ̃(b0 )).
For the seller’s virtual cost function, we will perform a similar ironing procedure if DS is
irregular2 . A formal definition of the ironing procedure can be found in Definition 5.1. Lemma 5.3
is analogous to Lemma 5.2, which states that the seller’s expected virtual cost is at least the
expected ironed virtual cost, under any monotone allocation rule.
Definition 5.1. (ironing for seller’s distribution) Let G(·), g(·) be the cdf and pdf of DS . Consider
the quantile space for the distribution. For any r ∈ [0, 1], let R(r) = r · G−1 (r).3 Let R̃(r) =
minr1 ,r2 ∈[0,1] (δ · R(r1 ) + (1 − δ) · R(r2 )), where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique value such that r = δ · r1 + (1 −
δ) · r2 . Now R̃(·) is a convex curve. The ironed virtual cost function is defined as τ̃ (s) = R̃0 (G(s)).
Lemma 5.3. For any non-increasing function xS (·) : T S → [0, 1],

Es [xS (s) · τ (s)] ≥ Es [xS (s) · τ̃ (s)].
The inequality holds with equality if xS (s) = xS (s0 ) for every two values s, s0 in the same ironed
1. x+ = max{x, 0}
2. A seller’s distribution DS is regular if and only if τ (·) is monotone non-decreasing.
3. By taking derivative, one can easily check that R0 (r) = τ (G−1 (r)) holds for every r. Thus τ (·) is non-decreasing
if and only if R(·) is convex.
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interval (or formally, τ̃ (s) = τ̃ (s0 )).
Proof. Notice that R0 (F S (s)) = f S (s)τ (s) for every s. By integration by parts, for monotone
allocation rule xS (·) we have,
Es [xS (s) · τ (s)] = −Es [(xS )0 (s) · R(F S (s))]

Similarly,
Es [xS (s) · τ̃ (s)] = −Es [(xS )0 (s) · R̃(F S (s))]
By definition, for every r ∈ [0, 1], R̃(r) ≤ R(r). Moreover, since xS (·) is non-increasing, we have
Es [xS (s) · τ (s)] = −Es [(xS )0 (s) · R(F S (s))] ≥ −Es [(xS )0 (s) · R̃(F S (s))] = Es [xS (s) · τ̃ (s)]
The inequality holds with equality if (xS )0 (s) = 0 for every s such that R(F S (s)) > R̃(F S (s)).
The proof is done by noticing that whenever R(F S (s)) > R̃(F S (s)), s must be in the interior of
the some ironed interval.
Lemma 5.4. OPTSU ≤ Eb,s [(ϕ̃(b) − s)+ ], OPTBU ≤ Eb,s [(b − τ̃ (s))+ ].
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, for any BIC, IR, and ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (x, p), x(b, s) is nondecreasing on b and non-increasing on s. The seller’s expected utility for the mechanism is

Eb,s [pS (b, s) − x(b, s) · s] ≤Eb,s [pB (b, s) − x(b, s) · s]

(M is ex-ante WBB)

=Eb,s [x(b, s) · (ϕ(b) − s)] − θ

(by Lemma 5.1)

≤Eb,s [x(b, s) · (ϕ̃(b) − s)] − θ

(by Lemma 5.2)

≤Eb,s [(ϕ̃(b) − s)+ ]

Similarly, for any mechanism that is BIC and IR for the seller, the buyer’s expected utility for
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the mechanism is

Eb,s [x(b, s) · b − pB (b, s)] ≤ Eb,s [x(b, s) · b − pS (b, s)]
= Eb,s [x(b, s) · (b − τ (s))] − η ≤ Eb,s [x(b, s) · (b − τ̃ (s))] − η ≤ Eb,s [(b − τ̃ (s))+ ]

where the second inequality follows from Lemma 5.3. The proof is done.
We remark that according to Lemma 5.5 in Section 5.2.2, both of the inequalities in Lemma 5.4
hold with equality as the bound is achieved by SO (and BO). In the rest of this section we will first
characterize the value of GFTSO and GFTBO , and then prove Theorem 5.2.

5.2.2

GFT of the SO and BO Mechanism

Lemma 5.5.
GFTSO = Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]]
GFTBO = Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[b ≥ τ̃ (s)]]
Proof. First consider SO. For every seller’s type s, if the seller uses q as the posted price in the
SO, the seller’s expected utility is uS (s, q) = (q − s) · Prb∼DB [b ≥ q] = Eb [(ϕ(b) − s) · 1[b ≥ q]]
according to Myerson’s lemma. By Lemma 5.2, this is at most Eb [(ϕ̃(b) − s) · 1[b ≥ q]]. Since ϕ̃(·)
is monotone, b ≥ q if and only if ϕ̃(b) ≥ ϕ̃(q). Thus choosing q ∗ = min{q|ϕ̃(q) = s}4 maximizes
the term Eb [(ϕ̃(b) − s) · 1[b ≥ q]]. Moreover, since q ∗ is not in the interior of any ironed interval,
uS (s, q ∗ ) = Eb [(ϕ̃(b) − s) · 1[b ≥ q ∗ ]]. Thus q ∗ also maximizes the seller’s utility. In SOM, the trade
happens whenever ϕ̃(b) ≥ s.
The proof for BO is analogous: In BO, the buyer with type b will choose max{q|τ̃ (q) = b} as
the posted price, and the trade happens whenever τ̃ (s) ≤ b.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.2. If both of the distributions are regular, Theorem 5.2
4. In fact if there are multiple values of q that satisfy ϕ̃(q) = s, choosing q ∗ = max{q|ϕ̃(q) = s} derives the same
maximum expected utility. In other words, the seller can choose either the start-point or the end-point of that ironed
interval as her posted price. Here we pick the one that allows more trade.
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directly follows from OPT ≤ OPTSU + OPTBU and the fact that the buyer’s virtual value is
always less than the true value and the seller’s virtual cost is always greater than her true cost.
For general distributions, we will apply Lemma 5.2 to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.2: By Lemma 5.4, we have

SB-GFT ≤ OPTBU + OPTSU ≤ Eb,s [(ϕ̃(b) − s)+ ] + Eb,s [(b − τ̃ (s))+ ]
For every s, note that 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s] is a monotone function and the jump from 0 to 1 happens
at the minimum value of b such that ϕ̃(b) = s, which is not in the interior of any ironed interval.
Thus

Eb,s [(ϕ̃(b) − s)+ ] = Eb,s [(ϕ(b) − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]] ≤ Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]] = GFTSO
Similarly we have Eb,s [(b − τ̃ (s))+ ] ≤ GFTBO . Thus ≤ GFTSO + GFTBO . 2

5.3

Double Auction Setting

In this section, we consider the double auction setting. In Section 5.2, we proposed two simple
mechanisms approximating the optimal GFT for bilateral trade. Both of the mechanisms are IR,
BIC and SBB. However in double auctions, such a mechanism appears to be hard to design directly.
One significant barrier is to find a payment rule that simultaneously satisfies all three conditions
mentioned above. Indeed, given an allocation rule, even monotone, such a payment rule is not
guaranteed to exist (Theorem 5.1).
However, even knowing there exists a payment rule that makes the mechanism IR, BIC and
SBB, it is still not easy to explicitly describe these payments. We circumvent this difficulty by
first proposing ex-ante WBB mechanisms whose GFT is at least

OPT
2 .

Then the mechanism can

be transformed into an SBB mechanism, while maintaining the same GFT. See Theorem 5.4 in
Section 5.4 for more details about the transformation.
Theorem 5.3. In any double auction, there exists an IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism
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whose GFT is at least

OPT
2 .

To prove Theorem 5.3, we first bound the optimal GFT using a similar argument as in Section 5.2. Denote OPTBU (or OPTSU ) the maximum value for the sum of all buyers’ (or sellers’)
utility attainable by any IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism. Lemma 5.6 gives an upper bound
of the optimal GFT. Before stating the lemma, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.2. Given type profile (b, s), build a complete bipartite graph between the buyers and
the sellers with edge weight wij (bi , sj ) equal to ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj for the edge between buyer i and seller j.
P
Then find a matching A(b, s) ∈ F that maximizes the total weight (i,j)∈A(b,s) wij (bi , sj ). Denote
A1 (b, s) the maximum weight matching. For the other side, denote A2 (b, s) the maximum weight
matching when the edge weight wij (bi , sj ) equal to bi − τ̃j (sj ).
Lemma 5.6.

SB-GFT ≤ OPTSU + OPTBU ≤ Eb,s 


X



(ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj ) + Eb,s 

(i,j)∈A1 (b,s)


X

(bi − τ̃j (sj )) .

(i,j)∈A2 (b,s)

Proof. By Lemma 5.1, for any BIC, IR and ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (x, p), for every b, s,
S
xB
i (b, s) is non-decreasing on bi for every i. And for every j, xj (b, s) is non-increasing on sj .

Denote xij (b, s) the probability that buyer i trades with seller j under profile (b, s). Clearly
P
P
S
xB
i (b, s) =
i∈[n] xij (b, s).
j∈[m] xij (b, s), xj (b, s) =
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The sum of all sellers’ expected utility for the mechanism is
X

X
X
Eb,s [pSj (b, s) − xSj (b, s) · sj ] ≤ Eb,s [
pB
xSj (b, s) · sj ]
i (b, s) −

j

i

(M is ex-ante WBB)

j

X
X
X
S
= Eb,s [
xB
(b,
s)
·
ϕ
(b
)
−
x
(b,
s)
·
s
]
−
θj
i
i
j
i
j
i

j

X
X
X
≤ Eb,s [
xB
xSj (b, s) · sj ] −
θj
i (b, s) · ϕ̃i (bi ) −
i

(Lemma 5.1)

j

j

(Lemma 5.2)

j

X
X
= Eb,s [
xij (b, s) · (ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj )] −
θj
i,j



j

X

≤ Eb,s


(ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj )

(i,j)∈A1 (b,s)

where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5.2.
Similarly, for any mechanism that is BIC, IR and ex-ante WBB, the sum of all buyers’ expected
utility for the mechanism is
X

X
X
B
B
Eb,s [xB
(b,
s)
·
b
−
p
(b,
s)]
≤
E
[
x
(b,
s)
·
b
−
pSi (b, s)]
i
i
b,s
i
i
i

i

i

(M is ex-ante WBB)

j

X
X
X
= Eb,s [
xB
xSj (b, s) · τj (sj )] −
ηi
i (b, s) · bi −
i

j

X
X
X
≤ Eb,s [
xB
xSj (b, s) · τ̃j (sj )] −
ηi
i (b, s) · bi −
i

(Lemma 5.1)

i

j

(Lemma 5.2)

i

X
X
= Eb,s [
xij (b, s) · (bi − τ̃j (sj ))] −
ηi
i,j



i

X

≤ Eb,s


(bi − τ̃j (sj ))

(i,j)∈A2 (b,s)

5.3.1

Generalized BO and SO

We propose two mechanisms and show that the better one has GFT at least 12 OPT. The allocation
and payment rule are defined as follows:
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Definition 5.3. We consider the following two mechanisms which are the generalizations of SO
and BO in double auctions.
• Generalized Seller-Offering Mechanism (GSO): Given type profile b, s, buyer i trades
with seller j if and only if (i, j) ∈ A1 (b, s) (see Definition 5.2). According to Lemma 5.7,
this allocation rule is monotone, and the buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold
payment. See below for more details about the payment rule.
• Generalized Buyer-Offering Mechanism (GBO): Given type profile b, s, buyer i trades
with seller j if and only if (i, j) ∈ A2 (b, s) (see Definition 5.2). According to Lemma 5.7,
this allocation rule is monotone, and the buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold
payment.
Lemma 5.7. Suppose wij (bi , sj ) is non-decreasing in bi and non-increasing in sj for every buyer i
and seller j. For any type profile b, s, if edge (i, j) is in the maximum weight matching M, this edge
is in the maximum weight matching under type profile (b0i , b−i , s) (or (b, s0j , s−j )) for any b0i > bi
(or any s0j < sj ).
Proof. We prove that for any b0i > bi , M is still a maximum weight matching under type profile
(b0i , b−i , s). For convenience, we use wij (b, s) to represent the weight of edge (i, j) under type profile
(b, s). wij (b, s) = wij (bi , sj ). For every matching M0 ∈ F, notice that wi0 j 0 (b, s) = wi0 j 0 (b0i , b−i , s)
for all i0 6= i and all j 0 ∈ [m]. Hence,
X

wi0 j 0 (b0i , b−i , s) =

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M

X

wi0 j 0 (b, s) + wij (b0i , sj ) − wij (bi , sj )



(i0 ,j 0 )∈M

≥

X

wi0 j 0 (b, s) + (wij (b0i , sj ) − wij (bi , sj )) (Optimality of M)

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M0

≥

X

wi0 j 0 (b0i , b−i , s)

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M0

(5.14)
The last inequality is an equality if (i, j) ∈ M0 . If (i, j) ∈
/ M0 , the inequality is because
P
P
0
wij (b0i , sj ) − wij (bi , sj ) ≥ 0 and
(i0 ,j 0 )∈M0 wi0 ,j 0 (b, s) =
(i0 ,j 0 )∈M0 wi0 j 0 (bi , b−i , s). Thus, M is
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a maximum weight matching under type profile (b0i , b−i , s). Similarly, we can show that M is a
maximum weight matching under type profile (b, sj , sj 0 ) for all s0j < sj .
By Lemma 5.7, the allocation rules for GSO and GBO are both monotone due to the monotonicity of functions ϕ̃i (·) and τ̃j (·) for all i, j. We use the threshold payment, that is, given any
B
B
B
type profile b, s, for every buyer i, if xB
i (b, s) = 0, pi (b, s) is also 0, and if xi (b, s) = 1, pi (b, s)
0
S
equals the smallest b0i such that xB
i (bi , b−i , s) = 1. Similarly, for every seller j, if xj (b, s) = 0,

pSj (b, s) is also 0, and if xSj (b, s) = 1, pSj (b, s) equals to the largest s0j such that xSj (b, s0j , s−j ) = 1.
As the allocation rule is monotone and the threshold payment is used, the mechanism is IR and
DSIC for every agent.

5.3.2

GSO and GBO in Bilateral Trade

To get a better understanding of the two mechanisms, we will first compare GSO with SO in the
bilateral trade setting (the buyer side is analogous). For GSO, the pair is selected in the optimal
matching if and only if the weight ϕ̃(b) − s ≥ 0. Notice that this is exactly same as the allocation
rule used in SO. Thus the two mechanisms have the same GFT, yet the different payment rule.
Different from SO which is SBB simply by the definition of the mechanism, it’s not straightforward
that GSO satisfies any budget balance criteria: By applying the threshold payment on both agents,
any monotone allocation rule can be used to construct a DSIC and IR mechanism. However,
Myerson and Satterthwaite’s impossibility result [MS83] implies that not all allocation rule can
induce a budget balanced mechanism. In Lemma 5.8, we show that with the specific allocation rule
in Definition 5.3, GSO is indeed ex-ante SBB.
Lemma 5.8. In the Bilateral Trade setting, GSO is an IR, DSIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism.
Proof. We only need to prove that the mechanism is ex-ante SBB in bilateral trade. By the
definition of the mechanism, if x(b, s) = 1, pB (b, s) = b0 (s) where b0 (s) = min{b0 : ϕ̃(b0 ) ≥ s},
pS (b, s) = ϕ̃(b). For any s,
Eb [pB (b, s)] = b0 (s) · Pr[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]
b

Eb [pS (b, s)] = Eb [ϕ̃(b) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]]
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According to the definition of b0 (s), b0 (s) does not lie in the interior of any ironed interval. Thus
by Lemma 5.2,
Z
Eb [ϕ̃(b) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]] = Eb [ϕ(b) · 1[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]] =

b̄

ϕ(b)f B (b)db = b0 (s) · Pr[ϕ̃(b) ≥ s]

b0 (s)

b

Thus we have Eb [pB (b, s)] = Eb [pS (b, s)].
Similarly, we can prove that GBO is ex-ante SBB. The trade happens if and only if the weight
b − τ̃ (s) ≥ 0 in GBO, which is exactly the same allocation rule with BO. Using a similar argument
as in Lemma 5.8, we can prove that GBO is also ex-ante SBB.
Lemma 5.9. In the Bilateral Trade setting, GBO is an IR, DSIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism.

5.3.3

Finishing the Proof

In this section, we consider the double auction setting and give the proof of Theorem 5.3. We first
need to prove that both GSO and GBO are ex-ante WBB. The idea is to consider each pair (i, j)
separately and show that the expected payment of buyer i for trading with seller j is greater than
the expected gains of seller j for trading with buyer i.
Lemma 5.10. Both GSO and GBO are IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanisms.
Proof. We will give the proof for GSO and a similar argument applies to GBO. Let (xB , xS , pB , pS )
be the allocation and payment rule for GSO. For every i, j and type profile b, s, let xij (b, s) =
1[(i, j) ∈ A1 (b, s)] representing whether buyer i is trading with seller j. Clearly xB
i (b, s) =
P
P
S
B
j∈[m] xij (b, s), xj (b, s) =
i∈[n] xij (b, s). We notice that with threshold payments, pi (b, s)
S
(or pSj (b, s)) is non-zero only if xB
i (b, s) (or xj (b, s)) is 1. Then the difference between all buyers’
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expected payments and sellers’ expected gains can be written as

Eb,s

X
n

B
xB
i (b, s)pi (b, s)−

i=1

m
X

xSj (b, s)pSj (b, s)



j=1



X

=Eb,s

xij (b, s) ·

pB
i (b, s)

−

pSj (b, s)





(i,j)∈A1 (b,s)

=Eb,s
=

X

xij (b, s) ·

pB
i (b, s)

−

pSj (b, s)





(5.15)

i,j
n
m
XX



S
Eb,s xij (b, s) · pB
i (b, s) − pj (b, s)

i=1 j=1

Now we fix i, j, b−i and s−j . Lemma 5.7 states that if a pair (i, j) is in the max weight
matching, then increasing the value of bi or decreasing the value of sj will not remove this pair
from the maximum weight matching. In other words, xij (bi , b−i , sj , s−j ) is non-decreasing in bi
and non-increasing in sj . Next, we characterize the threshold payments of i and j. For every
bi ∈ TiB , define s0j (bi ) to be the largest value of sj such that xij (bi , b−i , sj , s−j ) = 1. Notice
that when (i, j) ∈ A1 (b, s), ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj must be non-negative, as the feasibility constraint F is
downward-closed, so removing a pair with negative weight gives a strictly better matching. Thus,
s0j (bi ) ≤ ϕ̃i (bi ).
Similarly, for every sj ∈ TjS , define b0i (sj ) to be the smallest value of bi such that xij (bi , b−i , sj , s−j ) =
1. By the definition of threshold payments, given bi , sj , if xij (b, s) = 1, pSj (b, s) = s0j (bi ). As for
0
0
0
S
the buyer, pB
i (b, s) = bi (sj ). The reason is that when sj ≥ sj (bi ) (or bi ≤ bi (sj )) then xj (b, s) (or

xB
i (b, s)) must be 0. Imagine this is not the case, and j (or i) is in the maximum matching with
some other buyer i0 (or seller j 0 ) under profile (b, s), then clearly if we decrease the value of sj (or
increase the value of bi ), (i0 , j) (or (i, j 0 )) should remain in the maximum matching according to
Lemma 5.7. Contradiction.
Now fix sj . xij (b, s) = 1 if and only if bi ≥ b0i (sj ). We have



0
0
Ebi xij (b, s)pB
i (b, s) = bi (sj ) · Pr[bi ≥ bi (sj )]


Ebi xij (b, s)pSi (b, s) = Ebi [s0j (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]] ≤ Ebi [ϕ̃i (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]]

134

(5.16)
(5.17)

Again notice that b0i (sj ) does not lie in the interior of any ironed interval for all sj . So
Ebi [ϕ̃i (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]] = Ebi [ϕi (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]] = b0i (sj ) · Pr[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]

Hence,




S
Ebi xij (b, s)pB
i (b, s) ≥ Ebi xij (b, s)pi (b, s) .
Take expectation over sj , b−i , s−j , and sum over all i, j:
n X
m
X



S
Eb,s xij (b, s)(pB
i (b, s) − pj (b, s)) ≥ 0

(5.18)

i=1 j=1

Hence GSO is ex-ante WBB.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3: We use GFTGSO (or GFTGBO ) to denote the expected GFT of GSO (or
GBO). According to Lemma 5.10, both GSO and GBO are IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB, so we only
need to prove that GFTGSO + GFTGBO ≥ SB-GFT. By Lemma 5.6,

≤ Eb,s 


X



(ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj ) + Eb,s 

(i,j)∈A1 (b,s)


X

(bi − τ̃j (sj ))

(5.19)

(i,j)∈A2 (b,s)

For every i, j, fix b−i , s. As in Lemma 5.10, we will continue to use b0i (sj ) to denote the smallest
value of bi such that xij (bi , b−i , sj , s−j ) = 1 in GSO, and use xij (b, s) = 1[(i, j) ∈ A1 (b, s)] to
denote whether buyer i trades with seller j in GSO. Since b0i (sj ) does not lie in the interior of any
ironed interval, we have
Ebi [(ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj ) · xij (b, s)]
=Ebi [ϕ̃i (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]] − sj · Ebi [xij (b, s)]
=Ebi [ϕi (bi ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]] − sj · Pr[bi ≥ b0i (sj )] (Lemma 5.2)


≤Ebi (bi − sj ) · 1[bi ≥ b0i (sj )]
(ϕi (bi ) < bi )
=Ebi [(bi − sj ) · xij (b, s)]

135

(5.20)

Take expectation on b−i , s, and then sum up over all i, j:



Eb,s 

X

(ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj ) =

(i,j)∈A1 (b,s)

X

Eb,s [(ϕ̃(bi ) − sj ) · xij (b, s)]

i,j

≤

X

(5.21)
Eb,s [(bi − sj ) · xij (b, s)] = GFTGSO

i,j

Similarly, we have Eb,s

hP

(i,j)∈A2 (b,s)

i
(bi − τ̃j (sj )) ≤ GFTGBO . Combining this with Inequal-

ity (5.19), we have SB-GFT ≤ GFTGSO + GFTGBO . 2

5.4

Transformation between Mechanisms with Different BudgetBalanced Constraints

In this section, we argue how to transform an IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism to an IR, BIC
and SBB mechanism without changing the allocation rule. Clearly, the GFT remains the same after
the transformation. The result applies to general two-sided markets and we will use the notations
from Section 2.4 throughout this section.
Theorem 5.4. Given an IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) with non0

0

negative payment rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB , pS ) such that the
0

0

mechanism M 0 = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC and SBB.
As a SBB mechanism is clearly ex-ante WBB, thus with Theorem 5.4 we will have an equivalence among the ex-ante WBB constraint and the SBB constraint for IR and BIC mechanisms.
The intuition behind Theorem 5.4 is that if our mechanism has positive surplus, we can simply
divide the surplus to the agents evenly and independently from their reported types (Lemma 5.11).
Now we have an ex-ante SBB mechanism. Next, we massage the payments so that all interim
payments remain unchanged, while under every type profile the sum of buyers’ payments equal the
sum of sellers’ gains. This is achieved via an interesting linear transformation on the payments
(Lemma 5.12).
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Lemma 5.11. Given an IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) with non0

0

negative payment rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB , pS ) such that mecha0

0

nism M 0 = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB.
hP
i
Pm S
0
0
n
B (b, s) −
Proof. Let δ = Eb,s
p
p
(b,
s)
≥ 0. Define (pB , pS ) as follows: for every
i=1 i
j=1 j
0

0

b, s, pB (b, s) = pB (b, s) ≥ 0, pS (b, s) = pS (b, s) +

δ
m

≥ 0. Then





n
m
n
m
X
X
X
X
δ
0
0
=0
Eb,s 
pB
pSj (b, s) = Eb,s 
pB
pSj (b, s) − m ·
i (b, s) −
i (b, s) −
m
i=1

j=1

i=1

M 0 is ex-ante SBB. In mechanism M 0 , it first gives

(5.22)

j=1

δ
m

to each seller and then follows the allocation

rule and payment of mechanism M . Since each seller receives a fixed amount of money at the
beginning of the mechanism, M 0 will still be IR and BIC.
The next lemma provides a transformation for turning an IR, BIC, ex-ante SBB mechanism to
a SBB mechanism without modifying the allocation rule.
Lemma 5.12. Given an IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) with non0

0

negative payment rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB , pS ) such that the mech0

0

anism M 0 = (xB , xS , pB , pS ) is IR, BIC and SBB.
0

Proof. We will construct pB such that for every buyer i and her type bi , the expected payment for
buyer i to report type bi in M 0 is the same as her payment in M . Formally,
h 0
i
 B

Eb−i ,s pB
i (bi , b−i , s) = Eb−i ,s pi (bi , b−i , s) .
Similarly, for each seller j and her type sj , the expected gains for seller j to report type sj in M 0
is the same as her gains in M , that is,
h 0
i


Eb,s−j pSj (b, sj , s−j ) = Eb,s−j pSj (b, sj , s−j ) .

This property guarantees that the expected utility for buyer i (or seller j) when reporting type
bi (or type sj ) stays unchanged. Since M is BIC and IR, M 0 is also BIC and IR.
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Suppose we are given an IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism M = (xB , xS , pB , pS ). Define

0
0
0 0
the payment rule (pB , pS ) as follows. Let ΩB = i ∈ [n] : Eb0 ,s0 [pB
i (b , s )] > 0 and ΩS = {j ∈
[m] : Eb0 ,s0 [pSj (b0 , s0 )] > 0}.
0 0
0 0
B
For i 6∈ ΩB , since all payments pB
i (b , s ) are non-negative, we must have pi (b , s ) = 0 for all
0

B
S
b0 , s0 . We define pB
i (b, s) = 0 for all i 6∈ Ω and every type profile (b, s). Similarly, for all j 6∈ Ω ,
0

let pSj (b, s) = 0 for every type profile (b, s). For simplicity, we will slightly abuse the notation,
h
i
 B

S (s )) to denote E
S (b, s , s ) ), and pB (or pS )
using pB
(b
)
(or
p
p
(b
,
b
,
s)
(or
E
p
i
j
i −i
j −j
b−i ,s
s−j ,b
j
i
j
i
j
i
0 0
0 0
S
to denote Eb0 ,s0 [pB
i (b , s )] (or Eb0 ,s0 [pj (b , s )]).

For i ∈ ΩB and j ∈ ΩS , define
Y pB0 (bi0 ) Y pSj0 (sj 0 )
i
·
· pB
i
B
S
p
p
0
0
i
j
0
S
0
B

(5.23)

Y pB0 (bi0 ) Y pSj0 (sj 0 )
i
=
·
· pSj
B
S
p
p
0
0
i
j
0
B
0
S

(5.24)

0

pB
i (b, s) =

j ∈Ω

i ∈Ω

0
pSj (b, s)

i ∈Ω

For every b, s, since M is ex-ante SBB,
P

j ∈Ω

pB
i =

P

i∈ΩB

P

j∈ΩS

pSj , which implies that

0

P

i∈ΩB

pB
i (b, s) =

0

j∈ΩS

pSj (b, s). Since the payments of buyers (or sellers) that are not in ΩB (or ΩS ) are 0, Mech0

anism M 0 is SBB. Moreover, for every i ∈ ΩB and type bi , if we take expectation of pB
i (b, s) over
all b−i , s, we have
pB
i (bi ) ·
0

Eb−i ,s [pB
i (b, s)] =

Y
i0 6=i,i0 ∈ΩB

Y

Ebi0 ∼DB0 [pB
i0 (bi0 )] ·
i

Y
i0 ∈ΩB

j 0 ∈ΩS

pB
i0 ·

Y

Esj 0 ∼DS0 [pSj0 (sj 0 )] · pB
i
j

pSj0

(5.25)

j 0 ∈ΩS

= pB
i (bi )
0

B
If i 6∈ ΩB , Eb−i ,s [pB
i (b, s)] = 0 = pi (bi ). Similarly, for every seller j and any of her type sj ,
0

Eb,s−j [pSj (b, s)] = pSj (sj ). Thus, M 0 is an IR, BIC and SBB mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: It directly follows from Lemma 5.11 and Lemma 5.12. 2
With Lemma 5.11 and Lemma 5.12, one can show that under IR and BIC constraints, mecha-
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Figure 5.1: Transformation between Mechanisms with Different BB Constraints
nisms with all variants of the Budget-Balance constraint can be transformed to one another, without
changing the allocation rule (and thus not affecting the GFT).
Figure 5.1 describes the transformation between mechanisms with different budget balance
constraints. In the figure, all the simple arrows are directed from a stronger constraint to a weaker
one.
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Chapter 6

Approximating GFT with
Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms
The mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 achieves a constant approximation to the second-best GFT
in bilateral trade and double auction with arbitrary downward-closed trading constraint. However,
one caveat of this mechanism is that its expected GFT does not asymptotically converge to the
optimal GFT as the market grows large (see Example 6.1). In this chapter, we aim to design
mechanisms that are asymptotically efficient, and also achieve a constant factor approximation to
the second-best GFT in expectation.
In Section 6.1, we give an introduction of the results and techniques covered in this chapter. In
Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 we introduce our setting and go through mechanisms in the literature
that is useful in this chapter. In Section 6.4 we present our results for double auctions. In Section 6.5
and Section 6.6, we present our results for a more general setting matching market. In Section 6.7
we give some discussion about our results in this chapter.

6.1

Results in This Chapter

In light of the seminal impossibility result of Myerson–Satterthwaite [MS83], follow-up work in the
two-sided market literature has looked at IR, BIC, and BB mechanisms that are approximately
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efficient, rather than precisely efficient. The current state-of-the-art mechanisms in the literature
can be categorized as giving one of two guarantees:
1. A constant ex-ante guarantee, measured with respect to the second-best GFT, that is, the
(possibly very complex) mechanism obtaining the highest expected GFT of any IR and BIC
mechanism that is weakly budget balanced,

or

2. An asymptotically optimal ex-post guarantee, measured with respect to the first-best GFT,
that is, the mechanism obtaining full efficiency (VCG).
In this chapter, we aim to construct simple mechanisms that simultaneously achieve both guarantees. We study settings in which each seller is endowed with precisely one item, all items are
identical, and each buyer is interested in buying one item. In the double-auction setting, any seller
can trade with any buyer, while in the more general matching market setting, trade between some
buyer-seller pairs is disallowed. Before describing our results, we first survey the state-of-the-art
mechanisms giving each guarantee in more depth.

Ex-Ante Guarantees [BCWZ17] (henceforth BCWZ, presented in Chapter 5) present a simple
mechanism that is IR, BIC, and weakly BB, and obtains, in expectation, at least half of the
expected GFT of the second-best GFT, in any double auction with arbitrary downward-closed
trading constraint.
While the mechanism obtains at least half of the second-best GFT in expectation, we observe
that it does not give any ex-post efficiency guarantees, and moreover, even its expected GFT does
not asymptotically converge to the GFT of the second-best (let alone the first-best) mechanism as
the market grows large. This holds even for the very simple double-auction market with n sellers,
each selling an identical item, and n buyers, each interested in buying a single item, with the values
(or costs) of the agents sampled i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Even when n is large,
the mechanism of BCWZ will only give in expectation a constant fraction (strictly smaller than 1)
of the second-best GFT, and no more than that (see Example 6.1 in Section 6.4). In particular,
even in a large market, the efficiency of their mechanism does not converge to full efficiency.
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Ex-Post Guarantees The Trade Reduction mechanism1 of McAfee [McA92], which is defined for
the double-auction setting, does not suffer from the above drawback and is asymptotically efficient.
The mechanism circumvents the impossibility result [MS83] for bilateral trade, by providing an expost efficiency guarantee only when more than one trade is possible in the double-auction market.
The mechanism works as follows: it first finds the efficient trade — the allocation that maximizes
the GFT for the particular input profile. Denote the size (number of pairs) of this trade by q.
It then removes the least efficient trade (one buyer-seller pair), and only allows for the remaining
trades (the q − 1 most efficient trades) to realize, charging the winning buyers the value of the
removed buyer, and paying the winning sellers the cost of the removed seller. This creates an IR
and ex-post IC mechanism. As the value of the removed buyer is at least the cost of the removed
seller, each trade is weakly budget-balanced. The mechanism obtains at least a 1− 1/q fraction2 of
the realized optimal (first-best) GFT. In the double-auction example above, as n grows q will also
grow, and this fraction will tend to 1. Unfortunately, when q = 1 this mechanism performs no trade
and provides no guarantees at all. (Failing to provide an ex-post guarantee unconditionally is of
course inevitable in light of the impossibility result of Myerson–Satterthwaite [MS83].3 ) We note
that the Trade Reduction mechanism, while asymptotically efficient, fails to give any unconditional
approximation to the GFT, even with respect to the GFT of the second-best mechanism (as the
mechanism of BCWZ does give).

The Best of Both Worlds In this work we aim to design simple mechanisms that are IR, BIC,
and weakly BB, and simultaneously provide both types of efficiency guarantees discussed above.
First, in the spirit of the guarantee of BCWZ, we aim to guarantee for the expected GFT to be at
least a constant fraction of the expected GFT of the second-best mechanism. Second, in the spirit
of the guarantee of [McA92], we aim to guarantee for the ex-post GFT to be at least a realization1. McAfee’s original mechanism is slightly more involved. We use a simplified version that provides the same
worst-case guarantees.
2. Recall that q is a function of the valuation profile.
3. Ex-post approximation to the GFT requires the mechanism to trade whenever there is positive gain, but the
impossibility result implies that for some of these profiles trade will not occur.
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dependent fraction of the realized optimal GFT (first-best), such that this fraction tends to 1 “as
the market grows large” and the efficient trade size grows4 to infinity.

6.1.1

Our Results

We present results both for the double-auction setting and for the more involved matching-market
setting.Providing a result for this more involved scenario is considerably more challenging than for
the double-auction setting, and is the main result of this paper.
Double Auctions
We first present our result for double auctions.
Theorem 6.1. For the double-auction setting, there exists a simple mechanism that is ex-post IR,
BIC and ex-post weakly budget balanced, and satisfies both of the following.
• The expected GFT of this mechanism is at least 1/4 of the expected GFT of the second-best
mechanism.
• This mechanism guarantees at least 1−1/q of the realized optimal (first-best) GFT, where q is
the size of the most efficient trade. Thus the mechanisms is asymptotically efficient (converges
to full efficiency as the trade size q grows large).
Note that the asymptotic efficiency that is obtained is with respect to the most demanding
benchmark of the realized optimal GFT (the first-best and not only the second-best), providing the
same guarantee as the one provided by the Trade Reduction mechanism [McA92]. The concurrent
ex-ante guarantee is with respect to the second-best, similarly to the result of BCWZ.
Before examining the problem thoroughly, one might be tempted to think that it is trivial to
come up with such a mechanism for double auctions. Here is a natural naı̈ve candidate for such
a mechanism: first, the mechanism computes the efficient trade size q. If q > 1, it runs McAfee’s
4. The condition on the efficient trade size ensures that the growth in the market size does not, for example, come
from adding agents that are “irrelevant,” such as buyers with 0 value and sellers with very high costs, since in such
a case it would not be possible to provide any guarantee that is better for large markets than for small ones (such as
bilateral trade markets).
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Trade Reduction mechanism. Otherwise, it runs the mechanism of BCWZ. This naı̈ve approach
turns out to fail miserably as the allocation is not even monotone: it may well be the case that the
two agents that trade when q = 1 (i.e., those that trade according to the mechanism of BCWZ) are
not the highest-value buyer and the lowest-cost seller, and so in certain scenarios an agent that is
reduced in the q > 1 case (by the Trade Reduction mechanism) may be able to reduce her bid to
move to the q = 1 case and trade (for more details see Section 6.4).
To present our mechanism, let us first very roughly review the behavior of the mechanism of
BCWZ in the bilateral-trade case: in this special case, the mechanism flips a coin; with probability 50%, the seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to the buyer (calculated so as to maximize
the expected utility of the seller), and with probability 50%, the buyer offers a take-it-or-leaveit price to the seller (calculated so as to maximize the expected utility of the buyer). In order
to obtain the mechanism that we seek, we carefully make two main modifications to the naı̈ve
“compound” mechanism described above: first, in order to address the above-discussed source of
non-monotonicity, instead of running the mechanism of BCWZ on the entire market, we run their
bilateral-trade mechanism only on the (unique) pair in the efficient trade. To make the resulting
mechanism truthful, we need to make an additional adjustment: in the seller-offering case (the
adjustment to the buyer-offering case is analogous), we on the one hand force the seller to set a
price that is at most the threshold bid that puts her in the efficient (first-best) trade, and on the
other hand notify her of the values of all buyers except the one that she is facing, and calculate
the price that she offers to maximize her expected utility conditioned upon the fact that the buyer
that she is facing has value larger than all of these values. Both adjustments, and in particular the
first one, make the proof of the ex-ante guarantee, as well as the proof that the mechanism is BIC,
quite subtle.
The main challenge in obtaining the approximation guarantee for the case where q = 1 is
to reconcile the fact that the pair that our mechanism attempts to trade on is determined by
maximizing the realized GFT (first-best) and might not be the same as the pair that would have
traded according to the mechanism of BCWZ. The main hurdle to obtaining the approximation
guarantee for this case is therefore that for some valuation profiles, an offer between the unique
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pair in the efficient trade will be rejected, resulting in no trade in our hybrid mechanism, while in
the mechanism of BCWZ an offer will be made — and accepted — between a different pair. To
overcome this, we have to carefully charge such losses in GFT to gains in GFT by other parts of
our hybrid mechanism.

Matching Markets
As stated above, the mechanism of BCWZ does not converge to the efficient outcome in large
double-auction markets, and thus will clearly not do so in the more general matching market
setting. Our goal is to present a mechanism for matching market that is IR, BIC and ex-post
weakly BB, but also provide ex-ante guarantees for the GFT as well as ex-post guarantees that
converges to full efficiency “as the market grows large”. While in the double auction setting, every
buyer can trade with every seller, this is no longer the case in a matching market. Our notion of
a large matching market aims to generalize the fact that in a large market there are many agents
that are “equivalent” up to their values. The sense of agents being equivalent in a matching market
is that they can trade with exactly the same set of agents. So, we can naturally partition agents to
equivalence classes, with every two agents of the same class being interchangeable in any matching
(up to their valuations). We consider matching markets with a fixed set of such classes, and think
about a large market as a market in which the number of agents of each class is growing large, yet
the number of different classes that any agent can trade with remains bounded by some constant
d.
Recall that the Trade Reduction mechanism [McA92] is defined for a double-auction setting. We
first present a generalization for matching markets of the Trade Reduction mechanism (section 6.5.1)
and prove that it is ex-post asymptotically efficient “as the market grows large” in the above sense.
To our knowledge, this nontrivial generalization of the Trade Reduction mechanism, which may
also be of separate interest, is novel. Similarly to the Trade Reduction mechanism [McA92] for
double-auction settings, this mechanism does not give any ex-ante approximation guarantee.
As with the double-auction case, we cannot directly combine our Trade Reduction mechanism
for matching markets with the mechanism of BCWZ while maintaining truthfulness. Therefore,
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we present a novel mechanism (section 6.5.2), which we call the Offering Mechanism for Matching
Markets. Like the mechanism of BCWZ, this mechanism does not provide the ex-post guarantee
we are after, but we manage to carefully define it in a way that allows us to combine it with the
Trade Reduction mechanism for matching markets to obtain a truthful mechanism that provides
both types of guarantees that we are after. The precise definition of the Offering Mechanism that
allows for both the truthfulness and the efficiency guarantees of the hybrid mechanism has been
quite elusive to pin down, and the proofs of truthfulness, and in particular of the ex-ante guarantee,
are considerably more subtle than in the double-auction setting. To prove the ex-ante guarantee
of the Offering Mechanism, we compare it to the mechanism of BCWZ, showing that it attains
at least half of the GFT of their mechanism, resulting in an ex-ante guarantee of at least 1/4 of
the expected GFT of the second best mechanism. Proving the ex-ante guarantee of the Offering
Mechanism is the most technically challenging part of our analysis. To prove this guarantee, we
show that it is possible to carefully “charge” every edge of the matching of BCWZ to edges of
the first-best matching that will be traded in our Offering Mechanism, proving that the expected
GFT of our Offering Mechanism is at least half the expected GFT of the mechanism of BCWZ. The
combination of the Offering Mechanism for matching markets with the Trade Reduction mechanism
for matching markets creates the Hybrid Mechanism for Matching Markets (section 6.5.3), giving
us our main result.
Theorem 6.2. For the matching market setting, there exists a simple mechanism that is ex-post
IR, BIC and ex-post weakly budget balanced, and satisfies both of the following.
• The expected GFT of this mechanism is at least 1/4 of the expected GFT of the second-best
mechanism.
• When 1− d/q ≥ 1/2, this mechanism guarantees at least 1− d/q of the realized optimal (firstbest) GFT where d denotes the maximum number of classes that any agent can trade with,
and q denotes the minimal positive number of trading agents of the same class in the welfare
maximizing outcome. Thus the mechanism is asymptotically efficient in the sense that it
converges to full efficiency as the number of trading agents in every class grows large, as long
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as d is fixed.
We remark that while our mechanism ex-ante guarantees a quantitatively smaller fraction of
the second-best GFT than the 1/2 fraction guaranteed by the mechanism of BCWZ in Chapter 5,
the mechanism presented in this chapter has two qualitative advantages over the other mechanism:
first we obtain asymptotic efficiency and an ex-post guarantee, and moreover, our mechanism is
ex-post weakly BB, while the mechanism in Chapter 5 is only ex-ante weakly BB.

6.2
6.2.1

Definitions and Notations
Model and Definitions

Agents and Utilities

We focus on double auctions in this chapter. To remind the readers, in a

double-auction market for identical goods, there is a finite set S of sellers with one good each, and
a finite set B of unit-demand buyers, with |S| ≥ 2 and |B| ≥ 2. Each seller j ∈ S has a cost sj > 0
that she incurs if she sells her item, and each buyer i ∈ B has a value bi > 0 that she derives if
she purchases an item. We assume that an agent who does not trade does not incur any cost or
derive utility from this. Let s be the vector of sellers’ costs and b be the vector of buyers’ values.
The costs and values are sampled from agent-specific (but not necessarily identical) distributions
DiB for each buyer i ∈ B and DjS for each seller j ∈ S, each independent of all other distributions.
Agents have quasi-linear utilities and are risk neutral.

Trading Constraints In this chapter, we consider a special class of downward-closed trading
constraint where the set of trading buyer-seller pairs must form a matching in the bipartite graph
between buyers and sellers. Such a special case is called matching market. In a matching market
setting, an undirected bipartite graph G = (S, B, E) with the sellers on one side and the buyers
on the other constraints transactions. A set of trading agents K is a set of buyers and of sellers
that can be partitioned into pairs, each of one buyer and one seller that are neighbors in G (this
is equivalent to a matching of the set K in G) — the set K corresponds to each seller selling her
item, and each buyer buying one of the items sold from one of its neighbors in G. The size of trade
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of K is defined to be |K ∩ S| = |K ∩ B|.
Gains from Trade The gains from trade (GFT) when the set K (of trading agents) is trading
P
P
is defined to be i∈K∩B bi − j∈K∩S sj . Given a valuation profile (b, s), a set of trading agents is
efficient if it maximizes the gains from trade from (b, s) among all sets of trading agents.
Benchmarks

Given a valuation profile (b, s), let M (b, s) be the first-best matching, or the

maximum-weight matching in G, where ties between agents are broken by the “lexicographic order
by IDs” formally defined in Definition C.1 in appendix C.5.2.5 Slightly abusing notation, we use
M (b, s) to also denote the set of agents in the matching M (b, s). Let FB-GFT(b, s) be the GFT
P
of the “first-best” M (b, s), that is FB-GFT(b, s) = (i,j)∈M (b,s) (bi − sj ). Note that the VCG
mechanism (which is not budget balanced) attains a GFT of FB-GFT(b, s) on every valuation
profile (b, s).
A mechanism is called second-best if it maximizes the expected gains from trade among all BIC,
interim IR and ex-ante weakly budget balanced mechanisms.
Special Cases

The case where G is the complete bipartite graph (i.e., any seller can trade with

any buyer) is called the double-auction setting. In the double-auction setting, for every valuation
profile (b, s) we denote the size of the efficient set of trading agents by q(b, s). The case where
|S| = |B| = 1 and the buyer and the seller are connected by an edge in G (so this is also a special
case of double-auction) is called the bilateral-trade setting.

6.2.2

The Trade Reduction Mechanism

In the double-auction setting, the Trade Reduction (TR) mechanism [McA92] is a mechanism that
finds the most efficient trade of only q(b, s) − 1 items,6 and charges each agent his critical value for
winning. That is, the q(b, s)−1 highest-value buyers trade and pay the bid of the reduced buyer
5. This tie breaking rule satisfies two properties we use extensively: 1) it does not depend on weights, and 2) it is
subset consistent in the sense that when removing an edge (i, j) from some matching M and picking a matching on
the remaining nodes M \ {i, j}, it will pick the matching of M on these nodes.
6. If q(b, s) = 0 there is no trade in the TR mechanism, and no payments are made.
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(the q(b, s)-highest buyer); they trade with the q(b, s) − 1 lowest-cost sellers, each seller getting
paid the cost of the reduced seller (the q(b, s)-lowest seller).
Theorem 6.3 ( [McA92]). In the double-auction setting, the TR mechanism is ex-post IC, ex-post
IR, and ex-post (direct trade) weakly budget balanced. For every valuation profile (b, s), the gains
1
from trade of this mechanism are at least an 1− q(b,s)
fraction of FB-GFT(b, s).

Note that if q(b, s) = 1, then no ex-ante approximation to the GFT is achieved by the TR
mechanism, while for q(b, s) ≥ 2, Theorem 6.3 guarantees at least half the efficient GFT for (b, s),
ex-post.

6.2.3

The Random Virtual-Welfare Maximizing Mechanism

Here we recap the mechanism in Chapter 5 (see Definition 5.3) for double auctions with downwardclosed constraints (which subsume matching constraints), which we will refer to throughout this
chapter as the Random Virtual-Welfare Maximizing (RVWM) mechanism.
Observation 6.1. Let (b, s) be a valuation profile. If trade occurs with some positive probability
on a given edge (i, j) in the RVWM mechanism, then trade would occur on the same edge with at
least the same probability in the mechanism that runs one of the following, with probability 50%
each:
• Seller j offers a price to buyer i that maximizes the utility of seller j in expectation over the
distribution DiB from which buyer i’s valuation was drawn, and trade occurs if and only if
this price is at most buyer i’s valuation bi .
• Buyer i offers a price to seller j that maximizes the utility of buyer i in expectation over the
distribution DjS from which seller j’s valuation was drawn, and trade occurs if and only if
this price is at least seller j’s cost sj .
Theorem 6.4. (Restatement of Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.10) The RVWM mechanism is BIC,
ex-post IR, and ex-ante weakly budget balanced, and in expectation gets a 1/2-fraction of the gains
from trade of the second-best mechanism.
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Note that while the ex-ante guarantee of BCWZ is with respect to the second-best mechanism,
the ex-post guarantee of McAfee [McA92] is with respect to the more demanding benchmark of the
realized optimal first-best gains from trade.

6.3

The Seller-Offering, Buyer-Offering, and Randomized-Offerer
Mechanisms

Before we turn to our main results, in this section we present a slightly modified version of the
bilateral-trade construction of the SO and BO mechanism shown in Section 5.2, which we will use
as a building block in the construction of our hybrid mechanisms, and prove several properties
thereof.
Definition 6.1 (SO, BO, RO Mechanisms). Fix Ds and Db to be nonnegative-valued distributions,
and fix s̄ ≥ sup Support Ds and b̄ ≤ inf Support Db s.t. s̄ ≥ b̄. We define three mechanisms for
trade between a seller with cost s ∼ Ds and a buyer with value b ∼ Db .
• The Seller-Offering (SO) mechanism with offer constraint s̄ and target distribution Db is the
mechanism in which a seller with cost s offers to the buyer the lowest price p among the prices
that maximize the utility of the seller in expectation over b ∼ Db , under the constraint p ≤ s̄.


That is, the offered price is min p p ∈ arg maxp≤s̄ (p − s) · 1 − Db (p) . The buyer accepts
this price if it is no greater than the realized value b of the buyer. If the buyer accepts this
price, then trade occurs at this price; otherwise, no trade occurs.
• The Buyer-Offering (BO) mechanism with offer constraint b̄ and target distribution Ds is the
mechanism in which a buyer with value b offers to the seller the highest price p among the
prices that maximize the utility of the buyer in expectation over s ∼ Ds , under the constraint


p ≥ b̄. That is, the offered price is max p p ∈ arg maxp≥b̄ (b − p) · 1 − Ds (p) . The seller
accepts this price if it is no less than the realized cost s of the seller. If the seller accepts this
price, then trade occurs at this price; otherwise, no trade occurs.
• The (Bilateral) Randomized Offerer (RO) mechanism with SO parameters s̄ and Db and BO
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parameters b̄ and Ds is the mechanism that flips a coin, with probability 1/2 it runs the SO
mechanism with offer constraint s̄ and target distribution Db , and otherwise it runs the BO
mechanism with offer constraint b̄ and target distribution Ds .
We slightly strengthen the special case of the incentive and budget guarantees of Theorem 6.4 for
bilateral trade, and prove that they still hold even with offer constraints as in the RO mechanism.7
We furthermore show that whenever trade occurs, the trading happens at a price that indeed lies
between the seller’s and the buyer’s constraint.
Lemma 6.1. Fix Ds and Db to be nonnegative-valued distributions and fix s̄ ≥ sup Support Ds and
b̄ ≤ inf Support Db s.t. s̄ ≥ b̄ ≥ 0. Consider the RO mechanism with SO parameters s̄ and Db and
BO parameters b̄ and Ds .
1. When valuations are drawn from Ds × Db , this mechanism is a BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post
(direct trade) strongly budget balanced mechanism.
2. Whenever trade occurs in this mechanism, it holds that the price p that the seller pays the
buyer satisfies b̄ ≤ p ≤ s̄.
The proof of lemma 6.1 is given in appendix C.2. To conclude this section, we will prove two
more properties of the RO mechanisms that will allow us to lower-bound its GFT guarantee: the
first will allow us to compare its GFT to that of the first-best, and the second will allow us to
compare its GFT to that of the RVWM mechanism.
Lemma 6.2. Let Ds and Db be distributions and let s̄ ≥ b̄ ≥ 0. Let s ≤ s̄ be a cost for the seller
and let b ≥ b̄ be a value for the buyer. Consider the RO mechanism with SO parameters s̄ and
Db |≥b̄ and BO parameters b̄ and Ds |≤s̄ .8
1. If b̄ ≥ s or s̄ ≤ b, then the probability that trade occurs in this mechanism is at least 1/2.
7. We note that each of the SO and BO mechanisms is a deterministic and ex-post monotone mechanism, and so can
be made ex-post IC (and ex-post IR) by charging the threshold winning prices. The resulting modified mechanisms,
however, are not ex-post (even weakly) budget balanced, but only ex-ante (strongly) budget balanced.
8. For a distribution D and a value c, we use D|≤c to denote this distribution conditioned upon the drawn value
being at most c, and use D|≥c to denote this distribution conditioned upon the drawn value being at least c.
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2. If b̄ ≤ s and s̄ ≥ b, then the probability that trade occurs in this mechanism is at least as high
as the probability that trade occurs in the RO mechanism with SO parameters ∞ and Db and
BO parameters 0 and Ds .
The proof of Lemma 6.2 is given in Appendix C.2. In a nutshell, part 1 holds since if, e.g., b̄ ≥ s,
then an offer by the buyer will always be accepted by the seller, and part 2 holds since under the
given assumptions, if trade occurs in the unconstrained and unconditioned RO mechanism, then
the price offered there also satisfies all of the extra restrictions of the constrained and conditioned
RO mechanism, and therefore the same price will be offered in that mechanism as well, resulting
in trade there as well.

6.4

Double Auctions

In this section, we present our results for the double-auction setting, in which there are no constraints on which seller can trade with which buyer (i.e., the graph G is the full bipartite graph).
We first show that the RVWM mechanism is not asymptotically efficient, even ex-ante, and then
present our hybrid mechanism for double auctions, which is an ex-post IR, BIC, ex-post weakly
budget balanced mechanism, which ex-ante guarantees a constant fraction of the second-best, and
is ex-post asymptotically efficient.

6.4.1

Asymptotic Inefficiency of the RVWM Mechanism

We first observe that the the RVWM mechanism is not asymptotically efficient for double auctions,
even ex-ante and compared to the second-best.
Example 6.1. Consider a double-auction market with n seller and n buyers, with agents’ values
and costs sampled i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. We claim that even when n is
large, the RVWM mechanism will only give in expectation a constant fraction (strictly smaller than
1) of the expected GFT of the second-best mechanism. In particular, even in a large market, and
even in expectation, the efficiency of the RVWM mechanism with respect to the second best (and
thus also with respect to the first-best) does not converge to full efficiency.
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Proof sketch. We prove Example 6.1 in Appendix C.1, and here we give some intuition. When n is
large, it is easy to observe that in an efficient trade roughly the n/2 lowest-cost sellers (essentially
distributed uniformly in [0, 1/2]) will sell their items to roughly the n/2 highest-value buyers (essentially distributed uniformly in [1/2, 1]), increasing the welfare by about 1/2 in expectation in each
trade, resulting in the first-best having asymptotic expected GFT of about n/4. The second-best
mechanism gets GFT that is in expectation at least the expected GFT of the Trade Reduction
mechanism, so it has asymptotic expected GFT of about n/4 − 1, asymptotically the same as the
first-best mechanism. On the other hand, when a buyer offers an optimized price facing a uniform distribution as in the RVWM mechanism, she offers only half of her value (and similarly, a
seller offers a price that is half-way between her cost and 1). This results in only roughly the n/3
lowest-cost sellers (essentially distributed uniformly in [0, 1/3]) selling their items to roughly the n/3
highest-value buyers (essentially distributed uniformly in [2/3, 1]), increasing the welfare by about
2/3

in expectation in each trade, resulting with asymptotic expected GFT of about

6.4.2

2n/9

< n/4.

A Hybrid Mechanism for Double Auctions

While the RVWM mechanism is not asymptotically efficient, the Trade Reduction (TR) mech1
anism [McA92] is asymptotically efficient as it guarantees, ex-post, an 1 − q(b,s)
fraction of the

first-best GFT, where q(b, s) is the size of the most efficient trade (Theorem 6.3).9 As this mechanism gives no ex-ante guarantee (when q(b, s) = 1), we create a hybrid mechanism that runs the
TR mechanism when q(b, s) > 1 and run the RO mechanism with some constraints and conditional
distributions otherwise. We now present this mechanism.
Definition 6.2 (Hybrid Mechanism for Double Auctions). Our hybrid mechanism for double auctions is a direct revelation mechanism. Given the reports b and s (that are assumed to be truthful),
we use b(1) to denote the buyer10 with maximum value (when breaking ties lexicographically by IDs),
i.e., b(1) ≥ bi for every i ∈ B, and use b(2) to denote the buyer with maximum value after removing
9. If there is a trade with GFT of 0, then there are efficient trades with different sizes. In this case trading according
to the largest size will give full efficiency.
10. Somewhat abusing notation, we use b(1) to refer both to this buyer and to his value, and similarly for other
agents.
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buyer b(1) . Similarly, we use s(1) to denote the seller with minimal cost, and s(2) to denote the
seller with the second-minimal cost.11 The mechanism computes q(b, s) and runs as follows.
• If q(b, s) ≤ 1,12 the mechanism computes the set of trading agents and payments by running
the RO mechanism with SO parameters s̄ = s(2) and DbB(1) |≥b(2) and BO parameters b̄ = b(2)
and DsS(1) |≤s(2) .13
• If q(b, s) ≥ 2, the mechanism computes the set of trading agents and payments by running
the TR mechanism on b and s.
We will now sketch the intuition behind our choice, in the case where q(b, s) = 1, of the
constraints s̄, b̄ and the conditioned distributions DsS(1) |≤s(2) and DbB(1) |≥b(2) for which the offered
prices are optimized. First, we would never want to allow b(1) to pay a price p such that if b(1) had
valuation p then she would not be in the first-best. This is since such a possibility would create
an incentive for her to manipulate her bid if her valuation really were slightly higher than p but
still not high enough for her to be in the first-best: in this case, raising her bid would place her
in the first-best, and she may end up paying p, which would give her positive utility. So, we have
to make sure that b(1) never offers, nor is ever offered, such a p that is lower than b̄ = b(2) . (In
fact, the threshold bid of b(1) to be in the first-best is max{b(2) , s(1) }, but by definition of the RO
mechanism, she would never pay less than s(1) as this would result in negative GFT, so we only
need to make sure that she never pays less than b̄ = b(2) .) To make sure that b(1) never offers such
a price p, we constrain her to offer at least b̄ in the BO mechanism. To make sure that she is never
offered such a price p in the SO mechanism, we have s(1) optimize her offer under the assumption
that the value of b(1) is drawn from DbB(1) |≥b̄ , which is equivalent to disclosing to s(1) that she has
no point in offering a price lower than b̄ since an offer of b̄ will always be accepted. To see why
the mechanism is truthful once we have set b̄ (and s̄) this way, consider the following hypothetical

11. Note that the maximal efficient set of trading agents is s(1) , . . . , sq(b,s) , b(1) , . . . , bq(b,s) .
12.
 Recall that in this case, if there is any trade with positive gains, then the maximal efficient set of trading agents
is s(1) , b(1) .
13. We note that in this case since q(b, s) = 1, we have that b̄ = b(2) < s(2) = s̄ and therefore indeed also
s̄ ≥ sup Support DsS(1) |≤s(2) and b̄ ≤ inf Support DbB(1) |≥b(2) .
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scenario. Say that after calculating that q(b, s) = 1, the mechanism notifies s(1) and b(1) that
they are the lowest-cost seller and highest-cost bidder, and furthermore notifies each of them of the
values (and costs) of all other agents except the one that they are facing. In this case, the posterior
distribution of s(1) regarding b(1) is DbB(1) |≥max{b(2) ,s(1) } , so her best action is to optimize the price
that she offers under this assumption, which is equivalent to optimizing the price that she offers for
the distribution DbB(1) |≥b(2) (but optimizing for the latter is easier to analyze, as it does not depend
on the cost of s(1) ).
Theorem 6.5. For the double auction setting the above simple hybrid mechanism for double auctions is ex-post individually rational, Bayesian incentive compatible, ex-post (direct trade) weakly
budget balanced, and has both of the following efficiency guarantees:
• It gets at least a 1/4-fraction of the efficient gains from trade ex-ante (second-best).
• It gets at least a

q(b,s)−1
q(b,s) -fraction

of the efficient gains from trade ex-post (first-best) . Note

that the mechanism is asymptotically efficient: as the trade size q(b, s) goes to infinity, the
fraction of the efficient gains from trade that it gets ex-post (first-best) goes to 1.

6.4.3

Proof of Theorem 6.5

Proof of theorem 6.5. Recall that by Theorem 6.3 and Lemma 6.1, both the TR and the RO mechanisms are each ex-post IR, BIC, and ex-post (direct trade) weakly budget balanced.

Ex-post IR

Ex-post IR holds since both the TR and the RO mechanisms are ex-post IR.

Bayesian IC We will show that our hybrid mechanism is BIC for any buyer.14 A similar argument
holds for truthfulness of the sellers.
We first claim that if a manipulation by a buyer does not change the choice of the mechanism
that is run (TR or an instance of RO, where we consider each such instance to be a separate
14. In fact, when our hybrid mechanism runs TR, then it is ex-post IC for every agent, and when a price p is offered
by an agent in the RO mechanism, then our hybrid mechanism is Bayesian IC for the agent making the offer, and
ex-post IC for all other agents including the agent who receives the offer.
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mechanism) by our hybrid mechanism, then it is nonbeneficial in expectation. For TR this follows
since TR is ex-post IC. In Appendix C.3.1, we show that this holds also for each instance of the
RO mechanism, by conditioning over the bids and identities of all agents except s(1) and b(1) , and
using both properties of Lemma 6.1.
We now claim that a buyer who is in the efficient trading set cannot change the efficient trading
set while remaining in this set. Indeed, to see that this is the case, suppose a buyer in the efficient
trading misreports by adding x (positive or negative) to his bid. The gains from trade from any
trading set that includes this buyer therefore increase by x (while the gains from trade of any other
trading set remains the same); therefore, since we break ties in the same manner without and with
the deviation, no other trading set that includes this buyer other than the true efficient trading set
can “become” (as a result of the misreport) the new efficient trading set.
Since (1) agents outside the efficient trading set never win, (2) a buyer in the efficient trading
set cannot change the efficient trading set while remaining in this set, (3) the choice of the mechanism to run is completely determined by the efficient trading set and by the values/costs of the
agents outside the efficient trading set, and (4) a manipulation that does not change the choice
of the mechanism to run is nonbeneficial in expectation, we conclude that there are no strategic
opportunities (in expectation) for any buyer who is in the efficient trading set.
To complete the proof that our hybrid mechanism is BIC, it is therefore enough to show that
there is no beneficial manipulation by a buyer who is not in the efficient trading set. We will in
fact show that the mechanism is ex-post IC for such agents; we do so by considering several cases.
• If q(b, s) ≥ 2, then a buyer who is not in the efficient trading set cannot cause a move
to q(b, s) < 2. Any manipulation by such a buyer is therefore nonbeneficial since the TR
mechanism (which is run prior to, and following, the manipulation) is ex-post IC.
• If q(b, s) = 1, then we consider two possible manipulations by some buyer b(j) who is not in
the efficient trading set (and is therefore not the true b(1) ):
– First, consider a manipulation by b(j) that causes a move to q(b, s) ≥ 2 and causes her
to win. We claim that in this case, this buyer, who was previously not in the efficient
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trading set, must pay at least her true value whenever she wins. Indeed, by definition
of TR and since truly q(b, s) = 1, since this buyer wins following the manipulation (and
so is not reduced by the TR mechanism), she pays at least the original b(1) , which is at
least her true value. Therefore, she incurs non-positive utility.
– We next consider a manipulation by b(j) that maintains q(b, s) = 1 and causes her to
win (with some positive probability). We will show that whenever this buyer wins, she
incurs non-positive utility. Since q(b, s) = 1 is maintained following the manipulation,
we must have that b(j) raised her bid to be higher than the original b(1) , who is now in
the role of b(2) . By Lemma 6.1, if the manipulating buyer wins, then she pays at least
the new b(2) , i.e., the original b(1) , which is at least her true value, and so she incurs
non-positive utility.
• Finally, consider the case q(b, s) = 0 and consider a manipulation by any buyer that causes
her to win. Such a manipulation can only result in q(b, s) = 1, so the manipulator, if she
wins, trades with s(1) , and by definition of RO and since this mechanism is ex-post IR for
this seller, this buyer pays at least s(1) . Since q(b, s) = 0, we have that s(1) is larger than the
true valuation of all buyers (including the manipulator), so the manipulator incurs negative
utility whenever she wins.

Ex-post (direct trade) weak budget balance

Our hybrid mechanism is ex-post (direct trade)

weakly budget balanced since the two mechanisms TR and RO are both ex-post (direct trade)
weakly budget balanced (the one is in fact ex-post (direct trade) strongly budget balanced).

Ex-post efficiency guarantee When q(b, s) = 1, then the guarantee vacuously holds, while
when q(b, s) ≥ 2, the guarantee follows from the same guarantee by the TR mechanism.

Ex-ante efficiency guarantee We will show that for each valuation profile (b, s), our hybrid
mechanism achieves at least half of the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism for the same
valuation profile. Fix a valuation profile (b, s). We consider several cases.
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• Consider the case where s(2) ≤ b(2) . Note that this is precisely the case where q(b, s) ≥ 2. In
this case, our hybrid mechanism runs the TR mechanism, which by theorem 6.3 guarantees
at least a

q(b,s)−1
q(b,s)

≥ 1/2 fraction of the realized optimal gains from trade ex-post, and so at

least a 1/2 fraction of the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism.
• Consider the case where s(1) > b(1) . Note that this is precisely the case where q(b, s) = 0. In
this case, it is efficient to have no trade for (b, s), and this is what both our hybrid mechanism
and the RVWM mechanism do, so our hybrid mechanism has the same gains from trade as
the RVWM mechanism.
• Consider the case where b(2) < s(2) , and in addition either b(2) ≥ s(1) or s(2) ≤ b(1) . In this
case, since q(b, s) = 1, we run the RO mechanism. By Lemma 6.2, in this case s(1) and b(1)
trade with probability at least 1/2, so our hybrid mechanism achieves at least a 1/2 fraction of
the realized optimal gains from trade, and so at least a 1/2 fraction of the gains from trade of
the RVWM mechanism.
• Finally, consider the case where b(2) < s(1) ≤ b(1) < s(2) . In this case, the only possible trading
pair with positive gains is of s(1) with b(1) , so if the RVWM mechanism achieves positive gains
from trade, then it trades this pair with positive probability. By observation 6.1, in this case
the GFT of the RVWM mechanism are therefore at least those of the RO mechanism with
B (unconditioned distribution) and BO parameters
SO parameters ∞ (no constraint) and Db(1)

0 (no constraint) and DsS(1) (unconditioned distribution) on that edge. Since s(1) > b(2) = b̄
and b(1) < s(2) = s̄, we have by Lemma 6.2 that the probability that trade occurs between
s(1) and b(1) is at least as high in our hybrid mechanism (which runs the appropriate RO
mechanism, constrained and conditioned) as it is in the unconstrained and unconditioned
RO mechanism (that upper-bounds RVWM in this case). Therefore, in this case our hybrid
mechanism achieves at least the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism.
Combining all of the above, we have that the expected gains from trade of our hybrid mechanism
are at least a 1/2-fraction of those of the RVWM mechanism, and so by theorem 6.4 at least a
1/4-fraction

of the expected optimal gains from trade ex-ante (second-best).
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6.5

Main Results for Matching Markets

In this section we will generalize the results of Section 6.4 to matching markets. Recall that a
matching market is given by an undirected bipartite graph G = (S, B, E) with nodes on one side
representing the sellers and nodes on the other side representing the buyers, with edges indicating
possible trades. Recall that a profile (b, s) assigns a value bi for each buyer i ∈ B and a cost sj for
each seller j ∈ S.

6.5.1

A Trade Reduction Mechanism for Matching Markets

We first present a generalized Trade Reduction mechanism for matching markets. Like the Trade
Reduction mechanism [McA92] for double-auctions, the Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching
markets that we define below picks a subset of the “first-best” trade, and determines the payments
based on the values and costs of the agents that it removed from the first-best. The details are,
however, more subtle than in the double-auction setting.
Recall from Theorem 6.3 that for every valuation profile (b, s), the TR mechanism for double
auctions attains GFT of at least a 1 −

1
q(b,s)

fraction of FB-GFT(b, s). We note that giving the

same guarantee for matching markets, with q(b, s) remaining total the size of trade in the market, is
not possible — just consider a matching market that consists of two connected components, each a
double auction. So, to phrase our TR mechanism for matching markets, we will first have to define
some notation that will eventually help us phrase its GFT guarantee (which will still generalize the
1−

1
q(b,s)

of TR for double auctions, but in a slightly different way).

We say that the classes of buyer i and i0 are the same if for any seller j it holds that (i, j) ∈ E if
and only if (i0 , j) ∈ E. Similarly, we define classes for sellers.15 That is, two agents are of the same
class if in any case that one of them can trade with some agent x, it also holds that the other agent
can trade with agent x. Thus, nodes in the graph can be partitioned into equivalent classes, where
each equivalent class consists of all agents of some fixed class. Each such class either includes only
buyers, or only sellers, but never both. Let Tt denote the set of agents of class t. For each class t
15. Note that the classes that we define depend neither on the values of the buyers nor on the costs of the sellers
(nor on the distributions from which these values/costs are drawn).
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we denote by qt = qt (M (b, s)) the number of agents of class t that are matched in M (b, s), that is
qt = |Tt ∩ M (b, s)|. Additionally, we denote by dt = dt (M (b, s)) the number of distinct classes t0
such that there is an edge in M (b, s) between an agent of class t and an agent of class t0 .
Definition 6.3 (Trade Reduction Mechanism for Matching Markets). Fix a matching market
G = (S, B, E). The Trade Reduction mechanism for G gets as input a profile (b, s) and outputs an
allocation and payments as follows.
• Given profile (b, s), let M (b, s) be the “first-best” matching. Any agent not in M (b, s) is
marked as a loser and does not trade, paying 0.
• For each class t, recall that qt is the number of agent of class t that are matched in M (b, s)
and dt is the number of different classes that trade with agents of class t in M (b, s).
– For each buyer class t, the set of trading buyers will be the set of qt − dt highest-value
buyers of class t (breaking ties lexicographically by IDs).16 We say that dt buyers of class
t were reduced. Each buyer of class t pays the highest value reported by any reduced buyer
of class t.
– For each seller class t, the set of trading sellers will be the set of qt −dt lowest-cost sellers
of class t (breaking ties lexicographically by IDs).17 We say that dt sellers of class t were
reduced. Each buyer of class t is paid the lowest cost reported by any reduced seller of
class t.
We denote the set of agents that are trading under this mechanism by TR(b, s).
The following theorem presents the properties of the Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching
markets. In particular, it shows that the mechanism provides some ex-post GFT guarantees which
is a function of the maximum weight matching M (b, s). As with the TR mechanism for double
auctions, this mechanism does not provide any ex-ante guarantees, though, even with respect to
16. Note that the number of trading buyers is non-negative, as for every class t it holds that qt ≥ dt .
17. Note that the number of trading sellers is non-negative, as for every class t it holds that qt ≥ dt .
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the second-best mechanism. In particular, with a single trade in FB-GFT(b, s), there will be no
trade in this mechanism.
Theorem 6.6. The Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching markets is ex-post IR, ex-post IC,
ex-post (direct trade) weakly budget balanced, and for any (b, s) the fraction of the gains from trade

of FB-GFT(b, s) that it attains is at least min 1 − dqtt class t s.t. qt > 0 .18
We note that guarantee from Theorem 6.6 of the TR mechanism attaining a fraction-of
FB-GFT(b, s) of at least α(b, s) = min 1 − dqtt
class t s.t. qt > 0 coincides in the doubleauction setting with the guarantee of at least 1 −

1
q(b,s)

from Theorem 6.3, and naturally gen-

eralizes it. Another generalization for matching markets of the fraction 1 −

1
q(b,s)

that one may

find natural, which also coincides with it in the double-auction setting, is β(b, s) = min 1 −
1
rt,t0

classes (t, t0 ) s.t. rt,t0 > 0 , where for any buyers’ class t and sellers’ class t0 , we use rt,t0 to

denote the number of buyers of class t that are matched with sellers of class t0 in M (b, s). While
this alternative generalization is conceptually interesting in its own right, we in fact show that for
every valuation profile it holds that β(b, s) ≤ α(b, s), and so a GFT guarantee of β(b, s) follows
from the GFT guarantee of α(b, s) from theorem 6.6:
Corollary 6.1. For any (b, s), the fraction of the GFT of FB-GFT(b, s) that the TR mechanism

for matching markets attains is at least min 1 − r 1 0 classes (t, t0 ) s.t. rt,t0 > 0 .
t,t

The proofs of Theorem 6.6 and corollary 6.1 are given in Appendix C.4.

6.5.2

Offering Mechanism for Matching Markets

Before defining our hybrid mechanism for matching markets, we first define an offering mechanism
for matching markets, analogous to the specific instance of the RO mechanism (including the specific
offer constraints and conditioned distributions) that our hybrid mechanism for double auctions runs
whenever q(b, s) = 1 in that setting. In this mechanism, agents not in M (b, s) never trade, and
18. Note that dt , qt and rt,t0 are all function of M (b, s), so they are functions of the profile (b, s). This is similar
to q(b, s) being a function of (b, s) for Trade Reduction in double auctions.
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agent in a pair (i, j) ∈ M (b, s) either trades in that pair or does not trade at all. This mechanism
is defined as follows.
Definition 6.4 (Offering Mechanism for Matching Markets). The mechanism iterates over all
edges (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), and for each such edge acts as follows.
• Let s̄ = s̄(i,j) (b, s) be the minimal bid of buyer i such that any higher bid causes i to be in the
first-best in the market (S \ {j}, B), i.e., the market without seller j. We set s̄ = ∞ if no
such bid exists.
• Let b̄ = b̄(i,j) (b, s) be the maximal bid (reported cost) of seller j that causes j to be in the
first-best in the market (S, B \ {i}), i.e., the market without buyer i. We set b̄ = 0 if no such
bid exists.
Now, to decide whether trade occurs between i and j and at which price, run the RO mechanism
on this edge with SO parameters s̄ and DiB |≥b̄ and BO parameters b̄ and DjS |≤s̄ .
We note that the above offer constraints s̄ and b̄ precisely generalize the offer constraints from
our hybrid mechanism for double auctions from section 6.4. Indeed, in a double auction, the minimal
bid of buyer b(1) that causes her to be in the first-best in the market (S \ {s(1) }, B) without s(1)
is max{b(2) , s(2) }, and when q(s, b) = 1 in the double-auctions setting (this is the case where we
run the RO mechanism) it must be that b(2) < s(2) and so max{b(2) , s(2) } = s(2) , which how we set
the constraint s̄ in that mechanism. The choice of b̄ is similar. The careful definition of s̄ and b̄
above guarantees the two properties of these thresholds that our double-auction constraints readily
satisfied: first, both b̄ and s̄ are completely independent of bi and of sj , and second, as we will see in
our analysis, b̄ coincides with the minimal winning bid of buyer i in the original market whenever
this constraint is binding. (And similarly for s̄ and seller j.)
To show that the Offering Mechanism is well-defined, we have to make sure that the SO and BO
parameters that we specify for the RO mechanism meet the conditions imposed in the definition of
that mechanism. The following lemma does precisely this.
Lemma 6.3. For every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), it holds that (1) s̄ ≥ sj , (2) b̄ ≤ bi , and (3) s̄ ≥ b̄.
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We next prove that the Offering Mechanism is truthful, budget balanced, and has an ex-ante
guarantee.
Theorem 6.7. The Offering Mechanism is BIC, ex-post IR, ex-post (direct trade) strongly budget
balanced, and ex-ante guarantees at least a 1/4 of the expected GFT of the second-best mechanism.
The proofs of Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.7 is given in Appendix C.6. As noted in the introduction, proving the ex-ante guarantee of the Offering Mechanism for matching markets is the
most technically challenging part of our analysis. The main ideas behind this proof are surveyed
in Section 6.6.

6.5.3

Hybrid Mechanism for Matching Markets

We are now ready to define our hybrid mechanism for matching markets. It combines the TR
mechanism and the Offering Mechanism in a proper way. We note that for double auctions, the
mechanism defined below reduces precisely to our hybrid mechanism for double auctions from
Section 6.4.
Definition 6.5 (Hybrid Mechanism for Matching Markets). Let G = (S, B, E) be the constraints
graph. Our hybrid mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism. Given the the reports (b, s) (which
o
n
is assumed to be truthful), the mechanism computes M (b, s) and α(b, s) = min 1− dqtt class t s.t. qt > 0
and runs as follows.
• If α(b, s) ≥ 1/2, the mechanism computes the set of trading agents and payments by running
the Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching markets defined above.
• Otherwise, the mechanism computes the set of trading agents and payments by running the
Offering Mechanism for matching markets defined above.
We are now ready to formally state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 6.8. The Hybrid Mechanism for matching markets is ex-post IR, BIC and ex-post (direct
trade) weakly budget balanced, which satisfies both of the following.
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• The expected GFT of this mechanism are at least 1/4 of those of the second-best mechanism.
• For any (b, s) with α(b, s) ≥ 1/2, the fraction of the gains from trade of FB-GFT(b, s) that
this mechanism attains is at least α(b, s) ≥ 1/2.
The hybrid mechanism for matching markets inherits from the Trade Reduction mechanism for
matching markets also the ex-post guarantee of Corollary 6.1:

Corollary 6.2. Let β(b, s) = min 1 −

1
rt,t0

classes (t, t0 ) s.t. rt,t0 > 0 . For any (b, s) with

β(b, s) ≥ 1/2, the fraction of the gains from trade of FB-GFT(b, s) that the Hybrid Mechanism
for matching markets attains is at least β(b, s) ≥ 1/2.
The proofs of theorem 6.8 and corollary 6.2 are given in Appendix C.7.

6.6

Sketch of the Proof of Ex-Ante Guarantee of the Offering
Mechanism for Matching Markets

In this section, we sketch the proof of the ex-ante guarantee of the Offering Mechanism, which
has been stated in Theorem 6.7. The full proof is relegated to Appendix C.6. To prove that
the Offering Mechanism ex-ante guarantees at least a 1/4-fraction of the gains from trade of the
second-best mechanism, we compare the Offering Mechanism to the RVWM mechanism. Due to
Theorem 6.4, it suffices to show the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4. For any valuation profile (b, s), the gains from trade of the Offering Mechanism for
matching markets is at least half of the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism for that profile.
We first provide the intuition behind Lemma 6.4. Fix a valuation profile (b, s). Let M1∗ =
M1∗ (b, s) be the maximum-weight matching of G when edge weight is ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj for (i, j) ∈ E
and M2∗ = M2∗ (b, s) be the maximum-weight matching of G when edge weight is bi − τ̃j (sj ) for
(i, j) ∈ E.19 The RVWM mechanism runs the Generalized Seller Offering Mechanism (GSO) with
probability 1/2 and in that case obtains the GFT of the matching M1∗ , and it runs the Generalized
19. ϕ̃i and τ̃j are the ironed virtual value functions of buyer i and seller j, respectively.
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Buyer Offering Mechanism (GBO) with probability 1/2 and in that case obtains the GFT of the
matching M2∗ . See Definition 5.3 for the formal definition of GSO and GBO. It suffices to show
that the GFT of each of the two matchings M1∗ and M2∗ can be bounded by twice the GFT of the
Offering Mechanism for the valuation profile (b, s). We will show how to bound the GFT of M1∗ .
A similar argument can bound the GFT of M2∗ .
Consider the first-best matching M = M (b, s) together with the matching M1∗ . Each connected
component of the union of the two matchings M ∪ M1∗ is either a maximal alternating path20 or
an alternating cycle21 . We will show that all alternating cycles consist of two edges between the
same seller and buyer (see Figure 6.1 (a) ) due to our tie-breaking rules (proved in Corollary C.2)
and that the GFT of the Offering Mechanism from that buyer-seller pair is at least the GFT of
the RVWM mechanism from that pair. For an alternating path, we will consider the cases of an
even or an odd number of edges of the alternating path separately, and show that in either case,
the GFT of our Offering Mechanism from the path is at least half of the GFT of the matching
M1∗ from that path. Given the fact that M and M1∗ are each a maximum-weight matching w.r.t.
the edge weights bi − sj and ϕ̃i (bi ) − sj respectively, we prove that any maximal alternating path
that is not a cycle, starts with a buyer and an edge from M . See Corollary C.3 for more details.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the three different cases in our proof.
The following lemma plays a central role in our proof of Lemma 6.4. It provides a sufficient
condition for a buyer-seller pair to trade in that mechanism.
Lemma 6.5. Fix valuation profile (b, s). For every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), if j is in M−i (b, s) then buyer
i will trade with seller j in the BO Mechanism, and if i is in M−j (b, s) then buyer i will trade with
seller j in the SO Mechanism. Thus, in either case i and j will trade with probability at least 1/2
in the Offering Mechanism.
The next lemma shows that any seller who is not at the end of any alternating path, must still
be in the first-best matching if we remove the buyer that is matched to her.
20. A path is called an alternating path if the edges of the path alternate between the two matchings. A path is
maximal if it is not a subpath of any other path.
21. An alternating cycle is an alternating path whose two endpoints coincide.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 6.1: Example of the three different cases considered in the proof of the ex-ante guarantee: (a)
alternating cycle; (b) maximal alternating path with even number of edges; (c) maximal alternating
path with odd number of edges.
Lemma 6.6. Let A be an acyclic maximal alternating path of M (b, s) ∪ M1∗ (b, s). For every seller
j ∈ A who is not at the end of the path, it holds that j ∈ M−i (b, s), where i is the buyer such that
(i, j) ∈ M (b, s).
Combining Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.5, we show that all sellers in a maximal alternating path
of even length will trade in the BO mechanism with the buyers that are matched to them in the
first-best matching.
Next, we consider maximal alternating paths with odd length and present another useful characterization. We assume w.l.o.g. that any maximal alternating path of M ∪ M1∗ starts with a buyer
and an edge in M (by Corollary C.3). Let GF TM 0 (U ) be the GFT of all edges of M 0 that are
contained in U .
Lemma 6.7. For K > 3, let A = (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL jL ), be a maximal alternating path of odd
number of edges of M ∪ M1∗ with il denoting buyers and jl denoting sellers, and with (i1 , j1 ) ∈ M .
It holds that
• if biL > bi1 then iL ∈ M−jL .
• if biL ≤ bi1 then GF TM (A \ {iL , jL }) ≥ GF TM1∗ (A).
Proof of Lemma 6.4. By Corollary C.2, any alternating cycle of M and M1∗ has only two (identical)
undirected edges (i, j) ∈ M ∩ M1∗ . If j ∈ M−i (b, s) or i ∈ M−j (b, s), by Lemma 6.5 buyer i will
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trade with seller j in the Offering Mechanism with probability at least 1/2, which obtains at least
half of the GFT that the RVWM mechanism obtains on (i, j) ∈ M1∗ when the profile is (b, s).
Otherwise, since i ∈
/ M−j we have that s̄ ≥ bi , and since j ∈
/ M−i we have that b̄ ≤ sj . Since
trade occurs with positive probability on (i, j) in the RVWM mechanism, then similarly to the
double-auction case, by Observation 6.1, our Offering Mechanism achieves at least the gains from
trade of the RVWM mechanism on this edge (and therefore, on any alternating cycle).
Consider any maximal alternating path of even number of edges. By Lemma 6.5 and Lemma 6.6,
every pair (i, j) ∈ M trades in the BO mechanism, so whenever the BO mechanism runs, the
maximal GFT (first-best) of the agents in the alternating path, which is at least the GFT of M1∗
from these agents, is obtained. The Offering Mechanism runs the BO mechanism is probability 1/2,
so in expectation it obtains at least 1/2 the GFT of M1∗ from this path.
Now consider any maximal alternating path (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL jL ) of odd number of (at
least 3)22 edges, which starts with buyer i1 and an edge from M . Here L ≥ 2. By Lemma 6.5 and
Lemma 6.6, for every l = 1, 2, . . . , L − 1, buyer il will trade with seller jl in the BO mechanism. If
bi1 ≥ biL , the claim holds since by Lemma 6.7 the GFT of M1∗ from this path is at most the GFT
of the first L−1 pairs in the first-best matching M , and all these L−1 pairs will be traded in the
BO mechanism, which happens with probability 1/2.
If bi1 < biL , by Lemma 6.5 and Lemma 6.7, buyer iL will trade with seller jL in the SO
mechanism, which happens with probability 1/2. Therefore, every pair (i, j) ∈ M is traded with
probability at least 1/2. This obtains half the maximal GFT (first-best) of this path, which is at
least half the GFT of M1∗ in this path.
Similarly, we can show that the Offering Mechanisms obtains at least 1/2 of the GFT of M2∗ .
Since the expected GFT of the RVWM mechanism is the average GFT of M1∗ and M2∗ , we conclude
that the Offering Mechanisms obtains at least 1/2 the GFT of the RVWM mechanism.
22. If there is a single edge, then it is only in M . We only need to cover edges in M1∗ .
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6.7

Discussion

One of the biggest pushbacks against constant-approximation mechanisms is that while they provide some worst-case guarantee, they often do not provide any guarantee for significantly better
performance “when the instances are easy to handle”. We believe that a mechanism that not only
provides a worst-case guarantee, but also provides a guarantee of performing very well on “easy
instances” is much more appealing and more likely to be used. In our setting, we implement this
agenda by postulating that “nice instances” are large-market instances (for some formal sense of
“large”), and we are able to achieve the best of both worlds: a guaranteed constant approximation
on one hand, and asymptotic optimality when the markets are large on the other hand. We believe
that presenting similar results in other settings is an interesting research direction.
Mechanisms with such “worse-case and best-case guarantees” are of particular appeal when the
social planner needs to fix the mechanism well before the exact market characteristics are known,
for example, when the mechanism is defined by some laws or regulations (e.g., FCC auctions) that
are fixed well in advance.
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Chapter 7

Multi-Dimensional Two-sided
Markets
In this chapter we move on to multi-dimensional settings in two-sided markets. We focus on a
special setting with multiple unit-supply sellers and a single constrained-additive buyer. We design
simple, truthful and budget balanced mechanism to achieve an unconditional approximation to the
second-best GFT.
In Section 7.1, we give an overview of the results and techniques covered in this chapter. In
Section 7.2 we introduce the notations used in this chapter. In Section 7.3 we present a distributionparameterized approximation to the first-best GFT. In Section 7.4, we prove an unconditional
approximation to the second-best GFT, using results from Section 7.3. In Section 7.5 we draw a
connection between a lower bound to our analysis and one of the major open problems in a special
matching market. In Section 7.6 we present some examples toward the lower bound of our analysis.

7.1

Overview of Results and Techniques

We focus on a setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller i,
and there is a constrained-additive buyer with feasibility constraint F. The first main result is a
distribution-parameterized approximation to the first-best GFT.
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Result 1. There is a fixed posted price mechanism whose GFT is an O( log(1/r)
)-approximation to
δη
the first-best GFT when the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable (Definition 2.5), and
an O(log(n) · log(1/r))-approximation for a general constrained-additive buyer. r is a distributional
parameter: the minimum trade probability over all items. We define the trade probability of item
i as the probability that the buyer’s value for i exceeds the seller’s cost.
As shown in Section 2.7, many familiar feasibility constraints such as matroid, matching, knapsack, and the compositions of each, are known to be (δ, η)-selectable with constant δ and η [FSZ16],
so our result provides an O(log(1/r))-approximation for all of these environments. The main takeaway from Result 1 is that there is an O(log(1/r))-approximation to the first-best GFT for the
feasibility constraints stated above. Next we introduce the class of fixed posted price mechanisms.
Fixed Posted Price (FPP): In a fixed posted price mechanism, there is a collection of fixed

prices (θiB , θiS ) i∈[n] , where θiB ≥ θiS for each item i. Let R be the set of sellers that are willing to
sell their item at price θiS . The buyer can purchase any item i in R at price θiB . Trade only occurs
when the buyer wants to buy the item and the seller is willing to sell it.
Our result is a generalization of the result by Colini-Baldeschi et al. [CBGdK+ 17], where they
provide the same approximation using a fixed posted price mechanism for bilateral trade. Importantly, our approximation ratio has the optimal dependence on r up to a constant factor. Example 7.1 (adapted from an example by Blumrosen and Dobzinski [BD16]) in Section 7.6 shows that,
for any r > 0, there is an instance of our problem with minimum trade probability r such that
no fixed posted price mechanism can achieve more than a

c
log(1/r) -fraction

of even the second-best

GFT for some absolute constant c. In our fixed posted price mechanism, we allow θiB to be strictly
greater than θiS . This is crucial for our analysis, but makes the mechanism only ex-post weakly
budget balanced. We leave it as an interesting open question as to whether our approximation
ratio can be achieved by an ex-post strongly budget balanced fixed posted price mechanism.
When the trade probability of each item is not too low, our first result provides a good approximation to the first-best GFT using a simple fixed posted price mechanism. However, r can
be arbitrarily small in the worst-case, making our approximation too large to be useful. Is it pos-
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sible to produce an unconditional worst-case approximation guarantee? We provide an affirmative
answer to this question with an unconditional O(log n)-approximation to the second-best GFT.
Result 2. There is a dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post IR, and BB mechδη
anism whose GFT is at least Ω( log
n )-fraction of the second-best GFT when the buyer’s feasibility

constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable, and at least Ω( log21(n) )-fraction of the second-best GFT when the
buyer is general constrained-additive.
As we show in Example 7.1, no fixed posted price mechanism can provide such a guarantee. We
develop two new mechanisms. The first one is a multi-dimensional extension of the Generalized
Buyer Offering Mechanism (Definition 5.3). We provide a full description of the mechanism in
Section 7.4.2. The second mechanism is a generalization of the fixed posted price mechanism that
we call the Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism.
Seller Adjusted Posted Price (SAPP): The sellers report their costs s. The mechanism maps
the cost profile to a collection of posted prices {θi (s)}i∈[n] for the buyer. The buyer can purchase
at most one item, and pays price θi (s) if she buys item i. An item trades if the buyer decides to
purchase that item.
The main advantage of using a SAPP mechanism is that it provides the flexibility to set
prices based on the sellers’ costs, which allows a SAPP mechanism to achieve GFT that can be
unboundedly higher than the GFT attainable by even the best fixed posted price mechanism (see
Example 7.2). Example 7.3 in Section 7.6 shows that the class of SAPP mechanisms is necessary
to obtain any finite approximation ratio to the second-best: both the best FPP mechanisms and
the Generalized Buyer Offering Mechanism have an unbounded gap compared to the second-best
GFT, even in the bilateral trade setting.
An astute reader may have already realized that the payments to the sellers are not yet defined in
the SAPP mechanism. This is because the allocation rule of a SAPP mechanism is not necessarily
monotone in the sellers’ costs if the mappings {θi (·)}i∈[n] are not chosen carefully. Interestingly,
we show that if the mappings {θi (·)}i∈[n] satisfy a strong type of monotonicity that we call bimonotonicity (Definition 7.1), then the allocation rule is indeed monotone in each seller’s reported
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cost. Since the sellers are single-dimensional, we can apply Myerson’s payment identity to design
an incentive compatible payment rule. The final property we need to establish is budget balance,
which turns out to be the major technical challenge for us. We provide more details and intuition
about our solution to this challenge in the discussion of the techniques.
In Section 7.5, we draw a connection between a lower bound to our analysis and one of the major
open problems in single dimensional two-sided markets. We prove a reduction from approximating
the first-best GFT in the unit-demand setting to bounding the gap between the first-best and
second-best GFT in a related single-dimensional setting (Theorem 7.4). If in the latter market, the
gap between first-best and second-best GFT is at most c, then our mechanism is a 2c-approximation
to the first-best GFT in the former market.

7.1.1

Our Approach and Techniques

1. log(1/r)-Approximation (Section 7.3): Our starting point is similar to Colini-Baldeschi et
al. [CBGdK+ 17]. We first argue that the probability space of each item i can be partitioned into
O(log(1/r)) events {Eij }j∈[log(2/r)] , such that in each event Eij , the median of the buyer’s value bi
for item i dominates the median of the i-th seller’s cost si . The first-best GFT is upper bounded
by the sum of the contribution to GFT from each of these events. In bilateral trade, simply setting
the posted price to be the median of the buyer’s value is sufficient to obtain 1/2 of the optimal
GFT from Eij as shown by McAfee [McA08]. The log(1/r)-approximation by Colini-Baldeschi et
al. [CBGdK+ 17] essentially follows from this argument.
To illustrate the added difficulty from multiple items, it suffices to consider a unit-demand
buyer. Setting the posted price on each item to be the median of the buyer’s value does not provide
a good approximation, because the buyer will purchase the item that gives her the highest surplus,
which could be very different from the item that generates the most GFT. Similar scenarios are
not uncommon in multi-dimensional auction design, and prophet inequalities [KW12, KS78] have
been proven to be effective in addressing similar challenges. The main barrier for applying the
prophet inequality to two-sided markets is choosing the appropriate random variable as the reward
for the prophet/gambler. It is not obvious how to choose a random variable that will translate to a
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two-sided market mechanism, and in fact, for some choices, no translation between the thresholding
policy for the gambler and a two-sided market mechanism is possible.1 Our key insight is to replace
event Eij with a related but different event E ij where there is a fixed number θij such that si and
bi are always separated by θij (si ≤ θij ≤ bi ). We further show that the GFT contribution from
event E ij is at least half of the GFT contribution from Eij . Importantly, the GFT contributed by
item i in event E ij : (bi − si )+

2

= (bi − θij )+ · 1[si ≤ θij ] + (θij − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ]. Note that if

we replace E ij with Eij , the LHS can exceed the RHS when θij > bi > si . The decomposition of
(bi − si )+ using θij is critical for us to apply the prophet inequality. We can now choose the reward
for the gambler to be vi = (θij − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ], and the thresholding policy with a threshold T
can be implemented with a posted price mechanism where the price for the buyer is θij and the
price for the seller is θij − T .3
When the buyer’s feasibility constraint is general downward-closed, the only known prophet
inequalities are due to Rubinstein [Rub16] and are O(log n)-competitive. Unfortunately, the prophet
inequalities in [Rub16] are highly adaptive, and thus cannot translate into prices for a single buyer.
Further, an almost matching lower bound of O(log n/ log log n) is shown by Babaioff et al. [BIK07],
precluding much possible improvement for this approach. Instead, we use a constrained fixed posted
price mechanism that forces the buyer to buy at least h items (at their posted prices) if she wants
to buy any; otherwise, she must leave with nothing. We divide the same variables vi into O(log m)
buckets based on their contribution to seller surplus. Within each bucket k, all variables vi lie in
[Lk , 2Lk ] for some Lk . We prove a concentration inequality for the maximum size of a feasible and
affordable set. It guarantees that with constant probability, the buyer will be willing to purchase
at least h items (for an appropriate choice of h), generating sufficient GFT.
1. For example, one can choose the GFT from the ith item (bi − si )+ as the reward of the ith round, but no fixed
posted price mechanism corresponds to the policy that only accepts items whose GFT is above a certain threshold.
Indeed, no BIC, IR, and BB mechanism can implement a thresholding policy with threshold 0 due to the impossibility
result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83].
2. x+ = max{x, 0}.
3. A similar fixed posted price mechanism can take care of (bi − θij )+ · 1[si ≤ θij ].
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2. Benchmark of the Second-Best GFT (Section 7.4.1):

As our goal is to obtain a bench-

mark of the second-best GFT that is unconditional, the benchmark from the previous (distributionparameterized) result cannot be used here. We derive a novel benchmark in two steps. Step (i): we
create two imaginary one-sided markets: the super seller auction and the super buyer procurement
auction. We show that the second-best GFT of the two-sided market is upper bounded by the optimal profit from the super seller auction and the optimal buyer utility from the super buyer procurement auction. Step (ii): we provide an extension of the marginal mechanism lemma [HN12, CH13]
to the optimal profit. We show that the optimal profit for selling all items in [m] is upper bounded
by the first-best GFT from items in T and the optimal profit for selling items in [n]\T , where T is
an arbitrary subset of [n]. Our key insight is to choose T to be the “likely to trade” items, which
are the ones with trade probability at least 1/n, and apply the marginal mechanism lemma. This
partition allows us to use our first result to provide an O(log n)-approximation to the first-best
GFT of the “likely to trade” items using a fixed posted price mechanism. Moreover, we prove
that the optimal buyer utility from the super buyer procurement auction is upper bounded by the
GFT of an extension of the “generalized buyer offering mechanism” [BCWZ17]. Finally, we provide
an O(log n)-approximation to the optimal profit for selling the “unlikely to trade” items using a
SAPP mechanism. Note that the approximation crucially relies on the fact that in expectation at
most one item can trade among the “unlikely to trade” items.

3. Budget Balance of Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanisms (Section 7.4.3):

As

mentioned earlier, we restrict our attention to bi-monotonic mappings from cost profiles to buyer
prices {θi (·)}i∈[n] to guarantee incentive-compatibility. However, budget balance does not follow from bi-monotonic mappings. We extend the definition of bi-monotonicity to allocation rules
and show that all bi-monotonic allocation rules can be transformed into a DSIC, IR, and BB
SAPP mechanism. In our proof of the budget balance property, we identify an auxiliary allocation
rule q, which may not be implementable by a BB mechanism. We then show that the allocation
rule of our SAPP mechanism is “coupled” with q. In particular, our allocation probability is always between q/4 and q/2. The upper bound q/2 allows us to upper bound the payment to the
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seller, and the lower bound q/4 allows us to lower bound the payment we collect from the buyer.
Surprisingly, we can prove that the upper bound of the payment to the seller is no more than the
lower bound of the buyer’s payment. We suspect this type of allocation coupling argument may
also be useful in other problems.

7.2

Notations in This Chapter

Two-sided Markets.

We focus on two-sided markets between a single buyer and n unit-supply

sellers. Every seller i sells a heterogeneous item. For simplicity we denote the item sold by seller
i as item i. Each seller i has cost si for producing item i, where si is drawn independently from
distribution DiS . The buyer has value bi for every item i where bi is drawn independently from
distribution DiB . DiS and DiB are public knowledge. Let DB = ×ni=1 DiB be the distribution of
the buyer’s value profile and DS = ×ni=1 DiS be the distribution of the cost profile for all sellers.
Let b = (b1 , ..., bn ) and s = (s1 , ..., sn ) denote the value (or cost) profile for the buyer and all
sellers. For notational convenience, for every i we denote b−i (or s−i ) to be the value (or cost)
profile without item i. For every i, Fi , fi (or Gi , gi ) denote the cumulative distribution function
and density function of DiB (or DiS ). Throughout this chapter we assume that all distributions
are continuous over their support, and so the inverse cumulative functions Fi−1 and G−1
exist.4
i
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the buyer has a constrained-additive valuation over the
items (Definition 2.1). We denote F the downward-closed feasibility constraint of her valuation.

Mechanism and Constraints. Any mechanism in the two-sided market defined above is specified by the tuple (x, pB , pS ) where x is the allocation rule of the mechanism and pB , pS are the
payment rules. For every profile (b, s) and every i, xi (b, s) is the probability that the buyer trades
with seller i under profile (b, s). pB (b, s) is the payment from the buyer and pSi (b, s) is the gains
4. Any discrete distribution can be made continuous by replacing each point mass a with a uniform distribution
on [a − , a + ], for arbitrarily small . Thus our result applies to discrete distributions as well by losing arbitrarily
small GFT.
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for (or payment to) seller i. All agents in the market have linear utility functions.5

Gains from Trade. We aim to maximize the Gains from Trade (GFT), i.e. the gains of social
welfare induced by the mechanism. Formally, given a mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ), the expected
GFT of M is
P
GFT(M ) = Eb∼DB ,s∼DS [ ni=1 xi (b, s) · (bi − si )] .
We use SB-GFT to denote the optimal GFT attainable by any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism (also known as the “second-best” mechanism). Let FB-GFT denote the maximum possible
gains of social welfare among all feasible allocations (known as the “first-best”). Formally



P
FB-GFT = Eb∼DB ,s∼DS maxS∈F i∈S (bi − si ) .

In Section 7.3, the distribution-parameterized approximation uses the parameter r, the minimum probability over all items i that the buyer’s value for item i is at least seller i’s cost. Formally,
for every item i ∈ [m], let ri = Prbi ∼DB ,si ∼DS [bi ≥ si ] denote the probability that the buyer’s value
i

i

for item i exceeds seller i’s cost. Without loss of generality, assume that ri > 0 for all i ∈ [n].6 Let
r = mini∈[n] ri > 0.

7.3

A Distribution-Parameterized Approximation

In this section, we present an O( log(1/r)
)-approximation to FB-GFT when the buyer’s feasibility
δη
constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable, and an O(log(n) · log( 1r ))-approximation for a general constrainedadditive buyer. In Section 7.3.1, we show that FB-GFT can be bounded by the sum of four
separate terms. In Section 7.3.2 we show that two of the terms (“buyer surplus”) are relatively
5. Without loss of generality we can assume that the mechanism will only allow the buyer to trade with a (possibly
randomized) set S of sellers
where S ∈ F . For any trading set T , let S ∗ denote the utility-maximizing feasible subset,
P
S ∗ = argmaxS∈F ,S⊆T i∈S bi . If we only allow the buyer to trade with the sellers in S ∗ instead of all of T , the gains
from trade of the mechanism will not decrease.
6. If ri = 0 the mechanism should never trade between the buyer and seller i, and so it can remove seller i from
the market. This will not decrease the GFT of the mechanism as bi < si with probability 1.
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easy to bound using fixed posted price (FPP) mechanisms with the same prices posted on both sides.
In Section 7.3.3, we consider the special case of a unit-demand buyer and bound the other two terms
(“seller surplus”) using FPP mechanisms combined with the prophet inequality. In Section 7.3.4,
we bound the seller surplus for any selectable feasibility constraint by using a constrained FPP
mechanism. In Section 7.3.5, we present our result for a general constrained-additive buyer.

7.3.1

Upper Bound of FB-GFT.

For every i, let Fi = 1 − Fi denote the complementary CDF of bi . Let xi and yi be the
the buyer’s and seller’s distribution for item i, respectively. Formally, xi = Fi

ri
2 -quantile

−1 ri
( 2 ), yi

of

= Gi−1 ( r2i ).

We first prove that xi ≥ yi .
Lemma 7.1. For every i ∈ [n], xi ≥ yi .
Proof. Note that for every i ∈ [n], bi < xi ∧ si > xi implies that bi < si . We have

1 − ri =

Pr

bi ∼DiB ,si ∼DiS

= (1 −

[bi < si ] ≥ Pr [bi < xi ∧ si > xi ]
bi ,si

ri
) · (1 − Pr[si ≤ xi ]).
si
2

Suppose xi < yi . Then (1 − r2i ) · (1 − Prsi [si ≤ xi ]) ≥ (1 − r2i )2 > 1 − ri . This is a contradiction.
Thus xi ≥ yi .
In the following upper bound, we will separate the probability space for each item i into
2dlog(2/r)e events, and then divide the GFT into buyer surplus and seller surplus terms according to the cutoff for each event. For every b, s, define the feasible set that maximizes the GFT
P
as S ∗ (b, s) = argmaxS∈F k∈S (bk − sk ), and break ties arbitrarily. Observe the following upper
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bound for the first-best GFT:

FB-GFT = Eb,s [max
S∈F

X
(bi − si )+ ]
i∈S

P
≤Eb,s [ i (bi − si ) · 1[i ∈ S ∗ (b, s)] · 1[bi ≥ si ∧ si < xi ]]
P
+Eb,s [ i (bi − si ) · 1[i ∈ S ∗ (b, s)] · 1[bi ≥ si ≥ yi ]] ,
where the inequality holds because xi ≥ yi for all i. We refer to the two terms of RHS as 1 and 2
accordingly. We first consider term 1 . For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , dlog( 2r )e, let θij = Fi
Let Eij be the event that Fi
dlog( r2 )e

1 ≤

P

j=1

Eb,s [

P

i (bi

−1

1
( 2j−1
) ≤ si ≤ Fi

−1 1
( 2j )

∧ bi ≥ Fi

−1

−1 1
( 2j ).

1
( 2j−1
). Then we have

− si )+ · 1[i ∈ S ∗ (b, s) ∧ Eij ]].

As discussed in Section 7.1.1, in order to bound the benchmark with fixed posted price mechanisms, we will consider a more restrictive event E ij and show that the GFT contribution from
event E ij is at least half of the GFT contribution from Eij .
Lemma 7.2. For every i, j, let E ij be the event that Fi

−1

1
( 2j−1
) ≤ si ≤ Fi

−1 1
( 2j )

∧ bi ≥ Fi

−1 1
( 2j ).

Then the following inequality holds for every j = 1, . . . , dlog(2/r)e:

P
Eb,s [ i (bi − si )+ · 1[i ∈ S ∗ (b, s) ∧ Eij ]]
P

+
∗
≤2 · Eb,s
i (bi − si ) · 1[i ∈ S (b, s) ∧ E ij ] .

Moreover,
dlog(2/r)e

1 ≤2·

X

"
Eb,s

S∈F

j=1
dlog(2/r)e

+2·

X

#
X
max
(bi − θij )+ · 1[si ≤ θij ]
i∈S

#

"
X
max
(θij − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ θij ]

Eb,s

S∈F

j=1

.

i∈S

We will refer to the two terms of RHS as 3 and 4 accordingly.
Readers may notice that Pr[E ij ] =

1
2

· Pr[Eij ]. However, this alone does not prove the first
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statement of Lemma 7.2, since both the indicator 1[Eij ] and the contributed GFT (bi − si )+ · 1[i ∈
S ∗ (b, s)] depend on the realization of bi , si . In Lemma 7.2 we show that the two random variables
are positively correlated with respect to bi , which allows us to prove the first statement. The second
statement follows from the fact that (bi − si )+ ≤ (bi − θij )+ + (θij − si )+ for every bi , si , and that
S ∗ (b, s) ∈ F for every b, s.
In Lemma 7.3, we bound term 2 in a similar way. The proof of Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3 can be
found in Appendix D.1.
0 = G−1 ( 1 ). Then
Lemma 7.3. For every i ∈ [n] and j = 1, . . . , dlog(2/r)e, let θij
i
2j
dlog(2/r)e

2 ≤2·

X
0 +
0
(bi − θij
) · 1[si ≤ θij
]
max

Eb,s

S∈F

j=1
dlog(2/r)e

+2·

X

#

"

X

i∈S

#

"
Eb,s

j=1

X
0
0
max
(θij
− si )+ · 1[bi ≥ θij
]
S∈F

.

i∈S

We will refer to the two terms of RHS as 5 and 6 accordingly.
We refer to terms 3 and 5 as buyer surplus, and 4 and 6 as seller surplus. In the rest of
this section we will bound each term separately.

7.3.2

Bounding Buyer Surplus.

We bound terms 3 and 5 using fixed posted price mechanisms. Let GFTFPP denote the optimal GFT among all fixed posted price mechanisms. Recall that our market is not symmetric: a
single multi-dimensional buyer with a feasibility constraint faces multiple single-dimensional sellers. As a result, even for the general constrained-additive buyer, bounding buyer surplus is fairly
0 ) for each
straightforward using fixed price mechanisms that set θiS = θiB = θij (or θiS = θiB = θij

term.
Lemma 7.4. For any {pi }i∈[n] ∈ Rn+ ,
"

#

Eb,s max
S∈F

X

{(bi − pi )+ · 1[si ≤ pi ]} ≤ GFTFPP .

i∈S
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Thus both 3 and 5 are upper bounded by O(log( 1r )) · GFTFPP .
Proof. Consider the fixed posted price mechanism M with θiS = θiB = pi . For every s, let A(s) =
{i ∈ [n] | si ≤ pi } be the set of available items. Then the buyer will choose the best set S ⊆
P
A(s), S ∈ F that maximizes i∈S (bi − pi )+ (and not buy any item if bi − pi ≤ 0 for all i). Thus
P
P
the gains from trade i∈S (bi − si ) is at least i∈S (bi − pi )+ ≥ 0. We have
"
GFT(M) ≥Eb,s

#
X

max
S⊆A(s),S∈F

(bi − pi )+

i∈S

"

#

=Eb,s max
S∈F

X

(bi − pi )+ · 1[si ≤ pi ]

.

i∈S

0 ).
To bound terms 3 and 5 , just apply the above inequality with pi = θij (or θij

7.3.3

Bounding Seller Surplus for One Unit-Demand Buyer.

In the remainder of this section, we will bound the seller surplus terms ( 4 and 6 ). As a warm-up,
we first focus on the case where the buyer is unit-demand, i.e. the buyer is only interested in at
most one item. Here, the prophet inequality suffices for our bound.
Lemma 7.5. When the buyer is unit-demand, for any {pi }i∈[n] ∈ Rn+ , we have
Eb,s [maxi {(pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]}] ≤ 2 · GFTFPP .
Hence terms 4 and 6 are both upper-bounded by O(log( 1r )) · GFTFPP .
Proof. For every i, let vi = (pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ] be a random variable that depends on bi and
si . Let v = {vi }i∈[n] . Let Vi be the distribution of vi where bi ∼ DiB , si ∼ DiS , and V = ×ni=1 Vi
be the distribution of v. Then the LHS of the inequality in the Lemma statement is equal to
Ev∼V [maxi vi ].
Consider any threshold ξ > 0. Observe that vi ≥ ξ if and only if bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ ξ. Consider
the fixed posted price mechanism M with θiB = pi and θiS = pi − ξ for every i ∈ [n]. Whenever
the buyer purchases some item i, we must have bi ≥ pi (the buyer buys) and si ≤ pi − ξ (the seller
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sells), and the contributed GFT satisfies bi − si ≥ pi − si ≥ ξ. In addition, the buyer will purchase
some item if and only if there exists some i such that vi ≥ ξ. Therefore we can apply the prophet
inequality [KW12, KS78, SC+ 84] with threshold ξ =

1
2

· Ev∼V [maxi vi ] to ensure that the GFT of

mechanism M is at least 21 Ev∼V [maxi vi ].

7.3.4

Bounding Seller Surplus with Selectability.

In this subsection we bound terms 4 and 6 for a more general class of constraints F using a
variant of a fixed posted price (FPP) mechanism which we call constrained FPP. In the variant,
the mechanism determines a (randomized) subconstraint F 0 ⊆ F upfront. Then the buyer is only
allowed to take a feasible set in F 0 (among all items that the sellers agree to sell at prices {θiS }i∈[n] )
and pays the price θiB for each item she takes.7 Let GFTCFPP denote the the optimal GFT
among all constrained FPP mechanisms.8 Since all of the posted prices as well as the subconstraint
are independent from the agents’ reported profiles, the mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR. The
mechanism is also ex-post WBB since θiB ≥ θiS for all i ∈ [n].
To prove our result, we prove the following lemma that is adapted from [FSZ16] and connects
(δ, η)-selectability to constrained FPP mechanisms. Once again, the OCRS gives us both a GFT
guarantee and a mechanism: variables vi correspond to the bound on seller surplus, buyer item
prices are {pi }i∈[n] , seller prices are {pi − ξi }i∈[n] , and the subconstraint is suggested by the OCRS.
Lemma 7.6. Suppose there exists a (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS π for the polytope PF , for some
δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Fix any {pi }i∈[n] ∈ Rn+ . For every i ∈ [n], let vi = (pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]. For any
9
q ∈ PF that satisfies qi ≤ Prbi ,si [bi ≥ pi > si ] ∀i, let ξi = pi − G−1
i (qi / Pr[bi ≥ pi ]). We have

P

i Ebi ,si

[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi ]] ≤

1
δη

· GFTCFPP .

7. Throughout this paper, we assume for simplicity that the buyer will purchase item i when bi = θiB as long as the
bundle remains feasible after including i. Without this tie-breaking rule, one can simply decrease the posted price
for each item by an arbitrarily small value , and the loss of GFT will be arbitrarily small.
8. Note that FPP is a subclass of constrained FPP, and therefore GFTFPP ≤ GFTCFPP .
9. When qi ≤ Prbi ,si [bi ≥ pi > si ], qi / Pr[bi ≥ pi ] ≤ 1. Thus ξi is well-defined.
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Moreover, there exists a choice of q such that



P
Eb,s maxS∈F i∈S {(pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]}
≤

P

i Ebi ,si

[vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi ]] ≤

1
δη

· GFTCFPP .

Proof of Lemma 7.6: Let Vi denote the distribution of vi when bi ∼ DiB , si ∼ DiS . Let v = {vi }i∈[n] .
Let q̂ be a scaled-down vector of q such that q̂i = δ ·qi for every i ∈ [n] and ξˆi = pi −G−1
i (q̂i / Pr[bi ≥
pi ]). This is also well-defined since q̂i < qi ≤ Pr[bi ≥ pi ]. As q ∈ PF , then q̂ ∈ δ · PF . Consider the
constrained FPP mechanism M with buyer posted prices {pi }i∈[n] , seller posted prices {pi − ξˆi }i∈[n] ,
and subconstraint Fπ,q̂ ∈ F stated in Definition 2.5.
Fix any item i ∈ [n]. We say item i as active if vi ≥ ξˆi . Similarly to Section 7.3.3, vi ≥ ξˆi if
and only if bi ≥ pi ∧ si ≤ pi − ξˆi . That is, i is active if and only if item i is on the market and
the buyer can afford it, which by choice of ξˆi happens independently across all i with probability
Prvi [vi ≥ ξˆi ] = Prbi ,si [pi − si ≥ ξˆi ∧ bi ≥ pi ] = q̂i .
Then for any v, the set of active items is R(v) = {j ∈ [n] : vj ≥ ξˆj }. By (δ, η)-selectability
(Definition 2.5) and the fact that q̂ ∈ δ · PF , we have

Pr [S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ , ∀S ⊆ R(v), S ∈ Fπ,q̂ ] ≥ η.

π,v

(7.1)

Note that for the sets S ∈ Fπ,q̂ that have i ∈ S, then S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ with probability 1. Thus,
if we require S ⊆ R(v)\{i} instead, it can not be that i ∈ S, and so the following LHS occurs with
equal probability, allowing us to rewrite inequality (7.1) as follows:

Pr [S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ , ∀S ⊆ R(v)\{i}, S ∈ Fπ,q̂ ] ≥ η.

π,v

(7.2)

For any v−i , let Ri (v−i ) = {j 6= i : vj ≥ ξˆj }. Then inequality (7.2) is equivalent to

Pr [S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ , ∀S ⊆ Ri (v−i ), S ∈ Fπ,q̂ ] ≥ η.

π,v−i

Define event Ai = {v−i : S ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ , ∀S ⊆ Ri (v−i ), S ∈ Fπ,q̂ }. We will argue that item i
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must be in the buyer’s favorite bundle S ∗ when both of the following conditions are satisfied: (i)
vi ≥ ξˆi , and (ii) event Ai happens. Note that in M, the set of items in the market is T = {j : sj ≤
P
pj − ξˆj }, thus S ∗ = argmaxS⊆T,S∈Fπ,q̂ j∈S (bj − pj ). Suppose by way of contradiction that both
conditions are satisfied but i 6∈ S ∗ . Clearly, for every j ∈ S ∗ , we have bj ≥ pj , otherwise removing
j from S ∗ will give the buyer greater utility. In addition, we have sj ≤ pj − ξˆj , so S ∗ ⊆ R(v). By
definition, S ∗ must lie in Fπ,q̂ . Since event Ai occurs, then S ∗ ∪ {i} ∈ Fπ,q̂ . As vi ≥ ξˆi , this implies
that bi ≥ pi . Thus adding i to S ∗ keeps the set feasible and does not decrease the buyer’s utility
P
∗
j∈S ∗ (bj − pj ). Thus i ∈ S (see footnote 5). This is a contradiction.
Note that condition (i) and (ii) are independent. Thus for every bi and si such that bi ≥ pi ∧si ≤
pi − ξˆi (or equivalently vi ≥ ξˆi ), the expected GFT of item i over b−i , s−i is at least

Pr[Ai ] · (bi − si ) ≥ η · (pi − si ) = η · vi .

Thus

GFT(M) ≥ η ·

X

Evi ∼Vi [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξˆi ]] ≥ δη ·

X

i

Evi ∼Vi [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi ]],

i

where the last inequality is because for every i, we have E[vi |vi ≥ ξˆi ] ≥ E[vi |vi ≥ ξi ] and
Pr[vi ≥ ξˆi ] = q̂i = δ · Pr[vi ≥ ξi ].
For the second inequality stated in the lemma, note that
"
Eb,s

#
X
max
(pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]
S∈F

i∈S

For every v, let Ŝ(v) = argmaxS∈F

P

i∈S

"

#

= Ev max
S∈F

X

vi .

i∈S

vi , and break ties in favor of the set with smaller size. For

every i, let qi = Prv [i ∈ Ŝ(v)] be the probability that i is in the maximum weight feasible set. We
have that q = {qi }i∈[n] ∈ PF . Also for every i, qi = Prv [i ∈ Ŝ(v)] ≤ Pr[vi > 0] = Pr[bi ≥ pi > si ].
Moreover,
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#

"
Ev max
S∈F

X

vi =

i∈S

X

h
i X
Evi ∼Vi [vi · 1[vi ≥ ξi ]]
Ev vi · 1[i ∈ Ŝ(v)] ≤
i∈[n]

i∈[n]

The inequality follows from the fact that for every i, both sides integrate the random variable
vi with a total probability mass qi , while the right hand side integrates vi at the top qi -quantile. 2
0 ). Then both terms
For each j in the summation, choose pi from Lemma 7.6 to be θij (or θij

4 and 6 are bounded by

log(1/r)
δη

· GFTCFPP . Theorem 7.1 then follows directly from Lem-

mas 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.6.
Theorem 7.1. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1).
Then FB-GFT ≤ O( log(1/r)
) · GFTCFPP .
δη
Feldman et al. [FSZ16] show that many natural constraints—including matroids, matchings,
knapsack, and their compositions—are (δ, η)-selectable for some constants δ and η (see Section 2.7).
For all of these, Theorem 7.1 implies that GFTCFPP is an O(log(1/r))-approximation to FB-GFT.
Corollary 7.1. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint is F =

Td

t=1 Ft

for some constant d, where

each Ft is a matroid, matching constraint, or knapsack constraint. Then FB-GFT ≤ O(log( 1r )) ·
GFTCFPP .
Proof of Corollary 7.1: Pick any constant δ ∈ (0, 12 ). By Lemma 2.3 and 2.4, there exists some
constant η ∈ (0, 1) such that there exists an efficient, (δ, η)-selectable greedy OCRS for PF . Then
the result follows from Theorem 7.1.2

7.3.5

General Constrained-Additive Buyer.

In this section, we consider the case of a general constrained-additive buyer, and prove an O(log(n)·
log(1/r))−approximation to FB-GFT using constrained FPP mechanisms. Note that Lemmas 7.2, 7.3,
and 7.4 still hold in this setting. It is sufficient to bound the seller surplus term with GFTCFPP .
Throughout this section, we will use the following variant of FPP mechanisms: Other than
posted prices, the mechanism also determines an integer h > 0 upfront. The buyer can purchase
any set of items of size at least h by paying the posted prices for each item in the set; otherwise,
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she leaves with nothing. This is a subclass of constrained FPP, with subconstraint F 0 = {S | S ∈
F ∧ |S| ≥ h} ⊆ F.10
Lemma 7.7. For any {pi }i∈[n] ∈ Rn+ ,


P
A =Eb,s maxT ∈F i∈T {(pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]}
≤O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP .
Hence terms 4 and 6 are both upper-bounded by O(log(n) · log( 1r )) · GFTCFPP .
For every i ∈ [n], again construct random variables vi = (pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]. The main
issue here is that in an FPP mechanism, say with posted prices θiB = θiS = pi , the buyer will
pick the maximum weight feasible set (among all items that sellers are willing to sell) according
to weight bi − pi (her utility). However, this might be far from the set used in the benchmark,
i.e. the maximum weight feasible set according to weight pi − si . In the previous section (when
the constraint F had selectability), by setting different prices for both sides and adding a more
restrictive constraint, we guaranteed that if both the buyer and seller accept the posted prices for
some item, then the buyer would purchase this item with at least constant probability. For general
downward-closed F, it is unclear how to achieve this property with a constrained FPP mechanism.
P
For every b, s, let T ∗ (b, s) = argmaxT ∈F i∈T vi be the optimal set used in the benchmark. We divide A into three terms according to the value of vi when i is in this optimal
set: vi < A/2n, vi ∈ [A/2n, 2nA] and vi > 2nA. Denote the three terms AS , AM , AL accordingly. First we notice that the contribution of AS is at most a constant fraction of A, as

A
 A
P
A
∗
AS = Eb,s
i vi · 1[i ∈ T (b, s) ∧ vi < 2n ] < Eb,s 2n · n = 2 .
For AL , in Lemma 7.9, we first prove that Prbi ,si [bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA] ≤

1
2n

holds for every

i. This implies that in a standard FPP mechanism (where h = 1) with θiB = pi , θiS = (pi − 2nA)+
for all i, the buyer purchases each item i with probability at least

1
2

if both the buyer and seller i

accept the posted prices. First, we will need Lemma 7.8.
10. If h = 1, the mechanism becomes a standard FPP mechanism without any subconstraint F 0 .
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Lemma 7.8. Given any constrained FPP mechanism M with posted prices {θiB }i∈[n] , {θiS }i∈[n]
P
and h = 1, suppose i Pr[bi ≥ θiB ∧ si ≤ θiS ] ≤ 12 . Then
1
2

GFT(M) ≥

P

i Ebi ,si




(bi − si ) · 1[bi ≥ θiB ∧ si ≤ θiS ] .

Proof. For any item i, the buyer will purchase item i if both of the following events happen:
1. bi ≥ θiB and si ≤ θiS ;
2. For all items k 6= i, either sk > θkS or bk < θkB .
By the union bound, the second event happens with probability at least 1 −

P

k6=i Pr[bi

θiB ∧ si ≤ θiS ] ≥ 12 . Since both events are independent, we have
GFT(M) ≥



1X
Ebi ,si (bi − si ) · 1[bi ≥ θiB ∧ si ≤ θiS ] .
2
i

Lemma 7.9.
AL = Eb,s

"
X

#
∗

vi 1[i ∈ T (b, s) ∧ vi > 2nA] ≤ 2 · GFTFPP .

i

Proof. Consider the FPP mechanism with θiB = pi , θiS = (pi − 2nA)+ for all i (and h = 1).
Note that for every i ∈ [n], it must hold that Prbi ,si [bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA] ≤

1
2n .

In fact,

A ≥ Ebi ,si [(pi − si )+ · 1[bi ≥ pi ]] ≥ 2nA · Pr [bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA].
bi ,si

Thus by Lemma 7.8 and the fact that bi − si ≥ pi − si when bi ≥ pi , we have

GFTFPP ≥

1X
1
E [(pi − si ) · 1[bi ≥ pi ∧ pi − si ≥ 2nA]] ≥ · AL .
2
2
i

In Lemma 7.10 we bound AM , which is the primary challenge for this approximation.
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≥

Lemma 7.10. AM ≤ O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP .
Proof. We further divide the interval [A/2n, 2nA] into O(log(n)) buckets, where in each bucket
k, vi falls in the range [Lk , 2Lk ] for some Lk . Formally, for any k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d2 log(n) + 2e}, let
Lk = 2k ·

A
4n .

We have
d2 log(n)+2e

X

AM ≤

#

"
Eb,s

X

vi 1[i ∈ T ∗ (b, s) ∧ vi ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]] .

i

k=1

In the rest of the proof, we will show that for any k, there exists some constant c > 0 such that

Eb,s

"
X

#
vi 1[i ∈ T ∗ (b, s) ∧ vi ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]] ≤ c · GFTCFPP .

i
(k)

vi
2Lk

· 1[Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk ]. This is a random variable in
P
(k)
(k)
[ 12 , 1]. Note that all random variables t = {ti }i∈[n] are independent. Let Z(t) = maxT ∈F i∈T ti .
Fix any k. For every i ∈ [n], let ti

=

Then the contribution to AL from values in this range is bounded by the expectation of the random
variable Z(t):

Eb,s

"
X

"

#

#

∗

vi · 1[i ∈ T (b, s) ∧ vi ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]] ≤ Eb,s max
S∈F

i

X

vi · 1[Lk ≤ vi ≤ 2Lk ] = 2Lk Et [Z(t)].

i∈S

Now consider the constrained FPP mechanism with θiB = pi and θiS = (pi − Lk )+ for every
i (the threshold h is determined later). Then in the mechanism, whenever the buyer purchases
an item, the contributed GFT is at least Lk . Thus it is sufficient to show that the expected
size of the purchasing set is at least a constant factor of E[Z(t)]. Note that Z(t) is a random
variable on t, which is the maximum weight feasible set over n independent random variables in
[0, 1]. In Lemma 7.11, we prove that Z(t) concentrates near its mean. The proof is postponed to
Section 7.3.6.
Lemma 7.11. For any c ∈ (0, 1),

Pr[Z(t) ≥ c · E[Z(t)]] ≥
t
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(1 − c)2
.
1 + 1/E[Z(t)]

We first suppose that E[Z(t)] ≥ 14 . By applying Lemma 7.11 with c = 12 , we get


E[Z(t)]
1
Pr Z(t) ≥
≥ .
t
2
20
n
o
(k)
Let h = max b E[Z(t)]
c,
1
. In mechanism Mk , note that for every i, ti > 0 implies that item i
2
1
, Z(t) ≥ h, which
is on the market and that the buyer can afford it. With probability at least 20
P
(k)
(k)
implies that the item set {i | i ∈ argmaxS∈F i∈S ti ∧ ti > 0} is a feasible set of size at least
(k)

are in [ 21 , 1]). In this scenario, the buyer will purchase a set of items of

h. (Recall that all ti

size at least h. For every item i she purchases, the contributed GFT is bi − si ≥ θiB − θiS = Lk .
Thus, GFT(Mk ) ≥

1
20

· h · Lk . Readers who are familiar with mechanism design may notice

that the role of the size threshold h is similar to an “entry fee” in the posted price mechanism in
auctions [BILW14,CDW16,CZ17,CM16,RW15,Yao15], though the buyer doesn’t have to pay extra
money to attend the auction. It guarantees that the buyer will purchase at least h items when she
can afford it, as otherwise she gets no utility.
When E[Z(t)] ≥ 14 , we have h ≥

E[Z(t)]
.
4

Thus

"
Eb,s

#
X

vi 1[i ∈ T ∗ (b, s) ∧ vi ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]] ≤ 160 · GFTCFPP .

i
(k)

Now we consider the case where E[Z(t)] < 14 . For every i, let qi = Pr[ti > 0] = Prbi ,si [bi ≥
Q
(k)
pi ∧ pi − si ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]]. Then it holds that Pr[∀i, ti = 0] = ni=1 (1 − qi ) > 12 . This is because
P
(k)
(k)
(k)
if there exists i such that ti > 0, then Z(t) = maxT ∈F i∈T ti ≥ 12 as ti ∈ [ 12 , 1] for every i.
(k)

Thus if Pr[∀i, ti

= 0] ≤ 21 , then E[Z(t)] ≥ 41 , which leads to a contradiction.

Consider the constrained FPP mechanism M with θiB = pi , θiS = (pi − Lk )+ , and h = 1. For
(k)

every i, define event Ei = {t | ti

(k)

> 0 ∧ tj

(k)

= 0, ∀j 6= i}. Note that ti

> 0 implies that seller i

accepts price θiS and the buyer can afford item i. Under event Ei , there is at least one item on the
market that the buyer can afford, i.e. item i. Thus the buyer must purchase some item j on the
market that she can afford (possibly item i). For this item j, we have bj ≥ θjB and sj ≤ θjS . Thus
the contributed GFT is at least bj − sj ≥ pj − sj ≥ Lk . Since all Ei s are disjoint events, we have
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GFT(M) ≥

P

i Pr[Ei ] · Lk

= Lk ·

P

i qi

·

Q

j6=i (1 − qj )

≥ Lk ·

P

i qi

·

Q

j (1 − qj )

(k)

> 12 Lk ·

(k)

the equality uses the fact that all ti s are independent. On the other hand, since ti
hP
i P
(k)
(k)
i, E[Z(t)] ≤ E
t
·
1[t
>
0]
≤ i qi . Thus
i i
i

"
Eb,s

P

i qi ,

where

≤ 1 for any

#
X

∗

vi · 1[i ∈ T (b, s) ∧ vi ∈ [Lk , 2Lk ]] ≤ 2Lk · E[Z(t)] ≤ 4 · GFTCFPP .

i

Summing the inequality over all k finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7.7: By Lemmas 7.9, 7.10, and the fact that AS ≤

A
2,

we have that

A ≤ 2(AM + AL ) ≤ O(log(n)) · GFTCFPP .
2
Theorem 7.2 summarizes our result for a general constrained-additive buyer. It directly follows
from Lemmas 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.7.
Theorem 7.2. For any downward-closed constraint F, FB-GFT ≤ O(log(n) · log( 1r )) · GFTCFPP .

7.3.6

Proof of Lemma 7.11

We recall the statement of Lemma 7.11: For any c ∈ (0, 1),

Pr[Z(t) ≥ c · E[Z(t)]] ≥
t

Recall that Z(t) = maxT ∈F

(k)
i∈T ti .

P

(1 − c)2
.
1 + 1/E[Z(t)]

In the proof we will omit the superscript k as it is fixed.

The random seed t is also omitted if clear from context.
Lemma 7.12. (Paley-Zygmund Inequality [PZ32]) For any random variable Z ≥ 0 with finite
variance, for any c ∈ [0, 1],

Pr[Z ≥ c · E[Z]] ≥ (1 − c)2 ·
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E[Z]2
.
Var[Z] + E[Z]2

To use Lemma 7.12, we only need to show an upper bound on Var[Z(t)].
Lemma 7.13. Var[Z(t)] ≤ E[Z(t)].
Proof. By the Efron-Stein Inequality [ES81],

Var[Z(t)] ≤

X
1X
Eti ,t0i ,t−i [(Z(ti , t−i ) − Z(t0i , t−i ))2 ] =
Et−i [Var[Z(t)|t−i ]].
2
i

i

Here t0i shares the same distribution with ti (a fresh sample). Note that for every fixed t−i ,
Varti [Z(ti , t−i )] ≤ Eti [(Z(ti , t−i ) − a)2 ] for any real constant a. For every i, let

Zi (t−i ) =

max

T ∈F ,i6=T

X

tj

j∈T

, which only depends on t−i . We have

Var[Z(t)] ≤

X

Et−i [Var[Z(t)|t−i ]] ≤

i

X

E[(Z(t) − Zi (t−i ))2 ] ≤

X

i

E[Z(t) − Zi (t−i )],

i

where the last inequality follows from the fact that Zi (t−i ) ≤ Z(t) ≤ Zi (t−i ) + 1, as every random
variable tj ∈ [ 21 , 1].
P
Now fix any t. Let T ∗ = argmaxT ∈F j∈T tj . Then for every i, by the definition of Zi ,
P
P P
P
P
j∈T ∗ tj = (n − 1) · Z(t).
i
j∈T ∗ \{i} tj = (n − 1) ·
i Zi (t−i ) ≥
j∈T ∗ \{i} tj ≤ Zi (t−i ). Thus
Hence,
Var[Z(t)] ≤

X

E[Z(t) − Zi (t−i )] ≤ E[Z(t)].

i

7.4

An Unconditional Approximation for a Single ConstrainedAdditive Buyer

In this section, we prove Theorem 7.3, an unconditional O(log n)-approximation when the buyer’s
feasibility constraint is selectable, and an unconditional O(log2 (n))-approximation for a general
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constrained-additive buyer—without dependence on distributional parameters. The result combines
the log(1/r)-approximation and a novel mechanism—the seller adjusted posted price mechanism.
Theorem 7.3. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1).
n
Then there exists a DSIC, ex-post IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism M such that OPT ≤ O( log
δ·η ) ·

GFT(M). Moreover, for a general constrained-additive buyer, there exists a DSIC, ex-post IR,
ex-ante WBB mechanism M such that OPT ≤ O(log2 (n)) · GFT(M).

7.4.1

An Upper Bound of the Second-Best GFT.

Formally, we use OPT to denote the optimal GFT attainable by any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB
mechanism. Notice that the GFT of any two-sided market mechanism can be broken down into
the buyer’s expected utility of this mechanism, plus the sum of all sellers’ expected utilities (or
profit), plus the difference between buyer’s and sellers’ expected payment. We show that the OPT
is upper bounded by the sum of the designers’ utilities in two related one-sided markets: the
super seller auction and the super buyer procurement auction.

Super Seller Auction.

Consider a one-sided market, where the designer is the super seller

who owns all the items, and replaces all the original sellers. The buyer is the same as in our
two-sided market setting. The super seller designs a mechanism to sell the items to the buyer.
The main difference between the super seller auction and the original two-sided market is that the
mechanism only needs to be BIC and IR for the buyer and does not have any incentive compatibility
constraints for the super seller. We use OPT-S to denote the maximum profit (revenue minus her
cost) achievable by any BIC and IR mechanism in the super seller auction.
To avoid ambiguity in further proofs, for every subset T ⊆ [n] and downward-closed feasibility
constraint J with respect to T , we let OPT-S(T, J ) denote the optimal profit in the following
super seller auction: the super seller owns the set of items in T and has cost si ∼ DiS for every
item i ∈ T . The buyer has value bi ∼ DiB for every item i ∈ T and is additive subject to constraint
J . We slightly abuse notation and write OPT-S(T, ADD) if the buyer is additive (J = 2T )
and OPT-S(T, UD) if the buyer is unit-demand (J = {{i} :
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i ∈ T }). Clearly, OPT-S =

OPT-S([n], F).
Super Buyer Procurement Auction. Similarly, let the super buyer procurement auction be
the one-sided market where the super buyer (same as the real buyer) designs the mechanism to
procure items from the sellers. Here the mechanism only needs to be BIC and IR for all of the
sellers, but not the buyer. We use OPT-B to denote the maximum utility (value minus payment) of
the super buyer attainable by any BIC and IR mechanism in the super buyer procurement auction.
First, we prove that the GFT of any IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ) is
upper bounded by OPT-S + OPT-B.
Lemma 7.14. OPT ≤ OPT-S + OPT-B.
Proof. Take any BIC, IR, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (x, pB , pS ). Since every seller i is BIC
and IR, we have for any si , s0i ,



Eb,s−i pSi (b, s) − si · xi (b, s) ≥ max Eb,s−i [pSi (b, s0i , s−i )] − si · xi (b, s0i , s−i ), 0 .
Observe that M0 = (x, pS ) is a valid super buyer procurement auction. The above inequalities
are exactly the BIC and IR constraints for seller i. Thus M0 is BIC and IR. Similarly, M00 = (x, pB )
is BIC and IR, so it is a valid super seller auction. Since M is ex-ante WBB, Eb,s [pB (b, s) −
P S
i p (b, s)] ≥ 0. Thus we have

GFT(M) = Eb,s [

X

xi (b, s)(bi − si )]

i∈[n]

≤ Eb,s [pB (b, s) −

X

X
xi (b, s) · si ] + Eb,s [ (xi (b, s) · bi − pSi (b, s))]

i

i

≤ OPT-S + OPT-B.

Taking M to be the GFT-maximizing mechanism completes the proof.
Next we prove an analog of the “Marginal Mechanism Lemma” [CH13, HN12] for the optimal
profit. Namely, let (T, R) be a partition of the items in [n]. Then the optimal profit in a super
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seller auction with items in [n] is upper bounded by the first-best GFT for items in T plus the
optimal profit in a super seller auction with items in R.
Lemma 7.15 (Marginal Mechanism for Profit). For any subset T ∈ [n], we let F
S ∈ F} denote the restriction of F to T . We use FB-GFT(T, F
obtainable between sellers in T and the F

FB-GFT(T, F

T

T

T

T

= {S ⊆ T :

) to denote the first-best GFT

-constrained additive buyer, that is,

) = EbT ,sT [maxS∈F |T

P

i∈S (bi

− si )+ ],

where bT = {bi }i∈T , sT = {si }i∈T . Let (R, T ) be any partition of the items in [n]. Then

OPT-S([n], F) ≤ OPT-S(R, F

R

) + FB-GFT(T, F

T

).

Proof. Consider the optimal BIC and IR mechanism M = (x, p) in the super seller auction with
item set [n]. We will construct a BIC and IR mechanism M0 = (x0 , p0 ) in the super seller auction
with item set R as follows. The mechanism only sells items in R using the same allocation x. The
payment for the buyer is defined as the payment p in M minus the buyer’s expected total value
for all items in T . Formally, for every bR = {bj }j∈R , sR = {sj }j∈R and i ∈ R, let
x0i (bR , sR ) = EbT ,sT [xi (b, s)]
i
h
P
p0 (bR , sR ) = EbT ,sT p(b, s) − j∈T bj · xj (b, s) .
Notice that in M0 , the expected utility of the buyer with type bR when reporting b0R is
X
X
EsR [
bi · x0i (b0R , sR ) − p0 (b0R , sR )] = EbT ,s [
bi · xi (b0R , bT , s) − p(b0R , bT , s)],
i∈T

i∈[n]
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Since M is BIC and IR, M0 is also BIC and IR. Thus

OPT-S([n], F) = Eb,s [p(b, s) −

X

si · xi (b, s)]

i∈[n]

= EbR ,sR [p0 (bR , sR ) −

X

X
si · x0i (bR , sR )] + Eb,s [ (bi − si ) · xi (b, s)]

i∈R

≤ OPT-S(R, F

R

i∈T

) + FB-GFT(T, F

T

).

We partition the items into the set of “likely to trade” items, that is, items with trade probability
ri = Prbi ,si [bi ≥ si ] ≥ 1/n, and the “unlikely to trade” items. We can bound the OPT-S by the
first-best GFT of the “likely to trade” items and the optimal profit of the super seller auction
with the “unlikely to trade” items. We can further replace the first-best GFT of the “likely to
trade” by O(log n) · GFTCFPP according to Theorem 7.1 or by O(log2 (n)) · GFTCFPP according
to Theorem 7.2 depending on the buyer’s feasibility constraint. Formally,
Lemma 7.16. Define H = {i ∈ [n] : ri ≥

1
n}

and L = [n]\H = {i ∈ [n] : ri <

1
n }.

Suppose

the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then OPT is upper
bounded by

OPT-B + OPT-S(L, F

) + FB-GFT(H, F H )


log n
≤OPT-B + OPT-S(L, F L ) + O
· GFTCFPP .
δ·η
L

For a general constrained-additive buyer, OPT is upper bounded by

OPT-B + OPT-S(L, F

L


) + O log2 (n) · GFTCFPP .

Proof. The first inequality follows from Lemma 7.14 and 7.15. Since F is (δ, η)-selectable, F

H

is

also (δ, η)-selectable. We derive the second inequality by applying Theorem 7.1 on the items in H.
For a general constrained-additive buyer, we derive the inequality by applying Theorem 7.2 on the
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items in H.
It is well known that in multi-item auctions, the revenue of selling the items separately is
an O(log n)-approximation to the optimal revenue when there is a single additive buyer [LY13].
Cai and Zhao [CZ19] provide an extension of this O(log n)-approximation to profit maximization
(Chapter 4). We build on this in Section 7.4.4 to upper bound the OPT-S(L, F

L

) term, where

with |L| items, we get a log(|L|) factor (Lemma 7.23).
All together, this gives the following upper bound on the second-best GFT.
Lemma 7.17 (Upper Bound on Second-Best GFT). Define H = {i ∈ [n] : ri ≥

1
n}

and L =

[n]\H = {i ∈ [n] : ri < n1 }. Suppose the buyer’s feasibility constraint F is (δ, η)-selectable for some
δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then

log n
· GFTCFPP
OPT ≤OPT-B + O
δ·η
!
X


+O log(|L|) ·
Ebi ,si (ϕ̃i (bi ) − si )+ .


i∈L

For a general constrained-additive buyer, the O



log n
δ·η




factor above becomes O log2 (n) .

Next, Section 7.4.2 gives details on constructing a mechanism for a two-sided market whose
GFT is at least OPT-B. In Section 7.4.3, we show how to use a generalization of posted price
mechanisms to approximate the second term in the upper bound by the GFT of the Seller Adjusted
Posted Price mechanism. The approximation heavily relies on the fact that in expectation, only
one item can trade, so it is crucial that L only contains the “unlikely to trade” items.

7.4.2

Bounding the Optimal Buyer Utility in the Super Buyer Procurement
Auction.

In this section, we construct a two-sided market to bound OPT-B for any constrained additive
buyer.
Lemma 7.18. Consider the mechanism M∗ = (x, pB , pS ) where for every item i, buyer profile
P
b, and seller profile s, xi (b, s) = 1[bi − τ̃i (si ) ≥ 0 ∧ i ∈ argmaxS∈F i∈S (bi − τei (si ))+ ]. Here
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τei (si ) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value function11 for seller i’s distribution DiS . For every seller i,
since τ̃i (si ) is non-decreasing in si , xi (b, s) is non-increasing in si . Define pSi (b, s) as the threshold
payment for seller i, i.e., the largest cost si such that xi (b, si , s−i ) = 1. Define the buyer’s payment
P
pB (b, s) = i xi (b, s) · τ̃i (si ). M∗ is DSIC, ex-post IR, ex-ante SBB 12 and
GFT(M∗ ) ≥ OPT-B = Eb,s [max
S∈F

X
(bi − τej (sj ))+ ].
i∈S

Proof. Since the seller’s allocation rule is monotone and we use the threshold payment, M∗ is DSIC
and ex-post IR for each seller.
Note that for any seller profile s, when the buyer has true type b, her expected utility from
P
reporting b0 is i xi (b0 , s) · (bi − τei (si )). According to the definition of x, the buyer’s utility is
maximized when b0 = b. Hence, M is DSIC for the buyer. Moreover we have ex-post IR, as the
P
buyer’s expected utility when reporting truthfully is maxS∈F i∈S (bi − τei (si ))+ ≥ 0.
It only remains to prove that the mechanism is ex-ante SBB and to lower bound its GFT. By
Myerson’s lemma, for every b we have

Es

"
X
i

#
pSi (b, s)

"
= Es

#
X

xi (b, s) · τei (si ) = Es [pB (b, s)].

i

Thus the mechanism is ex-ante SBB.
P
Why is OPT-B = Eb,s [maxS∈F i∈S (bi − τej (sj ))+ ]? Notice that only the sellers are strategic in
a super buyer procurement auction, and their types are all single-dimensional. One can apply the
standard Myersonian analysis to the super buyer procurement auction and show that the optimal
P
buyer utility is exactly Eb,s [maxS∈F i∈S (bi − τej (sj ))+ ].
Note that the buyer’s expected utility in M∗ is exactly OPT-B. As M∗ is an ex-ante SBB
mechanism, the expected GFT of M∗ is equal to the buyer’s expected utility plus the sum of all
11. The seller’s unironed virtual value function is τi (si ) = si +

Gi (si )
.
gi (si )

P
12. One can make the mechanism IR and ex-post SBB by defining pB (b, s) = i pS
i (b, s). The mechanism is still
DSIC for all sellers. It is only BIC for the buyer, as the sellers’ gains only equal the virtual welfare when taking
expectation over sellers’ profile.
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sellers’ expected utility, and the latter is non-negative since M∗ is ex-post IR for every seller.

7.4.3

The Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism.

In this section, we introduce a new mechanism—the Seller Adjusted Posted Price (SAPP) Mechanism. We define an adjusted price mechanism to first elicit each seller’s cost si , and then produce
posted prices {θi (s)}i∈[n] as a function of the reported profile s; thus the mechanism is a collection
of posted prices depending on the reported seller cost profile. The items are offered to the buyer
at each posted price θi (s), with the buyer only allowed to purchase at most one item by paying
the posted price. See Mechanism 7.1 for a complete description of the SAPP mechanism. We show
that for a properly selected mapping {θi (·)}i∈[n] , the SAPP mechanism is DSIC, ex-post IR, and

P
+
ex-ante WBB. Moreover, its GFT is at least Θ
i∈L Ebi ,si [(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si ) ] .
Since the posted prices depend on the reported seller cost profile, we need to be careful to ensure
that there is no incentive for any seller to misreport the cost. We identify a sufficient condition for
the posted prices, called bi-monotonicity, to make sure the corresponding mechanism is DSIC and
ex-post IR.
Definition 7.1 (Bi-monotonic Prices). We say the posted prices {θi (s)}i∈[n] are bi-monotonic, if
(i) θi (s) ≥ si for all seller profile s and seller i; (ii) θi (s) is non-decreasing in si and non-increasing
in sj for all j 6= i.
In Lemma 7.19, we prove that bi-monotonic posted prices induce a monotone allocation rule
for every seller, enabling threshold payments [Mye81, MS83]. Formally, for every seller i let x̂i (b, s)
denote the probability that the buyer trades with seller i under profile (b, s). This is either 0 or 1
since all θi (s) are fixed values when s is fixed. If x̂i (b, s) = 1, pSi (b, s) is defined as the maximum
value s0i such that x̂i (b, s0i , s−i ) = 1. Otherwise pSi (b, s) = 0. This makes the SAPP mechanism
DSIC and ex-post IR.
Lemma 7.19. Let M be an SAPP mechanism with bi-monotonic posted prices {θi (s)}i∈[n] . Then
the allocation of the mechanism x̂i (b, s) is non-increasing in si for all sellers i, and M is DSIC
and ex-post IR for the buyer and the sellers.
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Proof. Notice that for every type b, the buyer chooses the item that maximizes bi − θi (s) (and does
not choose any item if she cannot afford any of the items). For every i, by bi-monotonicity, when
si decreases, bi − θi (s) does not decrease while bj − θj (s) does not increase for all j 6= i. Thus if the
buyer chooses item i under the original si , she must continue to choose item i for smaller reports
s0i . Thus x̂i (b, s) is non-increasing in si . Since every seller receives the threshold payment, she is
DSIC and ex-post IR. As the buyer simply faces a posted price mechanism, the mechanism is DSIC
and ex-post IR for the buyer.
Mechanism 7.1 Seller Adjusted Posted Price Mechanism
Require: ∀i ∈ [n], function θi (·) that maps each seller cost profile to a price for item i. Input
(b, s).
1: Given the sellers’ reported cost profile s, offer each item i to the buyer at price θi (s).
2: The buyer is allowed to purchase at most one item by paying the corresponding posted price.
3: If no item is picked, then no trade happens and payment is 0 for every agent. Otherwise, if
the buyer chooses item i, she receives item i and pays θi (s). Seller i sells her item and receives
threshold payment.

The main challenge we face here is establishing the budget balance condition. Unfortunately,
having bi-monotonic posted prices is not sufficient. Consider the n = 1 case: the posted price
p(s) = s is trivially bi-monotonic. Clearly, the corresponding SAPP mechanism achieves FBGFT. However, due to the impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83], no BIC,
IR, and ex-ante WBB mechanism can always achieve FB-GFT, so the SAPP mechanism must
sometimes violate the budget balance constraint. In Lemma 7.20, we show that even though bimonotonic posted prices do not imply budget balance, there is indeed a wide range of bi-monotonic
posted prices that induce budget balanced SAPP mechanisms. Our budget balance proof heavily
relies on an allocation coupling argument (Lemma 7.21) that simultaneously provides a lower bound
on the buyer’s payment, as well as an upper bound on the payment to the seller.
Lemma 7.20. Let x = {xi (b, s)}i∈[n] be an arbitrary allocation rule that satisfies (i) the buyer never
P
purchases more than one item in expectation under each profile (b, s), i.e., i∈[n] xi (b, s) ≤ 1, and
(ii) for every buyer type b and seller i, xi (b, s) is non-increasing in si , and non-decreasing in sj
for all j 6= i. We define qi (s) = Eb [xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]], where ϕ̃i (bi ) is Myerson’s ironed
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virtual value for DiB , and θi (s) = Fi−1 (1 −

qi (s)
2 ).

The posted prices {θi (s)}i∈[n] are bi-monotonic,

and the corresponding SAPP mechanism M is DSIC, ex-post IR, and ex-ante WBB. Moreover,
P
GFT(M) ≥ 14 Eb,s [ i (ϕ
ei (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s)].
Proof. It is not hard to verify that {θi (s) = Fi−1 (1 −

qi (s)
2 )}i∈[n]

is bi-monotonic. Now we proceed

to prove that the SAPP mechanism M is ex-ante WBB. We require the following lemma.
h
i
2 q (s)
i (s)
i
Lemma 7.21. For every seller i and every seller profile s, x̂i (s) ∈ qi (s)+q
,
.
4
2
Proof. Note that the buyer will purchase item i if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The buyer can afford item i, i.e., bi ≥ θi (s).
2. The buyer cannot afford any other items, i.e., bj < θj (s), ∀j 6= i.
By choice of θi (s), the first event happens with probability Pr[bi ≥ θi (s)] = qi (s)/2.
P
P
q (s)
Note that i∈[n] qi (s) ≤ Eb [ i∈[n] xi (b, s)] ≤ 1. For each j 6= i, Pr[bj < θj (s)] = 1 − j2 . Thus


P 
Q 
qj (s)
qj (s)
qi (s)
3
1
−
≥
n
−
+
.
The
second
event
happens
with
probability
1
−
≥
j6=i
j6=i
2
2
2
2
1
2

+

qi (s)
2 .

The equality holds when one out of the n − 1 qj (s)’s equals 1 − qi (s) and the rest are all

equal to 0. Notice that the two events are independent, so we have the upper and lower bound on
x̂i (s).
We return to the proof of Lemma 7.20. For easy reference, we list our notation again:
• x = {xi (b, s)}i∈[n] is an arbitrary allocation.
• x̂i (b, s) is the probability that item i trades in M under profile (b, s).
• x̂i (s) = Eb [x̂i (b, s)] is the probability that item i trades over the randomness of buyer valuations, i.e. the interim trade probability.
• qi (s) = Eb [xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]] is the probability that item i trades in allocation x and
the buyer’s ironed virtual value for item i is above the seller’s cost.
• θi (s) = Fi−1 (1 −

qi (s)
2 )

is the buyer’s posted price set such that Pr[bi ≥ θi (s)] = qi (s)/2.
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Fix any seller profile s. For simplicity, we slightly abuse notation and use x̂i (z) and qi (z) to
denote x̂i (z, s−i ) and qi (z, s−i ). The expected payment from the buyer under cost profile s is
P
S
S
i∈[n] x̂i (si ) · θi (s). For every seller i, denote pi (s) = Eb [pi (b, s)] as her expected payment under
cost profile s.
Note that for every b, s, the threshold payment pSi (b, s) can be rewritten as the quantity
R∞
si

x̂i (b, t, s−i )dt + si · x̂i (b, si , s−i ): When x̂i (b, s) = 0, then x̂i (b, t, s−i ) for all t ≥ si since x̂i (b, s)

is non-increasing in si . Thus the above quantity is 0. When x̂i (b, s) = 1, let s0i be the maximum
R s0
value such that x̂i (b, s0i , si ) = 1. Then the above quantity is equal to sii 1dt + si = s0i = pSi (b, s).
R∞
Thus pSi (s) = Eb [pSi (b, s)] = si x̂i (z, s−i )dz +si · x̂i (si , s−i ). We will show that pSi (s) ≤ x̂i (si )·θi (s).
By definition,

pSi (s) =

Z

∞

x̂i (z)dz
si
Z ∞Z ∞

+ si · x̂i (si )

1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dtdz + si · x̂i (si )

=

0
si
Z ∞ Z x̂i (si )

1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dtdz + si · x̂i (si )

=
0
si
Z x̂i (si ) Z ∞

1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dzdt + si · x̂i (si ).

=
0

si

The second inequality follows from x̂i (z) =

R∞
0

1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dt, ∀z. The third inequality is due

to 1[x̂i (z) ≥ t] = 0, ∀z ≥ si and t > x̂i (si ). The last equality follows from Fubini’s Theorem, as the
integral is finite due to the monotonicity of x̂i (·).
Moreover, since x̂i (·) is non-increasing, for every z ≤ si , t ≤ x̂i (si ), we have x̂i (z) ≥ x̂i (si ) ≥ t.
R x̂ (s ) R s
R x̂ (s ) R s
Thus 0 i i 0 i 1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dzdt = 0 i i 0 i 1dzdt = si · x̂i (si ).
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Combining the two equations, we have

pSi (s)

Z

x̂i (si ) Z ∞

1[x̂i (z) ≥ t]dzdt

=
0

Z

0
x̂i (si ) Z ∞

≤

1[qi (z) ≥ 2t]dzdt

Z x̂i (si ) Z ∞ 
≤
1 Pr[ϕ
ei (bi ) ≥ z] ≥ 2t dzdt
0

0

0

0

bi

The first inequality follows from Lemma 7.21 and the second inequality follows from the defiR∞
nition of qi (·). For every t, we prove that 0 1 [Prbi [ϕ
ei (bi ) ≥ z] ≥ 2t] dz ≤ ϕ
ei (Fi−1 (1 − 2t + )) for
any  > 0. In fact, let z ∗ = ϕ
ei (Fi−1 (1 − 2t + )). For every z > z ∗ , Pr[ϕ
ei (bi ) ≥ z] ≤ Pr[ϕ
ei (bi ) >
z ∗ ] = Pr[bi > Fi−1 (1 − 2t + )] ≤ 2t − . So 1 [Pr[ϕ
ei (bi ) ≥ z] ≥ 2t] = 0 for all z > z ∗ .
Therefore, for any  > 0, we have the following. In the second line, we change the variable by
denoting y = Fi−1 (1 − 2t + ).
pSi (s)
Z

Z
≤

x̂i (si )

ϕ
ei (Fi−1 (1 − 2t + ))dt

0
Fi−1 (1−2x̂i (si )+)

=
∞

ϕ
ei (y)d

1 +  − Fi (y)
2

Z −1
1 Fi (1−2x̂i (si )+)
=−
ϕ
ei (y)fi (y)dy
2 ∞
Z
1 ∞
=
ϕ
ei (y)fi (y)dy
2 Fi−1 (1−2x̂i (si )+)
1
= Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + ) · [1 − Fi (Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + ))]
2
=Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + ) · (x̂i (si ) − /2)
≤x̂i (si ) · Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + )
If qi (si ) = 0, then x̂i (si ) · Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + ) = 0 = x̂i (si ) · θi (s). Otherwise, choose  to be
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2

any number in (0, qi (s4i ) ). Then, according to Lemma 7.21 and our choice of ,
1 − 2x̂i (si ) +  ≤ 1 −

qi (si ) qi (si )2
qi (si )
−
<1−
.
2
4
2

Hence, Fi−1 (1 − 2x̂i (si ) + ) < θi (s). Thus pSi (s) ≤ x̂i (s) · θi (s) for every i and s, which implies that
P S

P
Es [ i θi (s) · x̂i (s)] ≥ Es
i pi (si , s−i ) . Hence M is ex-ante WBB.
We now need to lower bound the GFT from mechanism M.

"
GFT(M) =Eb,s

#
X
(bi − si ) · x̂i (b, s)
i

"
≥Es

#
X

(θi (s) − si ) · x̂i (s)

i

"
#



X
q
(s)
q
(s)
1
i
i
− si ·
Fi−1 1 −
≥ Es
2
2
2
i
"


#
X
1
qi (s)
−1
= Eb,s
(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si ) · 1 bi ≥ Fi
1−
2
2
i
"
#
X
1
≥ Eb,s
(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]]]
4
i
"
#
X
1
(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s)]
≥ Eb,s
4
i

Here the second inequality uses the definition of θi (s), qi (s) and Lemma 7.21. The third inequality follows from Myerson’s lemma. The second-to-last inequality uses the fact that

Ebi ϕ
ei (bi ) · 1[bi ≥

Fi−1



qi (s)
1
1−
≥ · Eb [ϕ
ei (bi ) · xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]]
2
2

holds for every s and i.
This is because the right hand side
1
1
· Eb [ϕ
ei (bi ) · xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]] = Ebi [ϕ
ei (bi ) · Eb−i [xi (b, s) · 1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]]]
2
2
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can be viewed as the expectation of ϕ
ei (bi ) on an event of bi with a total probability mass Ebi [ 12 Eb−i [xi (b, s)·
1[ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ]]] =

qi (s)
2 ,

while the left hand side is the maximum expectation of ϕ
ei (bi ) on any event

of bi with total probability mass

qi (s)
2 ,

as ϕ
ei (bi ) is non-decreasing on bi .

Lemma 7.22 shows how to choose an allocation rule x so that the induced SAPP mechanism

P
+
(using Lemma 7.20) has GFT at least Ω
i∈L Ebi ,si [(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si ) ] . Note that the existence of
such an x heavily relies on the fact that in expectation there is only one item that can trade among
the “unlikely to trade” items.
Lemma 7.22. We let GFTSAPP (S) denote the optimal GFT attainable by any DSIC, ex-post IR,
and ex-ante WBB SAPP mechanism over items in S for any subset S ⊆ [n]. GFTSAPP (L) ≥
1 P
ei (bi ) − si )+ ].
i∈L Ebi ,si [(ϕ
4e ·
Proof. Let bL = {bi }i∈L and sL = {si }i∈L . For every i ∈ L, define the event that only i is tradeable:

Ai = {(bL , sL ) : bi ≥ si ∧ bj < sj , ∀j ∈ L\{i}} .

We consider the following allocation rule:

xi (bL , sL ) =




1[ϕ
ei (bi ) ≥ si ] , if (b, s) ∈ Ai


0

, otherwise

Notice that (bL , sL ) ∈ Ai implies that (bL , s0i , sL\{i} ) ∈ Ai for any s0i ≤ si . Thus, xi (bL , sL )
is non-increasing in si . Similarly, it is easy to verify that xi (bL , sL ) is non-decreasing in all sj
P
where j ∈ L\{i}. Furthermore,
i∈L xi (bL , sL ) ≤ 1 for all bL , sL . If we choose the posted
prices according to Lemma 7.20, then the corresponding mechanism has GFT that is at least
P
1
ei (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s)].
4 Eb,s [ i (ϕ
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Moreover, by the definition of xi (b, s),

Eb,s

"
X

#
(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s) =

i∈L

X
i∈L

≥

X

Y

Ebi ,si [(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si )+ )] ·

Pr [bj < sj ]

j∈L\{i}

Ebi ,si [(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si )+ )] · (1 −

i∈L

bj ,sj

1 |L|
)
n

1 X
≥ ·
Ebi ,si [(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si )+ )]
e
i∈L

The first inequality holds because for each item j ∈ L, Prbj ,sj [bj < sj ] ≥ 1 − 1/n. Hence,

GFTSAPP (L) ≥

1 X
Ebi ,si [(ϕ
ei (bi ) − si )+ ].
·
4e
i∈L

7.4.4

Bounding the Optimal Profit from the Unlikely to Trade Items.

In this section, we provide an upper bound for the optimal super seller profit from items in L. It
is well known that in multi-item auctions the revenue of selling the items separately is a O(log n)approximation to the optimal revenue when there is a single additive buyer [LY13]. In Chapter 4
we have provided a extension of this O(log n)-approximation to profit maximization. Combining this approximation with some basic observations based on the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality
framework [CDW16], we derive the following upper bound of OPT-S(L, F
Lemma 7.23. OPT-S(L, F

L

) ≤ O log(|L|) ·

P

i∈L Ebi ,si

L

).


[(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si )+ ] . Here ϕ
ei (bi ) is Myer-

son’s ironed virtual value function13 for the buyer’s distribution for item i, DiB .
We need the following lemma proved in Chapter 4.
Lemma 7.24. (Restatement of Lemma 4.2) For any T ⊆ [n] and feasibility constraint J with
respect to T , consider the super seller auction with item set T and a J -constrained buyer. Any
flow λT induces a finite benchmark for the optimal profit, that is,
13. The buyer’s unironed virtual value function is ϕi (bi ) = bi −
function monotonic in quantile space, which creates ϕ
ei (bi ).
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1−Fi (bi )
.
fi (bi )

These values are averaged to make the

"
OPT-S(T, J ) ≤ max Eb,s
x∈PJ

1
where ΦTi (b) = bi − fi (b
i)

P

b0

#
X

xi (b, s) · (ΦTi (b) − si )

i∈T

λT (b0 , b) · (b0i − bi ) can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function,

and PJ is the set of all feasible allocation rules. More specifically, λT (b0 , b) is the Lagrangian
multiplier for the BIC/IR constraint that states that when the buyer has true type b, she does not
want to misreport b0 . The equality sign is achieved when the optimal dual λ∗T is chosen.
Next, we show that OPT-S(L, F
Lemma 7.25. OPT-S(L, F

L

L

) is no more than OPT-S(L, ADD) using Lemma 7.24.

) ≤ OPT-S(L, ADD).

Proof. Let λ̂L be the optimal dual in Lemma 7.24 when the buyer is additive without any feasibility
constraint, and Φ̂L
i (·) be the induced virtual value function. We have that
"
OPT-S(L, F

L

) ≤ max Eb,s
x∈PF |L

≤

#
X

xi (b, s) ·

(Φ̂L
i (b)

− si )

i∈L

max
xi (b,s)∈[0,1]

Eb,s

"
X

#
xi (b, s)(Φ̂L
i (b) − si )

i

= OPT-S(L, ADD).

Theorem 4.6 in Chapter 4 gives a logarithmic upper bound of the optimal profit for a single
additive buyer, using the sum of optimal profit for each individual item.
Lemma 7.26. (Restatement of Theorem 4.6)

OPT-S(L, ADD) ≤ log(|L|) ·

X

OPT-S({i}) = log(|L|) ·

i∈L

X

Ebi ,si [(ϕi (bi ) − si )+ ].

i∈L

Together, Lemmas 7.25 and 7.26 conclude the proof of Lemma 7.23:

OPT-S(L, F

L

) ≤ O log(|L|) ·

X
i∈L
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!


Ebi ,si (ϕ̃i (bi ) − si )+ .

Proof of Lemma 7.17: It directly follows from Lemmas 7.16 and 7.23. 2
Proof of Theorem 7.3: The theorem follows directly from Lemmas 7.17, 7.18, 7.20, and 7.22. 2

7.5

Lower Bounds and the First-Best–Second-Best Gap

In the unconditional approximation results stated in Section 7.4, we compare the GFT of our
mechanism to OPT. Readers may be interested in whether our mechanism is also an approximation
to FB-GFT. In fact, this question is related to one of the major open problems in two-sided
markets: How large is the gap between the second-best and the first-best GFT? In this section, we
consider a unit-demand buyer and present a reduction from achieving a FB-GFT approximation in
our multi-dimensional setting to the open problem regarding the gap in single-dimensional two-sided
markets.

Matching Markets. This setting has a two-sided market with n buyers, n sellers, and n identical
items. Each seller owns one item and each buyer is interested in buying at most one item. Thus the
value (or cost) for every agent is a scalar. Here we consider a special case where for every i ∈ [n],
buyer i and seller i can only trade with each other, and at most one pair of agents in the market
can trade. This is bilateral trade when n = 1.
Theorem 7.4. Suppose the buyer is unit-demand in the multi-dimensional setting, and define
FB-GFT, OPT-B, GFTSAPP as in the previous section. Also consider the following matching
market with n buyers and n sellers: for every i ∈ [n], buyer i has value drawn from DiB and seller i
has cost drawn from DiS . Let FB-GFTSD = Eb,s [maxi (bi −si )] be the first-best GFT of the matching
market defined above (which is the same as FB-GFT in the multi-dimensional unit-demand setting)
and SB-GFTSD be the second-best GFT. For any c > 1, suppose SB-GFTSD ≥ 1/c · FB-GFTSD ,
then
max{OPT-B, GFTSAPP } ≥
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1
· FB-GFT.
2c

Proof. We construct the following allocation rule x = {xi (b, s)}i∈[n] . For every i and b, s, let

xi (b, s) = 1 [i = argmaxk (ϕ̃k (bk ) − sk ) ∧ ϕ̃i (bi ) ≥ si ] .

Then x satisfies both properties in Lemma 7.20. By Lemma 7.20,
"
GFTSAPP ≥ Eb,s

#


X
+
(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si ) · xi (b, s) = Eb,s max(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si ) .
i

i

Moreover, by Lemma 5.4, we have that

SD

SB-GFT

+

≤ Eb,s max(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si )
i





+

+ Eb,s max(bi − τ̃i (si ))
i


.

Thus by Lemma 7.18, we have





1
+
+
max{OPT-B, GFTSAPP } ≥ · Eb,s max(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si ) + Eb,s max(bi − τ̃i (si ))
i
i
2
1
1
≥ · SB-GFTSD ≥
· FB-GFTSD .
2
2c

The main takeaway of Theorem 7.4 is that, if the largest gap between FB-GFTSD and SB-GFTSD
is at most (i.e. a constant) c for matching markets, then our mechanism is a 2c-approximation to
FB-GFT. Note that if the buyer is additive, such a reduction clearly exists: In the additive case,
items can be treated separately without impacting the IC constraint. Then performing a Buyer
(or Seller) Offering mechanism for every item separately obtains GFT at least SB-GFTSD , thus
approximating FB-GFT by the assumption. Theorem 7.4 shows that for a unit-demand buyer, a
similar reduction also exists using the SAPP mechanism.
On the other hand, finding a lower bound for our result (compared to OPT) is at least as hard
as finding a lower bound for the approximation ratio w.r.t. FB-GFT, and thus is at least as hard
as finding an instance in the matching market that separates FB-GFTSD from SB-GFTSD —a
problem that has long remained open. Indeed, even in bilateral trade, deciding whether the gap is
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finite or not is still open.

7.6

Some Lower-Bound Examples
1
r

Tight Example of the log



-Approximation.

Consider the case when n = 1 (bilateral

trade). We introduce an example provided by Blumrosen and Dobzinski [BD16]. They prove that
in this example, no fixed posted price mechanisms can achieve an approximation ratio better than
Ω(log(1/r)) compared to the first-best GFT. In addition, we will verify that the statement also
holds for the second-best GFT for the same example. It implies that our log( 1r )-approximation is
tight even compared to the second-best GFT.
Example 7.1 (Example in Bilateral Trading [BD16]). For any t > 0, consider a buyer and a seller
with values on the support [0, t]. Let λ =

1
.
1−e−t

Let F (b) = λ(1 − e−b ) with f (b) = λe−b and

G(s) = λ(es−t − e−t ) with g(s) = λes−t . Then
Z tZ
r = Pr[b ≥ s] =
0

b

λe−b · λes−t dsdb = λ2 · e−t (t − 1 + e−t ) =

0

Z tZ
FB-GFT =
0

b

(b − s)λe−b · λes−t dsdb = λ2 · (

0

t
t−1
+ t
t
e − 1 (e − 1)2

t−2 t+2
+ 2t )
et
e

In any fixed posted price mechanism, note that the mechanism always achieves a larger GFT by
choosing the same price for both agents. The gains from trade from posting at price p:
Z

pZ v

GFT(p) =
0

p

(b − s)λe−b · λes−t dbds = λ2 (

t + 2 2 p + 2 ep (t + 2 − p)
t+2 2
+ t − p+t −
) < λ2 ( 2t + t )
2t
2t
e
e
e
e
e
e

When t is sufficiently large, FB-GFT is about λ2 ·
t+2
e2t

t−2
et

while GFT(p) is at most λ2 ·

2
et ,

as

is negligible. Thus GFT(p) = O(1/t) · FB-GFT. On the other hand, r = Θ( ett ) for large t,

log( 1r ) = Θ(t). Thus GFT(p) = O(1/ log( 1r )) · FB-GFT.
We now verify that GFT(p) = O(1/ log( 1r )) · OPT for any p ∈ [0, t] and sufficiently large t.
By [BCWZ17],
OPT ≥ Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) − s ≥ 0]]
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For the above distribution, ϕ(b) = b −

1−F (b)
f (b)

= b − 1 + eb−t is monotonic increasing in b. Thus

ϕ̃(b) = ϕ(b).
1
· Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) − s ≥ 0]] =
λ2

b−1+eb−t

Z tZ
0

(b − s) · es−b−t dsdb

0

Z tZ

b−1

(b − s) · es−b−t dsdb
0
0
Z tZ b
k · e−k dkdb
= e−t ·
0
1
Z t
b
= e−t ·
(−e−k (k + 1) 1 )ds
0

Z t
2
−t
−b
=e ·
− e (b + 1) ds
e
0
2t t + 2
= e−t · ( + t − 2)
e
e
≥

Thus when t is sufficiently large, OPT = Ω(λ2 ·

t
et )

(k = b − s)

and we have GFT(p) = O(1/t) · OPT =

O(1/ log( 1r )) · OPT.
Example 7.2 (GFTSAPP is unboundedly higher than GFTFPP ). For any fixed n, consider the
following instance for an additive buyer. D1B and D1S are distributions in Example 7.1 some sufficiently large t. Pick any C > 0. For every i = 2, ldots, n, DiB is a degenerate distribution at C,
i.e. the value is C with probability 1. Distribution DiS takes value C +  with probability 1 −
and C with probability

1
2n ,

1
2n

for some small  > 0. As shown in Example 7.2, when t is large,

r1 = Θ( ett ) < n1 . For i ≥ 2, ri =

1
2n .

Thus all items are “unlikely to trade” items (ri < n1 ).

Note that for i ≥ 2, bi is always no more than si . By Lemma 7.22,
!
GFTSAPP = Ω

X

Ebi ,si [(ϕ̃i (bi ) − si )+ ]

= Ω(Eb1 ,s1 [(ϕ̃1 (b1 ) − s1 )+ ])

i

In Example 7.1, when t is sufficiently large, Eb1 ,s1 [(ϕ̃1 (b1 )−s1 )+ ] = Ω(λ2 · ett ). On the other hand,
any fixed price mechanism can only gain positive GFT from item 1. Thus GFTFPP = O(λ2 ·
which can be arbitrarily far from GFTSAPP as t goes to infinity.
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2
et ),

Dependence on r is Necessary.

We show that the dependence on r = mini ri is necessary for

the approximation result of fixed posted price mechanisms. More formally, suppose fixed posted
price mechanisms achieves an approximation ratio of f (r1 , . . . , rn ), for some n-ary function f . We
will show that f (r1 , . . . , rn ) = Ω(log(1/r)). Consider the instance shown in Example 7.2. Clearly
FB-GFT = E [(b1 − s1 )+ ]. Since all items other than item 1 always contribute 0 gains from trade,
no fixed posted price mechanism can achieve better than Ω(log(1/r1 ))-approximation to the firstbest. Thus f (r1 , . . . , rn ) = Ω(log(1/r1 )). Similarly we have f (r1 , . . . , rn ) = Ω(log(1/ri )) for all
i = 1, . . . , n. Thus f (r1 , . . . , rn ) = Ω(log(1/r)).
SAPP Mechanism is Necessary. We provide the following example (Example 7.3) to show
that the class of SAPP mechanisms defined in Mechanism 7.4.3 is necessary to obtain any finite
approximation ratio to OPT. More specifically, we show that in bilateral trading, the best FPP
mechanism and the mechanism used in Lemma 7.18 can both be arbitrarily far from OPT.
Example 7.3. For every positive integer m ≥ 2, consider the bilateral trading instance where the
seller’s and buyer’s (discrete) distributions are shown in the following tables. In the table, g(s) (or
f (b)) represents the density of the corresponding value in the support.
s
g(s)
τ (s)

0

2m − 2m−1

1
2m

1
2m
2m

0

...
...
...

2m − 2k
1
2k+1
2m

...
...
...

2m − 1
1
2
2m

Table 7.1: Seller’s Distribution

b
f (b)

2m − 2L
pL

...
...

2m − 2k
pk

...
...

2m − 1
p0

Table 7.2: Buyer’s Distribution
For the seller’s distribution, one can verify that the virtual value τ (s) is 0 if s = 0 and 2m
elsewhere.14
14. For discrete distributions, the virtual value for the seller’s distribution is defined as τ (s) = s +
where s0 is the largest type in the support that is smaller than s.
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P

t<s

g(t)·(s−s0 )
,
g(s)

For the buyer’s distribution, choose L = bm − log(m)c. Then define the sequence {pk }L
k=0
as follows: Construct the sequence {qk }L
k=0 with q0 = 1, q1 =
m−k+2
m−k

· qk−1 . Then for every k = 0, . . . , L define pk = qk /
P
By induction, we have kj=0 qj = qk+1 · (m − k − 1). Thus

qk =

k
X

1
m−1 ,

and for every k = 2, . . . , L,

PL

j=0 qj

for every k.

pj = pk+1 · (m − k − 1).

(7.3)

j=0

Lemma 7.27. For any sufficiently large integer m, let M be the mechanism used in Lemma 7.18.15
Then in Example 7.3 we have

max{GFTFPP , GFT(M)} ≤ O(

1
) · OPT.
log(m)

Proof. In mechanism M (see Lemma 7.18), the buyer only trades with the seller when b ≥ τ (s).
Thus in Example 7.3, the item trades only when s = 0.

GFT(M) =

L
X

L

(2m − 2k ) · pk ·

X
1
≤
pk .
m
2
k=0

k=0

For FB-GFT, we have

FB-GFT =

≥

L
X



m−1
X



(2j − 2k ) · pk ·

k=0

j=k+1

L
X



k=0

pk · 

m−1
X
j=k+1

1
+
2j+1


(2m

2k )p

−
2m


k

L

2j−1 2m−1  1 X
+ m
≥ ·
pk · (m − k),
2j+1
2
4
k=0

where the first inequality follows from the fact that 2j − 2k ≥ 2j−1 for any j > k.
Now consider any fixed posted price mechanism. Clearly the largest GFT is achieved when the
posted prices are same for both the buyer and the seller. Without loss of generality we can assume
the posted price p lies in the support of distributions, i.e., p = 2m − 2k for k = 0, . . . , L. For any k,
15. In bilateral trading, the mechanism is essentially the Buyer Offering mechanism [BCWZ17]: The buyer picks a
take-it or leave-it price according to her value and the seller can choose whether to sell at that price.
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the mechanism with posted price p = 2m − 2k achieves GFT
k
X

m−1
X

j=0

i=k+1

Let Qk =

i

(2 − 2 ) · pj ·

Pk

1

j

j=0 pj

2i+1

(2m − 2j )pj
+
2m

!
≤

k
X

pj

j=0

m−1
X
i=k+1

2i
+1
2i+1

!
≤

k
X

pj · (m − k).

j=0

· (m − k). Note that by the choice of sequence {pk }L
k=0 in Example 7.3, we

have for any k = 0, . . . , L − 1 that

Qk+1 − Qk =

k+1
X

pj · (m − k − 1) −

j=0

k
X

pj · (m − k) = pk+1 · (m − k − 1) −

j=0

k
X

pj = 0.

j=0

Thus each Qk is the same value. Let this value be Q. Then Q = QL =
P
QL
Moreover, GFTFPP ≤ maxk Qk = Q. GFT(M) ≤ L
k=0 pk = m−L ≤

PL

j=0 pj ·(m−L)

1
log(m)

= m−L.

· Q. On the other

hand,

FB-GFT ≥

L
L k−1
1 XX
1 X
pk · (m − k) = ·
·
pj
4
4
L

1 X Qk−1
≥Q·
=
4
m−k+1
k=0

(Equation 7.3)

k=0 j=0

k=0

Z

m+1

m−L+1

When m is sufficiently large, we have FB-GFT ≥

Q
5

1
Q
dx =
· log
x
4



m+1
m−L+1


.

· log(m). Thus

log(m)
· max{GFTFPP , GFT(M)} ≤ FB-GFT.
5
It remains to verify that OPT is a constant factor of FB-GFT. By Lemma 5.5,

OPT ≥ Eb,s [(b − s) · 1[ϕ̃(b) − s ≥ 0]].
Now we calculate the buyer’s virtual value.16 We have that ϕ(2m − 1) = 2m − 1, and for every
16. For discrete distributions, the buyer’s virtual value is defined as ϕ(b) = b −
smallest type in the support that is larger than b.
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P

t>b

f (t)·(b0 −b)
,
f (b)

where b0 is the

k = 1, . . . , L,
Pk−1
m

k

m

k

ϕ(2 − 2 ) = (2 − 2 ) −

j=0

pj · 2k−1
pk

= 2m − 2k − 2k−1 (m − k) ≥ 2m − 2k · m,

thus ϕ(·) is monotone increasing and ϕ̃(b) = ϕ(b) for every b. Note that when b = 2m − 2k and
s ≤ 2m − 2k+log(m) , it holds that ϕ(b) ≥ s. We have

OPT ≥

L
X



m−1
X

(2j − 2k ) · pk ·


k=0

j=k+dlog(m)e

= FB-GFT −

L k+dlog(m)e−1
X
X
k=0

≥ FB-GFT −

(2j − 2k ) · pk ·

j=k+1

L k+dlog(m)e−1
X
X
k=0

1
+
2j+1

j=k+1

(2m

pk ·

2k )p

−
2m


k

1
2j+1

2j
2j+1

L

log(m)
log(m) X
pk = FB-GFT −
≥ FB-GFT −
.
2
2
k=0

Note that FB-GFT ≥

Q
5

· log(m) =

m−L
5

· log(m) ≥

We finish the proof.
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1
5

· log2 (m). Thus when m → ∞,

OPT
FB-GFT

→ 1.

Chapter 8

Conclusion and Open Problems
In many of the mechanism design problems, there is a discrepancy between theory and practice:
The mechanism that achieves the theoretically optimal objective and mechanisms used in practice,
are often quite different. Motivated by the existence of this discrepancy, in this thesis we addressed
the following question: Can we design simple mechanisms to approximate the optimal
mechanism?
In this thesis, we addressed three central mechanism design problems. The first follows from
Myerson’s seminal result on the revenue-optimal auction in the single-item case, as well as the
existence of many undesirable properties of the revenue-optimal auction in multi-item case. There
has been extensive research effort on designing simple and approximately-optimal mechanisms, but
no result has been found beyond a single buyer, or multiple buyers with linear valuations. Our
work presents a unified approach to approximate the optimal revenue in multi-item auctions, with
multiple buyers with non-linear (subadditive) valuations. We improve the approximate ratio for
many of the results in the literature, and generalize the result to broader case, when the buyer is
XOS or subadditive. The main open question following our results is:
Open Question 1. Can we design simple mechanisms that obtain a constant fraction of the optimal
revenue, for multiple buyers with valuations that are subadditive over independent items?
A large fraction of the proof in this work already applies to subadditive valuations. More
specifically, our upper bound for the optimal revenue from Theorem 3.2 holds for all subadditive
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valuations, and we have used it to obtain a constant factor approximation for a single subadditive
buyer and a O(log m)-approximation for multiple subadditive buyers. Our analysis for the term
Single and Tail also applies to subadditive valuations.
The only component that does not extend to subadditive valuations is the analysis of the Core.
Our proof is inspired by Feldman et al. [FGL15], who showed that there exists a sequential postedprice mechanism that is an O(1)-approximation to the optimal social welfare for bidders with XOS
valuations. Their proof makes heavy use of the supporting prices for XOS valuations, and the
approximation ratio degrades to O(log m) for subadditive valuations.
A recent breakthrough by Dutting et al. [DKL20] managed to improved the approximation
ratio of Feldman et al. for subadditive valuations. They proved an O(log log m)-approximation
to the optimal social welfare for buyers with subadditive valuations, using sequential posted-price
mechanisms. In the same paper, they also uses this result to achieve the same approximation
ratio to the optimal revenue, following a similar approach to our work. Thus to resolve the open
question above, it is worthwhile to further improve the approximation ratio proved in [DKL20]. In
particular,
Open Question 2. Can sequential posted-price mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the
optimal social welfare when buyers have subadditive valuations?
An astute reader may have noticed that our approximation results are only existential. Luckily,
the only nonconstructive part of our argument is finding the right β, which is essentially the
same as finding the ex-ante allocation probabilities of the optimal or an approximately optimal
mechanism. In Appendix A.5, we show how to find the right β when the buyers are symmetric,
but the asymmetric case remains open.
Open Question 3. Can we design a polynomial time algorithm to compute these simple and
approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for constrained additive and XOS valuations?
As the second mechanism design problem, we studied profit maximization in multi-item auctions, which is considered as a more general model of revenue maximization. We proposed a novel
permit-selling mechanism, and showed a constant factor approximation to the optimal profit. Our
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result applies to a single constrained-additive buyer and multiple buyers with selectable feasibility
constraints (such as Matroid). The main open question following this result is whether we can
generalize the result to more general settings.
Open Question 4. In the profit maximization problem, can we design simple mechanisms that obtain a constant fraction of the optimal profit, for a single subadditive buyer, or multiple constrainedadditive buyers?
The last but not least mechanism design problem discussed in this thesis is approximating
gains from trade in two-sided markets. While the impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [MS83] shows that no truthful and budget balanced mechanisms can achieve full GFT and
the optimal mechanism is rather complex even in the simplist bilateral trade setting, our work
provide simple mechanisms that approximate the optimal GFT, in bilateral trade and more general
two-sided markets.
The main open question in two-sided markets follows from the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result. It shows that even in bilateral trade, the unconstrained first-best GFT is strictly
larger than the second-best GFT, the maximum GFT attainable by truthful and budget balanced
mechanisms. However, it remains open whether the two has a finite gap.
Open Question 5. How big is the gap between the first-best GFT and second-best GFT in two-sided
markets?
We remark that our unconditional approximation proved in this thesis are all compared to the
second-best GFT, while all other results in the literature compares to the first-best GFT. If the
gap between the first-best GFT and second-best GFT is shown to be infinite, then our proposed
framework to approximate the second-best GFT becomes an essential step of this problem.
In the thesis we made a first step on studying GFT approximation in multi-dimensional twosided markets. We considered a special setting with a single buyer and multiple unit-supply sellers
and proved an unconditional O(log m)-approximation. The open questions following this result is
whether the result can be improved or generalized.
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Open Question 6. Can we design a truthful and budget balanced mechanism that approximates
the second-best GFT, in two-sided markets with multiple buyers or multi-dimensional sellers?
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Appendix A

Missing Details from Chapter 3
A.1

Proof of Theorem 3.1

Proof of Theorem 3.1: When λ is useful, we can simplify function L(λ, σ, p) by removing the term
P
P
associated with p and replacing t0 ∈T + λ(ti , t0i ) with fi (ti )+ t0 ∈Ti λ(t0i , ti ). After the simplification,
i

i

i

we have

L(λ, σ, p) =

n X
X

fi (ti ) ·

i=1 ti ∈Ti

X

σiS (ti )·

S⊆[m]




vi (ti , S) −

=

1
fi (ti )

n
X

X

i=1 ti ∈Ti

X


λi (t0i , ti ) vi (t0i , S) − vi (ti , S) 

t0i ∈Ti

fi (ti ) ·

X

σiS (ti ) · Φi (ti , S),

S⊆[m]

which is exactly the virtual welfare of σ with respect to λ. Now, we only need to prove that
L(λ, σ, p) is greater than the revenue of M . Let us think of L(λ, σ, p) using Expression (3.1). Since
M is a BIC mechanism,
X



vi (ti , S) · σiS (ti ) − σiS (t0i ) − (pi (ti ) − pi (t0i ) ≥ 0

S⊆[m]
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for any i, ti ∈ Ti and t0i ∈ Ti+ . Also, all the dual variables λ are nonnegative. Therefore, it is clear
that L(λ, σ, p) is at least as large as the revenue of M .
When λ∗ is the optimal dual variable, by strong duality, we know maxσ∈P (D),p L(λ∗ , σ, p) equals
to the revenue of M ∗ = (σ ∗ , p∗ ). But we also know that L(λ∗ , σ ∗ , p∗ ) is at least as large as the
revenue of M ∗ , therefore σ ∗ maximizes the virtual welfare. 2

A.2

Proof of Lemma 3.4
(β)

Lemma A.1. For any flow λi

that respects the partial specification in Figure 3.3, the correspond-

(βi )

(βi )

ing virtual valuation function Φi
• vi (ti , S\{j}) + Vi (tij ) −

1
fi (ti )

of vi

P

t0i ∈Ti

for any buyer i is:



(β )
λ(t0i , ti ) · Vi (t0ij ) − Vi (tij ) , if ti ∈ Rj i and j ∈ S.

• vi (ti , S), otherwise.
Proof of Lemma A.1: The proof follows the definitions of the virtual valuation function (Definition 3.2) and relaxed valuation (Definition 3.3). We use ti,−j = htij 0 ij 0 6=j to denote bidder i’s
(βi )

information for all items except item j. If ti ∈ Rj

(βi )

and j ∈ S, vi
(βi )

Since λ(ti , t0i ) > 0 only when ti,−j = t0i,−j and t0i ∈ Rj

(βi )

, vi

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S\{j}) + Vi (tij ).

(t0i , S) = vi (t0i , S\{j}) + Vi (t0ij ) =

vi (ti , S\{j}) + Vi (t0ij ). Therefore,
(βi )

Φi

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S\{j}) + Vi (tij ) −


1 X
λ(t0i , ti ) · Vi (t0ij ) − Vi (tij )
fi (ti ) 0
ti ∈Ti

(βi )

If ti ∈ Rj

(β )

(βi )

and j ∈
/ S or ti ∈ R0 i , then vi

(β )

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S). If ti ∈ R0 i , there is no flow

(βi )

entering ti except from the source, so clearly Φi

(βi )

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S). If ti ∈ Rj

, then for any t0i

that only differs from ti in the j-th coordinate, we have vi (t0i , S) = vi (ti , S), because j 6∈ S. Hence,
(βi )

Φi

(ti , S) = vi (ti , S). 2

Proof of Lemma 3.4:
(β )

Let Ψij i (ti ) = Vi (tij ) −

1
fi (ti )

P

t0i ∈Ti



λ(t0i , ti ) · Vi (t0ij ) − Vi (tij ) . According to Lemma A.1, it
(βi )

suffices to prove that for any j > 0, any ti ∈ Rj

(β )

, Ψij i (ti ) ≤ ϕ̃ij (Vi (tij )).
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(βi )

Claim A.1. For any type ti ∈ Rj

, if we only allow flow from type t0i to ti , where tik = t0ik for all

k 6= j and t0ij ∈ argmins∈Tij ∧Vi (s)>Vi (tij ) Vi (s), and the flow λ(t0i , ti ) equals

fij (tij )
Prv∼Fij [v=Vi (tij )]

fraction

of the total in flow to t0i , then there exists a flow λ such that

(β )

Ψij i (ti ) = ϕij (Vi (tij )) = Vi (tij ) −


Vi (t0ij ) − Vi (tij ) · Prv∼Fij [v > Vi (tij )]
Prv∼Fij [v = Vi (tij )]

,

where ϕij (Vi (tij )) is the Myerson virtual value for Vi (tij ) with respect to Fij .
Proof. As the flow only goes from t0i and ti , where t0i and ti only differs in the j-th coordinate, and
tij ∈ argmaxs∈Tij ∧Vi (s)<Vi (t0ij ) Vi (s). If tij is a type with the largest Vi (tij ) value in Tij , then there is
(β )

no flow coming into it except the one from the source, so Ψij i (ti ) = Vi (tij ). For every other value
of tij , the in flow is exactly
Y
fij (tij )
fik (tik ) ·
Prv∼Fij [v = Vi (tij )]
k6=j

X

fij (x) =

x∈Tij :Vi (x)>Vi (tij )

Y
k

fik (tik ) ·

Prv∼Fij [v > Vi (tij )]
.
Prv∼Fij [v = Vi (tij )]
(βi )

This is because each type of the form (x, ti,−j ) with Vi (x) > Vi (tij ) is also in Rj

. So

fij (tij )
Prv∼Fij [v=Vi (tij )]

of all flow that enters these types will be passed down to ti (and possibly further, before going to
the sink), and the total amount of flow entering all of these types from the source is exactly
P
Q
(βi )
x∈Tij :Vi (x)>Vi (tij ) fij (x). Therefore, Ψij (ti ) = ϕij (Vi (tij )). Whenever there is no
k6=j fik (tik ) ·
(βi )

more type ti ∈ Rj

with smaller Vi (tij ) value, we push all the flow to the sink.

If Fij is regular, this completes our proof. When Fij is not regular, we can iron the virtual value
(βi )

function in the same way as in [CDW16]. Basically, for two types ti , t0i ∈ Rj
(β )

that only differ in

(β )

the j-th coordinate, if Ψij i (ti ) > Ψij i (t0i ) but Vi (tij ) < Vi (t0ij ), add a loop between ti and t0i with
(β )

(β )

a proper weight to make Ψij i (ti ) = Ψij i (t0i ).
(βi )

Lemma A.2. [CDW16] For any β and i, there exists a flow λi (β) such that for any ti ∈ Rj
(β )

Ψij i (ti ) ≤ ϕ̃ij (Vi (tij )).
2
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,

A.3

Analysis for the Single-Bidder Case

Proof of lemma 3.9: In Non-Favorite, since R0β = ∅, the corresponding term is simply 0. Notice
v(t, ·) is a monotone valuation for every t ∈ T ,

Non-Favorite(M ) =

X
t∈T

j∈[m]

≤

X

X

t∈T

j∈[m]

≤

X

X

f (t) ·
f (t) ·
f (t) ·

t∈T

X

h

(β)

i

(β)

iX

(β)

i

1 t ∈ Rj

·


X

(β)

σS (t) · v(t, S\{j}) +

S:j∈S

h

1 t ∈ Rj

X

(β)
σS (t) · v(t, S)

S:j ∈S
/

(β)

σS (t) · v(t, [m]\{j})

S

h

1 t ∈ Rj

· v(t, [m]\{j})

X (β)
(
σS (t) ≤ 1)
S

j∈[m]

P
Recall that for all t ∈ T and S ⊆ [m], v(t, S) ≤ v (t, S ∩ C(t))+ j∈S∩T (t) V (tj ). We will replace
P
v(t, [m]\{j}) above with v (t, ([m]\{j}) ∩ C(t)) + k∈([m]\{j})∩T (t) V (tk ). First, the contribution
from v (t, ([m]\{j}) ∩ C(t)) is upper bounded by the Core(M ).

X

f (t) ·

t∈T

≤

X

X

h
i
(β)
1 t ∈ Rj
· v (t, ([m]\{j}) ∩ C(t))

j∈[m]

f (t) ·

t∈T

X

h
i
X
(β)
1 t ∈ Rj
· v (t, C(t)) =
f (t) · v (t, C(t))

(Core(M ))

t∈T

j∈[m]

The inequality comes from the monotonicity of v(t, ·) and the fact that for every t only stays
(β)

in one region Rj .
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Next, we upper bound the contribution from
X

=

X

f (t) ·

t∈T

j∈[m]

X

X

f (t) ·

t∈T

h
i
(β)
1 t ∈ Rj
·

P

k∈([m]\{j})∩T (t) V

X

V (tk )

k∈([m]\{j})∩T (t)

h
i
(β)
V (tj ) · 1 t 6∈ Rj

j∈T (t)

X
X
V (tj ) · 1 [∃k 6= j, V (tk ) ≥ V (tj )]
≤
f (t) ·
t∈T

X
=
j

(tk ) by the Tail(M ).

(β)

(Definition of Rj )

j∈T (t)

X

fj (tj ) · V (tj ) · Pr [∃k 6= j, V (tk ) ≥ V (tj )]

tj :V (tj )≥c

t−j

(Tail(M ))

2
Proof of Lemma 3.12: We argue the three properties one by one.
• Monotonicity: For all t ∈ T and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], U ∩ C(t) ⊆ V ∩ C(t). Since v(t, ·) is monotone,
v 0 (t, U ) = v (t, U ∩ C(t)) ≤ v (t, V ∩ C(t)) = v 0 (t, V ).

Thus, v 0 (t, ·) is monotone.
• Subadditivity: For all t ∈ T and U, V ⊆ [m], notice (U ∪ V ) ∩ C(t) = (U ∩ C(t)) ∪ (V ∩ C(t)),
we have
v 0 (t, U ∪V ) = v ((t, (U ∩ C(t)) ∪ (V ∩ C(t))) ≤ v (t, U ∩ C(t))+v (t, V ∩ C(t)) = v 0 (t, U )+v 0 (t, V ).

• No externalities: For any t ∈ T , S ⊆ [m], and any t0 ∈ T such that tj = t0j for all j ∈ S, to
prove v 0 (t, S) = v 0 (t0 , S), it is enough to show S ∩ C(t) = S ∩ C(t0 ). Since V (tj ) = V (t0j ) for any
j ∈ S, j ∈ S ∩ C(t) if and only if j ∈ S ∩ C(t0 ).
2
n
o
Proof of Lemma 3.13: For any t, t0 ∈ T , and set X, Y ⊆ [m], define set H = j ∈ X ∩ Y : tj = t0j .
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Since v 0 (·, ·) has no externalities, v 0 (t0 , H) = v 0 (t, H). Therefore,

|v 0 (t, X) − v 0 (t0 , Y )| = max v 0 (t, X) − v 0 (t0 , Y ), v 0 (t0 , Y ) − v 0 (t, X)

≤ max v 0 (t, X) − v 0 (t0 , H), v 0 (t0 , Y ) − v 0 (t, H)
(Monotonicity)

≤ max v 0 (t, X\H), v 0 (t0 , Y \H)
(Subadditivity)


= max v (t, (X\H) ∩ C(t)) , v t0 , (Y \H) ∩ C(t)
(Definition of v 0 (·, ·))
≤ c · max {|X\H|, |Y \H|}
≤ c · (|X∆Y | + |X ∩ Y | − |H|)

The second last inequality is because both v(t, ·) and v(t0 , ·) are subadditive and for any item
j ∈ C(t) (C(t0 )) the single-item valuation V (tj ) (V (t0j )) is less than c. 2

A.4

Missing Proofs for the Multi-Bidder Case

Proof of Lemma 3.16: We replace every vi (ti , S) in Non-Favorite(M, β) with vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti )) +
P
j∈S∩Ti (ti ) Vi (tij ). Let the contribution from vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti )) be the first term and the contribution
P
from j∈S∩Ti (ti ) Vi (tij ) be the second term.
XX
i

ti ∈Ti

XX
i

h
i X
(β )
(β)
fi (ti ) · 1 ti ∈ R0 i ·
σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))+
S⊆[m]

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

X

h

(βi )

1 ti ∈ Rj

i

·

j∈[m]




X



(β)

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , (S\{j}) ∩ Ci (ti )) +

≤

i

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

X

(β)
σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))

S:j6∈S

S:j∈S

XX

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti ))

(Core(M, β))

S⊆[m]

The inequality comes from the Monotonicity of vi (ti , ·) by replacing vi (ti , (S\{j}) ∩ Ci (ti )) with
vi (ti , S ∩ Ci (ti )).
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(β )

For the second term, notice that when ti ∈ R0 i , Ti (ti ) = ∅. It can be rewritten as:



XX

fi (ti ) ·

X

ti ∈Ti

j∈[m]

=

XX

X

≤

XX

=

XX

≤

XX

i

i

i

i

i

fi (ti ) ·

ti ∈Ti

j

(βi )

1 ti ∈ Rj

i

·

X

(β)

σiS (ti ) ·

S:j∈S

h

Vi (tik ) +

(βi )

(βi )

i

(β)

· πij (ti )

fi (ti ) ·

(β)

(β)

(Recall πij (ti ) =

X

σiS (ti ) ·

X

k∈S∩Ti (ti )
(β)

σiS (ti ))

S:j∈S

h

X

X
S:j6∈S

k∈(S\{j})∩Ti (ti )

i

Vi (tij ) · 1 ti 6∈ Rj

X

j∈Ti (ti )

ti ∈Ti

ti ∈Ti

h

Vi (tij ) · 1 ti 6∈ Rj

β
(πij
(ti ) ≤ 1)

j∈Ti (ti )

X

fi (ti ) ·

Vi (tij ) ·

i
X h
(β )
1 ti ∈ Rk i
k6=j

j∈Ti (ti )

X

(β )

(ti ∈
/ R0 i )

fij (tij ) · Vi (tij ) ·

tij :Vi (tij )≥βij +ci

X
k6=j

Pr [Vi (tik ) − βik ≥ Vi (tij ) − βij ]
tik

(Tail(M, β))

2
Lemma A.3. Let {xij }i∈[n],j∈[m] be a set of nonnegative numbers. For any buyer i, any type
ti ∈ Ti , let Xi (ti ) = {j | Vi (tij ) < xij }, and let

v̄i (ti , S) = vi (ti , S ∩ Xi (ti )),

for any set S ⊆ [m]. Then for any bidder i, any type ti ∈ Ti , v̄i (ti , ·), satisfies monotonicity,
subadditivity and no externalities.
Proof of Lemma A.3: We will argue these three properties one by one.
• Monotonicity: For all ti ∈ Ti and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], since vi (ti , ·) is monotone,

v̄i (ti , U ) = vi (ti , U ∩ Xi (ti )) ≤ vi (ti , V ∩ Xi (ti )) = v̄(ti , V )

Thus v̄i (ti , ·) is monotone.
• Subadditivity: For all ti ∈ Ti and U, V ⊆ [m], (U ∪ V ) ∩ Xi (ti ) = (U ∩ Xi (ti )) ∪ (V ∩ Xi (ti )).
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Vi (tik )

Since vi (ti , ·) is subadditive, we have

v̄i (ti , U ∪ V ) = vi (ti , (U ∩ Xi (ti )) ∪ (V ∩ Xi (ti )))
≤ vi (ti , U ∩ Xi (ti )) + vi (ti , V ∩ Xi (ti )) = v̄i (ti , U ) + v̄i (ti , V ).

• No externalities: For any ti ∈ Ti , S ⊆ [m], and any t0i ∈ Ti such that tij = t0ij for all j ∈ S, to
prove v̄i (ti , S) = v̄i (t0i , S), it suffices to show S ∩ Xi (ti ) = S ∩ Xi (t0i ). Since Vi (tij ) = Vi (t0ij ),
for any item j ∈ S, j ∈ S ∩ Xi (ti ) if and only if j ∈ S ∩ Xi (t0i ).
2
Proof of Lemma 3.25: By Lemma A.3 and Definition 3.9, v̂i (ti , ·) satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities.





v̂i (ti , S 0 ) = vi ti , S 0 ∩ Yi (ti ) ≥ vi ti , S 0 ∩ Yi (ti ) ∩ Ci (ti ) = vi0 ti , S 0 ∩ Yi (ti ) .
Since S 0 ∩ Yi (ti ) ⊆ S,
X


vi0 ti , S 0 ∩ Yi (ti ) ≥

j∈S 0 ∩Yi (ti )

γjS (ti ) =

X

γ̂jS (ti ).

j∈S 0

(k)

for all j ∈ S, we have min{tij , Qj + τi } ≥ γ̂jS (ti ). Therefore, v̂i (ti , S) ≥

P

j∈S

γ̂jS (ti ). 2

Proof of Lemma 3.27: We first prove that µi (·, ·) is τi -Lipschitz. For any ti , t0i ∈ Ti and set




P
P
X, Y ∈ [m], let X ∗ ∈ argmaxS⊆X v̂i (ti , S) − j∈S Qj , Y ∗ ∈ argmaxS⊆Y v̂i (t0i , S) − j∈S Qj .
Recall that v̂i (ti , X ∗ ) = vi (ti , {j | (j ∈ X ∗ ) ∧ (Vi (tij ) < Qj + τi )}). This means that for every k ∈
X ∗ , Vi (tik ) must be less than Qk + τi , because otherwise µi (ti , X ∗ ) < µi (ti , X ∗ \{k}). Therefore,
v̂i (ti , S) = vi (ti , S) for all S ⊆ X ∗ . Since vi (ti , ·) is subadditive, vi (ti , X ∗ ) ≤ vi (ti , X ∗ \{k})+Vi (tik ).
So by the optimality of X ∗ , it must be that Vi (tik ) ≥ Qk for all k ∈ X ∗ . Similarly, we can show
that for every k ∈ Y ∗ , Vi (t0ik ) ∈ [Qk , Qk + τi ].
Now let set H = {j | j ∈ X ∩ Y ∧ tij = t0ij }, if µi (ti , X) > µi (t0i , Y ).
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X

µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , Y ) = v̂i (ti , X ∗ ) −





Qj  − v̂i (t0i , Y ∗ ) −

j∈X ∗




X

≤ v̂i (ti , X ∗ ) −

X
j∈Y



Qj 

∗


X

Qj  − v̂i (t0i , X ∗ ∩ H) −

j∈X ∗

Qj 

(Optimality of Y ∗ and X ∗ ∩ H ⊆ Y )

j∈X ∗ ∩H

≤v̂i (ti , X ∗ ) − v̂i (ti , X ∗ ∩ H) −

X

(No externalities of v̂i (ti , ·))

Qj

j∈X ∗ \H

≤v̂i (ti , X ∗ \H) −

X

Qj

(Subadditivity of v̂i (ti , ·))

j∈X ∗ \H

≤τi · |X ∗ \H|

(Vi (tij ) ∈ [Qj , Qj + τi ] for all j ∈ X ∗ )

≤τi · |X\H|
Similarly, if µi (ti , X) ≤ µi (t0i , Y ), |µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , Y )| ≤ τi · |Y \H|. Thus, µi (·, ·) is τi -Lipschitz
as
µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , Y ) ≤ τi · max {|X\H|, |Y \H|} ≤ τi · (|X∆Y | + |X ∩ Y | − |H|).
Monotonicity follows directly from the definition of µi (ti , ·). Next, we argue subadditivity. For


P
all U, V ⊆ [m], let S ∗ ∈ argmaxS⊆U ∪V v̂i (ti , S) − j∈S Qj , X = S ∗ ∩ U ⊆ U , Y = S ∗ \X ⊆ V .
Since v̂i (ti , ·) is a subadditive valuation,

µi (ti , U ∪V ) = v̂i (ti , S ∗ )−

X

j∈S ∗

 

Qj ≤ v̂i (ti , X) −

X
j∈X

Qj +v̂i (ti , Y ) −


X

Qj  ≤ µi (ti , U )+µi (ti , V )

j∈Y

Finally, we argue that µi (ti , ·) has no externalities. Consider a set S, and types ti , t0i ∈ Ti such
P
that t0ij = tij for all j ∈ S. For any S 0 ⊆ S, since v̂i (ti , ·) has no externalities, v̂i (ti , S 0 )− j∈S 0 Qj =
P
v̂i (t0i , S 0 ) − j∈S 0 Qj . Thus, µi (ti , S) = µi (t0i , S). 2
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A.5

Efficient Approximation for Symmetric Bidders

In this section, we sketch how to compute the RSPM and ASPE to approximate the optimal revenue
in polynomial time for symmetric bidders1 . For any given BIC mechanism M , one can follow our
proof to construct in polynomial time an RSPM and an ASPE such that the better of the two
achieves a constant fraction of M ’s revenue. We will describe the construction of the RSPM and
the ASPE separately in this section. The difficulty of applying the method described above to
construct the desired simple mechanisms is that we need to know an (approximately) revenuemaximizing mechanism M ∗ . We will show how to circumvent this difficulty when the bidders are
symmetric.
Indeed, we can directly construct an RSPM that approximates the PostRev. As we have
restricted the buyers to purchase at most one item in an RSPM, the PostRev is upper bounded
by the optimal revenue of the unit-demand setting where buyer i has value Vi (tij ) for item j when
her type is ti . By [CDW16], we know that the optimal revenue in this unit-demand setting is upper
bounded by 4OPTCopies-UD , so one can simply use the RSPM constructed in [CHMS10] to extract
revenue at least

PostRev
.
24

Note that the construction is independent of M .

Unlike the RSPM, our construction for the ASPE heavily relies on β which depends on M
(Lemma 3.6). Given β, we first compute ci s according to Definition 3.6. Next, we compute the
Qj s (Definition 3.7). Finally, we compute the τi s (Defintion 3.8) and use them to compute the
entry fee (Definition 3.10). A few steps of the algorithm above requires sampling from the type
distributions, but it is not hard to argue that a polynomial number of samples suffices. The main
reason that the information about M is necessary is because our construction crucially relies on the
choice of β. Next, we argue that for symmetric bidders, we can essentially choose a β that satisfies
all requirements in Lemma 3.6 for all mechanisms.
When bidders are symmetric, the important observation is that the optimal mechanism must
also be symmetric, and for any symmetric mechanism we can directly construct a β that satisfies all
the requirements in Lemma 3.6. For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], choose βij such that Prtij [Vi (tij ) ≥ βij ] =
1. Bidders are symmetric if for any two bidders i and i0 , we have vi (·, ·) = vi0 (·, ·) and Dij = Di0 j for all j.
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b
n.

Clearly, this choice satisfies property (i) in Lemma 3.6. Furthermore, the ex-ante probability for

any bidder i to win item j is the same in any symmetric mechanism, and therefore is no more than
1/n. Hence, property (ii) in Lemma 3.6 is also satisfied. Given this β, we can essentially follow the
algorithm mentioned above to construct the ASPE. The only difference is that we no longer know
the σ, which is required when computing the Qj s. This can be resolved by considering the welfare
maximizing mechanism M 0 with respect to v 0 . We compute the prices Qj using the allocation
rule of M 0 and construct our ASPE. As M 0 is also symmetric, our β satisfies all requirements
in Lemma 3.6 with respect to M 0 . Therefore, Lemma 3.31 implies that either this ASPE or the
RSPM constructed above has at least a constant fraction of Core(M 0 , β) as revenue. Since M 0 is
welfare maximizing, Core(M 0 , β) ≥ Core(M ∗ , β), where M ∗ is the revenue optimal mechanism.
Therefore, we construct in polynomial time a simple mechanism whose revenue is a constant fraction
of the optimal BIC revenue.

A.6

Proof of Lemma 3.3

We first prove some properties of v (β) , which will be useful for proving Lemma 3.3.
(βi )

Lemma A.4. For any βi , ti ∈ Ti and S ∈ [m], vi

(ti , S) ≥ vi (ti , S).

Proof. This follows from the fact that vi (ti , ·) is a subadditive function over bundles of items for
all ti .
(βi )

Lemma A.5. For any βi and ti ∈ Ti , vi

(ti , ·) is a monotone, subadditive function over the items.

Proof. Monotonicity follows directly from the monotonicity of vi (ti , ·). We only argue subadditivity
(β )

(βi )

here. If ti belongs to R0 i , vi
(βi )

belongs to Rj
(βi )

vi

(βi )

(ti , U ) + vi
(βi )

U . Then vi
(βi )

vi

(ti , ·) = vi (ti , ·). So it is clearly a subadditive function. If ti
(βi )

for some j > 0 and j is not in either U or V , then clearly vi

(ti , U ∪ V ) ≤

(ti , V ). If j is in one of the two sets, without loss of generality let’s assume it is in
(βi )

(ti , U )+vi

(ti , V ) = vi (ti , U \{j})+Vi (tij )+vi (ti , V ) ≥ vi (ti , V ∪(U \{j}))+Vi (tij ) =

(ti , U ∪ V ).

Here we prove a stronger version of Lemma 3.3.
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Lemma A.6. For any β, any absolute constant η ∈ (0, 1) and any BIC mechanism M for subadditive valuations {vi (ti , ·)}i∈[n] with ti ∼ Di for all i, there exists a BIC mechanism M (β) for
(βi )

valuations {vi
1.

P

ti ∈Ti

(ti , ·)}i∈[n] with ti ∼ Di for all i, such that

fi (ti ) ·

P

S:j∈S

(β)

σiS (ti ) ≤

P

P

ti ∈Ti

fi (ti ) ·

P P

P

S:j∈S

σiS (ti ), for all i and j,

2. Rev(M, v, D) ≤
1
1−η

· Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) +

1
η

·

i

ti ∈Ti



(β)
(βi )
f
(t
)
·
σ
(t
)
·
v
(t
,
S)
−
v
(t
,
S)
.
i
i
i i
S⊆[m] i i
i
iS

Rev(M, v, D) (or Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D)) is the revenue of the mechanism M (or M (β) ) while the
(βi )

buyers’ types are drawn from D and buyer i’s valuation is vi (ti , ·) (or vi

(ti , ·)). σiS (ti ) (or

(β)

σiS (ti )) is the probability of buyer i receiving exactly bundle S when her reported type is ti in
mechanism M (or M (β) ).
Proof of lemma A.6: Readers who are familiar with the -BIC to BIC reduction [HKM11, BH11,
DW12] might have already realized that the problem here is quite similar. Our proof will follow
essentially the same approach.
First, we construct mechanism M (β) , which has two phases:
Phase 1: Surrogate Sale
1. For each buyer i, create ` − 1 replicas and ` surrogates sampled i.i.d. from Di . The value of
` will be specified later.
2. Ask each buyer to report her type ti .
3. For each buyer i, create a weighted bipartite graph with the replicas and the buyer i on
the left and the surrogates on the right. The edge weight between a replica (or buyer i)
with type ri and a surrogate with type si is the expected value for a bidder with valuation
(βi )

vi

(ri , ·) to receive buyer i’s interim allocation in M when she reported si as her type

subtract the interim payment of buyer i multiplied by (1 − η). Formally, the weight is
P
(βi )
(ri , S) − (1 − η)pi (si ), where pi (si ) is the interim payment for buyer i if she
S σiS (si ) · vi
reported si .
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4. Compute the VCG matching and prices on the bipartite graph created for each buyer i. If a
replica (or bidder i) is unmatched in the VCG matching, match her to a random unmatched
surrogate. The surrogate selected for buyer i is whoever she is matched to.
Phase 2: Surrogate Competition
1. Apply mechanism M on the type profiles of the selected surrogates ~s. Let Mi (~s) and Pi (~s)
be the corresponding allocated bundle and payment of buyer i.
2. If buyer i is matched to her surrogate in the VCG matching, give her bundle Mi (~s) and charge
her (1 − η) · Pi (~s) plus the VCG price. If buyer i is not matched in the VCG matching, award
them nothing and charge them nothing.
Lemma A.7 ( [HKM11]). If all buyers play M (β) truthfully, then the distribution of types of the
surrogate chosen by buyer i is exactly Di .
Proof. In the mechanism, first the buyer i’s type is sampled from the distribution, then we sampled
` − 1 replicas and ` surrogates i.i.d. from the same distribution. Now, imagine a different order of
sampling. We first sample the ` replicas and ` surrogates, then we pick one replica to be buyer i
uniformly at random. The two different orders above provide exactly the same joint distribution
over the replicas, surrogates and buyer i. So we only need to argue that in the second order
of sampling, the distribution of types of the surrogate chosen by buyer i is exactly Di . Note
that the perfect matching (VCG matching plus the uniform random matching with the leftover
replicas/surrogates) only depends on the types but not the identity of the node (replica or buyer
i). So we can decide who is buyer i after we have decided the perfect matching. Since buyer i is
chosen uniformly at random among the replicas, the chosen surrogate is also uniformly at random.
Clearly, the distribution of the types of a surrogate chosen uniformly at random is also Di . The
assumption that buyer i is reporting truthfully is crucial, because otherwise the distribution of
buyer i’s reported type will be different from the type of a replica, and in that case, we cannot use
the second sampling order.
Lemma A.8. M (β) is a BIC mechanism with respect to valuation v (β) .
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Proof. We need to argue that for every buyer i reporting truthfully is a best response, if every
other buyer is truthful. In the VCG mechanism, buyer i faces a competition with the replicas to
win a surrogate. If buyer i has type ti , then her value for winning a surrogate with type si in the
P
(β )
VCG mechanism is S σiS (si ) · vi i (ti , S) − (1 − η)pi (si ) due to Lemma A.7. Clearly, if buyer i
reports truthfully, the weights on the edges between her and all the surrogates will be exactly her
value for winning those surrogates. Since buyer i is in a VCG mechanism, reporting the true edge
weights is a dominant strategy for her, therefore reporting truthfully is also a best response for her
assuming the other buyers are truthful. It is critical that the other buyers are reporting truthfully,
otherwise we cannot invoke Lemma A.7 and buyer i’s value for winning a surrogate with type si
may be different from the weight on the corresponding edge.
Lemma A.9. For any i and j,

P

ti ∈Ti

fi (ti ) ·

P

S:j∈S

(β)

σiS (ti ) ≤

P

ti ∈Ti

fi (ti ) ·

P

S:j∈S

σiS (ti ).

Proof. The LHS is the ex-ante probability for buyer i to win item j in M (β) , and the RHS is the
corresponding probability in M . By Lemma A.7, we know the surrogate selected by buyer i is
participating in M against all other surrogates whose types are drawn from D−i . Therefore, the
ex-ante probability for the surrogate chosen by buyer i to win item j is the same as RHS. Clearly,
the chosen surrogate’s ex-ante probability for winning any item should be at least as large as the
ex-ante probability for buyer i to win the item in M (β) .
Next, we want to compare Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) with Rev(M, v, D). The following simple Lemma
relates both quantities to the expected prices charged to the surrogates by mechanism M . As in
the proof of Lemma A.7, we change the order of the sampling. We first sample ` replicas and `
surrogates then select a replica uniformly at random to be buyer i. Let ski and rik be the type of
the k-th surrogate and replica, s = (s1i , . . . , s`i ), ri = (ri1 , . . . , ri` ) and V (s, ri ) be the VCG matching
between surrogates and replicas with types s and ri . We will slightly abuse notation by using ski
(or rij ) ∈ V (s, ri ) to denote that ski (or rij ) is matched in the VCG matching V (s, ri ).
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Lemma A.10. For every buyer i, her expected payments in M (β) is at least

(1 − η) · Es,ri 

X

ski ∈V (s,ri )


pi (ski ) 
,
`

and her expected payments in M is

X pi (sk )
i 
.
Es 
`


k∈[`]

Proof. The revenue of M (β) contains two parts – the prices paid by the chosen surrogates and the
revenue of the VCG mechanism. Let’s compute the first part. For buyer i and each realization
of ri and s only when the buyer i’s chosen surrogate is in V (s, ri ), she pays the surrogate price.
Since each surrogate is selected with probability 1/`, the expected surrogate price paid by buyer
i
hP
pi (ski )
. Since the VCG payments are nonnegative, we have
i is exactly (1 − η) · Es,ri
k
s ∈V (s,ri )
`
i

proved our first statement.
The expected payment from buyer i in M is Eti ∼Di [pi (ti )]. Since all ski is drawn from Di , this
hP
i
pi (ski )
is exactly the same as Es
.
k∈[`]
`
If the VCG matching is always perfect, then Lemma A.10 already shows that the revenue of
M (β) is at least (1 − η) fraction of the revenue of M . But since the VCG matching may not be
perfect, we need to show that the total expected price from surrogates who are not in the VCG
matching is small. We prove this in two steps. First, we consider another matching X(s, ri ) – a
maximal matching that only matches replicas and surrogates that have the same type, and show
that the expected cardinality of X(s, ri ) is close to `. Then we argue that for any realization ri
and s the total payments from surrogates that are in X(s, ri ) but not in V (s, ri ) is small.
Lemma A.11 ( [HKM11]). For every buyer i, the expected cardinality of a maximal matching that
p
only matches replicas and surrogates with the same type is at least ` − |Ti | · `.
The proof can be found in Hartline et al. [HKM11].
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Corollary A.1. Let R = maxi,ti ∈Ti maxS∈[m] vi (ti , S), then

Es,ri 



pi (ski ) 

X

`

ski ∈X(s,ri )



 r
X pi (sk )
|Ti |
i 
≥ Es 
−
· R.
`
`
k∈[`]

Proof. Since M is a IR mechanism when the buyers’ valuations are v, R ≥ pi (ti ) for any buyer i
and any type ti of i. Our claim follows from Lemma A.11.
Now we implement the second step of our argument. The plan is to show the total prices from
surrogates that are unmatched by going from X(s, ri ) to V (s, ri ). For any s, ri , V (s, ri ) ∪ X(s, ri )
can be decompose into a disjoint collection augmenting paths and cycles. If a surrogate is matched
in X(s, ri ) but not in V (s, ri ), then it must be the starting point of an augmenting path. The
following Lemma upper bounds the price of this surrogate.
Lemma A.12 (Adapted from [DW12]). For any buyer i and any realization of s and ri , let P be
an augmenting path that starts with a surrogate that is matched in X(s, ri ) but not in V (s, ri ). It


ρ(1) θ(1) ρ(2) θ(2)
ρ(k)
has the form of either (a) si , ri , si , ri , . . . , si
when the path ends with a surrogate,
or


ρ(1) θ(1) ρ(2) θ(2)
ρ(k) θ(k)
θ(j)
(b) si , ri , si , ri , . . . , si , ri
when the path ends with a replica, where ri is matched
ρ(j)

to si

ρ(j+1)

in X(s, ri ) and matched to si
X
ρ(j)

si



ρ(j)
pi s i
−
si

exists) for any j.



ρ(j)
pi s i
≤

X
ρ(j)

∈P ∩X(s,ri )

ρ(j+1)

in V (s, ri ) (whenever si

∈P ∩V (s,ri )

k−1

 

1 XX
ρ(j+1)
(β ) θ(j)
θ(j)
· vi i (ri , S) − vi (ri , S) .
·
σiS si
η
j=1 S

θ(j)

Proof. Since ri

ρ(j)

is matched to si

θ(j)

in X(s, ri ), ri

ρ(j)

must be equal to si

. M is a BIC mechanism

when buyers valuations are v, therefore the expected utility for reporting the true type is better
than lying. Hence, the following holds for all j:
X
S






 X






ρ(j+1)
θ(j)
ρ(j+1)
ρ(j)
θ(j)
ρ(j)
· vi ri , S − pi si
σiS si
· vi ri , S − pi si
≥
σiS si
S
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(A.1)

The VCG matching finds the maximum weight matching, so the total edge weights in path
P ∩ V (s, ri ) is at least as large as the total edge weights in path P ∩ X(s, ri ). Mathematically, it
is the following inequalities.
• If P has format (a):
k−1 X
X
j=1

σiS



ρ(j+1)
si



·

(β )
vi i



θ(j)
ri , S



− (1 − η) · pi



ρ(j+1)
si



!
≥

(A.2)

S
k−1 X
X
j=1

σiS



ρ(j)
si



·

(β )
vi i



θ(j)
ri , S



− (1 − η) · pi



ρ(j)
si



!

S

• If P has format (b):
k−1 X
X
j=1

σiS



ρ(j+1)
si



·

(β )
vi i



θ(j)
ri , S



− (1 − η) · pi



ρ(j+1)
si



!
≥

(A.3)

S
k
X
X
j=1

σiS



ρ(j)
si



·

(β )
vi i



θ(j)
ri , S



− (1 − η) · pi



ρ(j)
si



!

S

Next, we further relax the RHS of inequality (A.2) using inequality (A.1).

RHS of inequality (A.2)
≥

k−1 X
X
j=1

≥

ρ(j)

σiS si





θ(j)

· vi ri





ρ(j)

, S − pi si



!
+η·

k−1
X



ρ(j)
pi s i
(Lemma A.4)

j=1

S

k−1 X
X
j=1









ρ(j+1)
θ(j)
ρ(j+1)
σiS si
· vi ri , S − pi si

!
+η·

k−1
X



ρ(j)
pi s i
(Inequality A.1)

j=1

S

We can obtain the following inequality by combining the relaxation above with the LHS of inequality (A.2) and rearrange the terms.
k−1

 








1 XX
ρ(j+1)
(β )
θ(j)
θ(j)
ρ(1)
ρ(k)
≥ pi si
− pi s i
.
·
σiS si
· vi i ri , S − vi ri , S
η
j=1 S
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The inequality above is exactly the inequality in the statement of this Lemma when P has format
(a).
Similarly, we have the following relaxation when P has format (b):

RHS of inequality (A.3)
≥

k
X
X
j=1

≥

σiS



ρ(j)
si



· vi



θ(j)
ri , S



− pi



ρ(j)
si



!
+η·

k
X



ρ(j)
pi si
(Lemma A.4)

j=1

S

k−1
X

X

j=1

S

σiS



ρ(j+1)
si



· vi



θ(j)
ri , S



− pi



ρ(j+1)
si



!
+η·

k
X



ρ(j)
pi s i
(Inequality A.1 and M is IR)

j=1

Again, by combining the relaxation with the LHS of inequality (A.3), we can prove our claim when
P has format (b).
k−1

 






1 XX
ρ(j+1)
(β )
θ(j)
θ(j)
ρ(1)
·
σiS si
· vi i ri , S − vi ri , S
≥ pi si
.
η
j=1 S

Lemma A.13. For any β,



X

Es,ri 

ski ∈X(s,ri )

pi (ski ) 
`


Es,ri 

≤


pi (ski ) 

X

ski ∈V (s,ri )

`

+



1 X X
(β)
(β )
·
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) .
η
ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

Proof. Due to Lemma A.12, for any buyer i and any realization of ri and s, we have
X
ski ∈X(s,ri )

pi (ski )
−
`

ω(k)

where ri

X
ski ∈V (s,ri )

pi (ski )
1
≤
·
`
η·`

X

X

  

(β ) ω(k)
ω(k)
σiS ski · vi i (ri , S) − vi (ri , S) ,

ski ∈V (s,ri ) S

is the replica that is matched to ski in V (s, ri ). If we take expectation over ri and s on

235

the RHS, the expectation means whenever mechanism M (β) awards buyer i (with type ti ) bundle


(β )
S, η1 · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) is contributed to the expectation. Therefore, the expectation of the
RHS is the same as

1 
·
η

X X



(β)
(β )
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S)  .


ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma A.6.

Rev(M, v, D)


X
X pi (sk )
i 
=
Es 
(Lemma A.10)
`
i
k∈[`]
 r



X
X pi (sk )
|Ti |
i 
Es,ri 
≤
+
· R (Corollary A.1)
`
`
i
ski ∈X(s,ri )


X
X pi (sk )
i 
≤
Es,ri 
`
k
i

si ∈V (s,ri )


 X
1 XX X
(β)
(β )
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) +
+ ·
η
i

≤

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

i

r

|Ti |
·R
`

1
· Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D)
1−η
r

 X |T |
1 XX X
(β)
(βi )
i
+ ·
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) +
·R
η
`
i

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

(Lemma A.13)

(Lemma A.10)

i

Since |Ti | and R are finite numbers, we can take ` to be sufficiently large, so that

P

i

q

|Ti |
`

·

R <  for any . Let P (β) be the set of all BIC mechanisms that satisfy the first condition in
Lemma A.6. Clearly, P (β) is a compact set and contains all M (β) we constructed (by choosing
P P
P
(β)
different values for `). Notice that both Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) and i ti ∈Ti S⊆[m] fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) ·


(β )
vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S) are linear functions over the allocation/price rules of mechanism M (β) .
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Therefore,

Rev(M, v, D)





X
X
X
1
1
(β)
(β )
· Rev(M (β) , v (β) , D) + ·
≤ max 
fi (ti ) · σiS (ti ) · vi i (ti , S) − vi (ti , S)  .
(β)
(β)
1
−
η
η
M ∈P
i

ti ∈Ti S⊆[m]

This completes the proof of Lemma A.6. 2
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Appendix B

Missing Details from Chapter 4
B.1

Duality Framework

The seller aims to maximize her profit among all direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanisms. This
maximization problem can be captured by the following LP (see Figure B.1). Here we use type
∅ to represent the choice of not participating in the mechanism. Now the IR constraint can be
described as another BIC constraint that the buyer won’t report type ∅. Let Ti+ = Ti ∪ {∅}.
Variables:
• πi (ti , c), for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , c ∈ T S , denotes the interim probability vector that buyer i
with type ti receives each item, when the seller has cost c.
• pi (ti , c), for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , c ∈ T S , denoting the buyer i’s interim payment when she has
type ti and the seller has cost c.
Constraints:
• Ec [ti ·πi (ti , c)−pi (ti , c)] ≥ Ec [ti ·πi (t0i , c)−pi (t0i , c)], for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , guaranteeing
that the mechanism is BIC and interim IR.
• π ∈ P ({Fi }ni=1 ), guaranteeing the allocation is implementable.
Objective:
P
• max i Eti ,c [pi (ti , c) − c · πi (ti , c)], the expected seller’s profit.
Figure B.1: A Linear Program (LP) for Maximizing Profit.
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We then take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in Figure B.1 by lagrangifying the BIC and
interim IR constraints. Let λi (t, t0 ) be the Lagrangian multiplier. The dual problem is described
in Figure B.2.
Variables:
• πi (ti , c) and pi (ti , c).
• λi (t, t0 ) for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , the Lagrangian multiplier for buyer i’s BIC and interim
IR constraints.
Constraints:
• λi (t, t0 ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ .
• π ∈ P ({Fi }ni=1 ).
Objective:
• minλ maxπ,p L(λ, π, p).
Figure B.2: Partial Lagrangian of the LP for Maximizing Profit.

L(λ, π, p)
X
=
Eti ,c [pi (ti , c) − c · πi (ti , c)]
i

+

XX
i

λi (ti , t0i ) · Ec [(ti · πi (ti , c) − pi (ti , c)) − (ti · πi (t0i , c) − pi (t0i , c))]

ti ,t0i


=

XX
i

Ec [pi (ti , c)] · fi (ti ) +

X

λi (t0i , ti ) −

t0i ∈Ti

ti


+

XX
i

ti

(B.1)


X

λi (ti , t0i )

t0i ∈Ti+



Ec πi (ti , c) · 


X

ti · λi (ti , t0i ) −

X

t0i · λi (t0i , ti ) − fi (ti ) · c

t0i ∈Ti

t0i ∈Ti+

Definition B.1. A feasible dual solution λ is useful if maxπ∈P ({Fi }ni=1 ),p L(λ, π, p) < ∞.
Similar to [CDW16], we show that every useful dual solution forms a flow.
Lemma B.1. A dual solution λ is useful if and only if it forms the following flow:
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• Nodes: For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti a node ti . A source s and a sink ∅.
• For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti , a flow of weight fi (ti ) from s to ti .
• For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ , a flow of weight λi (ti , t0i ) from ti to t0i .
Proof. Suppose there exists i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ such that

fi (ti ) +

X

λi (t0i , ti ) −

t0i ∈Ti

X

λi (ti , t0i ) 6= 0

t0i ∈Ti+

Without loss of generality, suppose it’s positive. Notice that pi (ti , c) is unconstrained. Thus
when Ec [pi (ti , c)] → +∞, the Lagrangian also goes to +∞ (see Equation B.1). Hence for every
i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ ,

fi (ti ) +

X

λi (t0i , ti ) −

t0i ∈Ti

X

λi (ti , t0i ) = 0

t0i ∈Ti+

It’s essentially the flow conservation equation for node ti . Thus λ forms a flow. On the other
hand, if λ forms a flow, the Lagrangian only depends on π and thus bounded since π is bounded.
For any useful dual solution λ, by Lemma B.1, we can replace
P

t0i ∈Ti

P

t0i ∈Ti+

λi (ti , t0i ) by fi (ti ) +

λi (t0i , ti ) in Equation (B.1) and simplify L(λ, π, p). For any BIC and interim IR mechanism

M = (π, p), both λi (ti , t0i ) and Ec [(ti · πi (ti , c) − pi (ti , c)) − (ti · πi (t0i , c) − pi (t0i , c))] are non-negative
for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti , t0i ∈ Ti+ . Thus by Equation (B.1), L(λ, π, p) ≥ Profit(M ). We have the
following lemma.
Lemma B.2. (Restatement of Lemma 4.2) For any useful dual solution λ and any BIC, interim
IR mechanism M = (x, p),

Profit(M ) ≤ Et,c

"
X

#
πi (ti , c) ·

i

where
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(λ)
(Φi (ti )

− c)

(λ)

Φi (ti ) = ti −

X
1
·
λ(t0i , ti )(t0i − ti )
fi (ti ) 0
ti ∈Ti

can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function.

B.2

Missing Proofs from Section 4.3

Proof of Lemma 4.1: Consider a mechanism M that is ex-post implementable. For every i, ti , let
Ai (ti ) be buyer i’s (possibly randomized) equilibrium strategy, when her type is ti . It specifies all
~ c) be the vector of (possibly
the actions that the buyer takes in mechanism M . For every c, let Xi (A,
randomized) indicator variables that indicate whether buyer i gets each item j when buyers choose
~ = (A1 , ..., An ) and the seller’s realized cost vector is c; let Pi (A,
~ c) be the payment for
strategies A
the buyer. For every i and t−i , denote A−i (t−i ) = (A1 (t1 ), ..., Ai−1 (ti−1 ), Ai+1 (ti+1 ), ..., An (tn )).
Since A is an equilibrium strategy for the buyers, for every i, ti , t0i ∈ Ti , acting as Ai (ti ) induces
more utility than Ai (ti ), when the buyer’s type is ti and other buyers follow strategy A−i . We have

Ec,t−i [ti · Xi (Ai (ti ), A−i (t−i ), c) − Pi (Ai (ti ), A−i (t−i ), c)] ≥
Ec,t−i [ti ·

Xi (Ai (t0i ), A−i (t−i ), c)

(B.2)
−

Pi (Ai (t0i ), A−i (t−i ), c)]

We now define the direct mechanism M 0 = (x, p) as follows: for every profile (t, c), let xi (t, c) =
Xi (A(t), c) and pi (t, c) = Pi (A(t), c) for all i. It’s the allocation and payment rule when the
reported type profile is t and the seller’s realized cost vector is c. Then Inequality (B.2) is equivalent
to: for every i, ti , t0i ∈ Ti

Ec,t−i [ti · xi (ti , t−i , c) − pi (ti , t−i , c)] ≥ Ec,t−i [ti · xi (t0i , t−i , c) − pi (t0i , t−i , c)]
It’s exactly the BIC constraint for M 0 . Thus, M 0 is BIC.
Moreover, each buyer can choose not to participate in M , so Ec,t−i [ti · Xi (Ai (ti ), A−i (t−i ), c) −
Pi (Ai (ti ), A−i (t−i ), c)] ≥ 0, which implies that Ec,t−i [ti · xi (ti , t−i , c) − pi (ti , t−i , c)] ≥ 0. Hence, M 0
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is also interim IR. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4: Let Φ(λ) (·) be the virtual value function induced by the above canonical
flow λ. By Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3,

Profit(M ) ≤

X



X
(λ)
Eti ,c 
πij (ti , c) · (Φij (tij ) − cj )

i

j



X
X
(β)
=
Eti ,c 
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (ϕ̃ij (tij ) − cj )
i

j

+

X



X
(β)
Eti ,c 
1[ti 6∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (max{βij (c), cj } − cj )

i

j



X
X
(β)
+
Eti ,c 
1[ti 6∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (tij − max{βij (c), cj })
i

j



X
X
(β)
≤
Eti ,c 
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · πij (ti , c) · (ϕ̃ij (tij ) − cj )
i

(Single)

j

+2·

XX
i

Ec [qij (c) · (max{βij (c), cj } − cj )]

j



X
X
(β)
(β)
+
Eti 
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v̄i (ti , [m]\{j})
i

(Prophet)

(Non-Favorite)

j

The first inequality is due to Lemma 4.2, and the first equality is due to Lemma 4.3. The second
inequality is because: For the second term, notice that max{βij (c), cj } − cj ≥ 0, we bound the
indicator by 1 and use the fact that Eti [πij (ti , c)] = 2 · qij (c) for every c; For the third term, notice
(β)

that for every i, ti ∈ Rij and c, since π is feasible, we have
X

πij (ti , c) · (tik − max{βij (c), cj }) ≤

k6=j

max

S∈Fi ,j6∈S

(β)

X

(tik − max{βij (c), cj }).

k∈S

Taking expectation over c, the RHS equals to v̄i (ti , [m]\{j}). Thus the inequality holds. 2
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B.3

Missing Proofs from Section 4.4

Proof of Lemma 4.6:
Monotonicity: Fix any t ∈ T , U ⊆ V ⊆ [m]. For all c we have
P
P
maxS⊆U,S∈F j∈S (tj − cj ) ≤ maxS⊆V,S∈F j∈S (tj − cj ). Taking expectation over c on both sides
proves the monotonicity.
Subadditivity:
Fix any t ∈ T and U, V ⊆ [m]. For every c, let S ∗ (c) = argmaxS⊆U ∪V,S∈F

P

j∈S (tj

− cj ). Clearly,

tj − cj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S ∗ (c). Notice that S ∗ (c) ∩ U ⊆ U and S ∗ (c) ∩ U ∈ F; also S ∗ (c) ∩ V ⊆ V
and S ∗ (c) ∩ V ∈ F. We have

max

S⊆U ∪V,S∈F

X

(tj − cj ) ≤

X
j∈S ∗ (c)∩U

j∈S

≤ max

X

(tj − cj ) +
X

S⊆U,S∈F

(tj − cj )

j∈S ∗ (c)∩V

(tj − cj ) +

j∈S

max

S⊆V,S∈F

X

(tj − cj )

j∈S

Taking expectation over c on both sides, we have v̄(t, U ∪ V ) ≤ v̄(t, U ) + v̄(t, V ).
No externalities: fix any t ∈ T , S ⊆ [m] and any t0 ∈ T such that t0j = tj for all j ∈ S. To
prove v̄(t0 , S) = v̄(t, S), it suffices to show that for any c,

max

U ⊆S,U ∈F

X
j∈U

(tj − cj ) =

max

U ⊆S,U ∈F

X

(t0j − cj )

j∈U

It follows directly from the fact that t0j = tj for all j ∈ S. 2

B.4

Missing Proofs from Section 4.5

Proof of Lemma 4.22:
Monotonicity: Fix any ti , U ⊆ V ⊆ [m]. For all c we have
P
P
maxS⊆U ∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi j∈S (tij − max{βij (c), cj }) ≤ maxS⊆V ∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi j∈S (tij − max{βij (c), cj }).
Taking expectation over c on both sides proves the monotonicity.
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Subadditivity:
Fix any ti and U, V ⊆ [m].

For every c, let S ∗ (c) = argmaxS⊆(U ∪V )∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi

P

j∈S (tij

−

max{βij (c), cj }). Clearly, tij − max{βij (c), cj } ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S ∗ (c). Notice that S ∗ (c) ∩ U ⊆
U ∩ Ci (ti ) and S ∗ (c) ∩ U ∈ Fi ; also S ∗ (c) ∩ V ⊆ V ∩ Ci (ti ) and S ∗ (c) ∩ V ∈ Fi . We have

max

S⊆(U ∪V )∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi

≤

X

j∈S

(tij − max{βij (c), cj }) +

j∈S ∗ (c)∩U

≤

X
(tij − max{βij (c), cj })

max

X

(tij − max{βij (c), cj })

j∈S ∗ (c)∩V

X

S⊆U ∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi

(tij − max{βij (c), cj }) +

j∈S

max

X

S⊆V ∩Ci (ti ),S∈Fi

(tij − max{βij (c), cj })

j∈S

Taking expectation over c on both sides, we have µi (ti , U ∪ V ) ≤ µi (ti , U ) + µi (ti , V ).
No externalities: fix any ti , S ⊆ [m] and any ti such that t0ij = tij for all j ∈ S. To prove
µi (t0i , S) = µi (ti , S), it suffices to show that for any c,

max

U ⊆S∩Ci (ti ),U ∈Fi

X
j∈U

(tij − max{βij (c), cj }) =

max

U ⊆S∩Ci (ti ),U ∈Fi

X

(t0ij − max{βij (c), cj })

j∈U

It follows directly from the fact that t0ij = tij for all j ∈ S.
Now we prove that µi (ti , ·) has Lipschitz constant τi . For any ti , t0i , and set X, Y ⊆ [m], define
n
o
set H = j ∈ X ∩ Y : tij = t0ij . Since µi (·, ·) has no externalities, µi (ti , H) = µi (t0i , H). Therefore,

|µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , Y )| = max µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , Y ), µi (t0i , Y ) − µi (ti , X)

≤ max µi (ti , X) − µi (t0i , H), µi (t0i , Y ) − µi (ti , H)
(Monotonicity)

≤ max µi (ti , X\H), µi (t0i , Y \H)
(Subadditivity)
≤ τi · max {|X\H|, |Y \H|}
≤ τi · (|X∆Y | + |X ∩ Y | − |H|)
The second last inequality is because µi (ti , ·) is subadditive and for any item j ∈ Ci (ti ) (Ci (t0i )) the
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single-item valuation v̄ij (tij ) (v̄ij (t0ij )) is less than τi .
2
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Appendix C

Missing Details from Chapter 6
C.1

Proof of Example 6.1

Proof of Example 6.1. First consider the first-best mechanism. Fix buyer i. We’ll prove that if her
value bi > 1/2 +  for some small  that will be determined later, she will trade in the first-best
mechanism with high probability. Let S be the number of sellers whose cost is smaller than 1/2 + ,
and let B be the number of buyers whose value is larger than 1/2 + . Notice that there are at most
B buyers with value larger than i. Thus if B < S, all buyers with value > 1/2 + , including i, must
have traded with a seller whose cost is smaller than 1/2 +  in the first-best mechanism.
Both S and B are the sum of independent Bernoulli random variables, with expectation (1/2 +)n
and (1/2 − )(n − 1) respectively. By Chernoff bound,




Pr S < (1 − )

 
 2 
 



1
1 2
1
+  n ≤ exp − ·
+  n ≤ exp −  n ,
2
2
2
12



 2 




1

1
1 2
Pr B > (1 + )
−  (n − 1) ≤ exp − ·
−  (n − 1) ≤ exp −  n .
2
3
2
12
2
1 2
With probability at least 1 − exp − 12
 n ,





S ≥ (1 − )




1
1
+  n > (1 + )
−  (n − 1) ≥ B.
2
2
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In other words, if bi > 1/2 + , buyer i will trade in the first-best mechanism with probability at
2
1 2
least 1 − exp − 12
 n , taking expectation over all other agents’ types.
Choose  = n−1/3 . The expected GFT contributed by buyer i is at least
Z

1
1
1
+n− 3
2

2


3
1 1
= + o(1).
bi dbi · 1 − exp − n 3
12
8

By linearity of expectation and the fact that all buyers are i.i.d., the expected GFT contributed
by all buyers is at most

3n/8

+ o(n).

Similarly for every seller j, if her cost sj > 1/2 + for some small , she can only trade in the firstbest mechanism with small probability. The expected GFT contributed by all sellers (a negative
term) is at least −n/8 + o(n). Thus the first-best mechanism obtains GFT at least n/4 + o(n). The
second-best mechanism gets GFT that is in expectation at least the expected GFT of the Trade
Reduction mechanism, and as the GFT of the TR mechanism is at least the GFT of the first best
minus 1, the second-best mechanism obtains GFT at least n/4 + o(n) as well.
In the mechanism of BCWZ, with probability a half, the mechanism implements GSOM that
finds all the efficient trade based on buyers’ virtual value and sellers’ cost. And probability a half,
it implements GBOM that finds all the efficient trade based on buyers’ value and seller’ virtual
cost. We will only give the proof that the expected GFT of GSOM is at most
analogous proof shows that the expected GFT of GBOM is at most

2n/9

2n/9

+ o(n). An

+ o(n).

For each buyer whose value is drawn from uniform distribution [0, 1], her virtual value follows
the uniform distribution [−1, 1]. Fix buyer i, we’ll show that if her value bi < 2/3 −  (which
means her virtual value ϕi (bi ) < 1/3 − 2) for some small  she can only trade in the GSOM with
exponentially small probability. Notice that buyer i can only trade in GSOM with a seller whose
cost is smaller than 1/3 − 2. Let S be the number of sellers whose cost is smaller than 1/3 − 2,
and let B be the number of buyers whose value is at least 2/3 − . Then if buyer i trades in GSOM,
B ≤ S. This is because there are at least B buyers with value larger than i (and thus have a larger
virtual value since since all buyers are i.i.d.). If B > S, those buyers will take away all the sellers
with cost < 1/3 − 2. It contradicts with the fact that buyer i must trade with a seller with cost
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< 1/3 − 2 in GSOM. Notice that again S and B are the sum of independent Bernoulli random
variables. And the expectation of S (1/3 − 2)n is smaller than the expectation of B, (1/3 + )(n − 1)
1

when  = n− 3 and n sufficiently large. By Chernoff bound (and a similar calculation as above),
B ≤ S happens with exponentially small probability. The expected GFT contributed by each buyer
i is at most
Z

1
1
2
−n− 3
3

bi dbi + o(1) =

5
+ o(1).
18

Similarly, for each seller j whose value sj < 1/3 −  for some small , she will trade in GSOM
with high probability. The expected GFT contributed by each seller (a negative term) is at most
−1/18 + o(1). Thus GSOM obtains GFT at most

2n/9

+ o(n).

We conclude that the expected GFT the mechanism of BCWZ obtains is at most

2n/9

+ o(n),

which is only a constant fraction of the second-best mechanism.

C.2

Proofs of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2

Proof of lemma 6.1. We start by proving part 1. We will show all of these properties for the SO
mechanism with the given parameters. Similar arguments show them for the BO mechanism, and
therefore for the RO mechanism. That the SO mechanism with the given parameters is BIC for the
seller is immediate since the the seller chooses a price that maximizes her expected utility over the
distribution from which the buyer is drawn. That SO is ex-post IC and ex-post IR for the buyer is
immediate from the buyer choosing whether to accept or reject the offer in a way that maximizes
her utility. Strong budget balance is also immediate from definition. Finally, to show that that the
SO mechanism with the given parameters is ex-post IR for the seller, we note that since the seller’s
cost is drawn from Ds , and since s̄ ≥ sup Support Ds , we have that s̄ is at least the seller’s cost.
Therefore, seller j can always ask for a price equal to his cost (without violating the constraint
s̄), which will result in zero utility for her (regardless of whether the buyer accepts or rejects this
price), and in particular guarantees nonnegative utility for her.
We move on to prove part 2. We will show that any offered price is at least b̄. An analogous
proof shows it to be at most s̄. In case of the BO mechanism, this holds by definition since

248

any offer by the buyer is constrained to be at least b̄. We note that any offer by the seller will
also be at least b̄, since this seller knows that the buyer will buy at this price with probability 1
since b̄ ≤ inf Support Db (and since this price is at least s̄, offering it does not violate this seller’s
constraint), and therefore the seller will never make a lower offer, and the proof is complete.
Proof of lemma 6.2. We start by proving part 1. If s̄ ≤ b, then any price offered by the seller in
the SO part of the RO mechanism with the given parameters will be accepted by the buyer (as it
will be at most s̄ and therefore at most b). Similarly, if b̄ ≥ s, then any price offered by the buyer
in the BO part of the RO mechanism with the given parameters will be accepted by the seller (as
it will be at least b̄ and therefore at least s). Either way, trade will occur in the RO mechanism
with probability at least 1/2.
We move on to prove part 2. It is enough to show that if trade occurs in the SO part of the
latter mechanism, then trade occurs also in the SO part of the former mechanism. (The BO part
is handled analogously.) If trade occurs in the SO part of the latter mechanism (unconstrained
and unconditioned), then it means that in that mechanism, the price p that maximizes the revenue
of the seller from Db (unconstrained and unconditioned), which is the price that was offered, is
at most b (since the offered price is accepted) and at least s (since the mechanism is ex-post IR).
Therefore, since b ≤ s̄ and s ≥ b̄, we have s̄ ≥ b ≥ p ≥ s ≥ b̄, and so p is also the price that
maximizes the revenue of the seller from Db |≥b̄ constrained upon the price being at most s̄, and
so this is also (at most, in case of multiple utility-maximizing prices) the price offered in the SO
mechanism with parameters s̄ and Db |≥b̄ , and so the price offered by the seller is accepted in this
mechanism as well.
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C.3

Details Omitted from the Proof of Theorem 6.5 and Commentary

C.3.1

Details Omitted from the Proof of Theorem 6.5

We will show that that the region of the space of valuation/cost profiles where our hybrid mechanism
for double auctions runs each instance of the RO mechanism can be partitioned into disjoint subsets
where our hybrid mechanism is BIC on each such subset under the profile distribution conditioned
upon being in that subset.
Fix a choice of the identity (but not the cost) of seller s(1) and the identity (but not the value) of
bidder b(1) , and fix a profile of costs and valuations for all other sellers and buyers (so in particular
the cost s(2) and value b(2) are fixed). We first claim that either our hybrid mechanism runs the
same instance of RO on all possible profiles b, s that agree with these fixed choices, or does not run
any instance of RO on any of these profiles. Indeed, if s(2) ≤ b(s) (a conditioned fully determined
by these fixed choices) then TR is run on all such profiles, and otherwise the RO mechanism with
SO parameters s̄ = s(2) and DbB(1) |≥b(2) and BO parameters b̄ = b(2) and DsS(1) |≤s(2) (note that all
of these parameters are fully determined by the above fixed choices and do not depend on the cost
s(1) or the value b(1) ) is run on all such profiles.
We will next show that our hybrid mechanism is BIC on the subset of all profiles that agree with
these fixed choices. Note that when conditioning the distribution of all profiles to those that agree
with such fixed choices, the cost of the seller s(1) (conditioned to agree with these fixed choices) is
distributed precisely according to s(1) ∼ DsS(1) |≤s(2) and the value of the buyer b(1) (conditioned to
agree with these fixed choices) is distributed precisely according to b(1) ∼ DbB(1) |≥b(2) . By Lemma 6.1,
we therefore have that our hybrid mechanism is BIC for the offering agent (and ex-post IC for any
other agent) over all profiles that agree with these choices. We have therefore shown that if a
manipulation by a buyer does not change the choice of the mechanism that is run by our hybrid
mechanism, then it is nonbeneficial in expectation.
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C.3.2

Why The Proof of the Ex-Ante Guarantee Gives a Factor of 1/4 and Not
1/2

Having read the proof of the ex-ante guarantee of theorem 6.5, we note that at first glance, one may
be tempted to consider the following naı̈ve adaptation of this proof into a “proof” of an ex-ante
guarantee of 1/2 (rather than 1/4) of the second-best:
In each case analyzed above, the hybrid mechanism attains either at least the GFT of
the RVWM mechanism, or at least half of the GFT of the first-best, which in turn is at
least half of the GFT of the second-best. Since the GFT of the RVWM mechanism is
in turn also at least half of the GFT of the second-best, we get that in either case our
hybrid mechanism attains half of the GFT of the second-best.
The problem with this “proof” is that it mixes ex-ante and ex-post guarantees. While indeed the
hybrid mechanism attains, on each profile (b, s), either at least the GFT of the RVWM mechanism
or at least half of the GFT of the (first-best and therefore of the) second-best, it is wrong to assume
that on each profile (b, s) the GFT of the RVWM mechanism is at least half of the GFT of the
second-best, as we only know that the expected GFT of the RVWM mechanism, over all profiles,
is at least half of the expected GFT, over all profiles, of the second-best. In other words, it may
hypothetically be that the RVWM mechanism performs poorly on the profiles on which our hybrid
mechanism attains at least the GFT of the RVWM mechanism, and that the RVWM mechanism
performs very well, surpassing half of the GFT of the second-best, and even half of the GFT of the
first-best, on the profiles on which our hybrid mechanism attains at least half of the GFT of the
first-best (so on average, the RVWM mechanism would indeed attain its guarantee), and in such a
case, the above “proof” obviously fails.

C.4

The Trade Reduction Mechanism for Matching Markets: Proofs

Proof of theorem 6.6. We first observe that the allocation is indeed feasible, that is, that we can
perfectly match all winning buyers and sellers. Indeed, the set of winners can be obtained by
taking the matching M (b, s) and then removing the agents that correspond to one edge between
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any two classes t and t0 that are trading (have rt,t0 > 0), and then switching agents of the same
class (removing every agent in the leftover matching that has value lower than a removed agent
of the same class, and adding the removed agent in her stead), maintaining a perfect matching of
TR(b, s). Thus, there is a matching of the winners TR(b, s) such that there are exactly rt,t0 − 1
trades of agents of classes t and t0 whenever rt,t0 > 0. The reduced agents can be perfectly matched
with exactly a single edge between agents of classes t and t0 whenever rt,t0 > 0.
Now, the theorem will directly follow from the following sequence of claims.
Claim C.1. The Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching markets is ex-post IR and ex-post IC.
Proof. We first observe that the TR mechanism for matching markets is monotone. It is enough to
show this for the buyers. Assume that the value of a winning buyer i increases by δ. We show that
she still wins after the increase. Every matching that includes this buyer improves by the same
amount δ, while the value of any other matching did not change, so the same matching M (b, s) will
be picked after the value increase (ties are broken the same way, independent of values). Finally,
the reduction will also not change as for any class t, the values of qt and dt did not change, and
if buyer i is of class t, she will still not be in the set of dt lowest-value buyers after her value has
increased, so she will not be reduced.
To complete the proof that the mechanism is ex-post IR and ex-post IC, we need to show that
payments are by critical values. Indeed, assume that for a winning buyer i of class t, the value of
the highest reduced buyer of class t (if i bids truthfully) is x. If buyer i of class t changes her bid
but keeps it above x, she wins. Now assume that she drops her bid below x. If she is not in M (b, s)
she loses. If she is in M (b, s) and bids below x, then the matching M (b, s) will contain the exact
same set of agents, and will be the same (due to the tie breaking rule which is independent of the
actual bids), so she will lose while the agent with bid x will win instead of her, as both qt and dt are
the same but now i is no longer one of the qt − dt highest-bidding agents of class t. Thus, bidding
above x implies winning for i, while bidding below x implies losing, so x is indeed the critical value
for buyer i to win. Similar arguments prove the Claim for sellers.
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Claim C.2. The Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching markets is ex-post (direct trade) weakly
budget balanced.
Proof. To see that the mechanism is ex-post (direct trade) weakly BB we prove that every trade
is ex-post weakly BB. Indeed, consider a trade between two agents of respective classes t and t0 in
the matching of TR(b, s) that contains exactly rt,t0 − 1 trades of agents of classes t and t0 whenever
rt,t0 > 0, and consider the reduced edge between these two classes. The buyer pays at least the value
of the reduced buyer of the same class on the reduced edge between classes t and t0 , while the seller
receives at most the cost of the reduced seller on that edge. As that reduced edge has non-negative
gain (otherwise removing it will increase the welfare of the first-best matching M (b, s)), the trade
is ex-post weakly BB.
Claim C.3. For any profile (b, s), the fraction of the realized gains from trade (first-best) that the

Trade Reduction Mechanism for matching markets obtains ex-post is at least min 1− dqtt class t s.t. qt > 0 .

Proof. Recall that Tt is the set of agents of class t. Let α(b, s) = min 1 −

dt
qt

class t s.t. qt > 0 .

To prove the claim that the mechanism guarantees an α fraction of the welfare of FB-GFT(b, s),
we let vk be the value of agent k (vk = bi for a buyer k = i, and vk = −sj for seller k = j), and
assuming W is the set of agents in M (b, s) we observe that
X

FB-GFT(b, s) =

(bi − sj ) =

(i,j)∈M (b,s)

X

X

t:qt >0

k∈W ∩Tt

vk

.
As for each class t with qt > 0 we remove dt agents each with value at most the value of any
winner, we obtain at least a

qt −dt
qt

fraction of the value of agent of class t. Thus,

α(b, s) · OP T (b, s) ≤

X qt − dt
qt

t:qt >0

X

vk ≤ T R(b, s),

k∈W ∩Tt

as needed.
Theorem 6.6 follows from Claim C.1, Claim C.2 and Claim C.3.
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Proof of corollary 6.1. Let β(b, s) = min 1 − r 1 0
t,t

classes (t, t0 ) s.t. rt,t0 > 0 . By the guarantee of

theorem 6.6 with respect to α(b, s), it is enough to show that β(b, s) ≤ α(b, s). Indeed, for every
P
class t such that qt > 0, since qt = t0 rt,t0 :
qt − dt
=
qt

X
t0 :rt,t0 >0

rt,t0 − 1
=
qt

X
t0 :rt,t0 >0

rt,t0 − 1 rt,t0
rt,t0 − 1
·
≥ 0 min
,
t :rt,t0 >0
rt,t0
qt
rt,t0

where the inequality is since a weighted average of values is always at least the minimal value.
Taking the minimum of both sides of the obtained inequality over all classes t s.t. qt > 0, we obtain
that α(b, s) ≥ β(b, s), as required.

C.5
C.5.1

Additional Preliminaries for Appendices C.6 and C.7
Notation

First we give some notations specialized in this setting. Given profile (b, s), let M (b, s) be the
first-best matching, or the maximum weight matching1 , under graph G with edge weight bi − sj
on each edge (i, j) ∈ E. For each agent a, denote M−a (b, s) the maximum weight matching2 after
removing a and its related edges. For each buyer i such that (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), let Pi (b, s) be the
VCG payment of buyer i. Formally,

Pi (b, s) =

X

X

(bi0 − sj 0 ) −

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M−i (b,s)

(bi0 − sj 0 ) + bi

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M (b,s)

Similarly, let Pj (b, s) be the VCG payment received by seller j:

Pj (b, s) =

X

X

(bi0 − sj 0 ) −

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M (b,s)

(bi0 − sj 0 ) + sj

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M−j (b,s)

For simplicity, when the valuation profile (b, s) is fixed, we will abuse the notation and use M
1. We break ties lexicographically by IDs.
2. Follow the same breaking tie rules as the first-best matching.
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(or M−a , Pi , Pj ) instead in the proof, without writing the valuation profile.

C.5.2

Lexicographic Tie-Breaking by ID

In this section, we define the tie-breaking rule that we use whenever we have to choose between
multiple maximum weight matchings when picking a matching with maximum weight anywhere
throughout this paper. We first define a strict total order over matchings, which we call the
Lexicographic order by IDs.
Definition C.1 (Lexicographic order by IDs). Fix a bipartite graph, and let M 0 and M 00 be two
matchings in this graph. The Lexicographic order by IDs decides which of M 0 and M 00 is ranked
higher as follows. It first sorts the edges of the matching by the index of the buyer. For each k, let
00

00

(i0k , jk0 ) and (ik , jk ) be the k th sorted edges (according to the index of the buyer) in M 0 and in M 00 ,
respectively. Let k be the lowest index such that it is not the case that the two edges (i0k , jk0 ) and
00

00

(ik , jk ) are both defined and are the same edge.
• If one matching has a k th edge while the other does not, then the matching with more edges
is ranked higher.
• Otherwise, the matching with the lower buyer index in the k th edge is ranked higher.
• Otherwise, the matching with the lower seller index in the k th edge is ranked higher.
As noted above, throughout this paper when two matchings have the same weight, we use the
Lexicographic by IDs order to break ties when choosing a maximum weight matching, so we in fact
choose the lexicographically-by-IDs-highest matching among those with maximum weight. We will
refer to this practice as using the Lexicographic by IDs tie-breaking rule. We will now formalize the
two properties of this tie-breaking rule, which we will use in our analysis:3
Lemma C.1. The Lexicographic by IDs tie-breaking rule satisfies the following two properties:
• The tie-breaking is weight independent: ties between maximum weight matchings are broken
independently of any weight function. That is, if W and W 0 are two weight functions, if M
3. Indeed, our results would still hold for any other tie-breaking rule that satisfies these two properties.
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and M0 are the respective corresponding sets of maximum weight matchings, and if M and
M 0 are the respective corresponding chosen matchings, then if M ⊆ M0 and M 0 ∈ M, then
M = M 0 . So, the set of matched nodes that this tie-breaking rule picks (among all possible
maximum weight options), as well as the matching that this rule picks within that set, does
not depend on the weight function.
• The choice function is subset consistent: if the chosen maximum weight matching among all
matchings of the vertices U is the matching M , then for any (i, j) ∈ M , the chosen maximum
weight matching among all matchings of the vertices U \ {i, j} is the matching M \ {(i, j)}.
Proof. Weight-independence is by definition of the Lexicographic order by IDs. For subset consistency, let M 0 6= M \ {(i, j)} be another maximum weight matching of U \ {(i, j)}, and note that
when adding the edge (i, j) to M 0 , one obtains a maximum weight matching of U . By definition of
M , it is ranked higher than M 0 ∪ {(i, j)} by the Lexicographic by IDs order, and since the shared
edge makes no difference in the tie breaking, we have that after its removal M \ {(i, j)} is (still)
ranked higher than M 0 by the Lexicographic by IDs order (so the tie is be broken in the same
way).

C.6

The Offering Mechanism for Matching Markets: Proofs

We will now prove theorem 6.7, which states that the Offering Mechanism for matching markets is
BIC, ex-post IR, ex-post (direct trade) strongly budget balanced, and ex-ante guarantees at least a
1/4-fraction

of the optimal GFT (second-best). The Offering Mechanism is ex-post strongly (direct

trade) budget balanced as the RO mechanism is ex-post (direct trade) strongly budget balanced.
To show the remaining properties, we first develop some machinery.

C.6.1

Supporting Machinery

Lemma C.2. In the offering mechanism when run on a profile (b, s), for every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s)
the following hold:
• If i ∈ M−j (b, s), then s̄ = Pj (b, s).
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• If j ∈ M−i (b, s), then b̄ = Pi (b, s).
Proof. We will prove the first statement (the second is analogous). Since i ∈ M−j (b, s), the VCG
price of buyer i in the market without seller j is the minimal bid that causes her to be in the
first-best in that market, and so s̄ = Pi (b, s−j ). Now observe that:

Pj (b, s) =

X
(i0 ,j 0 )∈M

X

(bi0 − sj 0 ) −

(bi0 − sj 0 ) + sj =

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M

X

−j

(bi0 − sj 0 ) −

X
(i0 ,j 0 )∈M

(i0 ,j 0 )∈M \{(i,j)}

(bi0 − sj 0 ) + bi = Pi (b, s−j ) = s̄
−j

We are now ready to prove the first two parts of lemma 6.3:
Claim C.4. For every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), it holds that s̄ ≥ sj and b̄ ≤ bi .
Proof. We will show the former; the latter is analogous. If s̄ = ∞ the the claim immediately
holds, so we assume that s̄ < ∞. Consider the profile ((b−i , b0i ), s) for b0i = max{s̄ + 1, bi }. Since
we have only increased the bid of i, we still have that (i, j) ∈ M ((b−i , b0i ), s). By definition, s̄ is
the same for the profile ((b−i , b0i ), s) as it is for (b, s). By definition of s̄, we have by b0i > s̄ that
i ∈ M−j ((b−i , b0i ), s). Therefore, by lemma C.2, s̄ = Pj ((b−i , b0i ), s). Since (i, j) ∈ M ((b−i , b0i ), s),
we have that sj ≤ Pj ((b−i , b0i ), s), and so sj ≤ s̄, as required.
Claim C.5. For every (b, s) and (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), it is the case that Pj (b, s) ≥ Pi (b, s).
Proof. by the Second Welfare Theorem, there exist prices p = (pj 0 )j 0 ∈S (where pj 0 denotes a price
for the good of seller j) such that (M (b, s); p) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore, pj is a price
received by sj and paid by bi in some Walrasian equilibrium. By Theorem 8 of [GS99], we therefore
have that Pj (b, s) ≥ pj ≥ Pi (b, s), completing the proof.
We are now ready to prove the third and final part of lemma 6.3:
Claim C.6. For every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), it holds that s̄ ≥ b̄.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists a profile (b, s) and a pair (i, j) ∈ M (b, s) such
that s̄ < b̄. By claim C.4 we have that bi ≥ b̄ > s̄ and sj ≤ s̄ < b̄. Therefore, we have by definition
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of s̄ and b̄ that both i ∈ M−j (b, s) and j ∈ M−i (b, s). Therefore, by lemma C.2, s̄ = Pj (b, s) and
b̄ = Pi (b, s), and so Pj (b, s) < Pi (b, s) — a contradiction to claim C.5.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Follows from Claim C.4 and Claim C.6.
Lemma C.3. Fix valuation profile (b, s) and a pair (i, j) ∈ M . If j 6∈ M−i , then Pi (b, s) = sj .
Similarly if i 6∈ M−j , then Pj (b, s) = bi .
Proof. We only give the proof for Pi = Pi (b, s) and similar argument holds for seller’s VCG payment
Pj = Pj (b, s). If j 6∈ M−i , it holds that M−i = M \ {(i, j)} by subset consistency of the tie breaking
rule. Now, by definition of Pi , we have Pi = sj .

C.6.2

Incentive Guarantees

Claim C.7. The Offering Mechanism is ex-post IR.
Proof. That the Offering Mechanism is ex-post IR follows from claim C.4 and lemma 6.1.
Claim C.8. The Offering Mechanism is BIC.
Proof. We will prove that the Offering Mechanism is BIC for the seller. A similar argument holds
for the buyer. For each seller j with cost sj , suppose she misreports her cost to be s0j 6= sj . We
will show that taking expectation over other agents’ valuation profile b, s−j , the expected utility
of sj when reporting truthfully is at least the expected utility of seller j with true cost sj when
reporting s0j .
We first consider b, s−j such that j is not in the first-best M (b, s−j , sj ). It is sufficient to
consider manipulations s0j that cause j to become part of the first-best M (b, s−j , s0j ). Let s0j be
such a manipulation, and note that in this case, sj ≥ Pj (b, s−j , s0j ) ≥ s0j (since Pj (b, s−j , s0j )
is the threshold bid of seller j to become part of the first-best). Let i be the agent such that
(i, j) ∈ M (b, s−j , s0j ). We will complete the proof of this case by considering two cases. First, if
i ∈ M−j (b, s−j , s0j ), then s̄ = Pj (b, s−j , s0j ) by lemma C.2. Therefore, by lemma 6.1, seller j with
reported cost s0j can only trade with i in the RO mechanism at a price p ≤ s̄ = Pj (b, s−j , s0j ) ≤ sj ,
which derives non-positive utility for seller j. Second, if i ∈
/ Mj (b, s−j , s0j ), then by lemma C.3,
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Pj (b, s−j , s0j ) = bi . Since the mechanism is ex-post IR for buyer i, seller j can only trade with i
(who has value bi ) in the RO mechanism at a price at most bi = Pj (b, s−j , sj ) ≤ sj , which again
derives non-positive utility for seller j.
Now for every buyer i, consider those b, s−j such that (i, j) ∈ M (b, s−j , sj ). In this case, we
note that if seller j misreports to s0j , then either the first-best is unchanged (and so j participates
in the same RO mechanism with the same buyer i) or seller j is no longer in the first-best, receiving
utility 0. Either way, she cannot change the RO mechanism that is run, or the buyer that she is
facing. When the BO mechanism is processed, if seller j is in the first-best, she will be asked to
accept a price. This is ex-post truthful.
When the SO mechanism is processed, then it is enough to show that for every i and fixed
b−i , s−j , sj , in expectation over all bi such that (i, j) ∈ M (b−i , bi , s−j , sj ), the utility of j when she
reports s0j 6= sj (denoted as uj (s0j )) is at most the utility of j when she reports sj (denoted as
uj (sj )) truthfully. Notice that either i can never connect to j in the first-best M (b−i , bi , s−j , sj ),
or Pi (b, s−j , sj ) (which does not depend on bi ) is the threshold bid of buyer i to connect to j in
the first-best. Thus it is enough to prove the claim that when there exists a bid for i such that
i connects to j in the first-best, in expectation over bi ≥ Pi (b, s−j , sj ), the utility of j when she
reports s0j is at most the utility of j when she reports sj .
Note that fixed b−i , s−j , sj , when bi ≥ Pi (b, s−j , sj ), the outcome of the Offering Mechanism
for j is as if the SO mechanism with parameters s̄ and DiB |≥b̄ had been run between j and i. Notice
that the parameters s̄ and b̄ do not depend on sj or on bi . By lemma 6.1, the SO mechanism with
parameters s̄ and DiB |≥b̄ is BIC when the buyer’s valuation is drawn from DiB |≥b̄ . In other words,
Ebi ≥b̄ [uj (s0j )] ≤ Ebi ≥b̄ [uj (sj )].

(C.1)

Note that Pi (b, s−j , sj ) ≥ b̄ by claim C.4. If Pi (b, s−j , sj ) = b̄, then the above claim trivially
holds. Otherwise we have to reason about the case Pi (b, b−j , sj ) > bi ≥ b̄, which is included in the
expectation in eq. (C.1) but not in the expectation in the above claim.
In this case, since Pi (b, s−j , sj ) > b̄, then lemmas C.2 and C.3, Pi (b, s−j , sj ) = sj . We notice
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that when sj > bi ≥ b̄, seller j won’t trade with buyer i in the Offering Mechanism when j reports
sj , as (i, j) can’t be in the first-best M (b, s). The utility of j (contributed by buyer i) is thus 0
in this case. When sj > bi ≥ b̄ and j reports s0j , since the payment goes directly from buyer i to
seller j when they trade, they do so at price at most bj < sj (since we assume that buyer i reports
truthfully, and since the mechanism is ex-post IR for her), so seller j’s utility (contributed by buyer
i) in this case is negative if they trade, and 0 otherwise, so it is nonpositive. Combined this with
eq. (C.1), we obtain
Ebi ≥sj [uj (s0j )] ≤ Ebi ≥sj [uj (sj )]
which finishes the proof as sj = Pi (b, s−j , sj ).

C.6.3

Efficiency Guarantee

Given a bipartite graph (B, S, E) and two matchings M and M 0 over the graph, a path is called
an alternating path of M ∪ M 0 if the edges on the path alternate between edges of M and M 0 . If
aK = a1 , we call it an alternating cycle. A path is maximal if it is not a sub-path of any other
path.
It is well-known that the union of two matchings in a bipartite graph can be divided into disjoint
maximal alternating paths and cycles.
Observation C.1. Given any set of nodes V and two undirected graphs G1 = (V, E1 ) and G2 =
(V, E2 ) such that in both graphs the degree of any node is at most 1 (i.e., each is a matching), it
holds that in G1,2 = (V, E1 ∪ E2 ) every node has degree at most 2 and thus G1,2 is a disjoint union
of maximal alternating paths and maximal alternating cycles.
Given a bipartite graph (V1 , V2 , E), a set U ⊆ V1 ∪ V2 of nodes is matchable if it is possible
to find a perfect matching of all of the nodes in U using edges in E. Note that if U is matchable
then |U ∩ V1 | = |U ∩ V2 |. A node weight function is a function W that assigns a weight W (i) to
any node i ∈ V1 ∪ V2 . A node-based weighted matching problem is a matching problem in which
for some node weight function W , the weight of every edge (i, j) ∈ E is the sum of the weights of
the two nodes incident on the edge, that is, W (i, j) = W (i) + W (j). The weight of a matchable
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set of nodes U is W (U ) =

P

u∈U

W (u). For a weighted matching problem, a weight-maximizing

set is a matchable set of nodes that has maximum weight, over all matchable sets. Clearly, for
any node-based weighted matching problem, the weight of any matching over the same matchable
set of nodes U is the same. Moreover, if U is a weight maximizing set, then any perfect matching
of it does not include any edge of negative weight. For our mechanisms to work, we will need to
carefully define the tie-breaking rule that will be used to choose the weight-maximizing set, as well
as the perfect matching of its elements.
Observation C.2. Fix a bipartite graph. Let WV and WV0 be two node-based weight functions for
the graph, and let M and M 0 be the two maximum weight matchings picked by the tie-breaking rule
for these two weight functions, respectively. If the sets of matched nodes of M and M 0 are the
same, then M and M 0 must be the same.
We also observe that if an agent is in the first best, by changing his bid he cannot influence the
picked matching while staying in the first best.
Observation C.3. Fix a bipartite graph. Assume that with node-based weight function W , the
maximum weight matching M is picked by the tie-breaking rule. Fix any i and let W 0 be a nodebased weight function such that W 0 (k) = W (k) for any k 6= i. Let M 0 be the the maximum weight
matching picked for W 0 . Then if i ∈ M 0 it holds that M = M 0 .
We prove the following two lemmas about VCG prices which are both useful in our proofs.
Corollary C.1. Consider the VCG mechanism with lexicographic by IDs tie-breaking rule.
If (i, j) ∈ M (b, s) for some (b, s) then for any b0i such that i trades when the bids are ((b−i , b0i ), s),
it holds that buyer i trades with j and pays Pi (b, s). Moreover, for any such b0i it holds that
b0i ≥ Pi (b, s) ≥ sj .
Similarly, if (i, j) ∈ M (b, s) for some (b, s) then for any s0j such that seller j trades when the
bids are (b, (s−j , sj )), it holds that j trades with i and pays Pj (b, s). Moreover, for any such s0j it
holds that s0j ≤ Pj (b, s) ≤ bi .
Proof. The inequality b0i ≥ Pi (b, s) holds by VCG being ex-post IR. It holds that Pi (b, s) ≥ sj as
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otherwise, if Pi (b, s) < sj then for bi s.t. Pi (b, s) < bi < sj there is an inefficient trade in M , a
contradiction. Similar arguments prove imply the claim for seller j.
Observe that M = M (b, s), M1∗ = M1∗ (b, s) and M2∗ = M2∗ (b, s) are each a maximum weighted
matching for some node based weight function, all defined over the same undirected bipartite graph
G = (S, B, E) and chosen using the same tie-breaking rule. M (b, s) is derived from the node-based
function W that assigns weight bi to any node i ∈ B and weight −sj to any node j ∈ S. Similarly,
M1∗ (b, s) is derived from the node-based function W1 that assigns weight ϕ̃i (bi ) to any node i ∈ B
and weight −sj to any node j ∈ S, where ϕ̃i (bi ) is the ironed virtual value of i when his value is bi .
Finally, M2∗ (b, s) is derived from the node-based function W2 that assigns weight bi to any node
i ∈ B and weight −τ̃j (sj ) to any node j ∈ S, where τ̃j (sj ) is the ironed virtual cost of j when his
cost is sj .
A direct corollary of Observation C.2, is that any alternating cycle in M ∪ M1∗ cannot include
more than two distinct nodes, as any such alternating cycle is actually two different matchings over
the same matchable set of nodes. We state the claim for M1∗ ; the same claim holds also for M2∗ .
Corollary C.2. Let (a1 a2 ...aK ), be an alternating cycle of M ∪ M1∗ . Then K = 3. In other words,
a1 = a3 and the undirected edge (a1 , a2 ) is in both M and in M1∗ .
For a bipartite graph (V1 , V2 , E), we say that the node-based weight function W is a V1 -weakimprovement of W 0 if for any node i ∈ V1 it holds that W (i) ≥ W 0 (i) and for any j ∈ V2 it holds
that W (j) = W 0 (j). By definition of ϕ̃ and τ̃ , we have that the node-based weight function W
used to derive M is a B-weak improvement to the node-based weight function W1 used to derive
M1∗ (and similarly, W is an S-weak improvement to the node-based weight function W2 used to
derive M2∗ ).
Lemma C.4. Fix a bipartite graph (B, S, E), and assume that the node-based weight function W
is a B-weak-improvement of W 0 . Let M and M 0 be the maximum weight matchings that are picked
by the tie-breaking rule for W and W 0 respectively. Consider a maximal alternating path of M ∪ M 0
that is not a cycle. It holds that path cannot both start and end with an edge from M 0 . Moreover,
it holds that the path (or its inverse) starts with a node in B and that the first edge belongs to M .
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Proof. Let A = (a1 a2 ...aK ) be a maximal alternating path in M ∪ M 0 that is not a cycle, and let
U be the set of nodes in the path A. W.l.o.g., if there is a a node in B on any end of the path,
it is the first in the path. Assume that the path starts and ends with an edge from M 0 . In this
case the path must have an odd number of edges (as any edge from M 0 is followed by an edge from
M ), and it starts with a node a1 ∈ B and ends with a node ak ∈ S. If W 0 (a1 ) + W 0 (ak ) < 0,
then U 0 = U \ {a1 , ak } is matchable and has higher weight than U for W 0 , a contradiction to the
maximality of M 0 . If W 0 (a1 ) + W 0 (ak ) ≥ 0 then since W is a V1 -weak-improvement of W 0 it holds
that W (a1 ) + W (ak ) ≥ W 0 (a1 ) + W 0 (ak ) ≥ 0. If W (a1 ) + W (ak ) > 0 then the matchable set U 0 has
higher weight than U with respect to W , contradicting the maximality of M . If on the other hand
W (a1 ) + W (ak ) = W 0 (a1 ) + W 0 (ak ) = 0 both U and U 0 are matchable sets of the same weight with
respect to both W and W 0 , so by set consistency of the tie breaking, both M and M 0 must have
matched the same set, a contradiction.
Now, if the path starts and ends with an edge in M , it has an odd number of edges, so it has a
node in B on one end and a node in S on the other, and as we can assume w.l.o.g. that the node
in B is first, this completes the proof.
We are left with the case that the path has an edge from M on one end, and an edge from M 0
on the other. In this case it has an even number of edges and thus either both ends are in B, or
both are in S. We prove that both are in B, completing the proof of the claim. Assume by way of
contradiction that both a1 and ak are in S. Since W is a B-weak-improvement of W 0 , for any node
j ∈ S we have W (j) = W 0 (j) and thus W (a1 ) = W 0 (a1 ) and W (ak ) = W 0 (ak ). If W (a1 ) < W (ak )
then U \ {ak } is a matchable set with higher weight than the set U \ {a1 } with respect to W ,
contradicting the optimality of M . Similarly if W 0 (a1 ) = W (a1 ) > W (ak ) = W 0 (ak ) then U \ {a1 }
is a matchable set with higher weight than the set U \ {ak } with respect to W 0 , contradicting the
optimality of M 0 . Thus it must be the case that W 0 (a1 ) = W 0 (ak ). So both matchable sets U \ {a1 }
and U \ {ak } have exactly the same weight with respect to both W and W 0 , and as the tie breaking
is weight-independent, both should have picked the same set, a contradiction.
From Lemma C.4 and Corollary C.2 we immediately get the following corollary.
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Corollary C.3. Let (a1 a2 ...aK ), be a maximal alternating path of M ∪ M1∗ . Precisely one of the
following holds:
• K = 3, a1 = a3 and the undirected edge (a1 , a2 ) ∈ M ∩ M1∗ ,

or

• (w.l.o.g.) the path starts with a buyer and an edge from M .
lemma 6.5, which plays a central role in our proof of the ex-ante guarantee of the Offering
Mechanism, provides a sufficient condition for a buyer-seller pair to trade in that mechanism. Here
we restate and prove the lemma.
Lemma C.5 (Restatement of lemma 6.5). Fix valuation profile (b, s). For every (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), if
j is in M−i (b, s) then buyer i will trade with seller j in the BO Mechanism, and if i is in M−j (b, s)
then buyer i will trade with seller j in the SO Mechanism. Thus, in each such case the edge (i, j)
will be traded with probability at least 1/2 in the Offering Mechanism.
Proof. For every pair (i, j) ∈ M (b, s), if j ∈ M−i (b, s), we have by lemma C.2 that b̄ = Pi (b, s) ≥
sj , where the inequality is by lemma C.3. Similarly, if i ∈ M−j (b, s), then s̄ = Pj (b, s) ≤ bi .
Therefore, in either case, by lemma 6.2 the edge (i, j) will be traded with probability at least 1/2
in the Offering Mechanism.
Consider a maximal alternating path that is not a cycle. lemma 6.6 shows that for every seller
j ∈ A that is not at one of the ends such a path, it holds that j ∈ M−i , where i is the buyer that
is matched to j in M . Here we restate and give the proof of the lemma.
Lemma C.6 (Restatement of lemma 6.6). Let A be a maximal alternating path of M ∪ M1∗ that is
not a cycle. For every seller j ∈ A who is not at one of the ends of the path, it holds that j ∈ M−i ,
where i is the buyer such that (i, j) ∈ M .
Proof. By corollary C.3 we can assume w.l.o.g. that A starts with a buyer and an edge in M . So,
if the path has an even number of edges, then A = (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL ) and if it is odd then
A = (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL jL ), where in either case each agent il denotes a buyer and each agent
jl denotes a seller, such that for every l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1} it holds that (il , jl ) ∈ M . If the path is
odd, it furthermore holds that (iL , jL ) ∈ M .
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We need to show that for every l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1} it holds that jl ∈ M−il . Assume for
contradiction that jl ∈
/ M−il for some l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1}. Then M−il = M \ {(il , jl )} by subset
consistency of the tie-breaking rule, and in A the matching M−il matches the set of agents4 A0 =
M ∩ (A \ {il , jl }).
If the path has an even number of edges, then iL ∈
/ A0 . To derive a contradiction we observe
that the set A00 = A0 ∪ {jl , iL } = A \ {il } is matchable (using the edges of M on the path A up to
jl−1 , and the edges of M1∗ on the path A starting from jl ), and moreover, has weight with respect
to W that is at least the weight of A0 . This holds as M1∗ matched A00 ∩ R and not A0 ∩ R for
R = {jl , il+1 , jl+1 , . . . , iL }, and the weight of iL is not lower in W than in W1 (and the weight of
jl is the same in both). So we get an contradiction as either A00 is matchable and with a higher
weight than A0 with respect to W , or they have the same weight with regard to W and the same
weight with regard to W1 , and ties were broken differently.
Next we consider the case that the path has an odd number of edges, in which case also
(iL , jL ) ∈ M . It must hold that sjl ≤ sjL as M1∗ matches A \ {i1 , jL } and not the matchable
set A \ {i1 , jl }. Recall that since jl ∈
/ M−il , then M−il = M \ {(il , jl )}, but the matchable set
A00 = A \ {il , jL } ⊆ A \ {il } has at least the weight of A0 = A \ {il , jl } with respect to W (since
sellers have the same weight in W and W1 ), so we get an contradiction as either A00 is matchable
and with a higher weight than A0 with respect to W , or they have the same weight with regard to
W and the same weight with regard to W1 , and ties were broken differently in M−il and in M1∗ .
lemma 6.7 considers such paths with an odd number of edges and present some additional
characterization that will help us in bounding the GFT of our mechanism. By Corollary C.3 we
can assume w.l.o.g. that any maximal alternating path of M ∪ M1∗ starts with a buyer and an edge
in M . Let GF TM 0 (U ) be the GFT of all edges of M 0 that are contained in U . We now restate and
prove this lemma.
Lemma C.7 (Restatement of lemma 6.7). For K > 3, let A = (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL jL ), be a
maximal alternating path of odd number of edges of M ∪ M1∗ with any agent il denoting a buyer
4. We slightly abuse notation by using A to also denote the set of agents in the path A.
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and any agent jl denoting a seller, and the first edge in M ((i1 , j1 ) ∈ M ). It holds that
• if biL > bi1 then iL ∈ M−jL .
• if biL ≤ bi1 then GF TM (A \ {iL , jL }) ≥ GF TM1∗ (A).
/ M−jL . Since
Proof. We prove that if biL > bi1 then iL ∈ M−jL . Assume for contradiction that iL ∈
the tie breaking is subset consistent, the matching picked on A \ {iL , jL } will be the same as the
one in M . Yet, the set A \ {i1 , jL } is matchable (by the edges of M1∗ ) and has higher weight than
the weight that M gets on A \ {iL , jL }, a contradiction.
We next consider the case that biL ≤ bi1 . Let w = GF TM (A) =

PL

l=1 (bil

− sil ). Notice that:

GF TM (A \ {iL , jL }) = w − (biL − siL ) ≥ w − (bi1 − siL ) = GF TM1∗ (A \ {i1 , jL }) = GF TM1∗ (A).
We are now ready to complete the proof of lemma 6.4, which states that for any valuation
profile (b, s), the gains from trade of the Offering Mechanism for matching markets is at least half
of the from trade of the RVWM mechanism for that profile.
Fix a valuation profile (b, s). To prove the claim we consider the connected components of
M (b, s) ∪ M1∗ (b, s) and show that in each connected component separately the GFT of the Offering
Mechanism in expectation (over the randomness of the mechanism), is at least half the GFT of the
RVWM mechanism on (b, s).
By observation C.1 each connected component is either a maximal alternating path or a cycle.
By corollary C.2 any cycle has only two (identical) undirected edges, denote it by (i, j) ∈ M (b, s) ∩
M1∗ (b, s). That is, the unique edge (i, j) of M1∗ = M1∗ (b, s) in this cycle is the same as the unique
edge (i, j) of M = M (b, s) in that cycle. If j ∈ M−i (b, s) or i ∈ M−j (b, s), by lemma 6.5 buyer
i will trade with seller j in the Offering Mechanism with probability at least 1/2, which obtains at
least half the GFT that the RVWM mechanism obtains on (i, j) ∈ M1∗ (b, s) when the profile is
(b, s). Otherwise, since i ∈
/ M−j we have that s̄ ≥ bi , and since j ∈
/ M−i we have that b̄ ≤ sj . Since
trade occurs with positive probability on (i, j) in the RVWM mechanism, then by observation 6.1,
in this case the GFT of the RVWM mechanism on this edge are therefore at least those of the
RO mechanism with SO parameters ∞ (no constraint) and DbBi (unconditioned distribution) and
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BO parameters 0 (no constraint) and DsSj (unconditioned distribution) on (i, j). Since s̄ ≥ bi and
b̄ ≤ sj , we have by lemma 6.2 that the probability that trade occurs between i and j is at least
as high in our Offering Mechanism (which runs the appropriate RO mechanism, constrained and
conditioned) as it is in the unconstrained and unconditioned RO mechanism (that upper-bounds
the GFT of RVWM on this edge). Therefore, in this case our Offering Mechanism achieves at least
the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism on this edge (and therefore, on any alternating
cycle).
By corollary C.3, any other maximal alternating path of is not a cycle, and is a path starts or
ends with a buyer and an edge from M . We will assume w.l.o.g. that it start with a buyer and an
edge from M , and we consider such paths of even and odd numbers of edges separately. Note that
Corollary C.3 implies that there is no connected component that does not include at least one edge
from M , so by going over all connected components with at least two edges, we cover all the edges
of M1∗ .
If the number of edges in the path is even, by lemma 6.6, M matches every seller j in the
path to some buyer i, and for any such pair (i, j) it holds that j ∈ M−i . By lemma 6.5 buyer i
will trade with seller j in the BO Mechanism, so whenever the BO mechanism runs, the maximal
GFT (first best) of that connected component, which is at least the GFT of the M1∗ mechanism for
that connected component, will be obtained. The Offering Mechanism runs the BO mechanism is
probability 1/2, so in expectation it obtains at least 1/2 the GFT of M1∗ for this path.
We next consider the case that the number of edges in the path is odd and at least 3.5 Let the
path be A = (i1 j1 i2 j2 ...iL−1 jL−1 iL jL ) for some L ≥ 2. By lemma 6.6, for any l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1}
it holds that jl ∈ M−il . Next, we use lemma 6.5 again. We consider two cases, using lemma 6.7.
• If biL > bi1 then iL ∈ M−jL . In this case all edges of M will each be traded with probability
at least 1/2 in the Offering Mechanisms, so in expectation it obtains at least 1/2 the GFT of
M in this path and thus also at least 1/2 the GFT of M1∗ in this path A.
• If on the other hand biL ≤ bi1 then GF TM (A \ {iL , jL }) ≥ GF TM1∗ (A). Therefore, since every
5. As noted, if there is a single edge, it is only in M . We only need to cover edges in M1∗ .
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edge (il , jl ) for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1} is traded with probability 1/2 in the Offering Mechanisms,
we have that in expectation the Offering Mechanism obtains in this path A at least 1/2 of the
GFT of M1∗ in this path A.
We conclude that the Offering Mechanisms obtains at least 1/2 the GFT that the RVWM
mechanism gets on M1∗ . Similar arguments show that the Offering Mechanisms obtains at least 1/2
the GFT of the RVWM mechanism gets on M2∗ . Thus the Offering Mechanisms, obtains at least
1/4

the total GFT of M1∗ and M2∗ . The expected GFT of the RVWM mechanism is the average

GFT of M1∗ and of M2∗ . We conclude that the Offering Mechanisms obtains at least 1/2 the GFT
of the RVWM mechanism.

C.7

The Hybrid Mechanism for Matching Markets: Proofs

In this section, we prove theorem 6.8.

Ex-post IR, ex-post (direct trade) weakly budget balanced

They directly come from the

fact that both the TR mechanism and Offering Mechanism are ex-post IR and ex-post (direct trade)
weakly budget balanced.

Bayesian IC Lemma C.8 proves that after combining the two mechanisms, the hybrid mechanism
is still a BIC mechanism.
Lemma C.8. The hybrid mechanism for matching markets is BIC.
Proof. We will prove that the Hybrid Mechanism is BIC for the seller. A similar argument holds
for the buyer. For each seller j with cost sj , suppose she misreports her cost to be s0j 6= sj . We
will show that taking expectation over other agents’ valuation profile b, s−j , the expected utility
of sj when reporting truthfully is at least the expected utility of seller j with true cost sj when
reporting s0j . We consider three cases:
• First, consider the case where when seller j reports sj , then she is in the first-best and the
TR Mechanism is run. In this case, we note that if seller j misreports to s0j , then either the
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first-best is unchanged (and so the TR is still run) or j is no longer in the first-best. In the
former case, seller j does not profit since by theorem 6.6 the TR Mechanism is ex-post IC,
and in the latter case seller j does not profit as she gets utility 0.
• Now, consider the case where when seller j reports sj , then she is in the first-best and the
Offering Mechanism is run with an offer on the edge (i, j). Similarly to above, we note that
if j misreports to s0j , then either the first-best is unchanged (and so the Offering Mechanism
is still run) or j is no longer in the first-best, and has 0 utility. In particular, j cannot cause
the TR mechanism to run without getting 0 utility. Also note that for the same reason, for
every report of buyer i that keeps (i, j) in the first best, the Offering Mechanism is still run,
and so it is enough to show truthfulness of j in expectation over all such reports of buyer i,
and we have shown precisely that in claim C.8 using lemma 6.1. So, we have that when j has
cost sj such that there exists b, s−j such that the Offering Mechanism is run with an offer
on the edge (i, j), then in expectation over all such b, s−j , it is the case that sj cannot gain
from misreporting.
• Finally, consider the case where when seller j reports sj , then she is not in the first-best. In
this case, regardless of the mechanism that is actually run when j reports sj , her outcome
reporting sj would have been the same under both mechanisms. So, since we have shown
that when j is not in the first-best, truthtelling is ex-post IC in both mechanisms, we have
that this implies that truthfulness is ex-post IC for seller j in the hybrid mechanism in this
case.
Ex-post efficiency guarantee Whenever α(b, s) ≥ 1/2, the hybrid mechanism run TR mechanism. The ex-post guarantee directly comes from Claim C.3.
Ex-ante efficiency guarantee Let (b, s) be a profile. If α(b, s) ≥ 21 , the hybrid mechanism runs
the Trading Reduction mechanism, which achieves at least 1/2-fraction of the first-best gains from
trade. This is at least 1/2-fraction the gains from trade of the RVWM mechanism. If α(b, s) < 12 ,
the hybrid mechanism runs the Offering Mechanism, which by lemma 6.4 achieves at least a 1/2-
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fraction of the GFT of the RVWM mechanism for this profile. So, for any profile the hybrid
mechanism achieves at least a 1/2-fraction of the GFT of the RVWM mechanism for this profile,
and so by theorem 6.4, it achieves at least a 1/4-fraction of the GFT of the second-best mechanism,
as required.
Proof of corollary 6.2. Since β(b, s) ≤ α(b, s) (see the proof of corollary 6.1), we have that in this
case also α(b, s) ≥ 1/2, and so the hybrid mechanism runs the TR mechanism for matching markets,
and so the claim following via corollary 6.1.
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Appendix D

Missing Details from Chapter 7
D.1

Missing Details from Section 7.3

Proof of Lemma 7.2:
For every i, s, bi , define


1
−1
−1 1
qi (bi , s) = (bi − si ) · Pr [i ∈ S (b, s)] · 1 Fi ( j−1 ) ≤ si ≤ Fi ( j ) .
b−i
2
2
∗

+

Then we have that qi (bi , s) ≥ 0 is non-decreasing in bi , as both bi − si and the probability Prb−i [i ∈
S ∗ (b, s)] is non-decreasing in bi .
Since θij =

−1
Fi ( 21j )

h

and Prbi bi ≥

−1
Fi ( 21j )

i

=

1
2

h

Prbi bi ≥ Fi

−1

i
( 2j−1 ) , we have
1

Ebi [qi (bi , s) · 1 [bi ≥ θij ]] ≥qi (θij , s) · Pr [bi ≥ θij ]
bi


1
−1
=qi (θij , s) · Pr Fi ( j−1 ) ≤ bi < θij
bi
2



1
−1
≥Ebi qi (bi , s) · 1 Fi ( j−1 ) ≤ bi < θij .
2
Thus we have

271

(D.1)
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(Inequality (D.1))
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1
G−1
i ( 2j ). We have
dlog( r2 )e

2 ≤

P

j=1

Eb,s

hP

i
+ · 1[i ∈ S ∗ (b, s) ∧ E 0 ] .
(b
−
s
)
i
ij
i i

272

Fix any j. For every i, b, si , define


∗

+

qi (b, si ) = (bi − si ) · Pr [i ∈ S (b, s)] · 1
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1
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i ( j)
2



≤ bi ≤
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i ( j−1 )
2

.
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Thus we have
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Similarly,
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